



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Library of the University of Michigan
The 'Goyl' Collection.

Miss Jean L. Goyl
of Detroit
of her brother
Henry Goyl
1894.

DA

70

AI

V.7

PUBLICATIONS
OF THE
NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

VOL. VII.

DISCOURSES OF THE NAVY

TWO

Discourses of the Navy

1638 AND 1659

BY JOHN HOLLOND

ALSO

A DISCOURSE OF THE NAVY

1660

BY SIR ROBERT SLYNGESBIE

EDITED BY

J. R. TANNER, M.A.

FELLOW, ASSISTANT TUTOR, AND HISTORICAL LECTURER AT
ST JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

MDCCCXCVI

PUBLICATIONS
OF THE
NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

VOL. VII.

DISCOURSES OF THE NAVY

TWO

Discourses of the Navy

1638 AND 1659

BY JOHN HOLLOND

ALSO

A DISCOURSE OF THE NAVY

1660

BY SIR ROBERT SLYNGESBIE

EDITED BY

J. R. TANNER, M.A.

FELLOW, ASSISTANT TUTOR, AND HISTORICAL LECTURER AT
ST JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

MDCCCXCVI

Dedicated

TO THE MEMORY OF

SIR JOHN ROBERT SEELEY

K.C.M.G.

SOMETIME REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

165647

THE COUNCIL

OF THE

NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

1896-7

PATRONS

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG AND GOTHA,
K.G., K.T., &c.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK, K.G., &c.

PRESIDENT

EARL SPENCER, K.G.

VICE-PRESIDENTS

ADMIRAL SIR R. V. HAMILTON,
G.C.B.
MARQUIS OF LOTHIAN, K.T.

SIR CLEMENTS R. MARKHAM,
K.C.B., F.R.S.
EARL OF NORTHBROOK, G.C.S.I.

COUNCILLORS

LIEUT.-COL. EUSTACE BALFOUR.
REAR-ADMIRAL SIR FREDERICK
BEDFORD, K.C.B.
HON. T. A. BRASSEY.
OSCAR BROWNING.
PROFESSOR MONTAGU BURROWS.
J. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, M.P.
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. CLARKE,
G.C.M.G.
LIEUT.-COL. SIR GEORGE CLARKE,
K.C.M.G., F.R.S.
VICE-ADMIRAL COLOMB.
LIEUT.-COL. L. EDYE.
ADMIRAL SIR EDWARD FAN-
SHAW, G.C.B.

J. R. DASENT, C.B.
DR. FRANCIS ELGAR, F.R.S.
CAPT. H. H. GRENFELL, R.N.
SIDNEY LEE.
SIR ALFRED C. LYALL, K.C.B.
REAR-ADML. A. H. MARKHAM.
HON. SIR R. MEADE, K.C.B.
COMM. C. N. ROBINSON, R.N.
B. F. STEVENS.
J. R. THURSFIELD.
H. SEYMOUR TROWER.
REAR-ADMIRAL WHARTON, C.B.,
F.R.S.
CAPTAIN S. EARDLEY WILMOT,
R.N.

SECRETARY

PROFESSOR J. K. LAUGHTON, King's College, London, W.C.

TREASURER

H. F. R. YORKE, Admiralty, S.W.

The COUNCIL of the NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY wish it to be distinctly understood that they are not answerable for any opinions or observations that may appear in the Society's publications. For these the responsibility rests entirely with the Editors of the several works.

INTRODUCTION.

JOHN HOLLOND, the author of the two tracts on the abuses of the navy which form the principal part of this volume, appears to have entered the service about 1624¹ as clerk to Captain Joshua Downing, who resided at Chatham as assistant to the commissioners of the navy.² He so far gave satisfaction in this capacity that in November 1626, and again in May of the following year, Downing recommended him for a purser's place.³ In November 1628 he appears to have applied for the post of clerk of the check at Portsmouth, in succession to Matthew Brooke, who had held the office since 1616.⁴ It was now reported of Brooke that he 'hath been long sick, and cannot continue,' and Hollond managed to secure, probably by purchase, the recommendation

¹ When Hollond wrote the First Discourse in 1638 he had been fourteen years in the navy (p. 3, *infra*).

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1628-9, p. 454. See also p. 99, *infra*.

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1625-6, p. 480; 1627-8, p. 185.

⁴ Historical MSS. Commission, *Twelfth Report*, i. 370.

of Brooke's wife and son, which was duly transmitted to Sir John Coke¹ through Kenrick Edisbury, at that time paymaster, and afterwards surveyor of the navy. In spite of this he did not obtain the office, for two months later Downing and Edisbury were recommending him to the Lords of the Admiralty 'for employment as an inferior clerk or purser,'² and it is clear that the clerkship of the check fell to one John Brooke, in all probability himself the son in question,³ whom his father had asked to have associated with him before his death.⁴

Hollond's next appearance is in 1635, as paymaster of the navy.⁵ Edisbury had become surveyor in December 1632,⁶ and it is not unlikely that he may have obtained the reversion of the office of paymaster which he then vacated for his *protégé*, whose promotion was therefore more than usually rapid. The treasurer of the navy at the time was Sir William Russell, who, after holding the office from 1618 to 1627, had succeeded to it again in 1630.⁷

In his capacity of paymaster, Hollond once more came across John Brooke, the successor to the clerkship of the check at Portsmouth which he had once coveted. In March 1635, being at Portsmouth to pay the ordinary, he received information of an abuse by Brooke in selling a cook's place. Although officials constantly sold their own places, it was a different matter to take a large commission for selling other people's, and Hollond

¹ See note 2 on p. 118, *infra*.

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1628-9, p. 454.

³ *Ibid.* 1629-31, p. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1627-8, p. 527.

⁵ *Ibid.* 1635, p. 2.

⁶ *E. H. R.* ix. 475.

⁷ Index to Pipe Office Declared Accounts.

at once informed Sir Henry Palmer, the comptroller, and directed a stay of Brooke's wages.¹ Brooke, who was described by his enemies as a 'violent person,' thereupon vowed vengeance against Hollond, and the quarrel seems to have prolonged itself through the whole of the summer; eventually, however, Brooke was dismissed from his post, and suffered an imprisonment of five weeks, procured by the influence of the principal officers. Soon after his liberation, in December 1635, he launched a series of accusations against the officers,² not wholly unlike those that were afterwards brought, in 1651, against the family of the Petts. His general charge was that the officers made a private profit out of the King's business, but in particular that, the better to compass this end, they were leagued together in a kind of family alliance. All 'power of execution in the navy' had 'grown' 'into a particular hand.' Sir William Russell is treasurer; Mr. Edisbury, 'sometime his servant,' is surveyor; Mr. Hollond, Mr. Edisbury's servant, is paymaster; Mr. Short, who was Mr. Edisbury's servant, is clerk of the check at Chatham; his kinsman, Mr. John Edisbury, is now clerk of the check at Portsmouth; his servant, Mr. Hayward, 'who married his kinswoman,' is disposer of the moneys and clerk of the survey at Portsmouth; 'other offices and officers are either engaged agents to them, or are, like the petitioner, expelled or in disgrace.'³ The character of the principal officers of the time was by no means above suspicion,⁴ and

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 2.

² *Ibid.* p. 562.

³ *Ibid.* p. 562.

⁴ *E. H. R.* ix. 476-7.

the charges may very well have been true, especially as only the year before, Palmer, the comptroller, Denis Fleming, the clerk of the acts, and Phineas Pett, another principal officer, had been suspended for selling Government stores for their own profit.¹ The coincidence of persons suggests that Hollond may have had a grudge against Brooke for being the means of depriving him of promotion in 1628, and thus his vigilance on behalf of the navy may have been encouraged by motives not of the higher order.

Within a twelvemonth of Hollond's original complaint against Brooke, a charge was made against the treasurer's office which, as far as it goes, serves to confirm the impression that there was some kind of ring among the officials. On April 12, 1636, Augustine Boate, keeper of the out-stores at Chatham, complained to the Lords of the Admiralty that though the former commissioners of the navy established in 1618 had allowed him 20*l.* per diem, since the principal officers returned to power in 1628 he had had only 20*l.* per annum; and lately, Mr. Hollond, 'who pays under Sir W. Russell,' had on his own authority withheld his 'yearly means' altogether, though his bill was made out as formerly, 'and signed by all the officers.'² The Lords of the Admiralty referred the matter to the principal officers, and Sir William Russell made answer (1) that the petitioner was a pluralist, being purser of the Unicorn as well as keeper of the out-stores at Chatham, and had never personally per-

¹ *E. H. R.* ix. 476, note 16.

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 365.

formed the duties of the latter office; and (2) that no warrant appointing him to the post had ever been procured from the admiralty, his pay for the last two years having been given to him on the faith of an unfulfilled promise from his father, the previous holder of the office, that a regular warrant would be obtained.¹ This explanation was not accepted, and on June 2, 1636, the Lords of the Admiralty ordered the officers to pay Boate's arrears, and to continue him in his office in succession to his father.²

Not long after Boate's case had been decided, certain irregularities came to light in the treasurer's office, in which the paymaster was personally involved, although there is no reason to think that any more serious responsibility rests upon Hollond than that of continuing the dubious but lucrative practices of his predecessors.

In March 1636 the Earl of Northumberland had been appointed admiral of the ship-money fleet raised to assert the sovereignty of the seas. He was at this time full of zeal for the service, and six months' actual experience of it led him to present to the King, in or about October, a statement of abuses in the navy, embodied in thirteen articles. A court of inquiry was held, which examined Mervin, Rainborow, Penington, and others, whose testimony confirmed in the concrete what Northumberland had asserted in general terms. The testimony of

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 389.

² *Ibid.* p. 530. Boate's name appears in a marginal note to one of the MSS. of the First Discourse as one of those who received excessive rewards for their service (see p. 55, *infra*).

the captains, the answers of the officials accused, and the order eventually taken by the King in council, are printed in the Appendix to this volume.¹ These papers confirm in some points the statements made by Hollond in the Discourses, but they have also a special biographical interest, for Hollond himself, as paymaster, was one of the incriminated officials. It was pointed out by Northumberland in his ninth article² that the paymaster was in the habit of refusing to pay men turned over from other ships unless they brought with them tickets from the ships where they had first served, and evidence was adduced to show that this had lately 'grown a grievance' among the seamen.

The replies submitted by the treasurer of the navy and his paymaster on this point³ are a sufficient defence, and throw the responsibility for miscarriages upon the ignorance or carelessness of the pursers; but in meeting the other accusations they were not so successful. The tenth article⁴ accused Hollond of refusing to pay tickets except 'to the parties themselves unto whom the money is due,' and to the charge itself he was able to give a satisfactory answer,⁵ but two of the witnesses asserted that the paymaster had in some cases paid absent parties, apparently for a 'gratification,'⁶ and no denial of this appears in the case for the defence. The thirteenth article⁷ also contained an accusation

¹ P. 361, *infra*.

² P. 385. On the ticket system, see note 1 on p. 129.

³ Pp. 392 and 397.

⁴ P. 386.

⁵ Pp. 393 and 397.

⁶ Pp. 386-7.

⁷ P. 387.

of a more serious kind, and to this the plea was practically one of guilty. It was the practice for the paymaster to stop out of the seamen's wages any moneys that they might owe for clothes, drink, or advances, for the benefit of their creditors, and to charge for this service a commission of 2s. in the pound for the benefit of himself. Robert Halsted, the contractor for clothes, asserted that he had paid to Hollond 200l. 'for stopping of money due unto him from the common men for clothes, sold to them in the time of the last employment,'¹ and he even went so far as to attribute to these commissions the exorbitant prices of the clothes he sold.² It was said also that an officer in the Assurance 'upon occasion lending 40l. among the ship's company,'³ was forced to pay 2s. in the pound for his own money before he could get it charged against the wages of the men. The only defence offered by the treasurer and his paymaster was that the poundage had been collected by Hollond's predecessors in office 'by the space of thirty years past without complaint.'⁴ Such a defence, though it might do for the officials, was not accepted by the ultimate authorities. The matter eventually came before the King in council, and on March 16, 1637, measures were taken for the remedy of the abuses complained of. Amongst other things it was ordered 'that the paymaster shall not presume any more to abate or take to himself 2s. of the pound, or any other sum of any seaman's or

¹ P. 388.² *Ibid.*³ *Ibid.*⁴ Pp. 394 and 398.

mariner's wages, for collecting any sum for their creditors, or upon any pretence whatsoever.' ¹

Though on this point the action of the council was sufficiently decided, Northumberland appears to have been greatly dissatisfied with the result of his indictment against the administration of the navy. 'This proceeding,' he wrote to Strafford, 'hath brought me to a resolution not to trouble myself any more with endeavouring a reformation unless I be commanded to it.' ²

So far it is clear that Hollond's iniquities were of the minor order only. His official superior, Sir William Russell, had been fully informed of all the acts for which he was called in question; he had joined heartily in the defence of his paymaster; and in some matters he had acknowledged that Hollond was acting under direct instructions from himself. Moreover, the precedents of the office had served to salve the official conscience. But while we can acquit Hollond of any deliberate intention to defraud, the high moral tone of the First Discourse, written in 1638, seems a little incongruous when we know that its author had been found guilty of unjustifiable exactions in 1637.

From the date of the First Discourse to the Civil War we hear nothing of Hollond, and the only allusion to him in the State Papers—unless indeed it is a case of mistaken identity—is not entirely to his credit as the moralist of the navy. Russell's treasurership continued down to the outbreak of the war, and although from 1639 to 1641 he was dividing the office and its emoluments with

¹ P. 404, *infra*.

² *Dictionary of National Biography*.

the younger Vane,¹ there is no reason to suppose that he changed his paymaster. It is clear from the First Discourse² that at the time when it was written its author was holding an official post in the navy; and it is clear from the Second Discourse³ that both before his last period of service as a commissioner and after his final withdrawal from the navy, Hollond was associated with a partner in the timber trade. But the State Papers show⁴ that in September 1639 Sir William Russell took up for the use of the navy 'about 270 loads of timber and plank in Essex of the goods of Thomas Brown and John Hollond.' Thus, if it is not unreasonable to assume that there were not two men of the same name both trading in timber, and that Hollond, who was Russell's paymaster in September 1638, was occupying the same office in September 1639, the high tone taken in the Second Discourse concerning trading by commissioners of the navy⁵ is somewhat inconsistent with the former position of the author as a trading paymaster.

On the outbreak of the Civil War the control of the navy passed in the first instance to parliamentary committees. Subordinate to these was a financial board—the 'commissioners of the navy and customs'—and a body called the 'commissioners of the navy,' which discharged the functions of the principal officers other than the treasurer.⁶ The post of lord high admiral was at first occupied by the Earl of Warwick. The commissioners of the navy, ap-

¹ Signet Office Docquet Book, and *E. H. R.* ix. 475.

² P. 66, *infra*.

³ Pp. 209, 217, 220, 312.

⁴ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1639, p. 525.

⁵ Pp. 309-23, *infra*.

⁶ *E. H. R.* ix. 480.

pointed by an ordinance of September 15, 1642, at a salary of 200*l.* a year each,¹ were Richard Crandley, John Morris, and Roger Tweedy, and to these John Hollond was soon after added.² He continued to act in this capacity until 1645 or 1646,³ when he resigned, perhaps in consequence of differences with his colleagues,⁴ and reverted once more to the timber trade. But his retirement was not destined to be of long duration, for early in 1649 he was appointed to two posts of considerable importance. By an act of January 16, 1648–9,⁵ a new commission or 'committee of merchants' was appointed to regulate the navy and customs,⁶ consisting of nineteen persons, of whom John Hollond was one; and soon after, by the good offices of this commission, he was

¹ *Commons' Journals*, iv. 390.

² A letter of December 10, 1644 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1644–5, p. 223), written by the parliamentary committee of the navy to the navy commissioners, shows that Hollond was then acting with Crandley, Morris, and Tweedy as a commissioner of the navy; a reference in the Second Discourse (p. 139 *infra*) carries his appointment back to 1643; and although no mention is made of his name in any of the official documents, it is quite possible that he became a commissioner as early as 1642. As Russell ceased to be treasurer in that year, and was succeeded by Vane, Hollond's appointment as paymaster naturally lapsed, and although most of the navy officials remained faithful to the Parliament, and not many vacancies occurred, an officer of experience and energy was too valuable to be passed over. The fact that the appointment is not noticed in the Signet Office Docquet Books is explained by its not being a royal appointment; its absence from the Declared Accounts of the Audit and Pipe Offices only shows that it was an extra commissionership, and not one charged upon the navy accounts.

³ Hollond's total period of service as a commissioner was seven years (p. 312, *infra*). His second term was nearly four years (see *infra*); thus his first was about three. He was probably acting as late as September 1645 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1645–7, p. 168).

⁴ See p. lxiv, *infra*.

⁵ Scobell, ii. 2.

⁶ See note 3 on p. 122, *infra*.

'promoted to be surveyor of the navy'¹ (and therefore a commissioner *ex officio*) in succession to William Batten, who had revolted from the service of the Parliament in 1648. His salary of 300*l.* a year dates from February 16, 1648-9.²

Hollond soon fell out with the committee of merchants, and in the Second Discourse he gives a most unfavourable account of their actions and motives;³ but his membership of the new commission of the navy made a much larger demand upon his time and energies. This commission was the most active and efficient part of the best navy organisation England had yet seen. On the abolition of the kingship in 1649, a complete reconstruction of the administration had taken place. (1) Warwick's appointment as lord high admiral was cancelled by an ordinance of February 23, 1649,⁴ and the office was conferred on the Council of State, which appointed a committee of council to discharge its functions. The soul of this admiralty committee was the younger Vane, the treasurer of the navy, while three Puritan colonels, Jones, Purefoy, and Wauton, were active members. The committee had its own salaried clerk, Robert Coytmor, who was paid 100*l.* a year, and 50*l.* a year extra on the understanding that neither he nor his subordinate received fees; it also had its own messenger, Richard Blackden, at 30*l.* a year, and a

¹ P. 121, *infra*.

² Pipe Office Declared Accounts, Roll 2287.

³ Pp. 120-4, *infra*.

⁴ *E. H. R.* xi. 57. This was his second appointment. He had resigned in April 1645, and had been again appointed on May 29, 1648.

doorkeeper, Robert Tutnell, at 20*l.* a year.¹ (2) As the Council of State was represented in naval affairs by the admiralty committee, so Parliament continued to be represented as heretofore by a parliamentary committee of the navy, which claimed, and on occasion exercised, supreme authority. The membership of this committee² varied from time to time. At first it consisted of no less than thirty-seven members,³ five of whom were also members of the Council of State, and of these five, three—Denis Bond, Sir William Masham, and Colonel Valentine Wauton—were also members of the admiralty committee. To these authorities must be added (3) the temporary committee of merchants described above, which, however, took no important part in administration, and was dissolved in 1654;⁴ and (4) the navy commissioners, John Hollond, Thomas Smith, Peter Pett, Robert Thompson, and William Willoughby, who attended to the details of building, repairing, cleaning, and victualling the ships, and to the difficult business of providing them with men. There were also (5) the three generals at sea, Popham, Deane, and Blake, appointed February 27, 1649,⁵ who by their advice practically determined the distribution and movements of ships. (6) The ordnance was managed by a separate committee of the Council of State.⁶

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1649–50, pp. xxi–xxiii.

² *Ibid.* xxiii.

³ To these Mr. Allen and Colonel Purefoy were added on February 10, and Colonel Blake and Mr. Popham on February 12, 1649.

⁴ *E. H. R.* xi. 57.

⁵ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1649–50, p. 23.

⁶ The account given here of the constitution of the naval administration in 1649 remains true for Hollond's period of office. For subsequent changes, see *E. H. R.* xi. 57, 58.

Of these various bodies, the navy commissioners, though not the most dignified, were in practice the most important, and upon their exertions the efficiency of the navy largely depended. Mr. Oppenheim describes to us the admirable way in which they discharged the trust committed to them. It was upon them that the 'brunt of administrative work and responsibility fell,' and they 'laboured with an attention to the minutest details of their daily duties, a personal eagerness to ensure perfection, and a broad sense of their ethical relation towards the seamen and workmen, of whom they were at once the employers and protectors, with a success the admiralty never attained before, and has never equalled since.'¹ This feeling for the 'poor seamen' in particular is specially conspicuous in Hollond's Discourses, and there is no reason to write it down as hypocrisy. But that these genuine virtues were compatible with a certain sober regard for the personal interests of the commissioners, the Second Discourse suggests, and our knowledge of human nature confirms.

It is difficult to say exactly what share of the credit for the excellent work done by the navy commission is due to Hollond. His membership of that body does not extend over the most active period of the interregnum—the period of the Dutch War—and the most valuable services were those rendered by Nehemiah Bourne and Francis Willoughby, both of them soldiers, who joined the commission in 1653, after Hollond had ceased to

¹ *E. H. R.* xi. 58.

act.¹ Mr. Oppenheim speaks of him as the 'least active of the commissioners,'² but there are a good many evidences of his activity among the State Papers. In August 1649, Hollond and Thompson were selected by the Council of State to go down to Yarmouth with full powers to hold an inquiry into a mutiny on board the *Tiger* frigate.³ In January 1650, he and Peter Pett were summoned before the admiralty committee and consulted 'with reference to the building of the six frigates.'⁴ In May of the same year the same body ordered the attendance of 'the navy commissioners, or any two of them, of whom John Hollond is to be one,' about 'extraordinary occasions.'⁵ The natural, though not the inevitable, inference is that his judgment was regarded as of special value. In June he was engaged under the admiralty committee in superintending the pressing of men for the *Garland*;⁶ and on July 4 he was present as a representative of the navy commission at a meeting of the admiralty committee, at which measures were being debated for supplying the want of men on board the fleet at Lisbon.⁷ In 1652 he was entrusted with the duty of preparing reports for the Council of State relating to the payment of the wages of the ordnance officers and others employed in the Tower.⁸

But these are minor matters. In 1652 Hollond

¹ *E. H. R.* xi. 58. Bourne had been a seaman and a ship's carpenter before he joined the parliamentary army (Winthrop, *History of New England*, ed. 1853, ii. 245, 265, 452), and he had actually commanded the *Speaker* (*E. H. R.* xi. 58).

² *Ibid.* 59, note.

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1649-50, p. 267.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 473.

⁵ *Ibid.* 1650, p. 135.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 205.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 233.

⁸ *Ibid.* 1652-3, p. 99.

took a leading part in the discussion of a question of the first importance which came up then for consideration. The indestructible family of Petts had survived the special inquiry into the charges brought against them in November 1651,¹ but individual members of the famous clan were not exempt from the common lot of man. In the summer of 1652, Peter Pett of Deptford, the cousin of Peter Pett the navy commissioner, died, leaving a vacancy in the master shipwright's place at Deptford.² Among the applicants for the post was Christopher Pett, Commissioner Pett's younger brother, who was at the time assistant master shipwright at Woolwich. Hollond, who may have been actuated by hostility to the Pett ring, or perhaps by higher motives, at once took up his parable in a vigorous paper,³ dated August 9, 1652, which, though addressed in the first instance to his fellow-commissioners, ultimately reached the hands of the Council of State.⁴ In this he calls attention to the 'great damage that has so long attended the service by permitting the master shipwright to keep a private yard,' and points out the facilities offered by the system for 'abusing the State in timber, plank, masts, deals,' and other commodities used in both the State's and private yards; the 'like latitude' 'in the point of men serving the State, who, though borne on the State's yard or ships,' may yet work in the private yards; and the evils resulting from the double claim on the master shipwright's

¹ *D. N. B.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1651-2, p. 362. There is also a copy among the Pepysian MSS. (*Miscellanies*, iii. 382).

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 367, 413.

attention, and his frequent absence from the State & part in order to superintend his work. It is probable that for the future Holland suggests that Peter's successor should be invited to dwell in the State's house in the yard and be restrained from keeping a private yard. It would be better to give him only a year than to continue at his pleasure from his duty the work of the men and the well-being of that work which depending upon his care. The family influence of the Peto was strong enough to secure the appointment in Christopher Peto. Whether any conditions were attached to the appointment preventing him from keeping a private yard, we do not know.

Holland's paper concerning the master shipwright's place, which was, at any rate, evidence of zeal for the service, appears to have come finally before the Council of State on September 23, 1652.¹ It is surprising to find in the *Commons' Journals*, under date December 29, an entry of his discharge from his place.² The circumstances are not fully explained, as we have only Holland's own account of the matter. In the Second Discourse, where his tone is usually too virtuous to be convincing, he traces his misfortune generally to his own superior conscientiousness. 'I did endeavour,' he writes,³ 'to do the State that right that became my trust; but I found such cold comfort therein, and so many discouragements from some that acted with me and others that were above me, and should have protected me, that I thought it my wisdom to

¹ *Cul. S. P. Dom.* 1651-2, p. 413.

² *Commons' Journals*, vii. 237.

³ P. 241, *infra*.

decline the service wholly, rather than to contract the odium of all sorts of men upon me, and hazard the ruin of myself and family by endeavouring to do the State faithful service.' In another place,¹ however, he descends to particulars, and explains how, through his steadfast refusal to obey the 'positive orders' issued from time to time by the admiralty commission to the commission of the navy, he 'contracted the frowns and secret underminings of many then in power;' more especially, his refusal to sign and seal the victualling contract of 1650 'as it was then and there sent engrossed, without alteration,' so infuriated the contractors that they 'by their influence never left till they had totally wearied and almost worried' him 'out of the navy.'² It is not necessary to regard Hollond as wholly a martyr to his own integrity, but that his resignation was voluntary, at any rate in form, and that the contractors had a hand in bringing it about, is proved by evidence from other sources. The 'day's proceedings' of the Council of State for December 4, 1652,³ contain a minute referring to the admiralty committee for consideration and report 'the complaint brought by Captain Limbery against Mr. Hollond, a navy commissioner.' Captain Limbery was one of the victuallers,⁴ but Major. Thompson, one of Hollond's own colleagues, was associated with him in these accusations.⁵ Before any official action had been taken which could possibly be regarded as a decision against Hollond, he himself

¹ P. 295, *infra*.

² P. 296.

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652-3, p. 8.

⁴ See note on p. 158, *infra*.

⁵ *S. P. Dom. Interr.* xxix. 135.

attention, and his frequent absences from the State's yard in order to superintend his own. To remedy this for the future, Hollond suggests that Peter Pett's successor 'should be limited to dwell in the State's house in the yard, and be restrained from keeping a private yard.' 'It would be better to give him 1,000*l.* a year than to connive at his absence from his duty, the work of the men and the well-doing of that work wholly depending upon his care.' The family influence of the Petts was strong enough to secure the appointment for Christopher Pett. Whether any conditions were attached to the appointment, preventing him from keeping a private yard, we do not know.

Hollond's paper concerning the master shipwright's place, which was, at any rate, evidence of zeal for the service, appears to have come finally before the Council of State on September 23, 1652.¹ It is surprising to find in the *Commons' Journals*, under date December 29, an entry of his discharge from his place.² The circumstances are not fully explained, as we have only Hollond's own account of the matter. In the Second Discourse, where his tone is usually too virtuous to be convincing, he traces his misfortune generally to his own superior conscientiousness. 'I did endeavour,' he writes,³ 'to do the State that right that became my trust; but I found such cold comfort therein, and so many discouragements from some that acted with me and others that were above me, and should have protected me, that I thought it my wisdom to

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1651-2, p. 413.

² *Commons' Journals*, vii. 237.

³ P. 241, *infra*.

decline the service wholly, rather than to contract the odium of all sorts of men upon me, and hazard the ruin of myself and family by endeavouring to do the State faithful service.' In another place,¹ however, he descends to particulars, and explains how, through his steadfast refusal to obey the 'positive orders' issued from time to time by the admiralty commission to the commission of the navy, he 'contracted the frowns and secret underminings of many then in power;' more especially, his refusal to sign and seal the victualling contract of 1650 'as it was then and there sent engrossed, without alteration,' so infuriated the contractors that they 'by their influence never left till they had totally wearied and almost worried' him 'out of the navy.'² It is not necessary to regard Hollond as wholly a martyr to his own integrity, but that his resignation was voluntary, at any rate in form, and that the contractors had a hand in bringing it about, is proved by evidence from other sources. The 'day's proceedings' of the Council of State for December 4, 1652,³ contain a minute referring to the admiralty committee for consideration and report 'the complaint brought by Captain Limbery against Mr. Hollond, a navy commissioner.' Captain Limbery was one of the victuallers,⁴ but Major. Thompson, one of Hollond's own colleagues, was associated with him in these accusations.⁵ Before any official action had been taken which could possibly be regarded as a decision against Hollond, he himself

¹ P. 295, *infra*.

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652-3, p. 8.

⁵ *S. P. Dom. Interr.* xxix. 135.

² P. 296.

⁴ See note on p. 158, *infra*.

wrote a letter to the commissioners of the navy, dated December 15, in which he declined to act with them any longer.¹ After referring to the fact that he had received notice of the charges against him on December 6, he continues very much in the style of the Second Discourse :

‘ Before my receipt thereof you may remember I besought the council in your presence to dismiss me from their service, but could not obtain their favour therein. Since its receipt I sent a letter to Sir Henry Vane, dated 9th inst., intimating my desire and resolution to relinquish the service, and craving his assistance in the speedy settlement of some able man as my successor, that the service might not suffer in default thereof. At present I desire to tell you that I shall act no more in the service, conceiving it to be below the State’s honour (which I shall always study to preserve) to employ such an one as I am rendered to be in their service so long, much more any longer, and as equally below that respect which I have, or ought to have, to my good name (which I shall also study to preserve), if yet I should continue acting in the service when the Council of State have ordered the examination of supposed crimes committed by me in order to my dismissal from the service—a punishment far short of such heinous offences as the Exchange and all places ring me guilty of, insomuch that I can scarce walk the streets without wonder, pointing, &c., from men that scarce ever saw me, such is the influence of mine adversaries, and the reward of my faithful service. I pray communicate this letter to the State, or to

¹ *S. P. Dom. Interr.* xxix. 135.

whom you please, for the more speedy settlement of my successor, that the State's service may not suffer, whereof, if I had not been tender, I had long since quitted it to free myself of those many and manifold discouragements I have met withal in it. I pray also take notice that no disaffection to the State or their interest doth in the least measure ground my present relinquishment, but because I perceive I cannot act faithfully against corrupt interests in whomsoever I find them, and safely for mine own preservation, both which I am resolved to do, or not to act at all. If all or any of you, or any man else whatsoever, can tax me with any unjust or unworthy act, either against the State or any private man, since I came first into the service (as I hope you will not to), I desire you should not spare me in the least, being ready upon due conviction, as to acknowledge my error so to give satisfaction to the extremity of the justice of the State, under whose power I yet am, and indeed a fitter object of their justice than I either was or could be whilst I was yet their servant. . . . I am not insensible of my manifold infirmities, but disdain all mine adversaries to charge me with any intended unworthy act since I first knew the service. . . .'

In this letter we seem to catch sight for a moment of a rough, cantankerous official, who is himself upright in the main as regards greater matters, but not entirely proof against the minor temptations of official life; who assaults corrupt interests fiercely in others wherever they are to be detected, but is himself not absolutely unstained; who by the nature of his attacks upon them makes

enemies of all his colleagues, and yet is at the same time extraordinarily sensitive to attacks upon himself. The type of character is not uncommon, and there is nothing in what is known of Hollond's career inconsistent with this reading of him. The man who is the cleanser of Augean stables by temperament rather than from a sense of duty is not always himself above reproach. What the 'complaint' was which was the immediate means of terminating his official career it is impossible to say. The report of the admiralty committee to the Council of State about the business¹ is of the briefest and most formal nature, recommending only that a new commissioner be appointed 'in the room of Hollond,' and that Nehemiah Bourne and Edward Hopkins be added 'at the same salary as the others receive.' Hollond's immediate successor, George Payler, was not actually appointed until 1654.

From this time until 1660 Hollond ceased to hold any post in the navy. He gave up his official residence at Tower Hill,² and settled himself at Deptford, where by June 1653 he was engaged once more in the timber trade,³ which in all probability continued to occupy him until the Restoration.⁴ The only post-Restoration reference to him that is ready to hand is in Pepys' 'Diary,' where he is alluded to as the author of a project for restoring depreciated tickets to their full value.⁵ He was at that time secretary

¹ *S. P. Dom. Interr.* xxvi. 45.

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1653-4, p. 216.

³ *Ibid.* 1652-3, p. 618.

⁴ He was certainly thus engaged as late as the end of the year 1656 (*ibid.* 1656-7, p. 479).

⁵ 'To the office, where Sir G. Carteret did give us an account how Mr. Hollond do intend to prevail with the Parliament to try

to Sir George Carteret, then treasurer of the navy.¹

It is not unlikely that the Second Discourse itself, with its intimate knowledge of naval affairs, and its somewhat exuberant dedication to 'his illustrious Highness James, Duke of York, Lord High Admiral of England,' was intended as a bid for office under the restored King. If so, it was only in a measure successful, for an ex-commissioner of the navy could scarcely have been satisfied with a secretarial post which was little better than the appointment of paymaster under Sir William Russell, which he had enjoyed more than thirty years before. In any case, it is probable that the date 1659 is only the date of a final revision, and that the first draft of the Second Discourse had been written a good deal earlier, before the Restoration had come within sight. The dedication, written in 1661, speaks of it as 'for some years past digested,' and again as 'many years past penned,' and this would seem to show that the later allusions² were inserted on a revision, and do not fix the date of the original text. The chapter on 'Victuals' also appears to be decisive on this point. This contains an unfavourable account of 'the late experience of victualling by contract,'³ as part of a long argument to prove the advantages of his project of discharging the seamen all at present by tickets, and so promise interest to all men that will lend money upon them at eight per cent., for so long as they are unpaid; whereby he do think to take away the growing debt, which do now lie upon the kingdom for lack of present money to discharge the seamen.' (November 30, 1660.)

¹ Wheatley's note to Nov. 30, 1660.

² As, for instance, to the death of Colonel Pride in October 1658 (see p. 297, *infra*, and note).

³ P. 156.

the alternative method by which the State victualled for itself 'upon account.' But the contract expired in 1654, and from 1655 to the Restoration the victualling was managed by the State 'upon account.' If the chapter on victuals had been written much later than this, it is not likely that its author would have omitted all reference to the experience of the new system. His tone is that of an observer who writes after the old method had been discredited, but before the new one had been fully tried.

But even if the bulk of the Second Discourse was in shape as early as 1656 or 1657, the revision that had to take place before it could be dedicated to the Duke of York must have been a very important one. And perhaps this accounts for the fact that in one sense the subject-matter of the Discourse is disappointing. It would be natural to expect that if the same man should write on the navy twice, at an interval of twenty years, he would attempt to bring out a contrast. In 1638 naval organisation was monarchical; in 1656 it was in a manner parliamentary, and a parliamentary committee not only investigated details, but on occasion issued positive orders. Again, the dates are separated by two striking and successful attempts to organise war upon a large scale—the war of the great rebellion and the first war with the Dutch. We should expect that a writer of the Protectorate, who had before him a manuscript of his own on the same subject, dated from before the meeting of the Long Parliament, would attempt to show how war had affected organisation, what administrative improvements had been effected by the new military

state. In point of fact, there is scarcely a trace in the Second Discourse of any attempt on the part of the writer to compare his experiences or to discuss differences of organisation. No doubt he could have done so if he would: perhaps in his treatise as it originally stood he had actually done so; but in the end he was bound to consider the occasion. An author who wrote for the Restoration could scarcely venture to demonstrate the superiority of the Commonwealth methods; he had, therefore, no choice but to confine himself for the most part to the minutiae of the navy, without attempting comparisons or generalisations; where they are attempted, they are usually unfavourable to the system which he had himself done so much to build up.

Thus the relation between the two Discourses is not an intimate one. Ostensibly they cover almost the same ground. In both the fundamental principle of classification in naval affairs is declared to be under wages, victuals, and stores, or as the Second Discourse puts it alternatively, 'men, money, materials—under which three may be comprised almost, if not all, that great variety of persons, things, and actions that refer to the being of a navy.'¹ But within this classification the matters treated of are for the most part wholly different. For instance, under wages, only three abuses are exposed in both Discourses—the use of the State's labour and materials by officials for their own private purposes,² the favouritism shown by the master shipwright in rating the men employed in the yard,³ and the long-standing abuse of 'dead pays.'⁴

¹ P. 126. ² Pp. 16, 96, and 148. ³ Pp. 28 and 134.

⁴ Pp. 25 and 140. This abuse is described in a note on p. 140.

Another difference between the two tracts is that on certain subjects the second is much fuller than the first. The important question of victuals, the subject of a long and vigorous chapter in the Second Discourse,¹ is passed over by the First Discourse 'with silence.'² Under the head of stores there is an agreement concerning cordage, the First Discourse contending that 'cordage bought ready made' is 'one of the greatest thefts in the navy,'³ and the Second Discourse urging that 'it is without all question the safest and best way for the State to work it in their own ropeyards . . . and not by private rope-merchants,'⁴ but only three pages is allotted in the one case⁵ to what requires seventeen in the other.⁶ The two or three paragraphs on timber in the First Discourse⁷ grow to a chapter in the Second,⁸ and the Second Discourse devotes another chapter to 'Ironworks,'⁹ a kind of 'store' which the First Discourse had entirely ignored. The Second Discourse also contains chapters on 'Freight,'¹⁰ 'Certificates and Oaths,'¹¹ and 'A Free Market,'¹² for which the First Discourse has no equivalent.

The most striking point of contrast, however, between the two Discourses is the contrast in literary style. The First Discourse would seem to be the work of an unpractised pen. The sentences and the thought alike are often curiously involved, and the writer's touch is heavy at the best. Sound

¹ P. 153.⁴ P. 195.⁷ Pp. 77-80.¹⁰ P. 264.² P. 66.⁵ Pp. 74-6.⁸ Pp. 205-28.¹¹ P. 271.³ P. 75.⁶ Pp. 187-204.⁹ Pp. 229-63.¹² P. 280.

and sensible as the argument often is, it suffers under the disadvantage of being thrust between a pompous exordium and a tame conclusion. But twenty years' experience of affairs worked wonders in Hollond's style. The highly artificial system of logical division, which had appeared to him in 1638 to be the perfection of method, he discards altogether in 1656, and prefers to 'handle' abuses 'promiscuously,' and as his 'memory and observation prompt' him. The Second Discourse becomes trenchant and incisive, without losing that seriousness and weightiness of expression that had characterised the paymaster, and would still better befit the ex-commissioner of the navy. The expository dulness of his earlier manner has given place to a certain deftness and skill in the handling of words and the marshalling of phrases, while the whole is salted with a humour that is caustic without being malignant. A quite unusual capacity for self-development must have been the endowment of the man who, after being satisfied in 1638 with the second-rate and muddled eloquence with which the First Discourse opens, could in 1656 pen the excellent chapter 'Of Certificates and Oaths,' and add the effective touch which closes the chapter 'Of the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy.'¹

It is hardly necessary to point out that Hollond was not the first to denounce abuses in the navy. This had been a fruitful topic for anonymous writers long before his day, and if the scattered papers on the subject were collected they would constitute a

¹ P. 322.

complete literature. Charges of a circumstantial kind had been brought against naval administrators at least as early as the time of Hawkyns,¹ and one writer went so far as to accuse him of one of the modern refinements of cheating—the manufacture of a complete set of false books and vouchers for the purpose of concealing his malpractices.²

His recent biographers are disposed to defend Hawkyns himself against the more serious accusations,³ but the statements made reach beyond particular persons to the whole system of naval administration, and are too detailed and persistent to be wholly without foundation. The Pepysian Library contains copies of a considerable number of unpublished papers on abuses in the navy, ranging from 1587 to 1611, which Pepys had collected for his projected History of the Navy, and these earlier complaints are only the first of a series. The reports of the commissions of 1608,⁴ 1618,⁵ and

¹ *Dictionary of National Biography*, xxv. 217.

² 'At Christmas 1587, upon a fear of trial . . . he had seven men new writing his books fourteen days together, as also the bills, books, and notes of the clerks of the prick and check of Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham, and Portsmouth.' (*A Declaration of the Omissions and Abuses committed in the Office of the Admiralty*, in Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 273.)

³ Professor Laughton (*D. N. B.*) thinks that some of them were not unfounded, although Hawkyns was careful to stop short of anything that might have interfered with the actual efficiency of the navy. Mr. Oppenheim, on the other hand (*E. H. R.* vi. 486), acquits him of anything worse than using his official position to obtain discounts, and commissions on contracts.

⁴ *E. H. R.* vii. 478–9, and note 37.

⁵ See notes on pp. 114 and 118, *infra*. The report of the commission is printed, but not very accurately, in Charnock, *Marine Architecture*. The original report is among the State Papers; and there is a copy in the Pepysian Library (No. 2735), made from Sir William Coventry's transcript of the original 'in the Paper Office.'

1626,¹ the first two of which are of special importance in the history of the evolution of fraud, are largely concerned with these abuses; Sir William Monson, who in 1635 'turned physician,' and studied 'how to cure the malignant diseases of corruption' that had 'crept in and infected his Majesty's whole navy,'² devotes part of his 'Naval Tracts' to abuses in the navy; and in 1636 the Earl of Northumberland, fresh from the experience of a naval command, denounces them in a State Paper to the King in council.³ And not only has Hollond his predecessors, but he is confirmed by those who follow him; for Samuel Pepys, writing after the Restoration, says much the same thing; and such is the amazing durability of a well-established abuse in the navy, that malpractices not unlike those described by Hollond were exposed by a parliamentary inquiry as late as 1783.⁴ As the question of Hollond's relation to those who had handled the same subject before him has an indirect bearing on the trustworthiness of his statements, it may be worth while to discuss it briefly here.

In the First Discourse Hollond refers more than once to the enormous waste occasioned by the employment of 'unservicable men,' both as

Pepys had a high opinion of this report. He remarks of the commissioners' 'Propositions' for reform that they did 'please me mightily to hear read, they being excellently writ and much to the purpose' (*Diary*, March 14, 1668-9).

¹ *E. H. R.* viii. 479.

² Churchill, *Voyages*, iii. 372 (*Naval Tracts*).

³ See p. xiii, *supra*.

⁴ 'Interim Report of a Committee to inquire into abuses in the Victualling Department at Portsmouth' (*House of Commons' Miscellaneous Reports*, vol. xxxvi. No. 55). In this report the committee held it proved that the keys of the victualling storehouses had been entrusted to improper persons, who had access

labourers in the dockyards,¹ and as pressed men to serve at sea.² This was partly due to the corruptibility of prestmasters,³ partly to favouritism shown in promoting unfit men,⁴ and partly to a vicious system by which 'covenant servants' were employed at sea whose labour was sweated by their masters.⁵

It is interesting to be able to trace all these abuses in the papers of an earlier period. A system of sweating labour is fully described in a paper of 1597,⁶ and the report of the commission of 1618

to the stores at all hours (*cf.* pp. 245-6, *infra*); that certain persons kept hogs in the King's storehouses, which were 'fed with the King's serviceable biscuit'; that planks, spars, staves, and barrels were converted to private use; that 'mops and brooms' from the store were appropriated by an official who 'kept a shop and dealt in those articles'; that coals and candles were similarly appropriated, and 'the wine lodged in the King's stores' drawn off in large quantities 'in bottles, in a clandestine manner'; that certificates were granted for stores before they were actually received, and for articles received short, these being signed in blank by the clerk of the check beforehand; that it was a 'common practice' to send in bags of bread deficient in weight; that the accounts were imperfectly kept, and showed enormous deficiencies of stores; that by collusion with the contractor stores were accepted that were 'of improper quality, and not according to contract'; that the victualling board paid excessive prices to a bread contractor with whom they were in collusion, and refused to allow others to tender; and that fees amounting sometimes to one-third the value of the freight were extorted from the masters of vessels employed in carrying stores from the victualling office in London to the victualling office at Portsmouth. The abuses were notorious, and the investigation that exposed them was due in the first instance to a petition from certain inhabitants of the borough of Portsmouth to the House of Commons. It is quite possible that abuses of this kind continued even later, for the frauds and peculation during the war with France were on an enormous scale.

¹ P. 14, *infra*.

² P. 50.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Pp. 22 and 27-8.

⁵ P. 15.

⁶ *A Large and Severe Discourse concerning several Abuses in the Navy: Chatham, 1597* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 226) —a paper evidently put together by a repeater of gossip, but

complains more briefly of the pursers and cooks, whose servants are 'entertained only for the profit of their masters, who receive half their wages, and by which means (as the boatswains complain) there be not left two mariners in a ship fit to be trusted or able to do service in any time of need.'¹ A writer of 1611,² in a catalogue of desirable reforms, urges that men should 'attain offices by desert only, especially such as have been bred in the navy that thereby men may be the better encouraged to serve the King, and the King's service bettered with sufficient seafaring men, and not as now it is with tinkers, cobblers, and botchers, to the great defamation and scandal of the State'—the general form of an argument of which Hollond makes a particular application to the case of pressed men.³

The corruptibility of the prestmasters, who allowed themselves to be bribed into releasing the best men and filling their places with those that were unfit, and other abuses connected with the press, had been made a subject of complaint in containing several specific charges. 'There is a private game in the ordinary sailors, for whatsoever he be that wants entertainment he presently repairs to Mr. Buck; he enters his name in the book, and sends him aboard any ship which he thinks good. The fellow receives his wages every quarter. He has for his year's service 6*l*. He gives his master 4*l*., and 40*s*. he keeps for himself; so by every servant that they keep they gain 4*l*. a year by. Peradventure some one man has 20 servants. This is an abuse, for that the navy has such as can do nothing, and those that know not the name of a rope's end; for I heard a boatswain say, among fourscore men there was not ten that knew their labour' (p. 231). Peter Buck was a person of doubtful honesty, and there is nothing improbable in this reference to him.

¹ Pepysian MSS., No 2735, p. 77.

² Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 309.

³ Cf. pp. 22-3, *infra*.

Northumberland's articles of 1636.¹ Sir William Monson also in his 'Naval Tracts,' points out how the 'abuse used in pressing' foremast men supplied the navy in 1635 with 'watermen never before at sea, and others of the same sort, altogether unserviceable,' but he also connects this deficiency with the favouritism shown by the officers of the navy, 'who, to pleasure friends, or for other ends of their own, appoint tailors, porters, and others of that rank, unworthy of the hatches to lie on . . . so great a power has Partiality with these men that they prefer the unworthy before the well deserving, and are willing to pay 1*l.* 11*s.* a month to tailors, rather than 14*s.* to a sailor.'² Monson's remedy was to have 'no more than five lusty young watermen in every hundred sailors,' and he recommended also that 'some masters, or their mates should be sent out with the prestmasters,' and that 'without increasing the total charge, the wages of seamen should be increased or diminished in proportion to their sufficiency, as judged of by the master for those abaft the mast, by the boatswain for those before the mast, and by the gunner for those in the gun-room.'³

In both Discourses our author speaks strongly against the practice of using the State's labour in the gardens and grounds of officials,⁴ and the State's materials in repairing private houses,⁵ or sumptuously decorating official residences within the yards.⁶

¹ See Appendix, pp. 372, 374, 380-2, 402, 406, *infra*.

² Churchill, *Voyages*, iii. 374.

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 158.

⁴ Pp. 16 and 150, *infra*.

⁵ Pp. 97 and 150.

⁶ P. 149.

But on this point he had been anticipated by a whole series of protests against practices which must have been notorious in the navy. The writer of 1597 alluded to above had drawn sinister conclusions from the 'stateliness' of the officers' 'new houses,' and the 'dress and apparel of themselves and their families,'¹ and he had charged the comptroller with employing five labourers from the yard, the names of three of whom he gave, 'by the space of half a year' at house at Chatham 'about the making of a Bowling Alley and planting of trees.'² In or about the year 1602, another writer had commented on 'the greatness of wealth and fair buildings' of the officers and their clerks, 'wherein her Majesty's timber, plank, and lead is usually employed.'³ In 1603 specific accusations were made, though not from an unprejudiced quarter, against Phineas Pett for appropriating timber 'to make a bridge into his meadow,' to make a 'sluce,' to set up 'posts to hang clothes on in his garden,' and labour for the same.⁴ A writer of 1605 hints darkly at the

¹ *A Large and Severe Discourse, &c.* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 226).

² *Ibid.* 243. The comptroller must have been William Borough.

³ *A Declaration of the Omissions and Abuses committed in the Office of the Admiralty* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 273). The tone of this paper is sober and responsible.

⁴ *A Large and Particular Complaint against Phineas Pett relating to Abuses in the Navy about the end of the Queen's and beginning of King James's Reign* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 257). The writer begins his dissertation by a naive confession of his motives. 'In the last year of the Queen's reign, I, seeing some abuses by Phineas Pett, told him he had not done his duty. He stroke me with his cudgel. I told him he had better he had heid his hand, for he should pay for it.' Pett was in some respects a calumniated man, but this particular kind

misappropriation of timber for private uses,¹ and another of about the same date complains that work done by carvers and painters 'for any of the officers' is by connivance charged to the King.² The point is also touched on in the report of the commission of 1618.³

The combination of captains and pursers to return false musters, or to present men to receive pay that never served, was an abuse of long standing in the navy. The report of 1618 had pointed out the extravagant lengths to which the system of recognised allowances to officers upon the sea-books had been carried, often under the name of 'dead pays' ⁴—'the double, or rather treble, payments of wages to new-erected lieutenants, vice-admirals, and others, who receiving first 20s. or 10s. per diem in the exchequer, receive again the same wages for themselves upon the ship's charge; and receiving 8 or 16 men's wages in the exchequer for their retinue, receive likewise so many men's wages from the treasurer of the navy, and again allowance for the victuals of so many from the surveyors of victuals;' 'of late three principal officers of the navy have each of them allowance for the wages and victuals of a dead pay in every ship at sea; and in the Narrow Seas there is an allowance

peculation is more easily justified to the official conscience than any other, and there is nothing inherently improbable in the accusation.

¹ 'The building of ships and houses with his Majesty's timber much suspected' (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 402).

² *Ibid.* 433.

³ 'The great building, enlarging, taking to rent, and furnishing of houses to private uses' (Pepysian MSS., No. 2735, p. 66).

⁴ The character of the system of authorised 'dead pays' is discussed in a note on p. 140, *infra*.

demanded for a preacher and his man, though no such devotion be ever used on board ; and 7 or 8 admirals, vice-admirals, and captains with extraordinary allowances in one year.' The report also speaks of 'pursers, cooks, and carpenters who never came aboard ships in harbour, but are only borne as dead pays,' and urges the 'abating that excess of number which gave captains and pursers too much scope to fill the sea-books with names of retinues, and dead pays, and runaways, and so charge the King with wages and victuals to a double proportion.'¹ But the excessive multiplication of recognised 'dead pays' was an unimportant abuse compared with that of returning false musters and manufacturing fraudulent 'dead pays' after the manner described by Hollond.² A paper of 1603 gives a circumstantial account of a case in which Sir Richard Leveson, on mustering the companies of a squadron of four ships, found that out of a total complement of 1,250 men charged for, only 958 were actually serving, the King being 'abused in the pay of 292 men, which for four months, the least time of their employment,' was 800l.³ Another paper of about 1605 or a little later⁴ complains of similar abuses both in the yards and at sea ; and

¹ Pepysian MSS., No. 2735, pp. 66 and 78.

² Pp. 140-2, *infra*.

³ *An Account of Particular Abuses to be proved against the Officers of the Navy* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 271).

⁴ *Abuses and Ill-husbandries exercised upon the bringing-in Ships to be repaired in Dry Dock ; with a large Particular of other great Abuses in the Navy* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 427). 'When a ship is in preparing to go to serve at sea, more men are entered into wages and victuals than are continually serving, which turns to the benefit of the clerk of the check by

a writer of 1608¹ professes to expose an abuse in the Vanguard by which there were 'above 256 men' on board to be paid, 'which no sooner were the clerks gone from on board but three score at the least left the ship, 40 whereof had never been aboard before that time they came to receive their pay.' That abuses of this kind were officially detected we know from the report of the commission of 1608,² which complained that 'the captains being for the most part poor gentlemen, did mend their fortunes by combining with the pursers.' Nevertheless a writer of 1611³ remarks that the King is 'more abused and wronged' by the 'captains and pursers in the service of the Narrow Seas' than by 'any

bills or tickets of their wages directed to the treasurer, which oftentimes the treasurer is sharer of; the like by augmenting the number of men upon the petty warrants for victuals. . . . When a ship is at sea, the captain keeps his complement of men allowed short—in a great ship allowed 250 men, most commonly 80 men short; in a ship wherein 100 men is allowed, oftentimes 30 men—the wages whereof is, by false passes signed by captains and pursers, received for the most part to the benefit of the captain; the victuals whereof is divided between the victualler and the purser, and oftentimes the captain receives part. . . . At the return of the ship home, upon the payment of the company of mariners there is commonly increased by the treasurer's clerk and the other clerks so many dead pays as do amount unto sometimes 50*l.* or 60*l.*, which is equally shared between them, and so is there upon every ship that serves at sea' (p. 439). The treasurer at the time was Sir Robert Mansell, and the administration was so notoriously corrupt as to make these charges probable enough.

¹ *Thomas Buck's Letter to Sir Robert Cotton complaining of several Abuses in the King's Navy, &c.*, Feb. 1, 1608 (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 380). The letter was written while the agitation for the commission of 1608 was going on, and it refers to 'the business now in hand.' Cotton was one of the promoters of this commission.

² Robinson, *The British Fleet*, p. 347.

³ *Notes . . . of the Chief Disorders to be reformed in the Navy* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 303).

other officers, although boatswains, gunners, and carpenters are not free.'

It is interesting to find that this writer of 1611 proposes to remedy the abuses of the captains and pursers by a policy very similar to that indicated by Hollond for the seamen and the officials of the yards. The abuses connected with the delay in paying wages were very serious, but Hollond not only presses in the Second Discourse¹ for punctual payment for the seamen, he also urges in the First 'an increase of means from the King' for 'all subordinate ministers acting in the navy under the officers' command,' since, 'for want thereof,' they are 'necessitated to one of these two particulars, either to live knaves or die beggars, and sometimes to both.'² In the same way the writer of 1611 finds the cause of the unfair dealings of pursers and inferior officers to be, 'first, want of maintenance ;' 'secondly, want of countenance,' since they dare not 'displease an officer nor an officer's favourite, but must give them content, though it be to deceive the King, or else by one means or other they shall be thrust out of their offices and places ; and where is he in all the navy that has not bought his place, and paid dear for it, unless some few favourites.' Captains have not this excuse, but as regards the others the proper line of reform is 'by augmenting the wages of these inferior officers, and strengthening of them in their places.'³

Connected with this abuse of false musters is the neglect of the clerks of the check in the yards

¹ P. 137, *infra*.

² P. 100.

³ Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 323-4.

to keep 'strict and exact prick and check upon all men receiving day wages.'¹ Hollond complains only of carelessness, but the earlier writers had suggested fraud. In 1597 it was said² that the clerk of the check's man would sometimes receive 'a crown or a noble' to enter men as present when they were absent. In 1603,³ and again in 1611,⁴ two different writers suggest that at Chatham the omissions were due to the fact that the master shipwright and clerk of the check victualled the carpenters in the yard; thus they 'do not prick absence for fear of losing the board wages for the time of absence.'

Hollond's chapter upon victuals in the Second Discourse is an amusing exposure of what was perhaps the most unsatisfactory department of the navy. Complaints about the victualling begin at least as early as Elizabeth's reign, when 'many thousands did miscarry, by the corruption as well of drink as of meat,'⁵ and it was already said, as at a later time, that 'nothing doth displease the seamen more than sour beer.'⁶

The author of 'Notes of the Chief Disorders to be reformed in the Navy,'⁷ who wrote about 1611, puts together a long catalogue of abuses in the victualling, which is not without interest for readers of the Second Discourse. He not only complains of 'unwholesome and unserviceable victuals,' and short weight and measure, but also of a variety of

¹ P. 30, *infra*.

² Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 232.

³ *Ibid.* 261.

⁴ *Ibid.* 296.

⁵ *E. H. R.* vi. 478.

⁶ *Ibid.* 480.

⁷ Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 303.

tricks by which the victuallers enriched themselves at the King's expense. They victual fewer men, but charge for the full number; take allowance for more victuals than are expended; do not account for remains; 'undervalue such remains as have been expended in harbour in the ordinary companies'; 'account not for such abatements as are saved in the ordinary at Chatham'; take allowance for transportation where none is allowed by the King; 'do colour transportation of grain with pretence of the King's service'; 'impose waste on the King where none is'; 'use men's names to colour false accounts'; and many other deceits besides. 'The nurse of these abuses that nourishes and maintains them are these two—viz., first, [the victuallers] are permitted to be surveyors of their own doings, and seldom times do men find fault with their own actions, especially when benefit arrives thereby; secondly, they have their scope given them in their contract, that if their account be vouched by any two of the principal officers of the navy, it shall be their discharge, and who are they that vouch them but Sir Henry Palmer, who knows nothing nor ought will examine, and Sir John Trevor, who knows so much as that he knows he justifies a false account.' Then follow suggestions for the reformation of the victualling office. To prevent abuses in the weight and quality of the victuals supplied, when the beef is killed at the slaughter-houses on Tower Hill let there be 'two of the ancientest and best experienced pursers' present, 'who in the behalf of the absent pursers shall see to the weight and tale of the allowances of beef,

and to the good usage of it in salting and packing . . . they keeping true notice of the contents of each cask.' The filled casks were then to be stored in 'such a room as that none shall keep the key but the chief victualler himself, or his sufficient deputy, for whom he will answer.' 'The vouch of the two pursers that see to the packing of it, approving both goodness and weight,' was to be the victualler's discharge. In the same way the beer was to be gauged by a 'sworn gauger' appointed by the victualler, and delivered on board ship at the victualler's expense, 'not as now the purser to come up for it,'¹ and when it arrived it was to be solemnly tested by the purser, master, quartermaster, and boatswain. In order to provide for leakage of beer, let the victualler allow the purser twenty-one tuns for twenty, as is allowed to him by the brewer, for if the leak comes 'by badness of cask,' it is the victualler's fault; if, on the other hand, it comes by bad weather, the King should pay 'by certificate and testimonial of honest persons.'

This writer of 1611 appears to have shared Hollond's innocent confidence in the efficacy of an oath.² 'Whereas proof is made that the victualler combines with captains and pursers to keep short their complement of men,' let the victualler be sworn not to do so for the future, and all will be well. He did not, however, venture to apply this simple remedy to another combination which was giving great trouble—that between the victualler and clerk of the check, whereby 'a thousand men's victuals' had been 'wrongfully increased in one day,' with

¹ Cf. p. 181, *infra*.

² See p. 277, *infra*.

‘many other quintessences of deceit.’ His remedy in this case was to appoint three more officials, ‘whereof two of them should keep notice with the clerks of the check and keepers of the stores for the receipts and issues of all provisions the one of them to attend at Chatham the other for the performance of the like duty at London, Deptford, and Woolwich, and the third to muster monthly, both in harbour and the Narrow Seas.’

The author of this proposal continues naively, ‘It may be alleged that this increase of officers will but augment the King’s charges, and not reform the abuse.’ To remedy abuses which arose mainly from the dishonesty of officials by appointing more officials was not likely to find favour with what Hollond calls the ‘judicious regulator’ of the navy. The danger of collusion among officials was the standing danger of the navy. The commission of 1618 reported¹ that the ‘chief and inward causes of all disorder’ were ‘the multitude of offices and the poverty of wages,’ and the fact that the subordinate officials ‘have part of their maintenance from the merchants that deliver in the provisions which they are trusted to receive,’ and if this was true of cordage, timber, and ironworks, still more was it true of victuals. Sir William Monson in his ‘Naval Tracts’ gives instances of collusion between the victualler and the purser, and shows how easily the thing can be managed;² he even goes so far

¹ Pepysian MSS., No. 2735, p. 67.

² ‘Moreover the victuallers must be enjoined to put on board every ship the whole proportion of victuals to the quantity of men serving her, for in this there has been great deceit; for whereas his Majesty allows a large and sufficient rate for every man’s diet,

as to declare his own belief in the existence of a combination between the victualler and the principal officers themselves;¹ and Hollond in the Second Discourse,² when enumerating the advantages of the system of victualling 'upon account' as compared with a contract, points out that 'men are men, and may and will be tempted, and the victualler's contract hath enough in it to endear and engage men of all ranks to the interest of the contractor.' In fact, in Hollond's day the notion that one official could be trusted to watch another, and that miscarriages in any department could be remedied by

the victualler and the purser had wont to contract betwixt themselves that the purser shall have the victualling of a certain proportion of men, and to allow the victualler three-halfpence or twopence per diem out of that the King allows and justly pays.' This 'breeds a great inconveniency, for the purser's unreasonable griping the sailors of their victuals, and plucking it, as it were, out of their bellies, it makes them become weak, sick, and feeble,' and leads to 'uproars, mutinies, and disorders.' Monson's remedy is to prohibit the sale of the purser's place, and to find the missing 'honest and careful man,' who would 'neither contract with the victualler, or take advantage of poor men's being ashore for him to have their allowances of diet to enrich himself' (Churchill, *Voyages*, iii. 373).

¹ He tells a story from his own experience that when the James was on one occasion taking in victuals at Tilbury Hope, 'there appeared a certain proportion of beef and pork, able with its scent to have poisoned the whole company, but by the carefulness of the quartermaster it was found unserviceable; yet after it was refused by the said officers of the ship, and lay upon the hatches unstowed, some of the officers of the navy repaired aboard, and by their authority and great anger forced it to be taken in for good victuals. . . . My observation to this point is that though the officers of the navy have nothing to do with the victualling part, yet it is likely there is a combination betwixt the one and the other, like to a mayor to a corporation, a baker who for that year will favour the brewer, that shall the next year do the like to his trade when he becomes mayor' (*ibid.* 371). Cf p. 314, *infra*.

² See p. 158, *infra*.

increasing the staff of it, was practically played out. His own remedy was for the State to take over the victualling, and carry it through by means of its own officers, and he is therefore an advocate of the system that was actually adopted from 1655 to the Restoration, and again after 1683.¹ What Hollond does not explain satisfactorily is why the officials who victualled 'upon account' should not themselves be in collusion with the vendors from whom they bought quite as much as with the contractors under the older system. The later history of the navy shows that the method of victualling upon account did not entirely heal the diseases of this department of naval administration.

The administrative defects of the victualling recurred on almost as serious a scale in the department of stores, and Hollond's complaints concerning the provision of cordage and timber in particular have their parallels in the earlier papers. The badness of the cordage 'that came from Muscovia' ² was noted in the report of 1618,³ where part of it is described as 'neither good hemp, nor well-dressed, nor well-spun,' with only half the number of threads in a strand that good cordage ought to have, 'and, withal, six or seven pounds too much tar in every hundredweight at the least.'⁴ Monson noticed a great deterioration of cordage in his time. In his 'Propositions for improvements in the navy,' dated 1636,⁵ he declared that in his last voyage 'he had seen more topmasts carried by the board in a reasonable

¹ See note 2 on p. 154, *infra*.

² Complained of by Hollond on p. 193, *infra*.

³ Pepysian MSS., No. 2735, p. 57.

⁴ Cf. p. 197, *infra*. ⁵ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-36, p. 158.

gale of wind than he had known in great storms in the Queen's time,' and, though he is open to the charge of being *laudator temporis acti*, his account is very much confirmed by Northumberland's complaints of a year later.¹ Yet for this bad cordage the King was compelled, by collusion between the officials, to pay an exorbitant price; and by the connivance of the storekeeper at Deptford in 1618 cordage was entered on the books as heavier than it was weighed, large quantities of old cordage were sold at absurdly low prices to boatswains, clerks, and other parties interested, and stuff which was still fit for service was condemned as unserviceable on the survey of masters and boatswains, the boatswain himself being the contractor who purchased unserviceable stuff.²

In timber, according to Hollond, the navy suffered partly from the inefficiency of the surveyors, which led them to select bad materials,³ and partly from their dishonesty, which led to the stores being glutted with defective timber⁴ at exorbitant prices, in order to favour the monopolist or merchant, notwithstanding the fact that there was no present use for it, or it might be bought cheaper elsewhere.⁵ The complaints under this head, and under stores generally, are almost continuous from the reign of Elizabeth onwards. A paper belonging to the year 1602 or thereabouts⁶ complains of 'overpricing, surcharging, and false entries concerning masts,

¹ See Appendix.

² Pepysian MSS., No. 2735, p. 65.

³ See p. 78, *infra*.

⁴ P. 67.

⁵ Pp. 69-71.

⁶ *A Declaration of the Omissions and Abuses committed in the Office of the Admiralty* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 273).

cordage, canvas, pitch, tar, and oakum,' the clerk of the check increasing 'the show of quantity' sometimes 'to a half or a third part as much more;' and in the course of the next ten years charges of the kind are often repeated. Under James I. Mansell and Trevor supplied the timber for the navy themselves. It was said as early as 1604¹ that they paid the 'providers' less for timber of all kinds than they charged the King and appropriated the difference, the timber thus purveyed being 'often such as that much of it is only food for the fire, and not to be employed about the ships;' while the clerks of the check at Chatham, Woolwich, and Deptford 'abuse the king at the receiving these provisions by augmenting the bills that go into the office for payment, upon some bills 50*l.*, 60*l.*, 70*l.*, and 80*l.*, besides the increase of measure.' A couple of years later a writer² makes much the same complaint as Hollond does³ of inefficient purveyors, 'who are made choice of by favour' and select bad timber, 'ill-converting it' and abusing the King 'in the measure and carriage by the land.' When brought into the yard it is accepted, however bad it may be, 'the reason whereof is for that it is the officers' own provisions, whom the shipwrights will not and the clerk of the check dares not offend, wherein is a third part lost' to the King. 'Such timber and plank as is provided in his Majesty's own woods is for the most part very bad and unfitting for ship-

¹ *An Account of Particular Abuses to be proved against the Officers of the Navy* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 263).

² *Abuses and Ill-husbandries, &c.* (*ibid.* 427).

³ Pp. 77-78, *infra*.

building, by reason the best is licensed to be sold by the officers.' The quantities of timber are 'augmented by the clerks of the check when they receive it, to theirs and the purveyors' benefit'; and the King pays 5s. a load more for timber than the merchants of whom it is bought receive. The same tricks are also practised with regard to other commodities. Oil, tar, rosin, pitch, oakum, lead, 'and such like provisions' are 'increased in greater quantities than is truly delivered to his Majesty's use by the keeper of the store and clerk of the check;' 'middle band' tar is delivered for 'great band,' 'which is different in price upon every last at the least 3/.'; train-oil is delivered 'wanting in the measure it ought to contain, sometimes 40 gallons or more,' and it is 'oftentimes full of water, and so ill-conditioned that a great part is wasted;' brimstone is 'sophisticated and full of sand;' ironwork of all sorts is overcharged, 'sometimes 100% or more upon a ship, which is commonly shared between the clerk of the check and the master shipwright that builds the ship'; stores when brought on board ship are embezzled by the carpenter, and cordage by the boatswain; the sail canvas is 'bad and of the worst sort, and overpriced by the officers upon every bolt;' the sails 'ill-made' and 'of bad cloth,' and therefore not durable. The complaints of the badness of the timber and the inefficiency of the purveyors that send it into store are repeated in a paper of about 1606;¹ and peculation in stores of every kind is noted in a paper written three years after the exposure

¹ *Observations out of a Survey of Plank and Timber at Woolwich* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 411).

of 1608 ;¹ while the commission of 1618 reports² 'when provisions are made, the best are not chosen nor the worst refused,' and describes a 'store of unserviceable timber' at Deptford, with '2,400 foot of rotten plank, and a whole house full of other refuse stuff.'

As Mr. Oppenheim has shown, the reign of James I. was perhaps the worst and most corrupt period in the history of naval administration, and the navy succeeded later in emancipating itself to a certain extent from bad traditions. But perhaps enough has been said to prove that many of the abuses exposed by Hollond were at any rate nothing new, and there is therefore no *primâ facie* improbability about the statements which he makes. The question still remains to be considered—how far may he be relied upon as an accurate and unprejudiced observer of the 'passages' which he relates?

About Hollond's experience and competence there can be very little doubt. Though never a seaman,³ he had had fourteen years' experience of naval administration at the time when the First Discourse was written,⁴ and he was able to speak of the Second Discourse as 'part of the fruit of that observation and experience . . . reaped in the navy after thirty years' service.'⁵ Moreover, during seven years out of the thirty he had occupied one of the most important posts in the navy then open to men of no birth or special political influence. It is

¹ *Observations concerning some late Abuses committed both by the Principal and Inferior Officers of the Navy*, July 6, 1611 (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 291). ² Pepysian MSS., No. 2735, p. 57.

³ See p. 88, *infra*.

⁴ See p. 3.

⁵ P. 109. In another place (p. 238) he speaks of the time that he had 'known and lived in the navy' as 'almost thirty years.' It was from about 1624 to the end of 1652.

impossible that a man of the ability that Hollond exhibits in the Second Discourse should have failed during so long a service to thoroughly understand the practical working of naval administration. And that his tracts impressed contemporary experts there is direct evidence to show. Samuel Pepys spoke of the Discourses in the highest terms, writing in the 'Diary' that he was 'much pleased with them, they hitting the very diseases of the navy which we are troubled with now-a-days,' and adding 'I shall bestow writing of them over, and much reading thereof.'¹ And although this entry was made in 1662, in the days of his comparative inexperience, Pepys saw no reason to modify it in 1669.² Appreciation comes also, though rather indirectly, from a representative of practical seamanship. A copy made from Sir William Penn's own copy of the First Discourse³ describes it as 'writ by an able hand in the year 1638, and most fit to be read, and in the most material parts to be the measure of those that would perfect themselves in naval affairs.'

But notwithstanding the obvious merits of the Discourses, there are certain deflections of judgment for which allowance must be made, and for which it is not very difficult to account.

In the first place it seems clear that though he was in some respects more upright than many of his contemporaries, Hollond is not quite the pure-minded patriot he would have us believe. What he

¹ July 25, 1662.

² 'I away to the Office ; and there I sat late busy, making my people, as I have done lately, to read Mr. Hollond's Discourse of the Navy, and what other things I can get to inform me fully in all' (March 19, 1669).

³ Sloane MSS. 3232. See p. lxi, *infra* and note.

says may be true in the main, but that he went out of his way to say it suggests that he had axes of his own to grind, and therefore the judicious reader will be disposed to receive some of his statements with caution. Mr. Oppenheim, who has read and utilised the First Discourse, describes the tone of it as 'one of fetid adulation of the monarchy and the principles it represented.'¹ It is not easy to understand the ground of this description, for with the exception of the first six pages the First Discourse is businesslike enough, and avoids any discussion of the general principles of monarchy, the 'King' standing only for what in the Second Discourse appears as the 'State.' And even in these six pages there is nothing (with a single exception) that goes much beyond the ordinary good manners of monarchical England before the Civil War. In 1638 the Long Parliament had not met, and no one dreamed of the coming Commonwealth. At a time when it was the habit to show deference to the reigning monarch, and to ascribe all wisdom to his progenitors, the adulation is scarcely 'fetid' which speaks of 'his Majesty's wise government' of the navy; while the reverential allusion to the late King is after all only the equivalent of *divus Jacobus*. And who would quarrel with 'Queen Elizabeth of famous memory'? In fact, if allowance is made for the tone of the time, 'fetid adulation' scarcely applies, except perhaps to a single expression. 'Our ever-blessed Charles, when his abused patience began to be slighted,'² comes strangely from the pen of a writer

¹ *E. H. R.* xi. 59, *note*. In the recent revision of his articles, published since this passage was written (see note on p. lxxxiii, *infra*), Mr. Oppenheim has softened this to 'fulsome adulation of the Monarchy.'

² P. 5, *infra*.

of 1638; but the flavour of this is so characteristic of the Restoration that it seems not unreasonable to regard it as an interpolation, made, naturally enough, in or about 1660, before the First Discourse, which had never been printed, began to be handed about in manuscript for Pepys, and Penn, and other royalists to read. But if it is possible to join issue with Mr. Oppenheim on a particular expression, there is no doubt that he has read Hollond's character rightly. In 1638 he was a monarchist; in 1642 he became a parliamentary official; in 1661 he was a royalist again, with an eye on his chances of appointment as one of the 'regulators' of the Restoration navy.¹ No doubt there were many that did likewise in the collapse of fixed opinions that belongs to revolutionary times, but Hollond was willing to parade his own inconsistencies. In the dedication prefixed to the Second Discourse he makes the cynical avowal that since it was 'many years past penned according to the dialect of those times, and persons that were then in power,' he was 'necessitated to write according to their temperament, and as things then stood.'²

If it is granted that Hollond was deliberately utilising a parliamentary tract for royalist purposes, it is not difficult to see where this fact affects his competence as a critic of naval administration, and to make the necessary allowances for prejudice. We should naturally expect—what we actually find in the Second Discourse—a systematic attempt to belittle the system on which the navy was administered under the Commonwealth. This leads its

¹ P. 110, *infra*.

² *Ibid*.

author to sneer at the religious men of the Commonwealth after the Restoration fashion, and in one or two cases, in defiance of all the facts, to compare the naval administration of the Interregnum disadvantageously with that of the period immediately preceding it. It is this anxiety to make his treatise acceptable to the restored monarchy by depreciating the Commonwealth—associated, perhaps, with the standing jealousy between officials who were seamen and officials who were clerks¹—that leads Hollond, in the Second Discourse, to make his extraordinary attacks upon the generals at sea. In the chapter on Wages he accuses them of ‘turning merchants’ and forcing their wares upon the seamen, ‘for no other reason than their private profit, which as men in such places they can easily make more or less as they please.’² In the chapter on Victuals, he accuses the general of being so far in collusion with the contractor as to command the men supplied with defective or unwholesome victual to ‘eat it or starve.’³ In the same chapter he asserts that they act as victuallers, in a manner ‘highly prejudicial to the service, and much below a general’;⁴ and hints once more at ‘close compliance’ between the generals and the contractors for victuals.⁵ Elsewhere⁶ he brings a specific charge against a general of 1650, who must have been either Popham or Blake, of forcing bad victuals upon his fleet. Such accusations as this last are contradicted by every-

¹ See Hollond’s rather absurd and inconclusive argument on the advantage of selecting the officers of the navy from clerks rather than from seamen or shipwrights, pp. 88–94. *infra*.

² P. 131.

³ P. 166.

⁴ P. 170.

⁵ P. 172.

⁶ P. 273.

thing that we know of the men. There is nothing in the State Papers to justify a suspicion of dishonest or tyrannical dealing with regard to them, and they were not at all the sort of commanders to use their authority to oppress the seaman for the benefit of the victualling contractor. The only one of these charges against the generals for which there appears to have been any foundation was that of acting as victuallers for their fleets. Deane certainly acted as victualler in 1649, though the circumstances were peculiar, and everything was above-board.¹ Possibly the same charge might be sustained against Mountagu in 1656;² and it is certain that in the same year Richard Badiley, who had acted as general in the Mediterranean in 1653, contracted to supply the fleet with 'two or three hundred tuns of wine from Leghorn,' though the contract was abandoned at the instance of the admiralty commissioners, they 'since judging it more proper to leave that affair to the victualler.'³ Stoakes was general in the Mediterranean in 1658-9, and had a large sum of money entrusted to him for the use of his fleet,⁴ but there is nothing to show that he himself made a profit by his transactions. The facts with regard to the false accusations made against Sir Home Popham in 1803, accepted as true after enquiry by the navy board in 1804, and completely disproved by a select committee of the House of Commons in 1805,⁵ should make us cautious of accepting charges that emanate even from so well-

¹ See note on p. 170.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1656-57, p. 507.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1658-59, p. 401.

⁵ *D. N. B.*

informed a writer as Hollond, especially where such strong motives existed to make him unfair. Nothing could be more acceptable to the Restoration royalists than anything which depreciated the distinguished naval commanders of the Commonwealth, whose exploits had contributed so greatly to its stability. And this could be easily done by an expert who should pick up gossip and write it down as truth.

To specifically disprove Hollond's charges against the generals would be a very difficult matter ; we must be content to note their improbability. But for a good many of his other statements it is possible to find corroborative evidence. An attempt has been made in the footnotes to the text of the Discourses to justify a number of his assertions as they occur, and this tends to prove his general reliability where his prejudices and immediate interests were not involved. But one or two of these assertions are of general historical importance, and these should be noticed in the Introduction.

In the Second Discourse, Hollond makes certain charges against the parliamentary committee of the navy that was in power during the Civil War, and later during the war with Holland. In the matter of freight for the hire of the merchant-ships taken up by the State for war purposes in 1643, they are accused of having 'managed the business so effectually' as to secure for themselves, as owners of some of the vessels, payment for victuals and wages for a longer time than was necessary in the interest of the State ;¹ of having in their joint

¹ P. 139, *infra*.

capacities of owners and committee-men during both wars hired to the State their own ships, mostly unserviceable—‘old toads and leeward jades’¹; of taking advantage of their official position to ‘shuffle in old decayed English bottoms into the State’s service,’² ‘to employ their own ships in all profitable ways, ports, and places where profit may accrue to the owner,’³ to secure for themselves early payment when other men had to wait for their money,⁴ ‘to procure their ships to be measured and certified thirty or forty tons more than they are, or indeed ever were in burden,’⁵ to equip them with smaller guns than the contract contemplated,⁶ to return false musters of their men so as to get paid wages for a larger number than the vessels really carried,⁷ and to commit other frauds of a similar kind. And this indictment, which appears to be directed mainly against the committee of the navy, is so framed as to include members of Parliament, commissioners of the customs, and even commissioners of the navy.⁸

Now these, if true, are serious charges, and with regard to the period of the Civil War, at any rate, there is a good deal of evidence to confirm them. Dr. S. R. Gardiner⁹ notes the charges of corruption that were brought against members of Parliament in 1648, and remarks that ‘though some of the cases alleged were those of men who had been rewarded for service rendered, there can be little doubt that in many cases the rewards were higher than the services justified. and that in others

¹ P. 267.² P. 268.³ *Ibid.*⁴ *Ibid.*⁵ *Ibid.*⁶ *Ibid.*⁷ *Ibid.*⁸ P. 265.⁹ *History of the Civil War*, iii. 309.

opportunity was afforded of driving hard bargains at the expense of the State.' But the kind of corruption described by Hollond must have infected the navy still earlier. About the year 1645, Andrewes Burrell, shipwright, the son of William Burrell,¹ who had been one of the master shipwrights of James I., published pamphlets in which he criticised the administration of the navy. He attacked the officers on account of the slowness of their ships and frigates, which he attributed partly to their interference with the shipwrights in determining the lines on which they should be built, and partly to the low prices given to the builders.² But he also made charges against those concerned in navy administration of precisely the same kind as those made by Hollond in the passages referred to above. The principal officers, 'to accomplish their own ends . . . suffer the greatest part of their royal navy to lie rotting at Chatham and Portsmouth, and at a dear rate,' and hire 'the worst of merchant-ships, even colliers, to serve in their rooms.' Some of the vessels thus hired belong to the officers themselves and some to 'parliament men.'³ Burrell was pressed by the officers to prove his words, and though he afterwards admitted that he had been 'forced to write' in 'plain English,' and 'did use expressions a little too positive,' being 'forced to

¹ See note on p. 119, *infra*.

² *To the Right Hon. the High Court of Parliament, the Humble Remonstrance of Andrewes Burrell, Gent., for a Reformation of England's Navie.*

³ *England's Outguard; or England's Royal Navy surveyed and lamented.* By Andrewes Burrell, Gent., sometime a Servant in the Navy.

make a rumbling noise,' otherwise he 'could not be heard,'¹ he nevertheless stuck to his guns, and, unlike Hollond, whose standing defect is vagueness, descended to specific accusations against particular persons. Three members of Parliament, all of whom were also members of the committee of the navy,² are described as financially interested in the hired ships. Samuel Vassall was alleged to be part owner of the *Mayflower*, Squire Bence and Alexander Bence of the *Angel*, and the last-named of the *Blessing* also. Of the navy commissioners, Captain Crandley was owner of the *Dragon*, part owner of the *Anne Percy* with his colleague Morris, and also part owner of the *Providence* with another colleague, Tweedy. It was also asserted by Burrell that one Shafto, captain of a hired merchant-ship employed on behalf of the Parliament as a man-of-war, had been guilty of fraudulent practices in twice releasing a royalist vessel that he had taken as a prize. The facts having come to the notice of 'Mr. John Hollond, one of the commissioners of the navy,' he had stopped the payment of the freight of Shafto's ship until he should clear himself of the 'abuses' which he had 'cast upon the Parliament'; whereupon his colleagues, to oblige Alexander Bence, one of the owners of Shafto's ship, overruled Hollond, and paid the freight in full. 'And for that cause, and for some other unworthy practices, it is said Mr. Hollond hath forborne these fourteen months to come amongst the officers of the navy.'

So great an impression was made by these

¹ *To the Right Hon. the High Court of Parliament, &c.*

² *Commons' Journals*, ii. 271, 728.

pamphlets that in June 1646 the commissioners of the navy thought it necessary to publish a reply.¹ Their answer to the charges bearing on the inefficiency of the fleet does not concern us here. With pardonable irritation they speak of their accuser as a 'dull carpenter,' and attempt to overwhelm him with lists of ships and statements of repairs recently effected. In reply to the personal accusations they admit that Samuel Vassall is part owner of the Mayflower, 'a serviceable merchant-ship'; that Alexander Bence owns one-sixteenth part of the Blessing; and that Captain Crandley is a partner in the Providence, 'though not in the service,' as also in the Honour, lately burnt. But they deny that Crandley and Morris own the Anne Percy, or that Tweedy owns any ship in the service at all; and they assert that there is no such ship as the Angel in the service. They admit their interference in the case of Captain Shafto, urging that Hollond had acted 'against' their consent, and defend it on the ground that Shafto had not been convicted of any crime at the time; that the money belonged to the owners of the vessel and not to him; and that he was a responsible person 'to answer anything that should be afterwards laid to his charge,' and 'to our knowledge he is a man that hath been faithful to the Parliament.' 'And as for Master Hollond's forbearing fourteen months to sit in commission for this and many other abuses, as Master Burrell pretends, we humbly desire that

¹ *The Answer of the Commissioners of the Navy to a Scandalous Pamphlet, published by Mr. Andrewes Burrell.* London: June 18, 1646.

Master Hollond may be examined what these abuses were, and by whom committed, that if so they may receive condign punishment.'

The last passage has a personal interest, as it confirms the impression that Hollond had differences with his colleagues. Whether these were due to his superior moral standard is not clear, though the whole transaction, as it appears in Burrell's attack and the officers' reply, has a savour of official jobbery, and this impression is confirmed when we test the officers' assertions about the hired merchant-ships by the navy accounts. An examination of the payments on account of freight entered in the Pipe Office and Audit Office Declared Accounts shows that in 1646 Samuel Vassall was not only part owner of the *Mayflower*, but also received freight on account of the *Samuel*.¹ Alexander Bence was not only being paid for a share in the *Blessing*, but was engaged during the years 1643-46 in a number of profitable transactions. In 1643 he and Squire Bence received a sum of money 'for unlading a Danish ship of arms and ammunition'²; during 1643-5 the former was paid freight as part owner of the *Samuel*;³ and in 1646 he received a large sum for the hire of several ships employed in guarding the Iceland fishery.⁴ There may not have been a vessel called the *Angel* in the service at the moment when the officers' reply to Burrell was published, but there is among the State Papers, under date June 14, 1645,⁵ an application to the

¹ Audit Office, MDCCVI. 90.

² Pipe Office, 2285.

³ Audit Office, MDCCVI. 91.

⁴ *Ibid.* 90.

⁵ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1644-5, p. 590.

committee of the admiralty from the owners of the *Angel*—two members of parliament, Captain Crandley, a navy commissioner at the time, and Thomas Smith, afterwards a navy commissioner—that this vessel, being ‘reported an extraordinary sailer,’ may be taken up as a man-of-war for employment on the coast of Ireland ‘to intercept arms, ammunition, and other commodities, frequently imported and exported to and from the rebels in that kingdom.’ Benjamin Crandley, probably a relative of the navy commissioner, was also receiving freight in 1645 and 1646 as part owner of the *Messenger*, by order of the navy committee, and a Captain Crandley—either Richard or Benjamin—as part owner of the *Truelove* in 1645.¹

Enough has been said to show not only that the statement of the navy commissioners in answer to Burrell conveyed a false impression by its silence concerning the transactions of the accused persons with the navy before the date of its publication, but also that it was not an accurate account of their transactions at that date. It is clear that Hollond’s assertion that it was possible for the same man to be ‘an owner, a commissioner, a committee man, nay, a chairman of that committee, and in these capacities hire to the State (as a signal service) his or their ships,’² is justified by the recorded facts. If this is granted, the abuses that he describes may very well have followed ; and the ease with which transactions of this kind could be disguised under other men’s names makes it

¹ Audit Office, MDCCVI. 90, 91.

² P. 266, *infra*.

probable that what is recorded is only a part of what actually occurred.

Hollond's reference here to the 'chairman of that committee' is to Giles Grene, member for Corfe Castle in the Long Parliament, whom he had already alluded to in an earlier passage as 'one . . . that could . . . easily help a lame dog over the stile.'¹ It is worth noticing that in 1647 Grene was stung by the attacks upon him into publishing a very vehement protestation of honesty in his capacity as chairman of the committee of the navy and customs.² In this he declares that he himself had never received 'one penny' above his salary of 500*l.* for preferring men to places. 'To satisfy the world of my own integrity,' he says, 'I do solemnly profess, as in the presence of God, at whose tribunal I must give an account for all my actions before all men and angels, that for the appointing of all those moneys disposed of by that committee I never received, nor any other to my knowledge for my use, any sum or sums of money, not the value of a penny, from any person or persons whatsoever, as a fee, bribe, reward, or what other name you may give it . . . saving that there was about four years since 3*l.* sent unto me from a captain at sea for a beaver hat.'³ Clearly Hollond was not the first to accuse the committee of the navy of dubious practices.

The statements made by our author apply not

¹ P. 139.

² *A Declaration in Vindication of the Honour of the Parliament, and of the Committee of the Navy and Customs against all Traducers.* London: 1647.

³ *Ibid.* p. 20.

only to the war between the King and his Parliament, but also to that between the Parliament and the Dutch.¹ It is true that in neither case does he seriously blame his own colleagues, 'for they were not so much outwitted, as overpowered by the then committee of the navy.'² But there is reason to think that in the latter war also the hands of the commissioners were not altogether clean. Two contracts occur among the State Papers between the navy commissioners and Thomas Smith, one of their number, in one of which he was to receive 330*l.* a month for the *Lucie* of London, a vessel of 164 tons and 20 guns, and 345*l.* a month for the *Crescent*, 326 tons and 28 guns.³ These prices appear excessive when compared with those of other contracts of about the same date, though as the ordinary method of payment under the Commonwealth was at the rate of 3*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.* a man per month, this might be accounted for by their carrying larger crews. When Smith died in 1658, the navy owed him 3,140*l.* 'for the freight of shipping between 1643-51' . . . 'mostly his own personal debt and the rest bought of others.'⁴

There is one other important accusation which Hollond makes against the administrators of the navy in his time. In his chapter entitled 'Of the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy'⁵ he delivers a vigorous philippic against 'that lawless liberty the commissioners of the navy assume to themselves to be at the same time commissioners of the

¹ P. 265, *infra*.

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1651-2, p. 519.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1658-9, p. 39.

² P. 266.

⁵ P. 291, *infra*.

navy and private merchants or otherwise traders and dealers both by sea and land in foreign and home commodities.' ¹ This had been one of the most serious abuses of James I.'s reign, and an anonymous writer of 1611, who had suggested a number of reforms for 'disorders' in the navy, had strongly urged 'that no officer, neither principal or other, be a purveyor, or have participation with any purveyors, neither deal for any provision by the way of merchandise or otherwise; neither deliver any provision into the store by the means of using another man's name to colour it.' ² Hollond's exposure of the attendant evils is convincing, but trading was not formally prohibited in the navy until the Duke of York's 'Instructions,' issued in 1662. ³

The following manuscripts of Hollond's First Discourse are mentioned in easily accessible catalogues: (1) A good seventeenth-century copy in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene College, Cambridge, ⁴ with Sir Robert Slyngesbie's Discourse of the Navy added as an anonymous appendix. (2) A still better seventeenth-century copy among the Rawlinson MSS. ⁵ in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. This is written in three hands, the earlier part containing a marginal abstract and a few notes in the same hand as the text. This supports the Pepysian MS. in the main, but supplies certain omitted passages; the relation between them is evidently close. (3) An inferior copy in the British Museum. ⁶ This follows the Pepysian MS. closely, but occa-

¹ P. 309, *infra*. ² Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 307.

³ See note on p. 228, *infra*.

⁴ No. 2193.

⁵ A. 192.

⁶ Add. MSS. 15626.

sionally varies for the worse. It contains a few corrections by a different hand, which inserts brackets freely. (4) An excellent copy among Sir William Penn's 'Naval Tracts' in the British Museum.¹ (5) An eighteenth-century copy in the British Museum² of no special value, full of careless omissions and audacious emendations. Slyngesbie's Discourse is appended to this also. (6) Another eighteenth-century copy in the British Museum,³ on the whole more accurate than the first, but of no great value. (7) A copy among the Leeds MSS., described in the Eleventh Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission.⁴ (8) A folio copy; and (9) another copy, large folio, described in the Third Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission;⁵ both among the manuscripts at Longleat House.

The text printed below is combined from the first three of these manuscripts [referred to in the footnotes as the Pepysian MS., Bodleian MS., and B. M. copy]. The fourth manuscript [Penn MS.], which came to light later, has been also consulted, as well as the fifth and sixth. Variations of any special interest are noted where they occur.

Only two manuscripts of the Second Discourse have been disclosed by an examination of the usual sources of information: (1) a presentation copy,

¹ Sloane MSS. 3232. It is apparently this copy that is referred to in J. B. Deane's *Life of Richard Deane* (p. 392), with a wrong reference and a wrong date, as the work of an anonymous writer 'who seems to have been an admiralty clerk.' It is said to be itself a copy (made by order of William Penn the son) of a manuscript belonging to the Penn family, and formerly the private possession of Sir William Penn (Granville Penn, *Memorials of Sir William Penn*, ii. 530).

² Add. MSS. 9335.

³ Harl. MSS. 6277.

⁴ vii. 40.

⁵ P. 186.

folio, 193 pp., at Longleat House,¹ with the dedication signed and the text corrected in the author's own hand. Brief notes of its contents in Sir W. Coventry's handwriting are prefixed. As there are other Coventry papers at Longleat House, it seems probable that this was Coventry's own copy. (2) A good copy in the Pepysian Library.² As one or two mis-readings occur in this manuscript just where the text of the Longleat MS. is obscured by close sewing, it is probable that it was copied directly from it, and this conjecture the friendship between Coventry and Pepys would appear to confirm. When Pepys wished to add a copy of the Second Discourse to his library, he was more likely to borrow it from Coventry than anyone else. The text printed below was taken in the first instance from the Pepysian MS., but it has been since collated with the Longleat MS., which has been followed in all variations of any importance.

SIR ROBERT SLYNGESBIE, comptroller of the navy after the Restoration, the author of the Discourse of the Navy which follows Hollond's Discourses at the end of this volume, is a man who appears in some sense to belong to just the opposite type to Hollond. Hollond was a clerk, Slyngesbie a seaman; Hollond was a man of great ability, who had worked his way from an origin wholly obscure, while Slyngesbie belonged to a family that had already attained a position of some distinction; it is nothing against Hollond that he was a parlia-

¹ Historical MSS. Commission, *Third Report*, p. 186.

² No. 2835.

folio, 193 pp., at Longleat House,¹ with the dedication signed and the text corrected in the author's own hand. Brief notes of its contents in Sir W. Coventry's handwriting are prefixed. As there are other Coventry papers at Longleat House, it seems probable that this was Coventry's own copy. (2) A good copy in the Pepysian Library.² As one or two mis-readings occur in this manuscript just where the text of the Longleat MS. is obscured by close sewing, it is probable that it was copied directly from it, and this conjecture the friendship between Coventry and Pepys would appear to confirm. When Pepys wished to add a copy of the Second Discourse to his library, he was more likely to borrow it from Coventry than anyone else. The text printed below was taken in the first instance from the Pepysian MS., but it has been since collated with the Longleat MS., which has been followed in all variations of any importance.

SIR ROBERT SLYNGESBIE, comptroller of the navy after the Restoration, the author of the Discourse of the Navy which follows Hollond's Discourses at the end of this volume, is a man who appears in some sense to belong to just the opposite type to Hollond. Hollond was a clerk, Slyngesbie a seaman; Hollond was a man of great ability, who had worked his way from an origin wholly obscure, while Slyngesbie belonged to a family that had already attained a position of some distinction; it is nothing against Hollond that he was a parlia-

¹ Historical MSS. Commission, *Third Report*, p. 186.

² No. 2835.

mentarian, but he was certainly a selfish, and in some respects almost a sordid parliamentarian, whereas Slyngesbie displayed a devotion to the lost cause that does infinite credit to his heart, if not to his head. Hollond's is the valuable treatise, but the charm of personal character is all with Slyngesbie, and it is a relief to turn from the difficult and ambiguous motives of the one to the plain dealings and delicate loyalty of the other.

Robert Slyngesbie was the second son of Sir Gylford Slyngisbie, who had been comptroller of the navy in the reign of James I., and the grandson of Sir Francis Slingsby,¹ of Scriven, knight. Robert Slyngesbie's mother (the 'old Lady Slingsby' of Pepys' Diary²) was Margaret Water, the daughter of Sir William Water, an alderman of York,³ and his first cousin⁴ was the Henry Slingsby who was condemned by Cromwell's High Court of Justice, and expiated his loyalty on the scaffold. Thus he came of a family distinguished for its loyalty, and as the son of a comptroller he had an hereditary connection with the navy.

He was born probably in 1611,⁵ and according to

¹ The family name is usually written 'Slingsby,' but each member of it must have had his characteristic signature (see *N. R. S.* vol. i. p. lxxxii.). That this was so is brought out very clearly by the fact that Robert 'Slyngesbie' the son signs differently from Gylford 'Slyngisbie' the father (*S. P. Dom. Jac. I.* lxxxi. 57). It would be difficult to trace all the different spellings, so except in these two cases the ordinary form has been used here.

² January 29, 1661.

³ Collins.

⁴ Another first cousin was Mary Slingsby, the mother of Slingsby Bethell, who was Sheriff of London in 1680. An account of the family is given in *The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby*, ed. Rev. D. Parsons. London: 1836, p. 381.

⁵ *The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby*.

his own account was 'from his infancy bred up and employed in the navy.'¹ Soon after the loss of his father at sea,² leaving a widow and many children,³ the officers of the navy, on February 22, 1633, recommended the second son 'to be captain of the Eighth or Tenth Lion's Whelp, preparing for guard of the Narrow Seas.'⁴ In June 1636 he was in command of the Roebuck,⁵ a 10-gun pinnace of 90 tons, and doing convoy duty in the Channel under the orders of Captain Carteret of the Happy Entrance.⁶ Here he engaged with a French frigate, and wished to pursue, but Carteret recalled him, for which Northumberland afterwards called him to account.⁷ In November 1636 Slyngesbie was appointed to the command of the Third Whelp⁸ on the ground that it was 'a fitter vessel for the winter than a pinnace,' and ordered to join Mervin in the Downs; but there were delays in fitting out his ship,⁹ and when she eventually reached Mervin in Dover Road in December, she was immediately driven back to Portsmouth again by a dangerous leak, which led Mervin to complain to the Lords of the Admiralty of the loss the service sustained 'by too much negligence in sending forth these smaller vessels so ill-appointed and carelessly slubbered over.'¹⁰ Slyngesbie appears to have remained in nominal

¹ *S. P. Dom. Car. II.* i. 153.

² Apparently in 1631.

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1631-3, p. 263.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 546.

⁵ *Ibid.* 1636-7, pp. 33 and 87.

⁶ *Ibid.* 1635-6, p. 527.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 563.

⁸ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, p. 187 (November 9), and Historical MSS. Commission, *Twelfth Report*, ii. 144.

⁹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, pp. 188, 196, and 212.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 245. See also Historical MSS. Commission, *Twelfth Report*, ii. 150.

command of the Third Whelp until the end of 1637, although in August he was, as a matter of fact, doing convoy duty on board the Royal Defence,¹ but when, in November 1637, Sir John Penington wrote from the Swiftsure in the Downs asking for another ship in place of the First Whelp, which 'in the tempestuous weather of late' had 'sprung a desperate leak,' he suggested the Providence as the 'fittest,' 'which Captain Slyngesbie desires he may be put into in place of his Whelp.'² In April 1638 we find him in command of the Expedition, a 30-gun pinnace of 301 tons, escorting the Morocco ambassador from Portsmouth in company with Captain Carteret in the Convertive.³ In October he was ordered to join Sir John Penington,⁴ and in the following summer he was conveying despatches from Penington to Admiral Tromp before Dunkirk.⁵

By this time Slyngesbie's loyalty and seamanship were sufficiently well known for him to be selected for a service of considerable importance. On January 10, 1640, arrangements were made at the Council of War for levying an army of 23,000 men to march against rebellious Scotland in the summer.⁶ A fortnight later⁷ the Earl of Northumberland, as acting lord high admiral, issued instructions for Captain Robert Slyngesbie of the Expedition, to convoy the Providence of London from the Thames to Leith, with a force of 100 soldiers, a supply of

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1637, p. 393.

³ *Ibid.* 1637-8, p. 356.

⁵ *Ibid.* 1639, p. 457.

⁷ January 22, 1640.

² *Ibid.* p. 533.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1638-9, p. 64.

⁶ Gardiner, ix. 84.

ammunition from the Tower, and a sum of money, for the strengthening of the garrison and defences of Edinburgh Castle.¹ The safe arrival of his convoy is noted by Lord Balmerino in a letter to the Earl of Eglinton, dated from Edinburgh on February 10, 1640, in which he speaks of the event as an 'extraordinary occasion' which 'vexeth us here.'²

This successful enterprise meant promotion, and in the following June we find Slyngesbie, now captain of Carteret's old ship, the *Happy Entrance*, a 32-gun ship of 582 tons, in command of a small squadron entrusted by Sir John Penington, then admiral of the Narrow Seas, with the duty of supplying convoys for merchants from the Downs, and assisting the farmers of customs in preventing smuggling.³ He seems to have been employed in the Channel during the whole of the next year also, for on April 26, 1641, he writes to the Lord Admiral to complain of the 'insolencies' of Calais sloops in the Downs anchorage.⁴ His last employment before the outbreak of the war was in June 1642, when as captain of the *Garland* he was ordered to convey the Portuguese Ambassador to Lisbon, and bring back from thence the wife of Antonio de Sousa, the Portuguese resident in London.⁵

There was no doubt from the beginning that when the time came for him to choose a side Robert Slyngesbie would be loyal to the King. His correspondence with his official superior, Sir John

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1639-40, pp. 360, 362, 367, 390.

² Historical MSS. Commission, *Tenth Report*, i. 48 (Eglinton MSS.).

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1640, p. 372.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1640-1, p. 559. ⁵ *Ibid.* 1641-3, p. 343 (June 17).

Penington, during the latter part of the year 1641, which is preserved in the State Papers,¹ shows that they were on intimate terms, and Penington was, as Clarendon describes him, 'of unshaken faithfulness and integrity to the King.'² In November 1641 the *Happy Entrance* was ordered to Ireland, but, as Slyngesbie himself tells Sir John Penington, another captain was placed in command of her, 'some of the Parliament having made scruples concerning my fitness for that employment in respect of my brother's near relation to my lord of Strafford.'³

Thus when the fleet in the Downs was called upon to choose⁴ between Sir John Penington, the King's representative, and the Earl of Warwick, who had been appointed to the command by ordinance of Parliament, Slyngesbie, then captain of the *Garland*, followed Sir John Mennes, the rear-admiral, and five other captains in declaring for the King. The letter that he wrote to Warwick on July 3, 1642,⁵ just at the point when the conflict was about to break out and he had decided that he could not conscientiously refuse to obey the King, is a composition worthy of the writer's steadfast, if somewhat unintellectual, integrity. He has been in

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1641-3, p. 7, and letters of Nov. 25, Dec. 2, 16, and 30, 1641; and Jan. 6 and 14, 1642. These are long reports of the progress of affairs in London, and the growing alienation between the King and Parliament, during the time that Slyngesbie was unemployed. The letter of Jan. 6, 1642, gives an account of the attempt to arrest the Five Members.

² *D. N. B.* xliv. 301.

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1641-3, p. 179.

⁴ The circumstances are described by Gardiner (vol. x.).

⁵ House of Lords' MSS. (Historical MSS. Commission, *Fifth Report*, p. 34).

hopes, he says, 'to receive some propositions whereby he might legally, and without breach of his allegiance, discharge himself of his ship.' He 'has not heard that either his Majesty or the Parliament have declared any difference between themselves, and yet their several commands are distinctly opposite.' He 'calls God to witness that his only desire is to do that which is just towards the King and the law of the land. If his Majesty will be pleased to join with the Parliament in their ordinance, no man will obey his Lordship with greater alacrity than the writer, who will be ready to deliver up his ship to whomsoever his Majesty shall appoint.' After expressing his willingness even to go so far as to surrender it to the Principal Officers, 'whose commissions are derived from the King and are not disavowed by the Parliament,' he 'beseeches that those who serve in the ship, and whose conscience will not permit them to serve contrary to his Majesty's commands, may be discharged and paid at their departure, according to ancient custom, for the time they have served.' He 'prays pardon for some roughness, which the incivility of those employed by his Lordship compelled the writer to, as he did not think fit to let every man that came on board use his own language.' 'There is nothing the writer has received from his Lordship that he has not communicated to his men, particularly the last paper, directing the master and the rest of the men to turn the writer out of the ship. To show what confidence he has in this master, he has employed him to be the bearer of this letter. There is nothing

he desires more than to serve his Lordship without breach of his allegiance to the King.'

The resistance of Penington and the loyal captains was of no avail. The crews gave them no support, and the fleet declared for the Parliament. On July 12 Lieutenant Waters, perhaps a kinsman, wrote to Slyngesbie at once to congratulate and to warn him.¹ 'Yesterday walking in Westminster,' he writes, 'I heard people talk of you, and say how much Parliament was incensed against you. You have gained a fair name and much applause from such as wish well to the King. I exhort you to adhere to the course you have taken.' And the vengeance of the Parliament was not long delayed. At the time when this letter was written Slyngesbie and another captain who acted with him, one Baldwin Wake, had been already arrested,² and on July 18 they were both sent up to London in custody as delinquents.³ The charge against them was one of 'scandalous words' against the Earl of Warwick.⁴ Owing to a difficulty about bail they remained a long time in prison, as certain petitions for their enlargement among the manuscripts of the House of Lords prove;⁵ moreover Slyngesbie himself spoke of it afterwards as a 'long and chargeable imprisonment.'⁶ The circumstances and date of his liberation do not transpire.

As soon as his imprisonment was over Slyngesbie repaired to Oxford,⁷ where he was received as one

¹ Historical MSS. Commission, *Thirteenth Report*, i. 43.

² *Ibid.* *Fifth Report*, p. 39.

³ *Ibid.* p. 38.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 40.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 39, 41, 56.

⁶ *S. P. Dom. Car. II.* i. 153.

⁷ *Ibid.*

who had suffered for the cause, and whose loyalty could be relied upon under all circumstances. Thus the King was led to employ him 'in several capacities of trust,'¹ and in particular in January 1644 on a secret mission to Paris, where Lord Goring was to join him, and thence to Amsterdam, in order to try and arrange to raise more money upon the security of the Crown jewels which the Queen had pawned there, 'by changing the hands in which they are placed.' Goring himself predicted that the enterprise would fail, and there is no reason to suppose that it succeeded.²

In 1645 Robert Slyngesbie, together with his brother, Col. Walter Slyngesbie, was at the siege of Bristol, and the former was on Rupert's council of war.³ According to his own account, he raised a regiment of foot, consisting of seamen, for the defence of the city, 'which continued as long as that garrison, without charge either to his Majesty or the country ;'⁴ he also manned some ships in that port under Sir John Mennes' command with his

¹ *S. P. Dom. Car. II.* i. 153.

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1641-3, p. 504; 1644, p. 259. The Signet Office Docquet Book contains an entry of 100*l.* under date December 1643, paid to Robert Slyngesbie 'for a journey to be by him performed for his Majesty's secret service.' Under February 1643-4 there appears a note of a warrant to the Exchequer to pay him a fixed allowance of 40*s.* per diem 'for his entertainment in his employment as commissioner into Holland,' to begin from January 11, 'and to continue until his return to his Majesty's presence inclusively,' but the advance of 100*l.* was to be deducted from this. He was also to receive additional payment for 'transportation, posting, and charges.' The warrant in full, dated April 9, is among the State Papers, but in this the payment of 40*s.* per diem begins on April 1 (see *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1644, p. 105).

³ *The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby*, p. 406.

⁴ *S. P. Dom. Car. II.* i. 153.

own 'money and credit, by the pawn of his plate and jewels, which he was never able since to redeem.'¹ He was afterwards 'wounded in battle, left for dead, and stripped by the enemy; yet so soon as he was recovered from his wounds with the loss of his right hand,' he 'did frequently by stealth attend his Majesty in his restraint, and was by him employed on his most private negotiations.' On one occasion, while 'endeavouring access' to the King by his command, he was 'apprehended and laid in a loathsome jail.'²

If Slyngesbie's own details are to be trusted,³ he had the strongest possible claim upon the gratitude of Charles II. at the Restoration, and the comptrollership of the navy was but a poor reward. Moreover he was able to describe himself in 1660 as 'being now the most ancient survivor of your Majesty's royal father (of glorious memory) his constant sea-captains, except Sir John Mennes and Sir George Carteret,'⁴ and to claim to have spent 5,800*l.* in the royal service.⁵ As a matter of fact the late King had actually conferred on him the much more lucrative office of treasurer,⁶ but this was also claimed by Sir George Carteret, and thus Slyngesbie had to be content with the comptroller's

¹ *S. P. Dom. Car. II.* i. 153.

² *Ibid.*

³ This document is a petition presented to Charles II. in support of Slyngesbie's claim to office in the navy, but so much of what it asserts is corroborated that there is no reason to distrust the rest.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* Cf. also Pepys' *Diary* for November 10, 1660. 'The Comptroller and I to the coffee-house, where he showed me the state of his case; how the King did owe him about 6,000*l.*'

⁶ *S. P. Dom. Car. II.* i. 154.

place. The patent is dated June 25, 1660.¹ On March 18, 1661, he was also made a baronet.²

Slyngesbie and Pepys were on the whole good friends, and there are several references to him in the 'Diary'; in particular Pepys mentions Slyngesbie's 'design' for 'the King's making an Order of Knights of the Sea, to give an encouragement for persons of honour to undertake the service of the sea,' which he had drawn up 'with great pains and very ingeniously.'³ Pepys also notes that he was of opinion that the principal officers should 'labour to get into the next Parliament.'⁴ Unfortunately the honest seaman did not long enjoy his new honours and unwonted prosperity. On October 22, 1661, Pepys went to visit him, as he had 'fallen sick of this new disease, an ague and fever'—perhaps some form of influenza⁵—and on October 26, after only a week's illness, he died.⁶ He seems to have been a merry soul,⁷ and Pepys mourned greatly over

¹ Duckett.

² Bright's edition of the *Diary*, note in vi. 300.

³ *Diary*, December 9, 1660. ⁴ *Ibid.* February 23, 1660-1.

⁵ See note in Wheatley's edition of the *Diary*, ii. 124.

⁶ *Diary*.

⁷ *Diary*, November 14, 1660: 'Sir W. Penn, the Comptroller, and I to the Dolphin, where we found Sir W. Batten . . . and there we did drink a great quantity of sack, and did tell many merry stories, and in good humours were we all.' Cf. also December 14, 1660, February 4, 1661 (where after 'a very great and merry dinner,' the Comptroller 'begun some sports'), June 5, 1661, and elsewhere. Lady Slyngesbie also was described by Pepys as 'a good woman' (April 15, 1661). She was a daughter of Sir Edward Radclyffe of Dilston, Northumberland, and the Comptroller's second wife, being the widow of Sir William Fenwick, Bart., of Meldon. His first wife had been Elizabeth, daughter of Robert Brooke, of Newcells. (Lord Braybrooke's note.)

the news of his loss. It 'put me,' he says,¹ 'into so great a trouble of mind, that all the night I could not sleep, he being a man that loved me, and had many qualities that made me to love him above all the officers and commissioners in the navy.'

Slyngesbie's Discourse of the Navy in both style and subject-matter is conspicuously inferior to Hollond's Second Discourse, if not to the First also. The historical account of naval administration, which occupies the first fourteen pages, is rambling and ineffective, but one or two of the author's suggestions are sensible enough. He traces the 'present confusion of the office'² in the main, as an intelligent writer of the Restoration period was sure to do, to 'the great arrear of pay' whereby 'the officers are forced to wink at or dispense with several disorders.'³ His remedies are: a 'seasonable provision of . . . moneys';⁴ a more exact calculation of the 'medium' of wages, with 'some additional encouragement to the most able seamen';⁵ prohibition of the serious abuse of trading by the captains and other officers of the royal navy;⁶ and measures for the encouragement of merchant shipping,⁷ which he rightly regards as a reserve for the navy. Pepys speaks of his paper as painstaking, but does not appear to have been greatly impressed by its value.⁸ But some part of it bears sufficiently upon Hollond's

¹ October 26, 1661.

² P. 345, *infra*.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ P. 350.

⁵ Pp. 352-3.

⁶ P. 353.

⁷ P. 354.

⁸ 'To the Comptroller's house, where I read over his proposals to the Lord Admiral for the regulating of the officers of the navy, in which he hath taken much pains, only he do seem to have too good opinion of them himself' (*Diary*, January 22, 1661).

Discourses to make it worth while to include it in the same volume, especially as it is associated with the First Discourse in no less than three manuscripts, and the text already printed in Charnock, *Marine Architecture*, is very badly edited, and in many places scarcely makes sense.

The text printed below follows in the main (1) the Pepysian manuscript,¹ in which Slyngesbie's Discourse of the Navy is appended to Hollond's First Discourse; but the following manuscripts have also been consulted: (2) A good copy, among the Pepysian Miscellanies in the library at Magdalene College [referred to in the footnotes as 'Misc. MS.']; (3) an eighteenth-century copy appended to one of the eighteenth-century copies of the First Discourse in the British Museum² [referred to as 'B. M. copy']; (4) another copy in the British Museum³ [referred to as 'Harl. MS.']; (5) the printed text in Charnock, *Marine Architecture*,⁴ has also been collated. Other copies not consulted for this purpose are: (6) a third copy in the British Museum,⁵ and (7) a copy described, with a copy of Hollond's First Discourse, as among the MSS. of the Duke of Leeds.⁶

The Editor desires to express his gratitude to several personal friends who have kindly allowed him to consult them upon doubtful points, and also

¹ No. 2193. See p. lxviii, *supra*.

² Add. MSS. 9335. See p. lxix, *supra*.

³ Harl. MSS. 6287.

⁴ Vol. i. p. liii. This is erroneously dated 1669 (p. lxxiv).

⁵ Harl. MSS. 6003.

⁶ Historical MSS. Commission, *Eleventh Report*, vii. 40. See p. lxix, *supra*

to those officials at the Record Office, the British Museum, the Bodleian at Oxford, and the University Library at Cambridge from whom he has obtained help. In particular he would thank the Master and Fellows of Magdalene College, Cambridge, for their permission to consult the manuscripts in the Pepysian Library, and especially the librarian, Mr. A. G. Peskett, for his unfailing kindness in allowing him access to them at times that cannot always have been convenient to himself; the Marquis of Bath, for permission to consult the manuscript of the Second Discourse in the library of Longleat House; Mr. C. H. Firth, of Oxford, and Mr. W. A. J. Archbold of Peterhouse, Cambridge, for advice that was of the greatest value; and, above all, Professor J. K. Laughton, for carefully reading the proofs and making a number of most valuable suggestions. The extent of the Editor's indebtedness to the important researches of Mr. M. Oppenheim in the *English Historical Review* appears on almost every page. It is a matter of great satisfaction to all students of naval history that these articles are soon to appear in a more permanent form.¹

¹ Since this sentence was written, they have been published, with additions, under the title *A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in relation to the Navy*.

MR. HOLLOND
HIS FIRST DISCOURSE
OF THE NAVY

written Anno 1638

BRIEF DISCOURSE

OF

THE NAVY

AMONG the many and manifold books extant upon all subjects, both serious and trivial, the navy hath not been beholding to the pen's invention or pains of any, either scholar or seaman, artist or other whatsoever, for so much as either the commendation of its being, the benefit of its well-being, the direction for its better being, or discovery of its want in its present being and state wherein it now stands, notwithstanding in it and its affair there hath always been employed men of all sorts and conditions fitted and endowed with eminent and singular gifts. What the ground of this silence is I neither know nor list to inquire, only its consideration hath moved me, having reaped benefit by (and fourteen years' experience in) the navy, to declare to the world as my hearty desire for its well-being, so the great benefit of its being to all conditions of people whatsoever living under our gracious Sovereign, the present state of its government in harbour,

some errors observable therein, the way how to prevent and amend them, and thereby to advance honour, as to the navy in general and all subordinate ministers thereof, so especially to his most royal Majesty, the first mover of its welfare, whose vigilant care and thrice honoured vigilance for its increase, government, and prosperity, hath far exceeded the parallel of all preceding princes, and worthily merited our praise to God who hath highly honoured him to be by his navy master of the seas, that on shore makes it his greatest honour to be master of his navy. I know the proverb, 'None so bold as blind Byard.' Excuse my boldness and I shall freely acknowledge my blindness, with desire only to shoot my bolt, which if it miss, my blindness is a fair excuse, or if it hits or comes but near the mark, I desire no other commendation than of a blind archer, especially if thereby I may encourage others that see better to try to shoot nearer. But to the purpose. Who is so wilfully ignorant or so grossly blinded as not to see, and seeing, not to acknowledge, the being of a navy in this kingdom to be one of the greatest and [most] deserving undertakings of the State, worthy the care of the greatest peer, and the prayer of the greatest prelate?—which to commend, though it worthily deserves the sublimest brain and happiest orator, yet that being not the scope of this my labour, I rather choose to let it commend itself to every man's consideration by three or four arguments of its benefit accruing to all sorts of people, than to run myself beyond intention into any impertinent discourse of so useful and approved a subject.

If either the honour of a nation, commerce or trade with all nations, peace at home, grounded upon our enemies' fear or love of us abroad, and attended with plenty of all things necessary either

for the preservation of the public weal or thy private welfare, be things worthy thy esteem (though it may be beyond thy shoal conceit), then next to God and the King give thy thanks for the same to the navy, as the principal instrument whereby God works these good things to thee. As for honour, who knows not (that knows anything) that in all records of late times of actions chronicled to the everlasting fame and renown of this kingdom, still the naval part is the thread that runs through the whole woof, the burden of the song, the scope of the text? that whereby Queen Elizabeth of famous memory immortalised her name by her many great victories obtained over all her enemies, neighbours or remote dwellers; King James of ever blessed memory by almost silent commands commanded the silence, if not the love, of all neighbouring nations; and that whereby our ever blessed Charles, when his abused patience began to be slighted (as that his power on the seas and right to the seas began thereby to be questioned), hath not only by his late expeditions of 1635, 1636, 1637, and 1638,¹ quelled foreign insolencies, regained our almost lost power and honour, silenced homebred malcontents, but also settled his kingdoms in peace, commerce, and plenty, the common attendants of so wise and honourable a government?

As for commerce and trade, go to the Custom House, inquire and satisfy thyself in the exportations and importations of this kingdom for that part,² and compare them with former precedents, and see if they do not exceed by much all former collections; then ask the ground of that so great trade by the

¹ The ship-money fleets. Selden's *Mare Clausum* was published in the spring of 1636, and accepted as 'a faithful and strong evidence to the dominion of the British seas.'

² So Bodleian and Penn MSS. The others read 'port.'

English with all nations, and by all nations with the English. It is even money that his Majesty being master of the seas is put for all other reasons, or if not, yet made a main reason among others. Know the body by the foot, and conceive thus with thyself. If it be thus much augmented in so few years at such a petty port where thou livest, what and how much is it increased in Dover, London, or the whole kingdom? Whence is it that sundry nations that are enemies amongst themselves are all friends to the English? that we can, and do, convoy¹ all French and Dutch bottoms to their several ports, and protect them from the fear and annoyance of the Spanish party; and on the contrary, all Spanish and Dunkirk bottoms to their several ports, and protect them from the encounter of the French and Dutch parties? How comes it to pass that when both parties are under the tuition of any of his Majesty's castles or ships, neither party dare disturb the quiet of each other till they be both out of protection?² What occasioned the transmission of so much Spanish coin and plate to be either new minted here, or at least transmitted hence, by and under the convoy of his Majesty's ships? I could instance in many more particulars, were it not to prove it day at noon; suffice it thus far, nothing under God, who doth all, hath brought so much, so great commerce to this kingdom as the rightly noble employments of our navy; a wheel, if truly turned, that sets to work all Christendom by its motion; a mill, if well extended, that in a sweet yet sovereign composure contracts the grist of all nations to its own dominions, and requires only the tribute of its own people, not for, but towards, its maintenance.

¹ MSS. 'convey' in the old sense of 'convoy.'

² But see the episode of 1639, when the Spanish fleet took refuge from the Dutch in the Downs. Gardiner, ix. 60-8.

Commerce and trade implies¹ peace and plenty, and therefore I need not be large in discovering the benefit of either, or proving the profit of both, to be settled upon the heads of the people of this nation by the means (under God) of the navy and his Majesty's wise government thereof. Who remembers not the vaunting expressions of the French in 1635, seconded by their great-built (to no purpose) ships, wherewith reports, lies, and exchanges² had so dashed our countenances that some thought our navy was all rotten, others studied the cause in whom the right of the Narrow Seas lay, the French or English, and what divided the controversy? What is become of the great ships of France, the great fleet at Rouen? Go to the Exchange and ask the news, and see if there be a word of proclamation of the French not to strike to his Majesty's ships. Who talks of, much less dare maintain the title of the Narrow Seas for the French party? And whence is all this quietness? Came the calm for want of goodwill³? I trow not; our ships, or rather God by our ships, determined the case, commanded the calm, and we are at peace, and in our peace enjoy such plenty, that whereas all other nations admire us and God's goodness towards us, we through abundance surfeit in all manner of excess, and scarce know the thing we enjoy, much less the benefit of it.

Much more might be said of the manifold benefits we reap by the navy, but this is not the

¹ The MSS. (except Penn and B.M.) read 'employs' in the old sense of 'implies.'

² So the Penn MS. The other 17th century MSS. read 'exchanges,' and the 18th century MSS. omit. Probably used for reports on the Exchange among the merchants.

³ So all the 17th century MSS. The 18th century MSS. read 'and whence is all this quietness come and calm? For want of goodwill?'

thing I intended, and therefore I proceed to what I promised, viz., to show, as I am able, the present state of the government of the navy, especially in harbour, together with some errors observable therein, and the way how to prevent and amend them. In all which I shall endeavour to speak as plainly, so freely, not sparing any for fear nor myself for favour, having (God is my witness) no ends in this action but the honour of God and the honour of our lord the King, whom I desire may still flourish in his wise and careful government of his navy, wherein I have obtained almost all that I have, and therefore to it and its welfare owe and shall devote all that I am, without ends of rising, fawning, or closing with¹ persons or times—the common project of most writers and the main scope of many fair projects—desiring nothing more but that by the light which I shall discover in and about the government of the navy others better able would undertake the task and polish the work, which, however it hath been hitherto neglected of all officers of this kingdom, is most requisite and considerable to be done, and that out of hand, because as the navy increaseth, and all men study to amend it by punishing of delinquency obvious to all men's view, but few or none know the depth or mystery of it, and for want of knowledge are not careful to prevent the mischiefs of it by an orderly proposition for its government and a due execution of the same. The two pillars that support all offices in the kingdom and world be these, if my judgment fail me not.

When I speak of the state of the navy (mistake

¹ So the other MSS., but the Pepysian reads 'falling.' To 'fall with' = to 'fall in with'; hence, 'meet,' 'approach'; chiefly nautical, as to 'fall with' land. Possibly a metaphorical expression for a dishonest bargain. To 'close with' = to 'come to terms with' (*New English Dictionary*).

DISCOURSE OF THE NAVY 3

me not) I do not mean to run over in a fruitless discourse how many ships his Majesty hath what are their names, burdens in tons and tonnage, number of ordnance, men in harbour, men at sea in remote and home services—things fit in their places to be known, and yet better known by a digested list of them than other things fitter to be known. Nor is it my intention to undertake (that I know not to declare the trim of each ship, their draught of water, length by the keel, their age, steerage, build, repair, sailing by and large,¹ carriage of their ordnance, &c. things in their kinds not unworthy thy consideration, nor difficult to be discovered by those that either built or repaired them, or those that have sailed in them; nor yet to set down the size, length, and quantity of cordage, sails, anchors, &c., required for the complete rigging and stores of a ship of each rank respectively—it being already done to my hand by the authority of a late and great commission;² in a tract not difficult to be obtained to the view of those that desire to see and know those things: nor yet the rates of wages given by his Majesty to all ministers serving in his Majesty's ships both in harbour and at sea; but only to show the several distributions of its government and the state thereof, and then to discover some errors attending that branch of it which respects the government by the four principal officers, and propose some grounds for their redress, omitting all other offices which are, indeed, branches of the navy, but not within the compass of either my intention or experience.

¹ Sailing 'to the wind and off it,' i.e. when the ship is neither close-hauled nor sailing before the wind (*Smith's Sailing Dictionary*).

² Probably the commission first appointed in 1661, and afterwards made permanent. Extracts from the Report are given in Charnock, *Marine Architecture*, ii. 203. See also Mr. Symonds in *E. H. R.* vii. 480, and note on p. 114, *infra*. The Report itself is among the State Papers (vol. c.)

Next to his Majesty, the lord high admiral of England for the time being was always supreme governor and commander of the navy, and naval affairs either proper to the care of the vice-admiral of England and the admiral of the Narrow Seas, the judge of the admiralty and all offices and dignities incident to the jurisdiction of that court, the four principal officers and others the commissioners of the navy, with all subordinate ministers thereof, the office of the ordnance with the several branches thereof, and the victualling office and its particular dependencies, of which much might be said both touching their original institutions, their several growths, relations, manner of government, errors in view, charges to the Crown, distinct ways of accounting, &c. But I shall limit myself to my last, and speak only of that branch of the admiralty entrusted in the care of the four principal officers, &c., of the navy.

The four principal officers of the navy are, as all men know, the treasurer, comptroller, surveyor, and clerk of the records, and under them and their command do all subordinate officers and ministers of the navy move, such as the master attendants, master shipwrights, storekeepers, clerks of the check and ropeyards, boatswains, gunners, pursers, &c.

What the particular duty of each officer is, is not easily to determine; time, favour, ignorance, and alterations of persons and manners of government hath so blurred the memory of their first institution. When some have been wise and not in favour, others (though not so wise) if in favour have weathered them in their rights, and when others have been in favour and yet ignorant of the right and duty of their places, others more wise and experienced have outed them of their proper rights; so as that through the manifold changings both of times and persons,

DISCOURSE OF THE NAVY 11

manner of government and governors, the navy is become not unlike a great wood, wherein one may sooner lose himself than find another, sooner confuse himself by desire to declare their distinct duties than find out what they are. And, however I know some that have under their hands declared their opinions in this particular, yet I know others that would be reputed as wise (being as ancient navy men) as they that differ much from their opinions. And this I am sure : that, let the case be how it will, yet in the practical government of the navy they do all take liberty to do that as their own duty which in discourse they cannot well maintain to be other than the duty of another man ; and therefore I desire not to untie a knot¹ which by discourse is not to be done at all and yet in practice is done daily, but rather taking the case as it is, that they are all immediate ministers for the King, to manage and govern by commands from the lord admiral all masters and ministers falling and acting under him in the navy, I proceed to declare how in a joint matter they do at this day intend² and prosecute the service of the navy either proper to all or peculiar to any of their several places.

And this method I make choice of without determination of particular duties, not as being ignorant of what instructions are fitting for and might be given to each particular officer, according to which he ought to govern himself in the discharge of his particular trust, but because in my succeeding discourse I must of necessity touch upon many errors in the navy, and by personating no man I shall rather blame all than inform against any, a thing so far beyond my intention that its thought is hateful to me, being an act so unworthy (if attended

¹ For 'I desire not to untie a knot,' the B.M. copy reads I desire not only to know.

² = Attend.

with private ends) that I have for a long time suspended the benefit (if any) which may be reaped by this discourse, and chose rather to suffer the King to be at a loss, as shall appear by particulars, than to hazard the damage of particular men by publishing what I conceived might conduce to the general good and welfare of the navy; protesting before Almighty God that I owe no disrespect (nor have any cause) to all or any of the officers or other subordinate ministers of the navy, and humbly implore his Majesty, the Lord Admiral, and others in authority whom this small tract may concern, not to read it as intending out of it to pick exceptions at or occasions against the person, estate, or good name of any man in the navy, but (as it is by me intended) to give some light for the future, and to encourage others to add to my mite, that so upon grave counsel-taking and mature deliberation had of the navy and its government, a thing worthy consideration, his Majesty may be more truly served, his navy more carefully attended, and his subjects more duly rewarded. But to proceed.

The employment of the navy under the officers may for method's sake be digested into these three heads—wages, victuals, and stores.

Under the first I comprehend all sorts of wages, either by the day, which are without victuals, commonly called board wages, by the night, for watching, tide works, &c., and by the month or year, for salary, by the journey, for travelling charges, rewards, pilotage, disbursements, &c., and in general for all services and things that respect not an immediate supply of stores by the price of some material or other.

By victuals (the business being managed by contract) must be understood, though in an improper sense, not only the material of victuals, such as

bread, beer, beef, pork, butter, cheese, &c., but also all materials bought, used, expended, or employed in or about the service of victualling the navy.

As for stores, it needs no explanation, and it were almost infinite to repeat the particulars requisite for and expended in the navy; in general whatsoever provision is bought by warrant from the principal officers, or any two of them, and charged on the storekeeper to the King's account, may be fitly called a store, though in itself of small or no value.

Upon these three heads depends the general government of the navy, there being nothing done in the navy but may properly be reduced to one of them; and all three are either earned, bought, or paid for upon the only warrant of all or two of the principal officers of the navy. Such and so great is the trust committed to their charge, appearing by the account of the treasurer and victualler of late times to amount to above 250,000*l.* per annum.

As for wages, the principal care of the officers lies in these two cases¹:—First, in seeing that time and no more paid than is allowed by the King, where the number of men, months, days, or pay by the year, month, or day, is limited to a rate. Secondly, in rating by themselves, or experienced men by their appointment, all payments either by the day, month, year, or otherwise, as their discretion shall best guide them, according to the deserts of all persons respectively, without any partiality, favour, or any other by-ends² whatsoever, to the detriment either of the King from or the parties to whom they are due. In the first their power is governed by a rate; in the latter their discretion is the rule of their power.

Rated or set wages respects either harbour or sea pay.

¹ The B.M. copy reads 'the care of the principal officers lies chiefly in these two things.'

² See note 4 on p. 116.

In harbour wages many things are observable either to the prejudice of the King or subject. That which is to be obvious and by custom prescribed for a right, is bearing instead of seamen upon the ships not only boys, gromets,¹ and old men, but, which is worse, men of all callings and conditions whatsoever, without any due respect had either to their persons, qualifications for the service, or honesty in the service, either in point of labour or trust; insomuch that I dare affirm if a muster should be taken of the ordinary² of the navy, and the officers, boys, gromets, decayed old men, and logies,³ or useless men, were called out of the complement of each ship, in 350 men or thereabout borne at Chatham and Portsmouth there would not be above 150 men fit for the service as shipkeepers in harbour, much less seamen at sea. Not but that in this muster (supposed) to the view of the muster-master there may appear men of stature and feature, fitted with bodies and brains capable of a far greater labour than either the one or the other, but that these men being put to act cannot discharge the duties of their places, as being altogether ignorant of that kind of labour, being some gardeners, tailors, glovers, coachmen, smiths, &c., or incapable of labour of all kinds, being either old serving-men, decayed citizens, alehouse-keepers, horse-grooms, or at least servants to servants that serve the King's servants.

To this may be added the connivance of the

¹ Generally, a ship's apprentice; *cf.* Hakluyt: 'In every ship 21 men and a Garcion or Boy which is called a Gromet.' Technically, the rating below 'seamen' and above 'boys.'

² The establishment of persons employed to take charge of the ships of war which are laid up out of commission in harbours near the royal dockyards. (See Smyth, *Sailors' Word-book*.)

³ So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. The others read 'lazy.' *Adj.* 'logy' = heavy, slow, stupid (*Century Dictionary*). See p. 44, *infra*.

totquot¹ of servants to masters, boatswains, gunners, pursers, &c., and these sometimes boys, sometimes worse than boys, men fit for nothing but to purloin the King's stores and betray the service, taken up in the highway as they pass through Chatham to Dover, without knowledge of their breeding, parentage, callings, &c., or taking care to bind them apprentice for a certain term according to the law, but entertaining them as covenant servants only for and during such and so long time as by friendship, favour, &c., they can keep them in the navy at the King's charge, and then turning them loose to sink or swim, live or die, to the great abuse both of his Majesty's service and subjects ; as I have often seen a poor wretch falling sick some short time before the pay, and being but a covenant servant his master hath at the pay received his money, and, it may be, given him a third part thereof more or less, and turned him going to seek his fortune, when sickness would not suffer him to go far, and it may be death prevented his going further. This abuse hath of late time with some care been prevented, but unless it be carefully prosecuted, time and negligence will corrupt good intentions and as bad as ever enthrall the service and subject to this and the like inconveniences.

Upon these and the like grounds of multiplicity of servants and useless men do follow these inconveniences to the service : first, his Majesty is at a needless charge ; for if the navy may subsist in its well-being and government without the care and industry of able and deserving men, then these, that neither do nor know their labour, put the King to a useless charge in their victuals and wages. But

¹ A dispensation ; but also of a special abuse connected with the payment of ecclesiastical first-fruits (*Century Dictionary*). Perhaps here generally of an abuse. The Penn MS. reads 'at totquots.'

because it is not easy to maintain that the navy can be safe without men, therefore I will grant their number, yet in the second place infer from their insufficiency that his Majesty is at a double charge of victuals and wages by their insufficiency. And too common experience doth manifest this, both at their going to sea and return home of all or any of his Majesty's ships, at what time by command extraordinary men are pressed into the service, and borne sometimes two, three, four, yea five months together, to do nothing but what the ordinary ought and (if they were men and able men) might do without further charge to the King. I have known when,¹ only for the unrigging of twelve or thirteen ships at the most, it hath cost the King 600*l.* in victuals and wages to extraordinary men, taken into the service for that purpose, most of which labour and charge might both have been done and saved by the ordinary, though not in so short a time, if the men kept upon the ordinary had either known or been kept unto their labour. The like exorbitant expense is apparent by a constant maintaining of a needless number of labourers on shore to do those works which the shipkeepers (at least every forenoon) ought to attend.

In the next place, their capacities in other callings doth drown all delinquency in the King's service, because an officer, a master, a boatswain, a clerk of the check, master shipwright, &c., hath or may have occasion to, and do, make use of such men in their several houses, gardens, grounds, stables, or private employments; and being under the *benedicite*² of any

¹ The B.M., Penn, and Bodleian MSS. contain a marginal note here, 'Anno 1636.'

² So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. The others read 'benedict'—perhaps a contraction, as the word does not appear to be used in this sense.

one of these, and borne in any of the ships at the King's charge, he may go and come when and where he pleaseth, without miss or control. And in this particular it were not difficult to prove some men borne in harbour in victuals and wages that never came on board the ship they were borne upon, others that seldom appear but at pay-day, many that appear but once a month at the muster, and when that is over return to their private employments again ; and such is the countenance that those men by their private endeavour shall obtain, that a clerk of the check, a master, or boatswain under whose lash their negligence of the King's service may fall, were better take a wolf by the ears than find fault with or check any of them, because they are shrouded under the protection of those that can and do sometimes countermand their power in that particular.

Hence it comes to pass that the service is not only neglected, but also that no man doth or will complain, because such men as these are sheltered by those that should reform it, and those that would (but dare not), finding by their superintendency a power to prejudice them another way in a greater matter if they do not comply with them, &c., choose the same ways, and all take liberty in the same offence, insomuch that from an officer to a boatswain there is almost no man in the navy that hath not some of the King's (or his own borne at the King's charge) servants to attend his private person, horse, garden, ground, houses, &c., all or most part of their times to no small charge to the King. Upon this ground also depends that silent putting up of stealths, embezzlements, purloinings, &c., of all subordinate ministers or their servants ; because if those men it concerns to inquire into and punish such offences should be punctual observers of all such passages, these and the like to these wherein others are faulty would likewise come

to dispute, and they conceive it better and more safe to wink at a toy,¹ than by questioning small faults endanger the question of that which by power (though indeed a great one) is daily acted, and esteemed no fault.

It becomes not me who intend no particular man's prejudice in this discourse to burden my reader with aggravations of errors, although in many particulars I could enlarge the inconveniences of this one error both to his Majesty and the subject. I suppose these are enough to convince the impartial, and to invite care for their reformation from those whom it may concern.

Another error in rating wages in harbour respects the party's attendance (though never so able) as well to earn as to receive it ; and how any man may with safety receive that which he never attended for I am not yet satisfied. For if the service requires such an office, and that office such a man, then it will follow that that man must attend that office, or if not the King is abused. In the first proposition, that the service necessitates such an office, state the case either in masters, boatswains, pursers, gunners, &c. I conceive that where the service requires those officers it also requires their respective attendance ; and upon what ground all or any of their absence is either warranted, winked at, or tolerated, is not publicly known. Suppose the navy well manned according to the number allowed by the King, yet the absence or neglect of a boatswain, gunner, or purser (especially in the night) doth much weaken the guard of the ship, not so much in point of labour as of command and government ; for where parity is in commanders, or rather men are without commanders in a ship, and keep watch in the night, what mischief may not succeed? Generally the

¹ *I.e.* a trifle.

watchman is the thief, and the shipkeeper the cabin-breaker ; and all for want of government by limiting all men in their several places to a strict attendance upon their places, especially of lodging on board in the night, the time and opportunity of most abuse. Upon this ground it appears that to take away 20*l.* per annum in harbour from the master attendants, and then upon their petition to give them an increase of twice as much in another place, was not for the best behoof of the service ; for if they had not deserved what they had, viz. 60*l.* per annum, when they did attend in ordinary the whole year, they can much less deserve what they now have, being much more, and yet have liberty, some not to attend at all, and others but four months in the year at the most. The charge of Trinity brethren and boatswains, deputed in their absence to do their duties, is a sufficient demonstration of this truth ; and however it be thought by some that their means is too small and their pains too great to be tied to a constant attendance, yet it is not only thought but known to others, that their means from the King is as great as any principal officer's (except the treasurer's),¹ and

¹ The salary of the master attendants is given by Monson as 61*l.* 2*s.* 1*d.*, 'besides their victuals and the King's coat out of the wardrobe' (Churchill's *Voyages*, iii. 319) ; but we hear also of an allowance of 6*s.* 8*d.* a day, when employed at Portsmouth upon extraordinary service (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, p. 444). The exchequer fee of the treasurer was 66*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*, but that of the comptroller only 50*l.*, the surveyor 40*l.*, and the clerk of the acts 33*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* Thus the statement in the text is true, though misleading, for it ignores their perquisites, which were considerable (see *E. H. R.* ix. 474). The receipts from the treasurer's poundage of 3*d.* on all moneys passing through his hands, was estimated about this time at 653*l.* a year, and he had a house at Deptford worth 50*l.*, while allowances for clerks brought up the total to 979*l.* 3*s.* 4*d.* (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, p. 252). The net gains of the other offices were valued in 1635 at 138*l.* 1*s.* 8*d.* for the comptroller, 128*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* for the surveyor, and 92*l.* 3*s.* 4*d.* for the clerk of the acts (*ibid.* 1635, p. 561). From the time of the Common-

the King's charge and loss by their non-attendance so great, that it were better to give them more means and tie them to a constant attendance, than to bear them in two, sometimes in three, places at one time to increase their means, and by their absence from the place of their proper duties to betray the service.

In all private services the proverb saith 'The master's eye fats the horse,' and a steward may do his master better service by his presence than his labour, inasmuch as his presence is exemplary to the whole company; and why the same reason should not hold in the King's service I know not, especially in the particular instance of the master attendants, who from their constant attendance on the service (as stewards over the whole ordinary in harbour),¹ either by turns or otherwise, did thence take, as may be conjectured, their denomination of master attendant. But enough of this: from rated wages in harbour I proceed to observe something concerning sea pays, or wages paid at sea according to his Majesty's rates, and therein declare to my reader sundry ways wherein the service and subject are much abused.

First, it is none of the least grievances in his wealth these amounts were greatly increased, and immediately after the Restoration the treasurer was to have 2,000*l.* a year, the comptroller 500*l.*, the surveyor 490*l.*, and the clerk of the acts 350*l.* (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, v. 483; Penn, *Memorials of Sir W. Penn*, ii. 246). The reference to the decreased attendance is probably to an arrangement made in 1633, when a petition of the four masters for an increase of wages was refused by the lords of the admiralty, but 'for their encouragement' two were to attend at Chatham to command in turns the pinnacle on guard in the Thames and Medway, one to command on the guardship at Portsmouth, and one to go as master under the Admiral of the Narrow Seas (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1633-4, p. 5).

¹ The duties of the master attendant included the inspection of moorings and attendance at dockyard musters, as well as general supervision over the ships laid up in ordinary.

Majesty's service at sea to press men into the service from merchant-ships when the necessity of the service doth not require it, but merely to oppress poor men vainly, to show the extent of the power of a captain, lieutenant, or boatswain, or to supply the number of those whom the captain upon good consideration hath discharged; though it may be, and certainly it is so, that the discharged men are as able, and more able, than the new-pressed men, and were pressed at Newcastle, Plymouth, or other remote parts,¹ to the great charge of his Majesty in prest,² conduct,³ and presteing charges,⁴ and yet discharged with more money for his conduct back to the place of his press than his wages comes to before his discharge. A thousand passes in my custody are too clear a record of this truth, and this amongst other things makes his Majesty's service reputed a burden, when, notwithstanding there is neither want of men nor necessity of service, yet poor men that, it may be, have been at sea twelve, sixteen, yea, twenty months together, shall be forced to serve

¹ So Penn and Bodleian MSS. The others read 'ports.'

² 'Prest,' *subst.*, = 'a loan'; *vb.*, 'to lend or advance'; *adj.*, 'ready.' The *Century Dictionary* explains 'prest-money' as money paid to those who enlist into the service, since they are to be *prest*, or ready when called upon; but the sense would appear rather to be money *advanced*. 'Pressed' in the sense of 'forced,' and 'prest' = 'ready' appear to have been used indiscriminately in this connection. The usual amount of prest-money was 12*d.* per man.

³ 'Conduct' = an allowance for travelling expenses of 1*d.* per man for every mile, according to the distance of the places from which they were pressed (Laughton, *Defeat of the Spanish Armada*, N.R.S. ii. 318). The conduct homewards after being discharged from service was only $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* a mile, but in 1635 the Principal Officers recommended that it should be doubled (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 194). In 1649 it was raised to 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* a mile (see note on p. 134, *infra*).

⁴ 'Presteing charges' in 1588 included an allowance of 4*d.* per man to the pressers, but this may have varied (N.R.S. i. 315). See the reference to 20*s.* per diem, p. 51, *infra*.

without so much liberty as to receive their wages, see their friends, take care for their private adventures, &c., and all to satisfy the humour of a captain, lieutenant, master, boatswain, nay, sometimes of a coxswain, who in the captain's absence shall so domineer in pressing men on board merchant-ships, that men that know not the honour of the service do conclude it rather a slavery than a royalty to serve in the King's ships.

In the second place, it cannot be denied an injury to the subject when he is pressed and forced to serve the King, having, it may be, wife and children, whose livelihood depends upon his labour; or otherwise, being experienced at sea, that this man shall be forced to serve for a foremast man, or for common man's pay, and in the meantime men neither of desert in respect of carriage nor ability in respect of parts—and it may be no pressed man neither—shall be preferred and put down in the purser's book as quartermaster or other officers of the ship; nay, when, it may be, youngers,¹ boys, landmen, servants to boatswains, gunners, pursers, or carpenters, shall be preferred and their wages increased by some office in the ship. I could wish that daily complaints at the payment of his Majesty's ships from some seamen that have taken charge as master's mates, boatswains, and other officers of note, did not so clearly evince the truth of this discourse and the unequal proceeding of captains, &c., in their government at sea in this kind, and all it may be to gain a toy, or comply with those that

¹ = Youngster; but also used in the sense of a novice or simpleton. The word had also a technical sense in the navy, for a writer of the period speaks of 'the youngers . . . or the young men called foremast men, to take in the topsails or top and yard, for furling the sails or slinging the yards, bousing or tricing, and take their turns at the helm,' in contrast to the 'sailors . . . or ancient men for hoisting the sails, getting the tacks aboard, haling the bowling, and steering the ship' (Captain John Smith, *The Seaman's Grammar*, p. 36).

in other things must and will comply with them again, and in the meantime not regarding the great oppression done to a poor man, discouragement to a deserving man, dishonour to the King and his service, which by these and the like unequal usages is shunned as a serpent, defamed as a tyranny, and every way prejudiced, not only by those that have received the injury, but by hundreds more with whom their relation shall gain credit, insomuch that let a prestmaster demand the reason of a seaman's unwillingness (being pressed) to serve the King, and not one in forty shall be able to render one upon his own knowledge, but as he hath heard by those that have heretofore served in his Majesty's ships.

But how is it possible to please all men with offices when the ship is already full, and the officers appointed, it may be, before the deserving man you speak of was pressed? I plead for no impossibilities, for it is fit his Majesty should be served, when necessity shall require it, without respect to any man's particular loss or gain; but when (as most times it is) men shall be pressed upon pretence of necessity, and forced to serve as common men upon pretence of the ship's fulness of officers, and at the pay-day it shall appear by the purser's book that the ship wants twenty or thirty men of her complement, and that some of these officers belong to the master, others to the boatswain, gunner, purser, carpenter, &c., and that as servants, and, which is worse, as covenant servants for the term of the voyage only—this must needs discourage able seamen and discredit the service, as I have seen it too often in the payment of sundry of his Majesty's ships, there being almost no sea-book which is not stuffed with men's servants as officers, and in the meantime pressed men paid as common men.

But will you not allow that to a boatswain which you will allow to a pressed man—viz., if his servant

be an able man, and as able as the pressed man, then to have preferment as soon, if not sooner, than he? Else, what advantage have the King's servants more than strangers, who spend their whole time to do him service, and breed him able seamen as their servants to that purpose?

Where the case is without competition of an able and deserving pressed man, all the encouragement that may be is too little for a deserving seaman, though a servant to a boatswain, &c. ; but if the pressed man doth stand for it and desire his preferment, I conceive it injury to decline him and prefer the other ; for the one as able is forced from a better employment to a worse (I mean in point of profit and wages), and the other, though able, yea, as able as he, yet neither loseth the benefit of another, much less a better, employment, nor is forced to this by the King's, but his master's commands, and for his master's benefit, and not the King's ; and however it be true that boatswains, &c., may be said to breed able seamen in the King's service, and for that end deserve all encouragements for their preferment, &c., yet in deed and in truth it is not so, for it is not the boatswain, &c., that breeds the men ; it is the King and his service, and for the most part the man that breeds himself. The end why boatswains, &c., take servants is not the benefit of the King but themselves, as being allowed by the King one, two, or three in harbour to accommodate their small means, who, when they are once bound and entered into his Majesty's ships, in seven years' service do not see their masters' houses (I mean to live in them) seven weeks together, but wholly employ themselves from one ship to another till they be good for something, and then to the Straits for better wages ; for whatsoever is pretended, a boatswain, &c., will not keep a

servant in the King's service for 15s. a month ¹ if he can deserve 30s. another way.

Thirdly, I must not omit payments made to men that never served, called 'dead pays,' ² wherein heretofore his Majesty hath suffered, though of late, by the vigilancy of the Lord Admiral in appointing exact musters to be kept, much damage that way hath been prevented. The ground of this abuse is principally an allowance of retinue to the captains, construed by some of them not to be men serving, but so many men's wages and victuals, to be paid to and pursed by the captain in lieu of [so] many men allowed to attend his person ; ³ hence they have often taken liberty either to have no men and to enter men's names in the sea-book, or else to show men one day to the clerk of the check to gain the entry of their names in the rigging-book, and afterwards to dismiss them for the whole voyage ; and at the end thereof to procure blind warrant from the officers for their payment, the clerk of the check justifying by his rigging-book their appearance and entry. The victualler's payments of moneys, either to the captains themselves or to the pursers for the captains' use, in lieu of so many men's victuals, hath much encouraged this abuse, for many times where the captain could not finger the victuals he would rather enter the men and make them serve, than suffer the purser to share the victuals and himself the wages ; but if they can

¹ The pay of the ordinary seaman at this time. Gromets received 11s. 3d. and boys 7s. 6d. (*English Historical Review*, viii. 476).

² See note on p. 140, *infra*.

³ 'Retinue' was an allowance of four men in the hundred. There was evidently some uncertainty on the point, for on November 21, 1636, Holland himself, then serving as paymaster, had asked whether this allowance of retinue was intended for men really serving, or merely as so much given to the captains (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, p. 206).

either get the victuals, or money from the victualler in lieu thereof, then you shall be sure to have no retinue to attend, though entered only for the gain of the victuals, for they know that the muster-master by his check saves only the wages to the King, and that the victualler is paid by a medium of so many men's victuals allowed to each ship respectively, without respect had to the saving by the muster-book, and though this abuse (as I said before) in the main—viz., in point of dead pays—be prevented, yet in effect the service is no whit bettered thereby, for now the manner is instead of having no retinue [to have] a double retinue—I mean twice, and sometimes thrice, as many names entered as retinue to the captain as the King allows. And because if they were all put upon the sea-book in the title of retinue the abuse would be too obviously gross, thence you shall find in most sea-books, besides the retinue of four or five landmen entered amongst the number pressed, two or three entered as commanded¹ in the Hope,² Downs,³ &c., three or four more entered scatteringly up and down the sea-book—viz., one as the captain's cook, one as drummer, one as fife,⁴ another as corporal, whenas in deed and truth neither of these are either drummer, fife, or corporal, whereby the ship is pestered with useless men, his Majesty's service weakened, his treasure wasted, and the able seamen burdened, &c. When I speak of this abuse of captains I desire not to be understood of captains in

¹ 'Command' is occasionally used in the sense now associated with 'commandeer.'

² The Hope is a reach of the Thames just below Gravesend. A reach of the Forth, by Queensferry, is also so called. The reference in the text is, of course, to the former.

³ The famous anchorage between the coast of Kent and the Goodwin Sands.

⁴ The B.M. copy spells 'Pheife' here—a very unusual form.

general, there being some of them so noble that they scorn these and the like by-ways, but only of those whose carriage in other things doth proclaim their guilt of this, and who (were they not strictly looked unto) would make this the least of their intended sharkings¹ upon the service.

Next to rated wages, or wages allowed by his Majesty in a book of rates, both for harbour and sea service, we are to consider somewhat in the passage of the navy touching wages rateable by the discretion of the principal officers or others that they shall appoint, there being no certain ground for payments of this kind, which vary by the circumstances of times, places, persons, &c.

Under this head is comprehended all day wages to shipwrights, caulkers, boatmakers, labourers, &c. working in any his Majesty's yards, and these are generally rated by the master shipwrights and their assistants attending, as men conceived best able to judge and determine the deserts of each man by the day respectively ; wherein the officers do discreetly, inasmuch as they themselves are not so well able to know neither the ability nor desert of labouring men, being neither conversant with them at their several works, nor skilled in their several labours nor arts ; and yet in this particular they are not free from blame in not attending and seeing those men rated by the master shipwrights paid in their own presence, and at their pay exactly viewing every man's person, and together with their persons comparing their rates, and times they have served at their several trades, and thereby enabling themselves to judge between the King and the subject, whether the rate given by the master shipwright be too little or too great, and accordingly to do right to either. For want hereof oftentimes the favour of a master ship-

¹ The B.M. copy reads 'shearing,' and the Penn MS. 'sharings.'

wright to his own servants, and his friends and their servants, shall in one year's work exhaust the King's treasure to no small sum ; which in the particular is little or nothing, because it is given by the day, and that to distinct men, and therefore its consideration is neglected ; but if you consult the totals of each service, and compare them with former precedents of like nature, you shall find that this, amongst other things, hath begotten exorbitant expenses in all services done by the day in the repair or new building any of his Majesty's ships, either in dry dock or afloat. Hence it often comes to pass that the master shipwright takes liberty to press men when he pleaseth into the works, and yet at the same time [to] give leave to others already pressed to absent themselves from the work, to rate men's servants at great and more than deserved wages upon pretence to encourage their masters, being able and deserving men, and yet to connive at the masters' absence half or more of the time in the pay-book. This begets the clerks of the checks' entry of totquots of boys, needless and useless men, clerks and clerks' servants, &c., as shipwrights and labourers ; whereas if the officers themselves would in person attend the pay, they durst not make such gross entries, and if they did they must needs be traced in them and checked for them ; and for want of this care it is that the dead pay in time of extraordinary service in all his Majesty's yards allowed to the clerks of the check is in time augmented from working-days to Sundays and holidays, and in money from 18*d.* (the ordinary allowance) to 20*d.* and 22*d.* per diem ; this hath begotten 23*d.* per diem to one, two, or three foremen employed upon one service,¹ together with rewards by bills for extraordinary care, &c., and the master

¹ In the Penn MS. there is a marginal note here, 'The Constant Reformation, repaired at Portsmouth by Mr. Pett.'

shipwright himself in the interim winked at in his attendance, and attending his own private affairs at London when he should have been about the King's elsewhere, and was paid for though he were not. This and the like made the charge of the repair of one of his Majesty's ships upon the careen more and greater than the building of a ship of her burden ; this, among other things, made the charge in wages of building the Swallow and Leopard as much if not more than the charge of building the Henrietta Maria and the Charles—ships exceeding their burden 610 tons, as appears by the list of the tonnage of them.¹

Where the fault lies I know not, but this I am sure, that the matter of wages in all extraordinary services, either for new building or reparations, is much augmented in the charge or expense almost the one moiety of what it was in the years 1625 and 1626, when both the services was as great and as many as now they are. I confess there are two grounds (besides the officers' neglect aforementioned) of this so great and needless expense. The first is the great desire of the master shipwrights and their assistants to draw the business to be done by contract, which that they may the better compass they do not care how great the books of any service done by the day do swell, that thereby the officers may take notice that what they would have undertaken for so much (suppose the moiety), that hath cost the King twice as much ; and I have often seen and observed that for the repair of a ship upon survey taken the master ship-

¹ The MSS. read 'Henry Mary,' except the Bodleian, which reads 'Henry Maria.' The Henrietta Maria and the Charles were built in 1632—the former being 793 tons, and the latter 810. The Swallow, 478 tons, and the Leopard, 515 tons, were built in 1634. Thus the difference in the total tonnage of the two pairs of ships was exactly 610 tons as stated in the text. (See Mr. Oppenheim's list, *English Historical Review*, ix. 95.)

wright hath demanded but 1,000*l.*, more or less, and tendered security to perform the works for that money, which being afterwards done by the day by the same master shipwright hath cost the King triple the sum demanded. I know well, that upon survey of a ship no man can see all her defects till she be ripped, and that upon all reparations by contract there is an allowance given by bill for overworks which they have neither seen nor foreseen in the first view, but yet in all contract works I never observed that the overworks should double or treble the first contract, as it falls often out in the works done by day wages : but I shall handle that point hereafter.

The other is the great neglect of the clerk of the check in keeping strict and exact prick and check upon all men receiving day wages. I tax no particular person, but yet could wish that those that know themselves faulty would consider that, notwithstanding all other men's care, the service must needs suffer if they in whom the immediate trust of their time and service is reposed be any ways faulty either by ignorance or neglect, wherein they must needs be when masters as before shall be winked at to be absent a whole month or two together, and it may be one or two of that man's servants, good for little, continued on the works ; when men shall not be called sometimes but once in two or three days, and then only in a certain place and at a certain hour ; when an hour in the morning and another in the evening shall be lost by coming and going before and after the time to come and go from the service ; when half, if not the whole Fridays, being market days at Rochester every week, shall be spent without appearance, or check for non-appearance ; when so great a trust as the prick and check is committed to the care of careless boy-clerks, and sometimes to labourers that can neither write nor read ; when no master workman or his as-

sistant, though absent from the work whole months together, shall be pricked one day in the pay-book,

But is it in the power of the clerk of the check to prick the master shipwrights and their assistants? What other men think I know not, nor shall much care; I desire to be free, and for the present do conceive that any man that receives day wages ought to appear at the day call or muster, let his place be what it will—nay, in some sense the master shipwright ought rather to be mustered than any other, inasmuch as the care of the King and State is such that they settle them a constant reward, both out of the Exchequer and in the navy, over and above their day wages, the better as to engage their personal attendance, so to encourage them thereunto. For they wisely foresaw that, if the master workman be absent, the grace of that day's labour is lost, and not only neglect in inferiors may be expected but also confusion in the works, so as they were better undone than not done as they should be. Hence it is that in all his Majesty's yards they are accommodated with houses or lodgings to avoid all excuses in their absence from the works. I am not ignorant nor is it my meaning that a master shipwright should be like a common pressed man in point of labour or attendance, to be pricked upon all necessary absence. There ought to be discretion used in this and the like cases; but withal I know that if upon pretence of his warrant or patent for his place a master shipwright shall wholly neglect the duty of his place, and sit within-doors working by a deputy at the King's charge abroad, or take a private yard at London and yet undertake works at Chatham, Deptford, or Portsmouth, and come not there twice in six months, or procure warrants for assistants in works proper to their own care and duty to be paid by the King, when the King also pays them for the same labour, and then to do nothing but twice or

thrice a week walk a turn or two in the yard to receive the worshipful salute expected from poor men under their command—I say to do this and thus, as I have often seen and observed to be done, justly deserves a greater punishment than the prick of the clerk of the check, by how much the offence is greater, and increased by the person offending. Many reasons might with no difficulty be added to warrant the check, not only of the master shipwrights but also of the master attendants and others that are within the compass of the check, and I am sure the officers themselves cannot procure their fees from the Exchequer without their *liberate*¹ first obtained certifying their attendance on their several places. But let this suffice.

In the next place something is considerable of that kind of wages which, at the pleasure of the principal officers, is sometimes paid by the day and sometimes by the lump, either as contracted for before the work's begun, or else estimated by men appointed thereunto by the principal officers' warrant upon view of the works after they are finished. Such are all painted, carved, joined, and house-carpentry works, for the execution of each of which works there is by warrant from the lord admiral one or more to be supervisors, commonly called the King's master painter, carver, joiner, house-carpenter. In all which callings, however there be divers passages wherein his Majesty is daily abused to no small loss, yet in regard the main ground of all or most of these abuses respecting each particular

¹ So the Bodleian MS. '*Liberate*' was a legal term for a writ issued out of Chancery for payment of pensions, or other royal allowances (*Century Dictionary*). In estimating the receipts of the comptroller in 1637, a deduction of 13*l.* 11*s.* is made for 'liberate, poundage, and fees in the Exchequer' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1637-8, p. 82 ; see also *ibid.* 1631-3, p. 509). The other MSS. read 'certificate,' except the Penn MS., which reads 'liberty.'

place or employment is the same in one and all the former callings, I shall only handle them in general.

The chiefest cause of ill government in these employments is the unlimited expense, both of them and others,¹ in and upon his Majesty's ships and houses, there being no certain proportion of expense allotted either to painter, carver, or joiner, beyond which, without the lord admiral's warrant signifying his Majesty's pleasure to have it so, they ought not to go on in exorbitant curiosity and expense. Not but that on some royal ships, such as the Sovereign or Prince,² it is requisite to bestow, in those callings respectively, such and so much cost as shall be thought fitting by the lord admiral, not only for necessity and ornament, but also for royalty, curiosity, and honour ; but that upon ground of great expense bestowed upon these ships by special command, they should not take liberty to themselves, as of themselves, or by private directions, requests, or commands of a captain, master builder, or the like, whose ambition it is to have 'their' ships, as they call them, richest and gayest, to waste the King's treasure in a vain expense, either in point of quantity of painting, carving, or joining, or in point of curiosity of workmanship, especially upon small, old, or new-repaired ships. For hereby it is already come to pass that, in these callings, four

¹ The Bodleian and Penn MSS. read 'of thone and thother.'

² The Prince, a 100-gun ship of 1,200 tons, built in 1610 by Phineas Pett, was the largest ship of James I.'s reign. She was decorated with carvings and 'curious paintings, the like which was never in any ship before' (*E. H. R.* vii. 488). The Sovereign, a 100-gun ship of 1,522 tons, was built in 1637, also by Phineas Pett. £6,691 was spent on decorating her (*ibid.* ix. 101). Mr. Oppenheim's conjecture that in spite of the conventional representation of earlier 16th and 17th century vessels, the ordinary men-of-war were not highly decorated until after the Restoration (*ibid.*) is not supported by the text.

times the expense of what hath heretofore been thought competent is scarce sufficient to content a master shipwright that builds or repairs his Majesty's ships ; and when one master shipwright attending in one place or yard hath by favour or connivance gained liberty of so much cost to be bestowed upon his ship, the other master shipwrights have conceived a right in them¹ so to do with ships under their care in building or repair, and so, by favour at first and custom at length, it is now grown to that pass that every and each of these ministers do even what they list, and how and when they please, without the least care of all or any of the officers, other than to sign their bills at the end of the service, after they are rated either by those that understand not the quality of the works, being neither painters, joiners, nor carvers, or by the master shipwrights themselves at whose request the profuse expense premised was at first made. I know that in each of these callings there is a mystery, and that upon pretence of art in workmanship they have, all of them, in their several callings artificially weathered the principal officers, who do not understand what they ought, or it may be will not understand what they might, touching either the matter or the manner, the quantity or the quality, of these works respectively ; yet this is certain, that if care were taken by command from the officers, first, that they themselves for their particular callings should present under their hands what and how much carving, painting, and joining they conceive fitting for the ordinary expense of his Majesty's ships, and the same rated both by the lump, by the yard, and by the day, all which they are able to do exactly, or very near the business ;

¹ The MSS. read 'him,' except one 18th century copy.

and then, secondly, that the Trinity House¹ and masters of Shipwrights', Painters', and Joiners' Halls should make another estimate of the same, both in respect of quantity and price, and return the same to the officers respectively; it would not be difficult upon this advice taken to compare of both certificates together, and with their own judgments to settle the transaction of these callings so as that at all times the King may know his expense, they may know their duties, and the officers may know what to give them for the same, all which are now so obscured by a blind and confused way of acting, that they are altogether neglected by the principal officers as too mysterious for men of their breeding and quality to determine, and left either to the parties themselves to do, and demand what they please, or at least referred to those that generally importune them to do what otherwise they would not, and give them what they ask for work useless being done.

That which would further tend to no small profit to the King in these callings, and so in all other callings and business of the navy, is a serious debate and consideration of this question, viz. :—Which is the best and safest way for the King to do those or any other works—by contract or day wages? For my part, howsoever not only the opinion of the officers but also their practices, both in these callings and in the matter of new buildings and reparations, hath led the dance another way, yet I am utterly against the doing either of all or any of his Majesty's works, either in point of ship-

¹ The certificate of the Trinity House was already required for a great variety of purposes, as for instance in the purchase of ships, provisions, cordage, ordnance, and ammunition. Thus the suggestion in the text is only for a slight extension of the established duties of the corporation. (See Barrett, *The Trinity House*, pref. and c. iv.)

carpentry, house-carpentry, painting, joining, or carving, either by pre-contracts or post-ratings by gross, and do affirm that it is not only the best and safest, but also the cheapest way for the King's works to be done by day wages. My reasons leading me thereunto are these :—

First, all men know that works done by contract cannot be, nor never were, so punctually performed as the like works done by day wages, because the contractor will be sure to be a gainer by the bargain, be the works more or less, great or small, and his private respect to his profit will not only tempt him to neglect what he covenants to perform, but also (at least) to do it in that manner that profit shall redound to his purse thereby.

Secondly, it is impossible so to make a contract for any great works in almost any of these callings, that all particular circumstances proper to be inserted can be included in the contract.

Thirdly, it is impossible, after the works done by the contractor, either by view to compare them and the contract exactly together in all points of goodness and dimensions, or to value them by estimate in way of rating, or otherwise than at random, both for quantity and quality, and thence it is that the affirmation and demand of the contractor is so often taken by those that are appointed to view and rate works done by contract, they being altogether disabled to view some works after they are finished ; and how any man can be a competent judge of the value of that which he cannot see to estimate I know not. This is the ground of greater expenses and charges to his Majesty for overworks not included in contracts than the charge of the contracts themselves.

Fourthly, when part of the works are done by contract and part by day wages, his Majesty's constant

salaries and expense, to clerks of the check, surveyors,¹ foremen to labourers, &c., borne in all his Majesty's yards, is needless, and yet must be continued, as being such ministers that the service cannot be without, unless the service were wholly performed by contract.

Fifthly, when the works are done by contract, there is liberty given not only to the contractor to gain beyond reason, being better able to make his bargain to profit for himself than the officers are for the King, but also to the officers themselves, who, having power to give the contractor more or less as they please, may, in an undiscoverable way, comply with the contractor and wrong the King in great sums of money without the least jealousy of deceit. Thus the joiners may wainscot a room, make cabinets, tables, &c., for the use of an officer, and never be paid for it, other than in an inclusive way of the total of his contract. The like may be said of the painter, carver, and house-carpenter, all which callings are so necessary to every man's private use, that these men of all men are usually the greatest friends to, and most inward with, the principal officers, one courtesy requiring another, and the King paying for both ; whereas if the work be done by day wages, there is no possibility either for the King to be deceived (if either the master workman doth his duty, the clerk of the check his duty, or the principal officers theirs), or these men to deceive, without the combination of three or four at the least, and connivance of all standers-by, who by the books must needs be able to trace their ways² and discover their plots, as I could easily make it appear by particular discoveries were it needful. Nor is the capacity of the deceit in the officers only, when the works are

¹ The Bodleian and Penn MSS. and the 18th century copies read 'chyrurgeons.'

² The Pepysian and Penn MSS. and the 18th century copies read 'wages.'

done by contract, but also in all master shipwrights and their assistants, clerks of the check and stores, who are the men to whom generally the rating of works done by contract are referred by the officers ; for these men, having the same necessity and occasion to make use of the painter, carver, joiner, or house-carpenter in their private way, may—I say do—demand what courtesies they please from them, well knowing that at the rating of their works they have a power to gratify their loss in a liberal allowance, though in the King's wrong.

Sixthly, if the way of contract be best, I demand whether it be best to contract with the King's own ministers or with strangers. If with strangers, then the King pays his own ministers their constant salaries for doing nothing, the works being done by contract. If with his own ministers, then his Majesty not only pays the charge of the contract, but also maintains the contractors in his own yards with house-room, firing, and it may be a constant salary¹ of 4s. or 5s. per diem, only to attend the profit of his private contract and not the duty of his particular place, and I could tell that when a master shipwright did works by contract at Portsmouth and had not only a great gain by his contract, another gain by bills for overworks, a third gain of 5s. per diem salary from the King without check,² but also a fourth addition of profit of 6s. 8d. per diem for a long time together, because the service required his attendance at Portsmouth to perform his contract,³

¹ The 17th century MSS. read 'of a constant salary.' The 18th century copies read 'with.'

² The original Exchequer fee of the master shipwrights was 12d. per diem (Monson). They also had an ordinary allowance of 2s. per diem, which was increased under Charles I. by 2s. more as extraordinary. (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1633-4, p. 472.) In addition to this, particular shipwrights had special pensions (see *E. H. R.* vii. 491).

³ This was an additional allowance paid when they were employed on extraordinary service at Portsmouth. In Feb. 1637

and all this given at one and the same time to one and the same man. In like manner, if the books be consulted, all men may discover the master joiner paid for works done at Woolwich by contract, and at the same time, the better to confuse the business,¹ his Majesty's works were done at Chatham by the day—nay, you shall find him paid for contract work and day work at Chatham both together; and yet further you may perceive that when the works have been done by contract at Woolwich, and his Majesty been at the charge of furnishing materials in that yard for the dispatch of those works, the said materials have been transported to Chatham at the King's charge only for the accommodation of the master joiner, to enable him to do two contracts at once, and there framed amongst works done by day wages, and afterwards returned at the King's charge to Woolwich and paid for post-ratings to the master joiner; nay, that which is worst of all, when a master joiner hath attended his private contract works almost all the year at Woolwich, you shall find there hath been paid him 2s. per diem without check for attending the works done by day wages all the year at Chatham, and for fear that all this shall not be enough, 20*l.* per annum given him in reward for his extraordinary care and vigilance over the works done at Chat-

the master shipwrights complained that they had not received this allowance since 1632 'saving in time of travel on horseback' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636–7, p. 444), and a year later, that the Treasurer had refused to pay it at all (*ibid.* 1637–8, p. 195). Pepys complains that in his day 'the best master shipwright's place in England is not worth above 200*l.* a year' (Pepysian MSS., *Naval Minutes*, p. 272).

¹ The B.M. copy and the 18th century MSS. read 'confess,' the Pepysian MS. 'confound,' the first retaining the sound and the second the sense of what must be the right reading from the Bodleian MS. The Penn MS. reads 'confute.'

ham, where he seldom or never came other than on Saturday nights to his wife, and the next Monday morning to Woolwich again. If it be said that as he is master joiner he takes a general care over the whole works of the navy, and in part since the reward was given him, it is easily answered his general care is his particular profit, which that he may the better advance he winds, I know not which way, the officers to admit him to work in one place by contract and in another place by day wages, as to gain the benefit of his contract in one place and his 2*s.* per diem and 20*l.* per annum reward in the other, whereas if the works were all done either by contract or day wages, then he knows that if they be done all by contract his men may abuse him in one place whilst he attends in another, and if all done by day wages then it were too gross for him to demand (much more for the officers to allow him) day wages without check in two yards for one and the same time ; but by doing the works by contract in one place and day wages in another, he secured his profit by attendance in the one, the King bore the loss for his non-attendance in the other, and yet he gained 2*s.* per diem as an ordinary allowance for his wages and 20*l.* per annum as a reward for extraordinary service. Besides, if his warrant be consulted, there is no fee specified, which implies that for his attendance on the works as a master workman he is to have day wages and no more, nor hath the painter the same reward that hath the same general care as master painter.

Thus I have instanced in the master joiner ; I might enlarge both touching the master carver and especially the house-carpenter at Chatham. Both, notwithstanding their working by contract, have and do work the same time by day wages, and oftentimes

in one and the same place and yard, and both works done by the same ¹ men—being all or most of them servants to the master carpenter, and when he pleaseth he puts them on works done by the day, and when he pleaseth on works done by the great,² whereby the King must needs be intolerably abused, and the service carried in that confused way that no man almost (in active times) is able to render a reason of that great expense that is made, and all for want of stating this question in the manner and way of transacting his Majesty's officers.

Other reasons might be added to leave off the opinion of this old and blind way of contracts in the King's service, were I not pinched in time and did not conceive these satisfactory to any man that intends only the King's honour and service and not his private benefit; such as the hazard of his Majesty's ships, the loss of men's lives, as we have not long since seen in the Whelps built by contract, some whereof have miscarried, others forced, not a year after their building, to be brought into dry dock to be strengthened under water, &c.³ But I

¹ The MSS. read 'one and the same.'

² = wholesale, by the lump. Cf. Tusser :

'To let out thy harvest by great or by day,
Let this by experience lead thee the way ;
By great will deceive thee with ling'ring it out,
By day will dispatch and put all out of doubt.'

(*Century Dictionary*.)

³ An account of the ten Lion's Whelps built in 1627 is given by Mr. Oppenheim (*English Historical Review*, ix. 96), and fully bears out the statements in the text. The Whelps were built by contract by nine different shipwrights, at 3*l.* 5*s.* a ton. They were of something under 200 tons burden, square-rigged, three-masted, and carried 14 guns. They were described as built in haste 'of meansappy timber,' and only one of them lasted until the time of the Commonwealth. The Fifth Whelp, commanded by Edw. Popham, sprang a leak returning from the Brill, and went down on 28 June, 1637, and this tendency was shown by others also. Two were blown up by carelessness in action. 'These Whelps,' says Mr.

omit all these, and proceed to the answer of the main objection both of the master shipwrights and others that oppose the way of day wages, viz. : That upon survey of all his Majesty's ships, if the works in view be rated by them, they will undertake to do them for the same money (nay cheaper) than they rate them at, and yet daily experience teacheth that if the same works be done by day wages, it costs the King three, four, nay sometimes five times as much to do them as they would have asked to have done them by contract.

For this it is true (the more is the shame) that both the works exceed the first demand sometimes five times over, and that I have often heard the master shipwrights, &c., propose to do the same works for the same money and less than they have estimated them at. Yet the mystery lies not in the works estimated nor their value, which it may be the contractor will undertake to do for less money than indeed they are worth, the better to advance his contract, which is the thing he desires, but when he hath once gotten that, upon ripping the ship open to be repaired he finds her more defective than was conceived, and that in many more places than were concluded upon the survey. All which he desires no contract for before he begins the works, but goes on and takes it as the duty of his place, being the King's master shipwright, &c., to perfect the works in good manner both for the honour of the King and safety of the ship, notwithstanding those needful reparations be not mentioned in his contract ; and at the close when the works are all done he presents the officers with his demands for his contract, and another demand for his overworks

Oppenheim, 'were the first representatives, in intention, although not in form, of the regular sloop and gunboat class afterwards so largely used for minor police purposes.'

as they call them, pretending (and indeed it is so) that all needful reparations could not be seen till the ship was opened, &c. Hereupon¹ the officers make warrants to the master shipwrights to view, rate, and certify the overworks, which when they come to view neither they nor any man in the world are able to determine, neither how much nor how well they are done; for when a ship is planked both within board and without, and the contractor makes a demand for overworks done between the two planks, how is it possible for any man to say the service was either done at all, or if done, well done? And yet it is an ordinary thing for men appointed thus to view overworks, not only to set down the particulars, but also to determine the value of that which they never saw nor could imagine but as they were told by the contractor, whose bare affirmation they (and so the officers) must believe, and accordingly give him what he asketh, be it more or less, done or not done, well or ill done. This is the main ground of desired contracts, and in this lies the hidden gain so much coveted, and by this I have known the overworks to exceed the contract in point of charge, and the same ship thus repaired within one year not fit to set to sea without new docking and repair, after 2,000*l.* charge by contract and overworks but the year before.

But secondly, I desire but this satisfaction: If a master shipwright, &c., will undertake to repair a ship for so much as upon view he shall rate the works at, what is the reason that he, being the same man, the King's own minister, accommodated with a dwelling-house in his Majesty's yard, encouraged with good payment of 5*s.* per diem salary without check, the benefit of all his firing, three,

¹ B.M. copy reads 'her open.'

four, or five servants, the command of all men working under him, &c.—should not be able to do the same work for the King by day wages at as cheap a rate as he would undertake to do them for by contract for himself? Is the fault in the clerk of the check or his servants not keeping them to their call, &c.? Is it the want of provisions necessary for the service? exorbitant wages by the day given to shipwrights, caulkers, &c., and their servants? supernumerary number of labourers borne in the yard? employment of most of those labourers in private houses or stables? overcharging the work with boys, logies,¹ &c. All these and many such as these I do believe are grounds in some sense of that insufferable expense that attends his Majesty's works, yet there is neither all nor one of these but, if the master shipwright pleaseth, he may upon information redress or have redressed to his hands by those whose power and duty it is so to do, although I confess some of the officers have been and are too remiss in these cases. But the main thing is this: because the master shipwrights cannot have their wills in doing the works by contract, as they see the painter, joiner, carver, and house-carpenter have, and grow rich thereby, therefore they are sullen and pretend discouragement in the service, and indeed grow careless and negligent in and of their duties, attending them when and how they please, which must needs mount the expense far beyond the first demand, notwithstanding they would have undertaken the works for less than was demanded. But if there were such officers as there should be, they would easily make them work as cheap to the King as to themselves, or show better cause to the contrary than as yet they have produced.

From wages rateable by the day, night, or tide,

¹ See p. 14, *supra*.

proper to shipwrights and other extraordinary men employed in his Majesty's yards, I proceed to wages rateable by the journey or service, comprehending all travelling charges, presting charges, pilotage, water-carriage, rewards, purveyance, &c., given at the discretion of the principal officers.

For the first, it is in the power of the principal officers (and they do¹ it) to employ any man to travel to and fro in and about his Majesty's service, and for their pains to give them what they think fitting, either by the journey or service by agreement, or by the day, week, or month. This no doubt is a great trust, and requires not only the honesty of the principal officers but also great discretion and approved experience to distinguish and observe the variety of persons employed, places whither and employment wherein they are exercised: otherwise (as I have often seen it) one man shall have so much for a service, and another man for the same service shall have twice as much, and yet, it may be, both too much; and in this and the like cases such is the unhappiness of an ill precedent that, according to the old rule, *uno absurdo dato*, &c., this man's over-allowance, either by favour or want of judgment in the donor, shall beget the example into custom, and custom shall prescribe it for a rule, and so all men claim that as a duty which at first was but innovated by inexperience or otherwise. I could name some particular precedents in the navy that in this sense hath cost the King many hundreds of pounds—I might say thousands and not exceed modesty; but I only propound to consideration what may be done without care, and what hath been done for want of judgment, or honesty, or both, and of what consequence it is for an officer to be guilty of the want of either, having an absolute

¹ So the Penn MS. The other MSS. read 'to do it.'

trust and power to shut and open the King's purse, to give away or preserve the King's treasure; but hereof I omit all enlargement, knowing that when I come to treat of the title of Stores I shall have a just occasion to speak of this subject and cannot baulk it.

Among all bills of travelling charges those of the messenger of the navy ought to be most carefully attended, because in them is included a general expense, not of himself only, but of the officers themselves, the paymasters, and their clerks, and that sometimes for many days together, amounting to considerable sums;¹ wherein, if care be not taken, either disbursements that never were, or if they were, not proper to be paid by the King, or if payable by the King, yet not in a huddling and promiscuous blind way of the messenger's bills, may be inserted, or else more time (which maintains the expense) in his bills than was expended in the service. I am not ignorant of many inconveniences attending this particular, which to discourse upon would lead me too near the quick of men's persons, a thing far beyond my intention. I choose rather in this and many other errors proper to my succeeding discourse to smother with silence all past offences, and only to glance at them in general expressions, yet so as that a stander-by may for the future either prevent them or else know where to find and how to punish them.

In the case of travelling charges² there are these

¹ The messenger of the navy 'attends the officers at their meetings, and provides horses and victuals for the paymasters at such time as they go to make payments; he is also at the officers' directions to fetch any delinquent before them, and to keep him under custody till they give the order for his release' (Monson).

² Notes on excessive travelling charges under James I. are given by Mr. Oppenheim in *E. H. R.* vii. 476. The comptroller of the navy, when he went from London to Chatham, charged

questions to be disputed: First, whether the party employed, being an instrument in ordinary, and having, it may be, both wages and victuals, or at least a standing salary, whether this man shall have his full reward and travelling expenses without check upon his ordinary entertainment or not? To this it may be answered, that where the party seeks the employment he doth presume his content to leave or relinquish the benefit¹ of the one to advance the profit of the other; and in this sense the officers ought to be for the King, either in checking the time upon the ordinary, or abating so much as his ordinary entertainment comes unto out of his reward for his extraordinary service. But on the contrary, where the service is necessitated to the man, and the man no way ambitious of the service, but forced by command from his settled employment, in this sense some respect ought to be had both to the party employed and to the necessity of the service, and either to give him his ordinary entertainment during his extraordinary employment, or else (which is better, to avoid the prejudice of a precedent) to allow him somewhat extraordinary by way of reward in his bills of travelling charges.

The next is, whether a man employed by several warrants from the principal officers at one and the

9*l.* 9*s.* 11*d.*, and the surveyor required 19*l.* 16*s.* for the same journey. Sir Robert Mansell claimed 10,000*l.* for travelling expenses during his term of office! See also Monson's account: 'At my return from Portsmouth in the company of Captain Mason, . . . it was our hap to meet with thirteen clerks and officers of the navy, some of them stuffed in hired coaches with four horses, the rest well mounted on horseback, all of them to pay but two ships of the King's . . . which I think will not amount to much more than 1,000*l.* I desire there may be a query of their charge to his Majesty by this journey of theirs, and it shall appear what devices they have to enrich themselves and followers' (Churchill's *Voyages*, iii. 371).

¹ The Bodleian MS. spells 'benitt.'

same time upon several services shall have distinct rewards or travelling charges for each service respectively, or not? If the places of the several services be near one another, whereby the same person is capable to actuate both or all at once, it is unreasonable to demand a double or treble reward for the whole time, all the services yielding but a capable employment. But if the places be remote, then though it be fitting to respect in something the party that acts both or all, yet it is more fit and safe for the King and his service not to impose that upon one man's care which would take up two men's labour, and all, it may be, to advance that man (as a friend) the benefit of a double or treble entertainment, and others as able as he in the interim standing by; for hereby able men are discouraged, the service oftentimes neglected (it being impossible for one man to be in two places at once), and his Majesty's treasure wasted by distinct rewards given by the day to one man for two services in two places forty or fifty days together, whereas the same services might have been done (and that better) by two men in a far less time.

Thirdly, it may be demanded, if a master attendant be employed abroad about extraordinary service, and he deposes a boatswain to execute his place in his absence, who shall pay the boatswain for the deputation, the King or the master attendant? First, it is supposed the King pays the master attendant whether he attends or not; next, that the King pays the boatswain as boatswain, though he attend as master attendant's deputy; next, the boatswain in execution of the master attendant's place must needs neglect the duty of his own place. Lay all these together and it will seem unreasonable that the King should pay the deputy attendant.

Whether it is safe for an officer to allow himself, or any other, travelling charges for doing the proper duty of his place or not, as suppose to meet at Mincing Lane to sign the treasurer's or victualler's accounts? No doubt where the salary from the King is a competent maintenance to the principal officers, it is injustice to take or give anything in this kind, unless it be included in their patent from the King, and howsoever the want of a sufficient allowance doth not extinguish the injustice of such practices, yet it excuseth the offence *a tanto*, although to my knowledge this very thing costs the King more than would be thought a sufficient augmentation of their salaries without it.

I do not feign questions as desirous to show curiosity, for then I could be infinite in needless discourses, but to discover to my reader what the practice of the business of the navy is in this case of travelling charges, and doth daily admit; wherein I could easily show how to the disadvantage of the King in all these and other the like cases, either favour or (what else I know not) want of experience have prevailed, and led the precedent to the wrong tune, so far that custom hath almost drowned their consideration, it being taken for granted that such a man ought to have it so this year because such a man (or it may be the same man) had it so the year before.

As for presting charges, all men that know the navy cannot be ignorant both how great a charge it is to the King, how clamorous a business it is to the office of the navy, and what a great oppression it is to the subject, if it be not committed to the care of able, honest men to be employed as prestmasters, and however it be true that it is a thankless employment, though the prestmasters be never so able or honest, yet to make choice of such men

same time upon several services shall have distinct rewards or travelling charges for each service respectively, or not? If the places of the several services be near one another, whereby the same person is capable to actuate both or all at once, it is unreasonable to demand a double or treble reward for the whole time, all the services yielding but a capable employment. But if the places be remote, then though it be fitting to respect in something the party that acts both or all, yet it is more fit and safe for the King and his service not to impose that upon one man's care which would take up two men's labour, and all, it may be, to advance that man (as a friend) the benefit of a double or treble entertainment, and others as able as he in the interim standing by; for hereby able men are discouraged, the service oftentimes neglected (it being impossible for one man to be in two places at once), and his Majesty's treasure wasted by distinct rewards given by the day to one man for two services in two places forty or fifty days together, whereas the same services might have been done (and that better) by two men in a far less time.

Thirdly, it may be demanded, if a master attendant be employed abroad about extraordinary service, and he deposes a boatswain to execute his place in his absence, who shall pay the boatswain for the deputation, the King or the master attendant? First, it is supposed the King pays the master attendant whether he attends or not; next, that the King pays the boatswain as boatswain, though he attend as master attendant's deputy; next, the boatswain in execution of the master attendant's place must needs neglect the duty of his own place. Lay all these together and it will seem unreasonable that the King should pay the deputy attendant.

same time upon several services shall have distinct rewards or travelling charges for each service respectively, or not? If the places of the several services be near one another, whereby the same person is capable to actuate both or all at once, it is unreasonable to demand a double or treble reward for the whole time, all the services yielding but a capable employment. But if the places be remote, then though it be fitting to respect in something the party that acts both or all, yet it is more fit and safe for the King and his service not to impose that upon one man's care which would take up two men's labour, and all, it may be, to advance that man (as a friend) the benefit of a double or treble entertainment, and others as able as he in the interim standing by; for hereby able men are discouraged, the service oftentimes neglected (it being impossible for one man to be in two places at once), and his Majesty's treasure wasted by distinct rewards given by the day to one man for two services in two places forty or fifty days together, whereas the same services might have been done (and that better) by two men in a far less time.

Thirdly, it may be demanded, if a master attendant be employed abroad about extraordinary service, and he deposes a boatswain to execute his place in his absence, who shall pay the boatswain for the deputation, the King or the master attendant? First, it is supposed the King pays the master attendant whether he attends or not; next, that the King pays the boatswain as boatswain, though he attend as master attendant's deputy; next, the boatswain in execution of the master attendant's place must needs neglect the duty of his own place. Lay all these together and it will seem unreasonable that the King should pay the deputy attendant.

Whether it is safe for an officer to allow himself, or any other, travelling charges for doing the proper duty of his place or not, as suppose to meet at Mincing Lane to sign the treasurer's or victualler's accounts? No doubt where the salary from the King is a competent maintenance to the principal officers, it is injustice to take or give anything in this kind, unless it be included in their patent from the King, and howsoever the want of a sufficient allowance doth not extinguish the injustice of such practices, yet it excuseth the offence *a tanto*, although to my knowledge this very thing costs the King more than would be thought a sufficient augmentation of their salaries without it.

I do not feign questions as desirous to show curiosity, for then I could be infinite in needless discourses, but to discover to my reader what the practice of the business of the navy is in this case of travelling charges, and doth daily admit; wherein I could easily show how to the disadvantage of the King in all these and other the like cases, either favour or (what else I know not) want of experience have prevailed, and led the precedent to the wrong tune, so far that custom hath almost drowned their consideration, it being taken for granted that such a man ought to have it so this year because such a man (or it may be the same man) had it so the year before.

As for presting charges, all men that know the navy cannot be ignorant both how great a charge it is to the King, how clamorous a business it is to the office of the navy, and what a great oppression it is to the subject, if it be not committed to the care of able, honest men to be employed as prestmasters, and however it be true that it is a thankless employment, though the prestmasters be never so able or honest, yet to make choice of such men

for the employment (which is only in the power of the principal officers) is the doing of half the work, though otherwise great and troublesome; and the want of that care hath not only occasioned reproach to the service and all the ministers thereof, but also begotten just complaints from the country both to the late lords commissioners of the admiralty and the principal officers themselves, insomuch that there hath been sometimes more care taken to conceal the ignorance and take off unpunished the offence of a prestmaster, than the labour of pressing all the complement of men included in that prestmaster's warrant would amount unto. This is that which begets bribing to release men after they are pressed, exchanging of able seamen—I say not for fishermen, that were something, but for tailors, glovers, tinkers, brewers, coopers, and other poor handicraftsmen¹—whereby his Majesty not only

¹ The pressing of men who were landsmen, or otherwise unfit, appears to have been a standing grievance in the navy. Monson complained of the quality of the men impressed in 1635 (Churchill's *Voyages*, iii. 374), and the papers printed in the Appendix (p. 361, *infra*) show that it was attracting attention about that time. In 1656 Captain Francis Willoughby wrote from Portsmouth, 'men of all trades but seamen' are pressed, 'which tends to no other end but to multiply charge . . . a tinker, quaker, two glass carriers, hatter, chairmaker, and a tanner, with his boy seven years old . . . and thus the State is abused, the country oppressed, and many a poor man brought from his home to travel a hundred miles or more without a penny in his purse' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1655-6, p. 489). Pepys in the *Diary* complains of the pressing of men that were 'not liable to it, poor patient labouring men and housekeepers' (July 1 and 2, 1666); and Commissioner Myddelton, writing from Portsmouth on March 29, 1666, tells Pepys that he is 'ashamed to see' such pressed men as were sent from Devonshire; 'one with the falling sickness and a lame arm; another with dead palsy on one side, and not any use of his right arm' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1665-6, p. 323). The same individual, writing from Chatham a year later, criticises the material supplied by Watermen's Hall. 'The Masters of Watermen's Hall are good Christians, but very knaves; they should be ordered to send down ten or twelve

loseth his prest-money and 20s. per diem to his prestmasters for their charges and the party's conduct to Chatham, Portsmouth, &c., but all the victuals and wages of that man till upon musters he be found out what he is, and conduct of the party back again to his own country. Upon this ground it is (I mean of employment of undeserving and unable prestmasters) that twice so much time is spent by one prestmaster as is spent by another, that poor men at pay-day complain that either they had not their conduct at all, or not all they should have, or that captains take liberty in six months' service to discharge and enter double their complement of men, and having nothing else to excuse it but that the officers betray the service in pressing unable and unserviceable men.

As for rewards for pilotage, the business is not difficult (being grounded upon the captain's certificate) to determine, either by discretion or precedent, what is a fit reward for such and such a service, giving respect to the rank of the ship, season of the year, necessity of the service, and such other circumstances as may and do vary¹ the action, and so consequently the reward.

There are only these questions fit to be resolved in point of pilotage. First, whether it be safe for an officer of the navy to send to the seas, or a captain of a ship to transport over seas, any of his Majesty's old women to be nurses to the children they send for the King to breed for them' (*ibid.* 1667-8, p. xv). Captain John Hamilton, as late as 1742, reports the pressing of a lime-burner who was nearly blind, and a 'little old cobbler of 56, taken out of his stall rather it should seem for pastime than service,' and letters of 1747 show that the pressing of mere lads, or of persons not able-bodied, was a subject of 'general and constant complaint' (Public Record Office, *Captains' Letters*, H. 12 ; *Secretary's Letters*, 3). In 1864 or 1865 a 'man' who weighed 70 lbs. was sent on board the Prince Consort at Spithead.

¹ Pepysian MS. reads 'verify.'

ships without a pilot or not, his Majesty allowing a pilot both into and out of all harbours, notwithstanding the master boatswain or any of the ship's company know the port and can carry the ship as well as a pilot? Without all question it is not so safe neither for the one nor the other so to do; and however some have been too bold herein, as not doubting a good event, and it may be he having received a benefit by such expected good events, yet if ever it shall happen otherwise than well, I conceive the ability of any particular man in the ship would not be held, neither by the King nor the lord admiral, a sufficient excuse for such a presumption; and if the Anne Royal, lately miscarried, had so miscarried for want of a pilot in her transport from Chatham into the Hope, the ability of Master White would hardly have excused the officers in sending the ship away without a pilot.¹ But in the next place it is demanded, whether it be equal in the principal officers to give a reward to the master or boatswain of one of his Majesty's ships for piloting his own ship from port to port, he being the same time borne in victuals and wages as master or boatswain of the same ship, or not? I know the opinion of some and practice of others in this case to differ much from me, for I confess if I were an officer, let the service be never so well done, and the party that did it never so able and deserving a man, yet if I know it, and that there was not an absolute necessity of doing it for want of all possibility to take in a pilot, I would never consent to give him a re-

¹ The 18th century copies read 'the master, White.' The Anne Royal was bilged on her own anchor when bringing to in the river in April 1636. The disaster was attributed to the pilot and Peter White the master giving contradictory orders (*E. H. R.* ix. 103). White was afterwards imprisoned (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, p. 481). His own account of the catastrophe, given in his examination before Secretary Windebank, is quoted in the *Calendar of State Papers* (1635-6, p. 380).

ward, for it becomes not an officer nor any wise man to ground his reward upon an event, and in the meantime not consider the unwarrantableness of the act, together with the inconveniency of an evil precedent; for when masters and boatswains shall see that by asking they may have (upon certificate from their captains) rewards as pilots of their own ships, this will beget the hazard of both ship and men, to advance, it may be, 5*l.* to one private man's purse; and custom herein hath already made it so common that I have known a boatswain's pilotage extraordinary in a voyage yield him more money than all his voyage as boatswain. I confess where necessity enforceth, or that a boatswain be taken out of his own ship and put into another, though his wages goes on in the interim in his own ship, yet upon good certificate of the service and desert of the man there ought to be respect had for his competent reward, &c., but otherwise not.

Next to rewards for pilotage, something is considerable of other kinds of rewards, which in the navy are sometimes given for a service done, and sometimes as a salary to do a service, and sometimes as an increase of a salary. Thus the master shipwright hath his exchequer fee by patent, his 2*s.* per diem reward to augment his pay and encourage his service;¹ thus the master shipwright's assistants, master caulkers, &c., have their particular rewards; thus the clerks of the check have, besides their fee, bills of reward, some by a gross sum, viz. at Chatham 43*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* per annum, at Portsmouth 20*l.* per annum, and others by dead pays, viz. at Deptford and Woolwich a shipwright's and a labourer's pay to each clerk of the

¹ See p. 38, *supra*, note 2.

check.¹ It were infinite to run through the several kinds of rewards given according to the occasion of the service and desert of the parties in the navy. That which I would say in general is this : in all rewards there ought to be great care taken of the begetting a precedent to the prejudice of the King, and grounding the lawfulness of giving that and so much to all, which was only given and but once to one, and that upon special warrant and great favour ; otherwise the King's purse being in the breast of the principal officers, they may (I do not say they do) cut liberal thongs,² but dispose them to men it may be deserving nothing less. The reward of the dead pays to the clerks of the check prescribes custom for its title, but I could wish, and 'twere safer, for the King to give them a certain competent fee, than by an uncertain reward to expose them to sharking,³ either by increasing their time or wages upon the pay-book. Nothing discourageth the service more than the unequal distribution of rewards, some having rewards for service never done,

¹ According to Monson, the clerk of the check at Chatham had 50*l.* fee, at Portsmouth 20*l.*, at Deptford 30*l.*, and at Woolwich 12*d.* per diem. In addition to this, extraordinary allowances were given under the lord admiral's warrant, at Chatham and Portsmouth, as given in the text, but with the addition at Chatham of 6*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* 'for paper, quills, ink, and travelling charges coming quarterly with the books from Chatham to London, to deliver them to the treasurer and other officers ;' and at Portsmouth of 1*s.* 8*d.* 'for paper.' The Report of 1618 also credits a shipwright's pay to the clerk of the check at Chatham, as well as at Deptford and Woolwich (Charnock, *Marine Architecture*, ii. 214, 265). This would be about 2*s.* a day or less.

² A picturesque expression for minor embezzlements or encroachments. Thus Kenrick Edisbury, writing to Nicholas in July 1634, complains that the workmen in the yards 'cut large thongs of the King's leather' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1634-5, p. 169).

³ So the 18th century copies. The 17th century MSS., except the Penn MS., read here 'shirking,' originally another form of the same word.

others more than the service done could possibly merit ;¹ the ground of which is principally favour or some such by-respect, and sometimes the ignorance of the donor, whose discretion or experience cannot lead him to a due consideration of the matter and manner of the service, the time, person, or other circumstances not to be neglected in rewards, by² those that have power to give away the King's treasure. What should be the reason that one man that seldom or never attends should have a reward for his service, and another man that attends daily in a service equivalent to the other have nothing, that one man should have the benefit of a contract in one of his Majesty's yards where he daily attends, and 2s. per diem without check in another of his Majesty's yards where he seldom comes, and yet at the end of the year have 20*l.* per annum reward for extraordinary service done in that yard wherein he could not attend to do his duty (much less supererogate³) by reason he was forced by his contract to attend elsewhere? I could enlarge, and show that within this subject that is fitter by others to be amended than by me to be discovered ; let it suffice that ignorance and by-ends are known to be the cause of these abuses, and that, on the contrary, till deserving, knowing, and honest men be placed in the government of the navy, and those encouraged by a competent reward to themselves from the King, these and the like rewards will be by them given to others subordinate under them, if nothing else

¹ The Penn MS. gives a marginal note here—'Charles Grant, Aug. Boate, Mr. Sheldon, Mr. Cooke.'

² The older MSS., except the Penn MS., read 'to,' but the 18th century copies 'by.'

³ So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. Used here as a verb = do more than his duty requires. The B.M. copy reads 'pre-rogative,' the Pepysian MS. and later copies 'superogative,' a rare adjective for 'supererogatory.'

yet to purchase¹ retribution from them, and thereby to enable them to subsist in that port² and expense which the dignity of their places and the honour of his Majesty's service requires. But of that more hereafter.

In the next place, purveyance—not to be omitted, as a service wherein the King issues great sums of money, and therefore, by how much it exceeds other particular services of the navy, by so much ought the experience, care, and circumspection³ of the officers to be the greater in the discharge of that trust.

Purveyors are of two sorts, some constant or settled, as general purveyors for the navy, having a certain fee by the year, and always attending the execution of the officers' commands to provide, survey,⁴ and see delivered or sent into his Majesty's yards all manner of provisions whatsoever that the necessity of the service shall require; others occasional or unsettled, being only so made and appointed by warrant and instructions from the officers of the navy for the execution of a particular service, and again discontinued when the particular service whereon they were employed determines, the fee or reward of these kinds of purveyors being likewise various; sometimes they are paid by the day, and sometimes by the load of timber or plank they do purvey or serve into his Majesty's yards, according to the discretion (or favour) of the officers of the navy.

That which is considerable of the first sort of purveyors respects their choice, viz. that they be honest, active, and able men, inasmuch as they are

¹ The Bodleian and Penn MSS. read 'purchase;' the others 'purge.'

² Port = style, magnificence.

³ Bodleian MS. spells 'sirconspection.'

⁴ Bodl. and Penn MSS. The others read 'purvey,' omitting 'provide.'

employed to purvey, buy, and certify for the goodness of all manner of materials respecting the service of the navy, wherein, if either judgments or honesty be wanting, great loss and damage will thereby accrue to the King; for (for want of experience themselves) the principal officers are led by certificates of these men, not only to the quantity of the materials provided but also to the quality, both in length, breadth, depth, size, content, and goodness of each particular commodity respectively, and do accordingly either enlarge or diminish the rate to be given the merchant for the same. For want hereof I have known the King pay for great and had small, long and had short, broad and had narrow, thick and had thin, good and had bad commodities, and could easily make it appear that the same commodities which the King hath bought at an excessive rate as good (and certified by the purveyors and others appointed to view it) have at the next survey taken of the King's stores, though never used, been set down as unserviceable. How great the loss to the King in this particular is, is not easily determined, but that it's great, and so great as is not to be suffered, is not difficult to prove.

But suppose their abilities and honesties, another thing considerable is whether a purveyor, though never so able and honest, be a fit man to buy the commodities with his own money, and afterwards as a purveyor to serve the same into his Majesty's stores, or not. First, admitting the supposal, it is not safe for the King to pay the purveyor but the parties from whom the commodities was first bought, because a precedent in this kind should beget a custom, and custom prescribe it as a rule to the succeeding officers and purveyors, who for ought any man knows may be knaves or dishonest men. But, on the contrary, setting aside the supposal, I

am sure the King hath paid to purveyors twenty in the hundred dearer for a commodity bought from the purveyor than he might have had the same commodity for from another man, and than the purveyor himself did pay for the same commodity to another man not ten days before he sold it to the King.

The like question to the former may not unfitly be here demanded touching the King's merchant, who indeed is no other than a purveyor, viz.—whether it be safe for the King's service to continue in his navy such a minister or not, inasmuch as he purveys and provides nothing to the King but what he serves as his own commodity upon pretence of being the King's merchant. For my particular (submitting to better judgments) I am clear of opinion that, as the business of the King's merchant is now carried, he is a most unnecessary and chargeable minister in the navy, and that it is very unsafe to continue him, or any man in his place, with power to do as ever since he came to the employment he hath done.¹

What the ground of the original institution of² that place was, I know not, nor are all or any of the ancient clerks or men of the navy with whom I have consulted in this particular able to give me any true information therein; only thus much they accord in, that though it be true that Sir William Wynter³ and

¹ Monson gives the Exchequer fee of the King's merchant as 30*l.*, 'without any other allowance.' According to him the office was originally instituted 'to inform the officers of the rates of all outlandish provisions, as hemp, cordage, tar, pitch, oil, masts, deal boards, &c. ;' but since it has been converted 'from advising for the King to merchandising for himself' it has become quite useless.

² So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. Other MSS. read 'instructions in' for 'institution of.'

³ Sir William Wynter was surveyor of the navy and 'master of the ordnance on the seas' under Elizabeth (*Cal. S. P. Dom. Add.*

others that succeeded him in that place did not only purvey but sell (and that in their own names) provisions to the King, yet it was done more by power and connivance than by right; and that because Mr. Prusen,¹ lately the King's merchant, could not enjoy that privilege that his predecessor had, he chose wholly to relinquish the execution of his place till such time as he sold it to the party now in being. I am not ignorant of what is pretended, that hereby the King upon reasonable notice given is sure to be supplied with all manner of stores upon all occasions or necessities of service; but, withal, I know that upon the same notice given to private merchants he may in like manner be supplied, and that without timely and seasonable warning of what is requisite to be provided neither the one nor the other are able to do the service.

Of all provisions in the navy his Majesty is seldom or never necessitated of any—or at least need not if the officers do their duties—but masts, and those of twenty-two hands and upwards; and why the King should, upon pretence of one provision difficult to be supplied without some extraordinary care and forewarning, be tied to take all manner of provisions from one man, without knowing or trying the market for the same provisions, or having any present occasion for the use of all, or it may be any, of those stores that are served by him, is not easily

1547–65, p. 455), and he took an important part in the operations against the Spanish Armada (N.R.S. i. and ii. *passim*).

¹ Hildebrand Prusen received, on November 3, 1610, the grant of the office of 'merchant in the East for furnishing the King's ships' for life (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1603–10, p. 640), in succession to Sir F. Cherry and his son (*ibid.* 1625–6, p. 205). He appears to have held the place until 1635, when he was succeeded by Randolph Crew (*ibid.* 1635–6, p. 135). He died in 1636 (*ibid.* 1636–7, p. 328). He and his father before him had been also sailmakers to the navy for sixty years (*ibid.* 1637, p. 385).

resolved. And I am certain that the King hath paid for provisions to his merchants two, three, four, yea, five years since, that neither are yet spent, nor are now so fit to spend by 20*l.* in the 100*l.* as those of the same kind that may at all times upon demand be had and at easier rates of other men, nor yet (as thought by some) will be spent at all till they be altogether unfit for service ; whereby it plainly appears that the King's treasure hath needlessly been exhausted, and for the supply of other services his Majesty hath been forced to pay interest for moneys taken up, and thereby not only lost the interest paid, the benefit of his own money for the present occasion, but also the money itself, or a great part thereof, in the waste of the commodity before its use.

If it be further urged, that not to keep the stores well furnished would be an unanswerable neglect on the principal officers' parts if in case there should happen any necessitous service, it is easily answered that as it is an unexcusable offence, if they have money, not to supply the stores with such provisions as at some times for money cannot be had, so it is as great improvidence to glut the stores with any commodities, and much more with such materials as may at all times be had upon five days' warning, and that at cheaper rates from others than from him that, upon pretence of his place, promiseth a great care and charge in their providing, though indeed he only intends his own profit and not the benefit or necessity of the service.

Let this suffice touching purveyors receiving yearly salary. As for the other sort of purveyors, many things are observable, but chiefly the ability and honesty of the man to be employed, and that not so much in the general as in that particular way of employment, wherein if they be deficient¹ there

¹ So the Penn MS., the B.M. copy, and the 18th century MSS. The Bodleian and Pepysian MSS. read 'difficult.'

must needs follow no small damage to the King and the service. For it is to be noted that all purveyors in remote places have a trust without all possibility of check, and must and do act their employment in the country, not as purveyors, but in the place and room of the officers of the navy, storekeepers, clerks of the check, purveyors, and all other subordinate officers whatsoever whereto that particular store may relate, because whilst they are in the woods¹ they have an uncontrollable trust, and are both one and all these officers in a considerable sense; hence it comes to pass that if the purveyor do not charge himself with any, or not all, moneys received either for tops, lops, slabs,² bark, wastes, and defective timber, sold for his Majesty's use, he may purse it, or a great part of it, without control; and such hath been the honesty of one that I could name, that when the officers had taken his accounts, and passed his bill without query, he voluntarily charged himself and discounted to the King a considerable sum of money wherewith neither the officers nor any man else could have charged him.

Amongst other inconveniences these are not to be passed over with silence in purveyance. First, that no man (though otherwise never so able) be employed that hath another duty or place to attend upon at the same time. For the business is of that consequence to the King and in itself that it admits no purveyor's absence from it any long time without apparent damage, and the covetousness of some to get a double salary for one and the same time, by attending sometimes here and sometimes there, hath cost the King to my knowledge forty times as much

¹ In order to purvey timber.

² 'Tops and lops' = tops and small branches of trees lopped off for fagots. 'Slabs' = the outer cut of a tree or log when sawn up into planks or boards.

as that man's salary came to, either in the loss of the season, waste of the materials, clamour of the country, or increase of the purveyor's salary.

The like indiscretion to this is the employment of one purveyor upon two or three purveyances at one and the same time, especially in places distant any space one from the other. This very thing is very disadvantageous for the King. How is it possible (especially if he be a dull man) that one purveyor can well act the business of two or three places, distant, it may be, forty or fifty miles the one from the other, to the best advantage of the King, when in the bills of all purveyors employed but at one place only you shall find allowances (and those great ones) given to the purveyors for the entertainment and reward of men to assist them in that particular service? It is hard to determine what is lost hereby, but I could easily demonstrate that no small sums are daily lost and improvidently spent.

Another case wherein the King hath been much and may be more damnified in point of purveyance is, when no care is taken to call purveyors seasonably to account, not only of what money they have received, but also what timber they have served in, and what time, and why no sooner, and why no more; for want hereof I have known a purveyor spin out six years' time in doing of that which no man that understood the business but might have finished¹ in half the time and less. The damage that ariseth to the King thereby is: First, purveyor's entertainment of 3s. 4d. per diem² for so long time as he needlessly spendeth in the woods; secondly,

¹ The MSS. read 'but might have finished *the business*.'

² According to the Report of 1618 the purveyor had 3s. 4d. per diem when travelling, 2s. 6d. when at home (Charnock, *Marine Architecture*, ii. 205).

the purloining of his Majesty's materials in the absence of the purveyor, who minds and follows other business, and only keeps this on foot to advance him a salary; thirdly, the sogging¹ and rotting of his Majesty's timber lying in the woods sometimes two or three years after it is felled before it comes into his yards, insomuch as when it comes in it is scarce worth the land and water carriage, as I have too often seen; fourthly, exorbitant prices given by his Majesty for timber, &c., out of private men's yards to supply his present necessity, when his own lies in the woods altogether neglected to be sent in in season—all which laid together makes that an offence intolerable which is commonly tolerated as no offence, as sundry bills in my custody can too plainly manifest.

I list not to enlarge myself with the devices of purveyors and others, who, to blind the business, will sometimes purvey by the load, sometimes by the day, sometimes by a general reward for an entire business, though indeed every one of these have their ruse² and sleight of hand. It concerns the officers in whom the trust is, as to discover so to prevent them by their wisdom and circumspection for the King's service. Let this be an hint to them whose care it is to inquire further.

The next thing considerable in wages rateable by discretion is water-carriage, whereof much need not be said, because an easy capacity may discern what is fit to be given between the King and the subject without prejudice to either, especially considering there is nothing almost carried by water from one place to another, but the same or the like

¹ 18th century MS. 'soaking.' Sog = wet; soggy = soaked.

² So the B.M. copy, though altered by a later hand to 'guise.'

hath been transported before to and from the same places, whereby the officer rating may consult the precedents of the office in that particular, and thereby guide his judgment. Yet in this, as in most things in the navy, there wants not some abuses to the King and sometimes wrongs to the subject.¹

The ways of rating bills of water-carriage are either in gross, by the freight, or in particulars, by the load, ton, hundredweight, last, &c., respectively, according to the quantity and condition of each commodity so transported, in both which ways there is something observable as worthy consideration and amendment; as thus, when the King presseth any lighter, hoy,² &c., to transport goods from Deptford to Chatham, &c., and doth not fully freight her, and that she goeth thither solely for the King, without all manner of freight for private men, or possibility to procure a freight back. In this case for the officers to deny the master the benefit of a full freight for his hoy to that place, and only rate the transportation³ of the commodity by the load, ton, or hundred, which, it may be, will not advance the moiety of his full freight, is somewhat too severe, and, as I conceive, beyond the royalty of the King's service; for if there be not a full freight ready, it was the indiscretion of the purveyor to press the hoy before the King had goods enough to freight her, and the hoyman ought not to suffer for another man's neglect, as I have often seen him do. Thus, on the contrary, if a hoy be fully freighted to Chatham, Portsmouth, or elsewhere, and at the

¹ So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. Other MSS. read 'service.'

² A lighter is a large, open, flat-bottomed boat employed to carry goods to and from a ship. A hoy is a small sloop-rigged vessel, often employed for the same purpose where lighters could not be safely used (Falconer).

³ So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. The B.M. copy reads 'exportation,' and the Pepysian 'proportion.'

signing of the bill an officer rates the freight by particulars, either by the hundredweight, ton, last, &c., in this case there must needs be a great loss to the King, for whereas the hoy, it may be, might have been hired for so much by agreement for the voyage, the goods transported in that hoy, being rated by particulars, shall, according to the ordinary precedent of such goods, amount almost to double the money, as too many bills thus rated do plainly demonstrate.

Another thing in water-carriage hath cost the King a groat at least, and that is when a hoyman shall comply underhand with a purveyor—I must not say with an officer—to give him notice of a freight from Deptford to Portsmouth, and when he comes thither to give him another freight from Portsmouth to Chatham or Woolwich, and at the passing of his bill allow him—not in one bill, that would be seen—in two distinct bills the full freight of his hoy backward and forward, as for two distinct voyages, whenas if he were hired by a private man he would willingly accept of the value of the first bill for both bills, as for what is given by the King in very considerable sums, compared with what the private merchant doth give in like cases, too plainly appeareth.

I purposely omit many petty passages touching this particular. No man that acts as an officer, if he be a wise man, can be ignorant of them. My meditations are already swelled beyond my first intention, and for brevity's sake I proceed to that which follows.

The second general head proposed as considerable in the navy respects victuals, which brancheth itself into sea victuals and harbour victuals, and the last, that is to say harbour victuals, into such victuals as is expended upon the ordinary in harbour,

and such as is provided for extraordinary men attending the rigging and setting to the seas his Majesty's ships ; both which, although they agree in quantity and price according to the victualler's contract, yet in distribution and the grounds thereof do somewhat vary. Many things are disputed and might easily be discussed touching this particular thus distinguished, and I am not ignorant that though the business is actuated by contract, yet no victuals issue but by warrant, first from the lord admiral to the principal officers of the navy, and from them to the victualler, to whom,¹ as to the King, he² doth yearly account, and without whose hands³ (notwithstanding his contract) he cannot have allowance ;⁴ so that, as the former of wages, this of victuals is necessary to be declared, both for the benefit of the King, the victualler, and the subject employed in that business. Yet because it was not my intention at the first to intermeddle therein, and that in itself it will take up more time than my present employment in his Majesty's service will allow me, I desire for the present to pass it over with silence, to proceed to the last general head propounded in the government of the navy, respecting provisions or stores.

To treat of stores of all kinds in a particular enumeration would both tire me and my reader ; withal it may be an useless discourse. For the general let this be permitted : First, that it is unsafe (cost what it will) to cumber the King's yards and storehouses with any provision that in itself is not good and serviceable in its kind ; secondly, that though the particulars be never so good, yet it

¹ *I.e.* the principal officers.

² *I.e.* the victualler.

³ *I.e.* the principal officers.

⁴ See Sir William Monson's *Naval Tracts*, printed in Churchill's *Voyages*, vol. iii.

is no providence, if not a great deal of ill husbandry, in the officers to glut the stores with any provision that may be had for money upon all demands in several markets, especially if it be wasteable ; thirdly, that it is a great neglect not to provide and furnish the stores with all manner of provisions that are necessitated to the service and yet difficult without great care, timely warning, and extraordinary prices to be supplied. In all these particulars with respect to stores in general I shall declare in my ensuing discourse how the navy stands in its present government, and then proceed distinctly to touch upon some particulars especially considerable in the navy.

First, I affirm that it is unsafe and much prejudicial to the King and his service to furnish, or rather to burden, the stores with any provision that is not good and serviceable in its kind. Too lamentable experience makes this true and apparent, from whence it is that all surveys are stuffed with timber and sundry other provisions taken upon survey either as unserviceable or at least defective. My demand is, Was that timber ever used or not ? if not, how came it defective ? if it were so at its first coming into the yard, when the King paid not only the price but also the land and water carriage of that commodity (which oftentimes exceeds the first value) which being in his yard is either worth nothing, or at least but little ? And though for the present it may be there, and being there be valuable according to its goodness, yet if upon the next survey you consult the warrants or books of the keeper of the out-stores to know what became of it, you shall find that it was never used to any advantage, because unfit for the service, but either cleaved¹ out for firing for the houses of those that live in his Majesty's yards, or it may be disposed

¹ The Pepysian MS. reads 'cleaned ;' but see p. 80, *infra*.

a worse way in another place ; so that in effect to admit the serving of a bad commodity is not only to misspend the King's treasure for an useless material, but also to lose the material itself, being commonly fit for nothing else but to burn.

I know it hath been a position of some—to drive their own ends in the action—that there is nothing but is good for something, and that if the King hath a proportionable abatement in the measure and the price for what is wanting in the quantity and goodness of the provision, he receives no damage, though the material be in itself defective.

For an officer to expose the King's treasure to loss upon Ifs and Ands when he might act without all peradventure neither becomes his discretion nor fidelity, for when the purveyor or party vending hath gotten but so much favour as to obtrude a bad commodity upon the King (as I have too often seen it) he desires no more, and neglects to take out his bills for his commodity till time hath eaten out the memory of its condition, and then gets the storekeeper, clerk of the check, or others, to certify on their bills that either they were indifferent good, or as good as usually are served, or some such blind expression, whereby the officers are led, and do daily give as much for that which indeed is not fit to come into stores as for the best commodities of those lengths and kinds.

Besides, though I will not tax any particular person in their trust, for that is not the intention of my discourse, yet I am sure that the officers, upon signing of any bill, never have any certificate from the storekeeper what is abated in the measure for want of goodness in any provisions ; so that if they would, yet for want thereof they cannot right the King. But admit they have a certificate to lead their judgments in the qualification of its defect. I

demand, from whom have they that certificate? Not from the storekeeper, nor the clerk of the check, who are the immediate ministers of the King, but from a shipwright trusted under the storekeeper to measure provisions coming into the yard; and how easy it is for a merchant or purveyor to procure a favourable certificate from him that hath no other livelihood than his day wages for the execution of that service, let all men judge.

I know well that let what care be taken that can, yet sometimes in a great parcel of goods some bad will be shuffled in amongst the good, and that in so great a service as that of the navy the variety of the business may admit the use of some defective pieces compared with the best; but yet for the officers upon this pretence either to contract for whole bargains, and those for great sums of money, for commodities that (setting aside Master Friendship) would be judged by all men that view them unfit to be brought into the King's stores, and when they are, [fit for] nothing but to fill up survey-books and thereby make the State believe the King hath a great and good magazine of that provision, when, indeed, it is nothing so, or to suffer the King's merchant, or any other, without occasion of service, to serve in¹ goods upon pretence of furnishing the stores as the service shall require, and not to let those provisions be paid for nor surveyed till such time as they be spent (as a private man's goods and not the King's), and then to give that man a great price without distinction of good and bad, long and short, serviceable and unserviceable, must needs be a great damage to the King and neglect of the trust reposed.

To instance particulars were to meddle with persons. Let it suffice to be known that, whether such things be done or not, if they be not prevented

¹ *I.e.* to serve into the stores.

a worse way in another place ; so that in effect to admit the serving of a bad commodity is not only to misspend the King's treasure for an useless material, but also to lose the material itself, being commonly fit for nothing else but to burn.

I know it hath been a position of some—to drive their own ends in the action—that there is nothing but is good for something, and that if the King hath a proportionable abatement in the measure and the price for what is wanting in the quantity and goodness of the provision, he receives no damage, though the material be in itself defective.

For an officer to expose the King's treasure to loss upon Ifs and Ands when he might act without all peradventure neither becomes his discretion nor fidelity, for when the purveyor or party vending hath gotten but so much favour as to obtrude a bad commodity upon the King (as I have too often seen it) he desires no more, and neglects to take out his bills for his commodity till time hath eaten out the memory of its condition, and then gets the storekeeper, clerk of the check, or others, to certify on their bills that either they were indifferent good, or as good as usually are served, or some such blind expression, whereby the officers are led, and do daily give as much for that which indeed is not fit to come into stores as for the best commodities of those lengths and kinds.

Besides, though I will not tax any particular person in their trust, for that is not the intention of my discourse, yet I am sure that the officers, upon signing of any bill, never have any certificate from the storekeeper what is abated in the measure for want of goodness in any provisions ; so that if they would, yet for want thereof they cannot right the King. But admit they have a certificate to lead their judgments in the qualification of its defect. I

demand, from whom have they that certificate? Not from the storekeeper, nor the clerk of the check, who are the immediate ministers of the King, but from a shipwright trusted under the storekeeper to measure provisions coming into the yard; and how easy it is for a merchant or purveyor to procure a favourable certificate from him that hath no other livelihood than his day wages for the execution of that service, let all men judge.

I know well that let what care be taken that can, yet sometimes in a great parcel of goods some bad will be shuffled in amongst the good, and that in so great a service as that of the navy the variety of the business may admit the use of some defective pieces compared with the best; but yet for the officers upon this pretence either to contract for whole bargains, and those for great sums of money, for commodities that (setting aside Master Friendship) would be judged by all men that view them unfit to be brought into the King's stores, and when they are, [fit for] nothing but to fill up survey-books and thereby make the State believe the King hath a great and good magazine of that provision, when, indeed, it is nothing so, or to suffer the King's merchant, or any other, without occasion of service, to serve in¹ goods upon pretence of furnishing the stores as the service shall require, and not to let those provisions be paid for nor surveyed till such time as they be spent (as a private man's goods and not the King's), and then to give that man a great price without distinction of good and bad, long and short, serviceable and unserviceable, must needs be a great damage to the King and neglect of the trust reposed.

To instance particulars were to meddle with persons. Let it suffice to be known that, whether such things be done or not, if they be not prevented

¹ *I.e.* to serve into the stores.

for the future, I know who must pay for it ; and that though I could say something to the purpose fitter to be concealed, yet this that is said may serve for prevention of that which the discovery of particulars cannot now help.

The second thing premised was this : that, let the provision be never so good, yet it is improvidence in the officers to glut the stores with any provision that may be had for money (especially if it be wasteable) upon all demands and in sundry places. Something touching this hath been formerly explained in the case of the King's merchant ;¹ to repeat the same thing were fruitless ; but if that sufficeth not, let this be considered : that it is not the necessity of the service, nor the provident care of the officers to supply the magazine, that occasions a glut of any commodity in the stores, but the importunity of and favour to the merchant, especially in these times of good payment, without any respect had either to the quantity fit to be supplied or the present use of that provision ; and the main ground of this is his Majesty and the officers granting patents or warrants to men for places that respect no personal service, nor, indeed, anything else good to the King, other than the party's private profit : such as to be the King's merchant, upholsterer, ironmonger, both for iron and ironwork, ropeseller, draper, &c., all which, having warrants for their places and driving a settled and constant trade with the King for all manner of provisions, may lead the officers in a string not only to take into store what they desire, but also at such rates as they demand, notwithstanding there be, first, no present use of the commodity ; secondly, the commodity might be bought cheaper elsewhere, the King paying ready money ; and, thirdly, the

¹ See pp. 58-9, *supra*.

DISCOURSE OF THE NAVY 7

commodity itself before it be used decays in it goodness and wastes in its quantity.

It is true that which is objected, that those men, being constantly dealt with, all do apply themselves to accommodate the King upon a occasions, and sometimes some of them have trusted the King with great sums for a long time before they could procure their payment; but it is also a true that when moneys are plenty and payment good every man seeks to serve the King because of the price and payment, and why the King should not have the liberty of all his subjects to buy his provisions where he can get them best and best cheap, but upon pretence of a warrant be limited to have them of this man or of none is, as was said before, not easily determined. Besides, when payments are bad the same men that now seek the service will decline it, and the King by commission taketh a commodity from them, it is certain that the forbearance is included in the price, to a far greater loss to the King than if he had taken up money at interest to make present payment, and bought the provision so for ready money.¹

In the next place, the King's stores may be glutted in one yard² and yet starved in another and therefore it concerns the officers, if they will needs provide a magazine of those provisions that

¹ Some interesting illustrations of the way in which want of money in the navy affected the price of commodities at a late time are found in *Mr. Pepys's defence of the Navy, upon an Inquisition thereto by Parliament*, 1669 (Pepysian MSS. No. 2554). The Navy Board bought hemp at 57*l.* a ton on credit, that was being sold for cash at 49*l.* 10*s.*; 'iron-furnaces were 30*s.* a lb. for cash, 'with a refusal of 50*s.* to be paid by bill and deals offered at 8*l.* for cash, were afterwards bought on credit at 12*l.*

² The B.M. and Pepysian MSS. read 'year.'

may at all times be had, to take special care the same provisions be served by the merchant into that yard where in all probability his Majesty's service shall require their use and expense; otherwise it will follow that not only the King's treasure shall be wasted without occasion of service, but also when the service requires such and such provisions, his Majesty must needs be at an exorbitant expense in cartage, craneage, water-carriage, and landing-charges of that material, in and from one yard to another, whenas the same commodity might be had and delivered into his Majesty's yard where the service requires it free of all those charges, and at as cheap a rate, if not cheaper, than they were at first brought into a yard where there was no use of them. I have known and could name sundry provisions first bought at London at the suit and entreaty of the vendor, the same provisions carried at the King's charge to Deptford, the portage, lading-charges, water-carriage, landing-charges, and stowage paid for by the King, and, within one month after, the same provision by command transported to Chatham to be spent there, to no small charge to the King. It's bad enough in commodities not wasteable, such as timber, plank, tree-nails,¹ deals, &c., though these may admit of exchange or come short of their number before they be delivered; but then if you take the case in a provision wasteable, such as tar, rosin, reed, oil, brimstone in meal, &c., it must needs be worse. I add to this that common ground of surplusage on the treasurer's accounts and surcharges for service already esti-

¹ Pins of hard wood used for fastening a ship's planks or timbers. They were to be 'of young trees, the sap hewed quite away, and the stuff cleft out of the heart only.' The best trees for the purpose were at this time said to be at Shotover and Stow Wood in Oxfordshire (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, p. 104).

mated and stated in the needless supply of more provisions of one sort than the service doth require, merely to favour a friend or the vendor, and the neglect of providing other provisions that are necessitated to the service.

The third and last thing premised in the case of stores was,¹ that it is a great neglect in the officers not to furnish the stores with all provisions necessitated to the service, and yet difficult, with great care, timely warning, and unreasonable prices, to be obtained. The chiefest and most necessitated provision is great masts from twenty-two hands upwards; others, such as great timber, long planks, hemp, tar, &c., although upon special occasion they may be scarce and hard to come by, yet generally are to be had for money upon demand; so that although in both these sorts of provisions care ought to be taken by the officers, yet principally in the first, as being both difficult and yet without which in case of necessity the affairs of the State may be much retarded, if not altogether disappointed. For want of this timely providence I have known the King not only necessitated to give excessive prices for these commodities, but also to take into stores together with them a great quantity of other less useful, if not altogether useless, provisions, upon pretence of great service done in furnishing the stores with three or four great masts whereof the service was by improvidence necessitated; and to speak the truth, this is the best and all the service that the King's merchant hath at any time done to the King, which by care taken might as well have been done by other men, and was never done by him but upon very considerable prices, as the ledger-books will show, and always attended with an addition of other provisions in great quantities, though the service neither

¹ The MSS. read 'viz.'

required their supply nor admitted their sudden expense, the inconveniency whereof hath been formerly touched.

From these things premised concerning stores in general, let us descend to the consideration of some particulars. The greatest provision of any one particular in the navy is hemp, distinguished into several kinds of russband, rhynband, and smallband hemp,¹ in all which, without great care in the officers to survey, and skill and fidelity in those that are appointed to view and certify their several goodness, &c., there happens much variety and deceit, either by mixing short ends, smallband amongst russband, russband amongst rhynband, wet amongst dry, and sometimes no better than tows amongst the best hemp, all which, after view, certificate, contract, and price given, have in sundry parcels of hemp served into his Majesty's stores at Chatham been discovered, and so abated from the vendor, by the vigilance and fidelity of the clerk of the ropehouse there, whose care therein hath merited much and deserves due recompense; the want whereof discourageth others as able and willing, it may be, as he to do their duties in such discoveries, especially when they know that those that have power to reward them, if for nothing else, yet for that very thing will oppose them, and it may be by their power crush them. As for cordage made

¹ See p. 188, *infra*. Russia or Muscovia cordage was much complained of (see Appendix, and Charnock, *Mar. Arch.* ii. 220). It was said that it would only last a year, 'whereas the cordage may be made here to little more cost to serve at the least 18 months, and get that cost gained by the good making thereof' (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 559). The term 'band' appears to be used here in a technical sense, perhaps associated with the way in which the hemp was packed. Thus we have three kinds of tar, 'great band,' 'herring band,' and 'middle band;' also 'great band' pitch (Charnock, ii. p. 224).

of hemp brought into the stores, nothing hath more prejudiced its goodness than making it by contract at so much per hundredweight, delivering weight for weight—a plain way to cozen the King; and I doubt the storehouses at Deptford groan under the burden of cordage thus made, and pray for the docking of ships there, that by the use of launching tackles they may be disburdened, the cordage being otherways good for little. Cordage bought ready-made before the erection of his Majesty's manufactures at Chatham and Woolwich¹ was one of the greatest thefts in the navy, those that sold and bought it doing nothing herein but by special warrant, and upon view and certificate both of its goodness and price, under the hands of divers men employed to survey the same, a course a man² would think without all exception, and yet indeed so deceptive that if I said nothing else, the cordage which was bought some twelve, ten, eight, and six years ago in this kind, lying yet in store never used nor useful, would justify what is already said. Such hath been the abuse herein, that I have known the same man

¹ Among the papers in the Pepysian Library are several relating to a controversy of 1610 concerning the relative merits of Russia and East country or Riga hemp. This was occasioned by a decision to supply the want of Russia cordage due to the interruption of trade by war, by importing East country hemp and setting up the trade of ropemaking 'here at home.' A contract was signed on May 7, 1610, with William Greenwell and Thomas Still, 'merchants of London trading for the East country,' by which they undertook to establish a rope-manufactory at Woolwich, and there manufacture cordage for the navy, and deliver into the stores at Deptford at such times and in such quantities as might be required. They undertook to employ Englishmen only, and to 'cause the said cordage to be as well and substantially spun and wrought as the cordage made for the East India Company of late was, and as good as the best of Russia stuff as formerly . . . received' (*Miscellanies*, x. 539).

² So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. The B.M. copy and Pepysian MS. read 'a coarse man.'

employed as a master attendant and servant for the King to view and certify the goodness of a parcel of cordage, to have given it under his hand for very good, and yet within three months after its receipt into store, having part of that cordage issued for the rigging and store of a ship of the King's whereof he went master, hath rejected the same as base stuff and not fitting to be used in the King's service. I know it is the opinion of some of those officers that, let the cordage be never so good that is made by the King's own ministers, yet it lasts no longer than that (be it never so bad) that is bought of the merchant, because the boatswain will be sure to spend or waste so much in a voyage with clenching,¹ splicing, &c., so that the King saves nothing in the close. It is certain (the more is the pity) there is little difference made in the expense of cordage in the King's service, be it good or bad, and so scanty is the pay of boatswains in the King's service, that in a voyage of six months, though it be good they will be sure to spend so much, and if it be bad they dare not say they have spent much more, for fear they exceed the ordinary allowance thought fit for so long service ;² but yet this is nothing to the point, that therefore it is safe to hazard the King's ships with bad ground-tackle, or to furnish the King's stores with a magazine of base cordage. It concerns the duty and fidelity of the officers of the navy to prevent the waste by supply of the best, and not to waste the King's treasure for that which is bad, upon pretence that though it were good so much would be spent, and being spent as good

¹ = Clutching, grasping. But the word has also a technical sense = to make the end of a rope fast in a particular way.

² In December 1637 several boatswains were suspended by the principal officers, on the ground that the expenditure of cordage in their ships during the summer had been 'very exorbitant' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1637-8, p. 30).

(though bad) the King loseth nothing upon the balance.

The next great provision to hemp and cordage is timber of all sorts, whether oak, elm, ash, &c., unconverted, or else as by conversion it receives the several denominations of knees, raking and square,¹ plank, tree-nails, boards, &c. This provision of all others in the navy admits the [greatest] variety in its kind, and therefore requires not only the greater care in the providing of it, but also experience in some competent measure to distinguish the prices according to its several worth and goodness.

Timber in the navy is sometimes the King's own, and sometimes purchased by the King from private men. When it is the King's own timber, the manner is to grant warrants for a certain number of trees to be felled in such a wood or forest of the King's for such a service, and then to employ purveyors to send it into stores. When it is a private man's, sometimes the King takes it in the woods, either by girt² or square measure, unconverted, and is at the charge of land and water carriage, and sometimes the vendor serves it into the stores free of all charge.

There are many things considerable in this provision : as, first, the choice of an honest and able man to be purveyor, whose trust, as I said before, is so great that it is impossible almost to check or trace him ; secondly, the place where the timber grows, viz.—how near London, how near a navigable river, &c.—as the better to guide the officers in its charge of purveyance and serving into stores, so to direct

¹ Knee = a piece of timber with an angular bend, used to secure the beams of a ship to her sides or timbers. 'Raking and square' refers to the angle, which varied according to the situation of the pieces to be joined.

² 'Girt measure' is by the circumference or 'girth' of the timber.

them in its price in the woods, both which vary more or less according to the place where it lies ; thirdly, the condition of the timber in its age, bigness, colour, goodness, length, straightness or crookedness, that according to each of these care may be taken for its conversion in the woods into beams, wale-pieces,¹ clamps,² plank, compass-timber,³ knees, tree-nails, &c. ; fourthly, the hewing and squaring of it (if it be bought square measure), that so the King may not pay for that which indeed is not in being, viz. for so many foot of timber in a piece which, if it were hewed as it ought, would not, it may be, make so much by ten or twenty foot ; fifthly, if you respect the provision⁴ as plank, then that it be sound,⁵ unshaken, square edged, without slabs (unless the contract bears them), or at least having two slabs for one, according to the private custom of private timber-merchants in the Thames. The want of these and the like considerations hath cost the King many hundreds of pounds. The ignorance of the purveyor hath oftentimes, by converting timber to such uses as it was not fit [for], not only lost the provision in its proper use, but also made it incapable of any use ; by sending in provisions that have been defective, not only made the King pay the price of a good for a bad provision in the woods, but also the land and water carriage of that provision, which, it may be, exceeded the first price, and yet when it was brought into the King's

¹ 'Strong planks extending along a ship's side throughout her whole length at different heights, and serving to reinforce the decks' (Falconer, *Marine Dictionary*). Also applied to the horizontal timbers of a quay or jetty, secured to the vertical timbers or masonry, in order to receive the impact of vessels coming or lying alongside (*Century Dictionary*).

² 'Clamps,' in the nautical sense, are the thick planks in a ship's side below the shelf-piece which supports the ends of the deck-beams.

³ *I.e.* curved timber.

⁴ B.M. copy 'proportion.'

⁵ So Bodleian and Penn MSS. Other MSS. 'found.'

yard was fit for little else than the fire—and all to gain to himself his eighteenpence a load for the purveyance: by neglecting the season of the year for land-carriage of his provision, hath forced the King to supply his stores out of private yards at excessive rates—and all to gain him three shillings and fourpence per diem for so long time as he can keep his purveyance on foot by pretended excuses, &c. But of these things I have said somewhat in the case of purveyance.

I could run through each particular forenamed consideration, and not only show but prove that the King hath paid a seventh penny more than he needed for timber bought by the officers at large without knowledge or consideration of the place where it grew or stood: that in many contracts for timber, so the quantity be served in, it matters not how it be squared, and if it were squared and hewn as it ought to be, a tenth part of the provision, and so of the price, might be saved to the King: that the King hath often paid for plank contracted for at a great price with respect had to its goodness and length, and when it hath been served in, hath neither been so long nor so good: that little better than slabs and staves have been served in lieu of plank, and yet still taken into store as so much plank, and to colour the business the contractor hath stayed for his money till the provisions were spent, and then taken of his bill and been paid by virtue of his contract without estimation of the dimensions and goodness of the provision: that the purveyor and the merchant have been one and the same man, and in doing the business the former hath made over his right to a second party, that those that have certified the goodness of timber have been, if not sold, yet at least put into other hands of the same timber, and at the same time the King

servants—I had almost said master shipwrights ; that the rates and prices of timber and plank of all sorts hath for seven years past risen every year above three shillings the load respectively,¹ and yet there are those that will undertake to serve the navy with all sorts seven years to come at the same rates that are now given ; that timber, &c., hath been received into his Majesty's yards without either warrant to the storekeeper or clerk of the check to receive or take notice of the same, and the party paid for that timber without their hands to the bill to signify the delivery of the provision ; that within six months after the King had paid for a parcel of timber and the same delivered into store, ten—I might say twenty—loads at a time have been cleaved out for the firing of those that should have preserved it, and the King hath paid the charge of the labourers for doing it.

These and many more such things as these might be as easily proved as specified, but (as before I said) I drive at no man's person, and therefore omit what might further be said herein, only wishing that, considering timber is a great material in the navy, and that which admits such great variety in ² its use, special care may be taken ³ both for its seasonable provision and reasonable payment, with respect had to former circumstances. These

¹ A comparison of the prices of timber in the Report of 1618 (Charnock, *Mar. Arch.* ii. 206), with those given by Mr. Oppenheim in his article on the Royal Navy under Charles I. (*E. H. R.* ix. 492), shows an increase, though not the increase stated in the text. Knee timber was 2*l.* a load in 1618 and 2*l.* 10*s.* in 1631. Crooked timber had increased from 1*l.* 5*s.* to 1*l.* 10*s.* ; straight timber from 1*l.* 5*s.* to 1*l.* 10*s.* ; and plank, which was 1*l.* 16*s.* 8*d.* a load in 1618 (Charnock, *Mar. Arch.* ii. 224), was 1*l.* 18*s.* in 1626.

² The MSS. read 'is,' except the Penn MS. and an 18th century copy.

³ The B M. copy begins a new sentence, and reads 'Specially tar might be taken.'

and many other great provisions are incident to the service of the navy, as iron, deals, canvas, &c., of all which it were not difficult to show divers passages wherein the King is not well served, or at least may be served better, but for brevity's sake I omit them.

I should now proceed from the general government of the navy by the four principal officers to handle the particular duty of all subordinate ministers in the navy acting distinctly under them in their several places, and therein to show how and which way they move in their several orbs, and wherein they may do, and do, the King good service, or may and do[do] the King a disservice; but this was beyond my first intention and promise, which in the last place was only to propound a way how to amend and prevent abuses in the navy for the future, the scope of my ensuing discourse.

In all government, whether general or particular, method or order hath always been esteemed amongst the wiser sort the best help, and that which not only facilitates things otherwise burdensome and tedious, but also makes them appear graceful and lovely in the actor. In private employments all men have the benefit of the choice of that method or order which they think fittest and best. In public affairs order is swallowed up by command, that being often thought fittest to be done which is commanded, though sometimes the thing commanded, or at least its manner of doing, be altogether unfit. In the particular government of the navy, from the officers downward—I meddle no further—nothing hath been a greater cause of the several errors before named, and many hundreds more omitted, than want of order, the bane of many fair intentions, the stroy-good¹

¹ So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. The Pepysian MS. and B.M. copy read 'stray good.'

of the navy. I need not be copious¹ in declaring that which all men know—the method of the government of the navy at present by four principal officers, distinguished into a treasurer, comptroller, surveyor, and clerk of the records. It were easy to show how all these act in themselves distinctly,² and together as a body, and how all men in the navy act under them by their command—a way certainly grounded in its first institution³ upon solid and sound reason, and so fit for a methodical government of the navy that in my succeeding discourse I shall endeavour not how to project new ways of government, but rather propound how to revive the old, which by succession of time is in some points corrupted by the increase of shipping in the navy, in other points varied, and by the variety of yards remote and distant one from another, and dwelling-houses, storehouses, and other things erected in each yard for the better accommodation of the navy, made altogether impossible to be acted and kept regularly according to the ground of its first institution.

At the first coming of the Israelites out of Egypt, God appointed Moses for their government, but being some time in the wilderness, and finding that the business grew a great burden in sitting to judge the people from morning till night, by the advice of his father-in-law, Jethro, he distributed his power in small matters to able men, and reserved the power of greater matters to himself. What was done by him in that case, if the same were done in the navy, would not only ease the burden of the business, but also discharge the trust thereof with much more fidelity than either is or indeed can be

¹ So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. The Pepysian MS. and B.M. copy read 'captious.'

² *I.e.* individually, separately.

³ So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. The Pepysian MS. and B.M. copy read 'intention.'

showed in the way wherein it now goes. For I demand, How is it possible for a principal officer living at London to act the general duty of an officer, and the particular duty of such an officer in the King's yard at Portsmouth, Deptford, Chatham, and Woolwich at one and the same time, the service often so requiring it? If it be answered, He may do it by his clerks or instruments, I answer again that if clerks may do the work, what needs the officer? But that clerks cannot do it as they ought appears by the precedent discourse in point of day wages, and by the constant trudging of the subject from post to pillar, from Portsmouth to London, London to Chatham, Chatham to Deptford, &c., and all, it may be, but to get an officer's hand to his bill. How shall this man's trouble and charges be borne? Certainly by the King in the price of the provision. If it be further said that the officers do go down themselves to each yard several times in the year to settle and dispose of business in each yard and satisfy the subject in all demands, it is likewise answered that such journeys were better spared than made, inasmuch as they go not down purposely, but occasionally to attend the pay of some ship or to take some survey, &c.; or, if they do, their backs are no sooner turned but the business is carried the old way, and for want of one to act in a power beyond all subordinate ministers attending in each yard respectively, all men take liberty to do what they list both in point of care and fidelity, and the officers are sure never to hear of any abuses till they fall out among themselves and betray one another. Where all men claim an equal power and interest in a service, there it is impossible but either they jangle in the execution, or, if they comply,¹ it is generally in the worst sense, to do mischief rather

¹ *I.e.* agree, act together.

than to assist the service. Upon these and the like premises I conclude, and do humbly propose to consideration, that seeing his Majesty's ships are more and his navy far greater than heretofore, his yards remote, his stores various, his buildings many, &c., and that thereby it is impossible for an officer to act as he ought in the discharge of so great a trust as the government of the whole navy, that the way to facilitate the business, discharge the trust, prevent the abuses, and discover the errors of the government of the navy, is to settle in each of his Majesty's yards respectively one able minister, to be and remain constantly there with the power of a principal officer (but as an assistant to the principal officers),¹ who shall from time to time attend all pays, rate all wages, enter and discharge all ministers, survey and certify for all stores before they be laid up in his Majesty's storehouses, and in general do all things proper to an officer at large (excepting payments of money, proper only to the treasurer), and be responsible, as to the lord admiral-in-chief, so to the four principal officers under him, of and for all and all manner of abuses, misdemeanours, and neglects, either respecting men's persons, wages, victuals, or stores—serving, served into, or earned at that yard where they shall be appointed to attend respectively. I propose him an equal power to the

¹ The suggestion made in the text was no novelty, although it had been only irregularly carried out, for Sir William Monson refers to it as a practice of the Commission [of 1618] to have 'always one of themselves or an able assistant dwelling at Chatham' (iii. 322). During the Dutch war under the Commonwealth a navy commissioner was stationed in charge of each of the principal yards (*E. H. R.* xi. 59), and at the Restoration Peter Pett was appointed one of the commissioners of the navy, at a smaller salary than his colleagues (350*l.* instead of 500*l.*), with instructions to reside permanently at Chatham and take charge of the dockyard there (Wheatley, *Samuel Pepys and the times he lived in*, p. 137).

principal officers, that he may be enabled not only to act in command over those that attend as subordinate ministers in each yard under him, but also to oppose and countermand the power of any of the four principal officers who may interpose themselves in commanding those things within the compass of his care, contrary to the course of the office and duty of his place. Again, I propose him to be but an assistant to the officers, the better to teach him that respect and observance which he ought to give in all fair commands to the principal officers, as also to let him know that upon all demands he is not only to answer to them for any obliquity in the government of that yard, but also render them an account, once every year at least, of all passages of service in that yard for each year, together with the present state of all stores in that yard, that so they in their several places and as a body may know how and what to inform the lord admiral, for the general good of the service and well ordering of the navy for the year ensuing.

Records declare that in former times such men as these were allowed in the navy, viz. three assistants to the principal officers of the navy, who enjoyed their places by patent and received 20*l.* per annum out of the exchequer;¹ but the manner of

¹ In Sir William Monson's list of 'Officers in Fee' prior to the reign of Queen Elizabeth, 'three assistants to the principal officers' appear at a salary of 20*l.* each (Churchill's *Voyages*, iii. 319). They are also mentioned among offices 'of ancient constitution' in the Report of the Commission of 1618 (Charnock, *Marine Architecture*, ii. 215). But Monson notes (p. 324) that 'in the last thirty years there has not been much use of them,' adding, 'I suppose rather in respect of the officers' jealousies to have competitors, than for want of employment fit to further the King's service.' In a 'List of officers and places belonging to the navy with fees and wages' dated February 10, 1629, only two assistants to the officers appear (*State Papers, Domestic, Charles I.* cxxxv. 32).

their action was different to what I propose, nor do I conceive there was then that occasion of service, nor so many distinct ¹ places settled for the service of the navy, but by and upon the accident of some special services, all which were the grounds of their discontinuance. For the better government of these men, and their government of others, I humbly advise that whatsoever instructions might be given to a principal officer—either as an officer, or such an officer, viz. comptroller, surveyor, &c.—should, by and from the lord admiral or the four principal officers, be given in general and at large to each of these, with special respect had to the yard they serve in, as the service of that yard may variously require, that so in case of delinquency they may be altogether inexcusable, or otherwise justify themselves to have done nothing but what either the honour of the King and his service did require, or else what the words of their instructions did lead them unto.

For the encouragement of these men, the question may be propounded, What salary is to be given for such a service? It becomes not me to propose, much less to determine, the reward of these men; only thus much is fit to be considered, that though the men be of equal desert, and have an equal power and trust, yet according to the place of their service their salary ought to be abated and augmented: for it is not equal to give a man attending at Chatham no more than a man attending at Portsmouth, Deptford, or Woolwich; and I do conceive that as he that attends at Chatham shall deserve most, so he that attends at Woolwich shall deserve least, because in the first place the service is by much the greatest, and in the other place the service is by somewhat the least.² Further it may be considered

¹ Bodl. MS. 'distant.'

² Chatham was 'the master yard of all' (Pepysian MSS.,

that for their encouragement, though their salaries be different, yet he that hath least should have the benefit of his turn to be removed in case of survivorship¹ to that yard that is next in degree, and so from the highest to the lowest take turns, both for change of places and advance of salaries by their places, which would not only make them studious how to enable themselves for the service against their turns fall, but also save the labour of picking and choosing men (otherwise able) to be officers of the navy out of other places and callings, whenas indeed for the business of the navy in point of action [they] are no other than dunces, and the King must suffer the damage of four or five years' ignorance before that man, though a wise man, shall be able to act as a wise officer.

Something is fit to be said for the choice of these men, viz. what sort of men are most fit for such an employment both in respect of trust, execution, and order. There are three cases wherein the choice of the principal officers hath much prejudiced the service—ignorance how to act well, indiligence² necessitating them to act ill, and age and infirmity forbidding them to act either well or ill. One officer may be able in body and bulk and yet dull in brain; another may have a quicksilver brain and an infirm body and purse. Whether of the three is the worst is not easy to determine. The first by his power may give much in the King's wrong, and yet

Admiralty Letters, x. 358). Mr. Oppenheim's estimate of the size of the yards, based on the number of watchmen required in each, makes Portsmouth the smallest at the beginning of the Commonwealth, though before the Restoration it had become important (*E. H. R.* xi. 76).

¹ The Pepysian MS. reads 'surveyorship.'

² Frequently used for slothfulness. Cf. Jeremy Taylor: 'If we put off our armour too soon, we . . . are surprised by indiligence, and a careless guard' (*Century Dictionary*).

be satisfied in his conscience that he doth God and the King good service ; the second by his power may both give and take ; the third, though he neither takes nor gives, yet cannot be excused in another man's taking through his defect. If one or any of these distinctly considered be unsufferable¹ in the navy, how must the King needs suffer when two or all of them shall meet in one subject ! The navy is a business wherein, however there be distinction of fees, places, and employments, yet there is no place but the party enjoying it hath an immediate and great trust, either respecting himself or others ; and, indeed, such is the trust of the navy in sundry particular places far inferior to a principal officer, that it is almost incredible what mischief a man that enjoys not 40*l.* per annum from the King may do, if any of the three forementioned blemishes be in the officers—yea, such is the trust of some inferior ministers that let the principal officers be never so able, honest, and active, yet (as the navy is now governed) they may betray the service to no small damage.

Therefore for the general, I advise that in the choice of an officer or his assistant both the one and the other of these three be as much as may be avoided² or declined. More particularly let these things be considered : that the main business of the navy in point of government respects men either as seamen, shipwrights, or clerks, so as that the question is easily resolved if you can but resolve which of these three callings is fittest to govern. I confess being a clerk myself I could willingly have baulked this proposition and resolution, as being privy to mine own infirmities and not ignorant

¹ A form frequently used. Cf. Jeremy Taylor also : 'Tormented with the unsufferable load of His Father's wrath' (*Century Dictionary*).

² Bodl. MS. 'avoyed.'

of the opinions of others (far wiser than myself) in this point ; yet, knowing it a business upon which depends the well or evil fare of the navy and the orderly or disorderly government thereof, I shall declare myself freely in matters of opinion, and having showed it and my reasons for it, submit it and myself to the gravity of those whom it may further concern.

And, first, I positively affirm that there is no man fitter (nor indeed so fit, if at all fit to govern the navy as an officer or his assistant) than a clerk bred up in the navy. If there were nothing else but the consideration of the distribution of the fore-named government into wages, victuals, and stores—whereon, directly or by consequence, depends all that can be said of or concerning the navy—yet [by] that itself doth plainly appear that there is much more required to act the business in point of clerkship than either as a seaman or a shipwright. I know (as I said at the beginning of my discourse)¹ that there be many things fit to be known in the point of building and managing of a ship wherein it may be a clerk cannot be expertly practical as those whose proper callings it is so to be (and 'twere a shame for them if they were), yet I know also that such hath been the providence of former ages in the government of the navy—seeing that there is a necessity of having both seamen and shipwrights in the navy—to settle distinct places for men of that breed and condition, such as the three master shipwrights and their assistants, and the four master attendants and their assistants, who act in their places, though subordinate under the officers, yet as the officers under the lord admiral, and the lord admiral under the King, and have as absolute a power to act either in point of surveying,

¹ Probably a reference to p. 9.

docking, building and repairing, shoring, graving, and mooring of his Majesty's ships as any officer. And [I know] that no officer ought to (or will if he be wise) do any of these things, nor any other proper to their several places, without the advice and consent both of the master attendants and master shipwrights signified under their hands in their several places respectively, his Majesty having given them settled places, patents, and fees in ordinary for that end, and all officers a superintendent power over them, whereby they may command them upon all occasions so to do. So as that, though it be confessed that men of these callings are necessary instruments of and in the navy, yet considering that the main part of the matter of government consists in clerkship, and that though there were no officers seamen, &c.,¹ yet there are constantly borne in all his Majesty's yards, master shipwrights (and those as able as the kingdom affords any), master attendants, or both, whom the officers ought always to call to their assistance in things proper to their places and elements, it is plain that clerks bred in the navy are the fittest men for the navy's government as officers or their assistants.²

But may not officers being seamen, &c., as well call to their assistance or be assisted by clerks, as clerks being officers be assisted by seamen, &c. ? It is not denied but that they may, but still with this difference—when an officer that is a clerk consulteth the opinion of a master attendant or master shipwright for the execution of any service touching his Majesty's ships or navy, if anything miscarries in the action of the service the officer is free in point

¹ *I.e.* Though none of the officers were seamen.

² The construction of this paragraph in the MSS. is very confused.

of blame, having it under their hands to do it thus or thus who are instruments appointed by the King and lord admiral to assist by advice and command in those services. But on the contrary if an officer that is a seaman consults with his clerk how to act in such a business of the navy, and notwithstanding his clerk's advice fails either in the matter or form and be questioned for it, the opinion of his clerk is not a sufficient excuse for his obliquity, but rather an aggravation of his offence. Besides, when an officer that is a seaman or shipwright acts in things proper to their professions, it were some weakness of their judgments to advise and consult with men of their own callings; and if they do not, and anything happens contrary to expectation, the officer is worthily blamable for presuming to act in a State's affair upon his own head (let his judgment be what it will), seeing his Majesty is at the charge of and hath appointed these men—viz. the master attendants and master shipwrights—to attend for their advice in and execution of these services that are proper to their own callings and places respectively, so as that he must either hazard his own judgment by asking theirs, or by neglecting theirs let them stand as ciphers,¹ and the King pay their salary without service.

Moreover the principal care of an officer lies not only in commanding others by their warrants how to govern themselves in the despatch of the affairs of the navy, and calling to his assistance all men in their several employments where his experience may be doubted, but also at the end of the year, when the treasurer and victualler pass their accounts which he must sign, to be able himself to trace, as the totals of each service so the rates and service of each bill, the ground and reason of

¹ B.M. copy reads 'scyphers'—a rare form.

each allowance ; to make disposition of bills to and upon their proper heads ; to know what moneys are issued by the treasurer upon all services as imprested¹ to divers men and not accounted for in the ledgers, what moneys the treasurer hath received out of the exchequer upon any and all services proper for that year, what thereof is paid and what remains in his hands, &c. ; to audit yearly the issues and receipts of all storekeepers ; to consult and examine the prick and check books of all clerks of the check, and counter-books of clerks of the check for all receipts and issues of all storekeepers, whether duly and truly kept or not ; to see to and balance the issues of all out-stores, the smith's account for iron received and returned ; to charge the victualler and others, not only with remains taken at the return of ships from sea, but also with what shall appear to be saved or saveable to the King upon the trace and balance of all sea-books for dead pays, short pays, runaways, &c.,—all which, and many more needless to be particularised, do only respect clerkship, and immediately respect the officer's own action, or at least his examination after his clerks have done them, which if either he neglects or be not able to do, the King must needs be ill served, these being matters of great trust, and relating either to money or money's worth. It is not difficult to prove and show warrants, bills, ledger-books, and accounts, signed by officers that have been both seamen and shipwrights, who, though I am confident went² fairly for and to the King and his service, yet in truth signed sometimes neither to what they knew nor were able to give a reason for, if they should be called to an account for their so doing.

When I speak of clerks bred in the navy as the fittest men for those places, mistake me not ; I do

¹ *I.e.* advanced on account.

² Penn MS. 'meant.'

not mean that all clerks bred in the navy are fit men, though never so ancient standards, nor yet that every clerk (though otherwise ingenious) should upon one or two years' service in the navy be preferred as because active therefore able to act in such important affairs, wherein is required discretion, gravity, and a staid comportment, according to the dignity of the place and greatness of the trust, &c. But my meaning is that if a clerk, a seaman, and a shipwright should be competitors for the place, and there be good certificate both of the ability, trust, breeding, and experience of the clerk to do his Majesty service in such an employment, in this sense, though the seaman or shipwright be in respect of their callings without exceptions, this clerk being preferred shall do the King more good service in one year than either of the other shall or can in seven, especially if times be active and the action of State serious.¹

I am not ignorant that some clerks, though in some sense able clerks and have been twenty or thirty years together bred in the navy, yet never were nor will be fit men for officers or their assistants, and that the navy, of so great an office, is the most barren of able clerks in a general sense of any office in the kingdom; and the reasons are—first, because neither their masters from the King nor they from their masters (except the paymaster) have means enough to encourage their pains or invite their proficiency² in the general knowledge of the

¹ With this sketch of the functions of a principal officer compare Sir William Monson's account (Churchill, iii. 321-2.) According to his view, the surveyor's place should be divided between a shipwright and a mariner, while the offices of comptroller and clerk of the acts should be combined in the person of an 'experienced clerk long bred in the office' (*ibid.* p. 327).

² So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. The others read 'sufficiency.'

each allowance ; to make disposition of bills to and upon their proper heads ; to know what moneys are issued by the treasurer upon all services as imprested¹ to divers men and not accounted for in the ledgers, what moneys the treasurer hath received out of the exchequer upon any and all services proper for that year, what thereof is paid and what remains in his hands, &c. ; to audit yearly the issues and receipts of all storekeepers ; to consult and examine the prick and check books of all clerks of the check, and counter-books of clerks of the check for all receipts and issues of all storekeepers, whether duly and truly kept or not ; to see to and balance the issues of all out-stores, the smith's account for iron received and returned ; to charge the victualler and others, not only with remains taken at the return of ships from sea, but also with what shall appear to be saved or saveable to the King upon the trace and balance of all sea-books for dead pays, short pays, runaways, &c.,—all which, and many more needless to be particularised, do only respect clerkship, and immediately respect the officer's own action, or at least his examination after his clerks have done them, which if either he neglects or be not able to do, the King must needs be ill served, these being matters of great trust, and relating either to money or money's worth. It is not difficult to prove and show warrants, bills, ledger-books, and accounts, signed by officers that have been both seamen and shipwrights, who, though I am confident went² fairly for and to the King and his service, yet in truth signed sometimes neither to what they knew nor were able to give a reason for, if they should be called to an account for their so doing.

When I speak of clerks bred in the navy as the fittest men for those places, mistake me not ; I do

¹ *I.e.* advanced on account.

² Penn MS. 'meant.'

not mean that all clerks bred in the navy are fit men, though never so ancient standards, nor yet that every clerk (though otherwise ingenious) should upon one or two years' service in the navy be preferred as because active therefore able to act in such important affairs, wherein is required discretion, gravity, and a staid comportment, according to the dignity of the place and greatness of the trust, &c. But my meaning is that if a clerk, a seaman, and a shipwright should be competitors for the place, and there be good certificate both of the ability, trust, breeding, and experience of the clerk to do his Majesty service in such an employment, in this sense, though the seaman or shipwright be in respect of their callings without exceptions, this clerk being preferred shall do the King more good service in one year than either of the other shall or can in seven, especially if times be active and the action of State serious.¹

I am not ignorant that some clerks, though in some sense able clerks and have been twenty or thirty years together bred in the navy, yet never were nor will be fit men for officers or their assistants, and that the navy, of so great an office, is the most barren of able clerks in a general sense of any office in the kingdom; and the reasons are—first, because neither their masters from the King nor they from their masters (except the paymaster) have means enough to encourage their pains or invite their proficiency² in the general knowledge of the

¹ With this sketch of the functions of a principal officer compare Sir William Monson's account (Churchill, iii. 321-2.) According to his view, the surveyor's place should be divided between a shipwright and a mariner, while the offices of comptroller and clerk of the acts should be combined in the person of an 'experienced clerk long bred in the office' (*ibid.* p. 327).

² So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. The others read 'sufficiency.'

navy ; and, secondly, because there is no more capacity of preferment to a clerk after seven years' service than to a mere stranger that never saw the navy. Whereas if it were by the lord admiral settled in the navy, as it is in the King's household, that men should rise not only by desert but by degrees from place to place, as they shall fall [in] in the navy, then men of good repute would breed their children in the navy, and they being so bred, the King would never want able men, not only fit for the government of the navy but also for any other service, the office of the navy affording an ingenious observer of the variety of its passages as it relates to State affairs as much experience and proficiency in knowledge as any one particular office in the kingdom whatsoever.

In the next place it will be opposed, that the setting of assistants to the officers will trench upon their power, obscure their dignity, take off from their esteem, &c., inasmuch as these men, if they be choice and able men, will,¹ doing the duty of each yard, leave² little or nothing for them to do. I answer, nothing less but rather advance their power and add to their esteem ; but however they should have an equal power with them to further the King's service in each yard, yet whensoever the principal officers shall either doubt their honesties or discretions therein it is fit they should control and countermand, and although they living there must needs know what is fittest to be done and best to be provided for the supply of that yard wherein they live, yet in all considerable provisions, either of timber, plank, masts, hemp, tar, &c., nothing should be supplied

¹ The Pepysian MS. reads 'well.'

² So the Penn MS. The others read 'have,' an easy copyist's mistake.

without the contract being first signed and allowed by the principal officers, and the money assigned to the treasurer, who (as I take it), though custom hath made it otherwise, ought not only to sign to all contracts but also to all bills, though payable by himself, the treasurer having a double capacity, viz. as treasurer to pay what is signed by two of his fellow-officers, and as an officer to contract and rate for the best advantage of the King ; and the want hereof hath begotten exorbitant allowances in divers passages of the navy, the office being lame without a treasurer in this part of his duty, and though it be true that the treasurer cannot sign his own account, yet he may and ought to sign as officer to the bills which are cancelled at the passing of his account, and to the account of the victualler, to certify, as his care in the King's service, so his consent in that particular. Hence is that opinion that a merchant of all men is the fittest man to be a treasurer of the navy,¹ because the State supposeth² his capacity more than ordinary, not only in credit and supply of moneys, but also in the prices and markets of all merchandises proper to the service of the navy.

The last and main question is this : what benefit or saving of charge will redound to the King, if the lord admiral should approve and propose to consideration the settling of these assistants? I answer—for this all men know—he that saveth that which would otherwise be lost, doth in effect gain so much as he saveth to the King ; and what is daily lost in the general hath in some measure been already declared ; more particularly, in each yard the

¹ Monson thought that the treasurer of the navy should be 'either a merchant or a mariner that is or has been an owner of ships.'

² So Penn and B.M. copy. Other MSS. 'supporteth.'

party attending may (if he be such an one as I premise he ought to be) save the King more or less as the service of that yard shall happen to be. In wages, he may save much by being constant at all pays made proper to that yard, rating and examining the rates of all men working there by an experimental and daily observance of their labour and desert, discharging all useless and needless men in time of works, and all otherwise useful men so soon as the works are done, entering no more than the present service shall require, and compelling those that the service requires to attend upon the King and his service, not upon himself or other inferior officers in their private houses. All which and many more, as hath been formerly showed, cost the King no small sums, and are almost impossible to be prevented by the officers at large, living at London and coming down once a quarter, &c., to settle the whole business for that quarter in three days at the most.

In stores, they may save great sums by not suffering them to be unprovided with necessary provisions against occasion of service ; to be glutted or cumbered with provisions, though good, yet not required by the service of that yard ; to be furnished with any provision that by virtue of any contract with the principal officers shall appear upon receipt to be either wanting in substance or circumstance, goodness or weight, quantity or quality, &c. ; to be wasted as chips (too great an abuse),¹ cleaved for firing, embezzled for building or

¹ The intolerable abuses prevailing in Charles I.'s reign 'under colour of chips' are described by Mr. Oppenheim (*E. H. R.* ix. 478). The perquisite appears to have been recognised, but it was very difficult to keep it within reasonable limits. On November 15, 1634, the Lords of the Admiralty issued strict injunctions 'that no shipwright . . . be suffered to carry away any chips . . . but that chips not used for the King's pitch-kettle are

repairing private houses, nor yet misspent in a prodigal curiosity¹ upon the King's own houses in the yard—whereby those houses that at first (and that not long since) were erected and by favour tolerated for a master shipwright, a clerk of the check, a storekeeper, a master joiner, &c., only for and as lodging in time of winter and wet weather, shall be made dwellings fitter for knights, &c., than men of their quality. Thus he may prevent the abuse of stores by not suffering in his own house—much less in every man's house living in the yard—back-doors, private conveyances, keys to the great gate, stables in the King's yard, &c. All which are no better than thieves in the King's service, and I have often smiled to see the great care and cost taken in building brick walls ten foot high, setting up watch-houses in all corners of the King's yard, maintaining porters, watchmen, &c., to prevent what abuses might happen, and yet all this time liberty given to at least five or six back-doors through men's dwelling-houses, which by how much they are least suspected by so much they are the

to be distributed according to the ancient order established, and that in lieu of the same there be allowed to the master shipwrights and chief of the workmen the old allowance of one penny per day' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1634-5, p. 293). In April 1650 another attempt was made to get rid of 'chips' by raising the pay of carpenters and caulkers from 1s. 10d. to 2s. 1d., and labourers from 1s. to 1s. 1d., 'in lieu of all chips and perquisites' (*ibid.* 1650, p. 501). But this did not prevent Richard Holborn, the master mastmaker at Chatham, from 'having his bedsteads made at the State's charge, as also two coffins to bury himself and his wife when they die, which coffins are now in his own house' (*ibid.* 1651-2, p. 127). A similar abuse existed on board ship, for in 1635 the captains were charged with weakening their ships by cutting out 'windows, scuttles, and ports,' and spending 'the carpenter's sea store in making round-houses, new cabins, closets, and other alterations' (*ibid.* 1635, p. 14).

¹ Elaborateness.

more dangerous to be the very receptacles¹ of thefts and embezzlements in the King's service. Not that I can or do tax any particular man's person living in any of his Majesty's yards and enjoying those liberties—far be it from me to do them that wrong—but that these things for favour being connived at, may be (if they be not), without the privity or consent of the master or dweller in the house, very abusive to the service, especially considering there is almost no master shipwright, &c., but keeps sometimes three, four, or five servants constantly in day wages in the King's works, and that all men know in private houses, and much more in a King's service, a back-door was always reputed a thief to the inhabitant.

Again, these assistants to the officers shall in very travelling charges save to the King many hundred pounds yearly; for they being settled to attend constantly whensoever the King sends down money to any of his yards, as to Chatham, Portsmouth, &c., whereas now it costs the King five, six, or seven pounds a day all the time the officers and paymasters are abroad, the business may as well and safely be done for a third part of that charge that now it is for the whole charge, for no officer shall need to go down to any pays,² nor yet to send above one clerk at the most, seeing that the assistant is there ready at all times to attest³ the treasurer's payments, who together with one clerk more is sufficient, and more than was held fitting so to do by the late commissioners of the navy. Besides, at Portsmouth, he that attends there may save the King 40*l.* per annum now given to a clerk

¹ Bodleian MS. and B.M. copy 'receiptals.'

² On the practice of officers attending pays, see Pepys's *Diary*, *passim*.

³ So the Penn and Bodleian MSS. The others read 'attend.'

of the survey,¹ who both there and at Chatham is no other than an assistant, though not to the officers in general yet to the surveyor in particular.

Further, much more may be saved in seeing all officers subordinate and living in each yard [each] to do his particular duty and give his particular and personal attendance on the service in taking of surveys, examining of storekeepers' accounts, and returning of certificates to the officers, monthly or yearly, of all passages proper to each yard—a course in some sense held convenient by the late commissioners, who settled first Captain Norris, and after him Captain Downing, at Chatham, as to act in all business there, so to certify them from time to time of all occurrences that might be worthy their consideration or tend to the advance of his Majesty's service.²

Many things might be enlarged in this point of husbandry which I for brevity's sake omit. 'The master's eye fattens the horse,'³ and, if I be not deceived, the only ground of a lean store and an exhausted treasure is the want of an eye of providence and presence in every of his Majesty's yards. I could discover how these men might, without prejudice of either or commixture of both offices, serve not only as assistants to the officers of the

¹ An officer holding by warrant of the lord admiral to the principal officers at a salary of 42*l.* 13*s.* (Monson). It was his duty to assist in the issue of stores, and to survey articles returned into store and the remains of boatswains and carpenters on the return of the ships from sea.

² All the MSS. except the Penn MS., read 'Captain Morris,' but the reference is clearly to Thomas Norris, surveyor of the navy (*Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1623–5, p. 63), who at one time resided at Chatham (*ibid.* 1628–9, p. 560). Captain Joshua Downing, assistant to the navy commissioners (*ibid.* 1625–6, p. 109), was an active officer, and many letters dated by him from Chatham appear in the State Papers during the years 1625–8 (*ibid. passim*).

³ See p. 20, *supra*.

navy but also to the officers of the ordnance in those affairs that relate to naval employments, and thereby save the King good store of money now spent (as may appear upon Sir John Heydon's accounts)¹ in travelling charges, rewards, &c., from London to Chatham, Portsmouth, &c., only to take the remains of a gunner at the end of a voyage. But I desire not to officiate in other men's places, and do only give this as an hint to a further consideration of those that understand the business better than myself.

It hath been the opinion of some to add to the government of the navy the place of an auditor of the stores, but I suppose that if these assistants be settled, either they may be able to do that business, or else the principal officers by their help in other matters may have more time to do it themselves. Others are of opinion that it is requisite to settle a register² in the navy, who may by way of record help the officers in their more methodical government of the navy, but this is already done by the King if it were as well prosecuted by the clerk of the navy, who indeed is or ought to be as a register to the rest of all actions done or fitting to be done by them all, and thence he hath his title of clerk of the acts, or clerk of the records.

There are but two things more that I would advise in the government of the navy: the first, a careful choice of all subordinate ministers acting in the navy under the officers' command; and, in the last place, an increase of means from the King beyond their former and present allowance, most of them being for want thereof necessitated to one

¹ Sir John Heydon, soldier and mathematician, was lieutenant of the ordnance from 1627 onwards (*Dictionary of National Biography*).

² *I.e.* Registrar.

of these two particulars, either to live knaves or die beggars—and sometimes to both. The addition of these two to the former of assistants would make the office of the navy flourish, the King's service to be sought after by able and honest men, and performed as for a man's self¹ in a careful and conscionable way; but, on the contrary, if all three be denied, the business must go the old way, and the King's treasure pay for it.

If assistants be settled and the other two omitted, though by their care much may be prevented, yet if there were twenty officers more the King must and will be abused. As for able men in these places, who knows not what mischief an ignorant clerk of the check, storekeeper, clerk of the survey, purser, &c., may [do] and have done in their several places? and yet such hath been the indulgence of past times, that men that never knew the navy, set foot in a ship, kept any account, nay that can scarce write their own names, have been commended to their places by and upon certificate from the officers. As for the increase of salaries—the large thongs² and daily embezzlements, thefts, and purloinings of boatswains, gunners, &c., are sufficient argument of its equity. How is it possible for a boatswain, having a wife and three, four, or five children depending upon his labour, to maintain himself and them with 20*l.* per annum wages,³ without clenching,⁴ changing, selling, wasting, and purloining of his Majesty's cordage and other stores committed to his trust? And the like

¹ So the Bodleian and Penn MSS. ; the Pepysian reads 'life.'

² See p. 54, *supra*.

³ The wages of a boatswain at this time varied from 14*l.* to 27*l.*, according to the ship's rate (Oppenheim, *E. H. R.* viii. 476). The rates given by Monson are rather higher—15*l.* 4*s.* 2*d.* to 29*l.* 6*s.* 7*d.* (iii. 320). 20*l.* would roughly represent the wages of a boatswain of a third or fourth rate.

⁴ See p. 76, *supra*.

may be said of the officers themselves—all gunners, pursers, clerks, &c., employed in the navy. What is the reason that in thirteen years' experience of the navy I never knew any man suffer as an officer for any kind of delinquency in his place, though he hath been convicted of direct stealths, burglaries, &c.—but only the discretion of the officers, or rather their charity, in smothering those offences with sharp reproofs and admonitions only, because they knew they could not live without them by the King's pay, and when for example's sake they have selected one or two, and suspended them from their places, and left them to the lord admiral's mercy, they have always sooner or later been restored by special warrant from his lordship upon the ground aforesaid.

It is the opinion of some of those great ones that, let the King give them never so much, they will still be as they are, and the King shall save nothing by his bounty. For answer to this, I demand whether it be not safer for the King to give them what may enable them to do him honest service, and leave the event to God who disposeth the ways and hearts of all men, than by denying them what is convenient to necessitate them to those ways which (without law and conscience forbid them) nature and natural affection command, and custom so sears the conscience of the taker, that in time he takes that as a right which at the first he dared not to have done had not the necessity of nature (which admits no reason) swayed his conscience. Further, let it be considered that there is nothing gotten in these ways by any subordinate minister but must needs cost the King twice as much as the party makes of it, for all men know that they dare not sell it publicly, and if it be sold obscurely then the party that buys it runs the hazard of a receiver of stolen goods, and will

have it at a price to bear the adventure of the law, or else deserves to be hanged for a greater fool than knave. This is the case of connivance of the officers themselves, upon hope of recompense from the party to whom they do any courtesy. Whatsoever is gotten by them this way the King pays five for one for it, for no merchant or other will give anything to an officer unless he be sure of five times so much gain by that officer's means from the King, either in taking into stores a bad commodity for a good, or giving an exorbitant price for that which is good, and a hundred ways more wherein the officers have a power to deceive, and for want of means may be tempted thereunto, wherein it were easy to enlarge were not this whole discourse too evident a proof thereof. And therefore to conclude, I heartily wish that his Majesty and the lord admiral were truly informed how much his Majesty doth, and how much more he may suffer, both for want of good men, and good means to those that deserve well.

It becomes not me to prescribe what is fit to authority. What I have said in this whole discourse hath proceeded from that duty which I owe my King and country, that special obligation which I have to the welfare of the navy in succeeding times, the glory of God in both, without affection or base ends to myself, prejudice¹ opinion of others, or hatred of or evil will to any now acting in the navy.

Composed by Mr. John Hollond, 29 September, 1638.

¹ =Prejudiced, biassed. 'Prejudicate opinion' was a phrase in frequent use for an opinion formed before due examination.

M^R HOLLOND'S SECOND DISCOURSE

TOUCHING THE

N A V Y

Written about the Year 1659—viz.

BETWEEN THE

DEATH OF THE PROTECTOR

AND

RESTORATION OF HIS MAJESTY

AND PRESENTED

BY THE AUTHOR TO

His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral of England

Anno 1661

THE
NAVY RIPT AND RANSACKT

OR,

A Brief Discovery of some few (of the many) Rents and Leaks
of the Navy, principally Occasioned by the Default of some
of the Master Caulkers: Whereby much of the King's
Treasure shipt in that Bottom has miscarried,
been lost, and cast away; and the Common
Seaman expos'd to manifold Perils

HUMBLY PRESENTED
TO BE REGULATED STOPT & CAULKED

BY

JOHN HOLLOND

A WELL-WISHER TO THE NAVY AND ALL SEAMEN
SERVING THEREIN

That which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which
is wanting cannot be number'd.—*Eccles.* 1. 15.

They that forsake the Law praise the Wicked; but such as keep the
Law contend with them.—*Prov.* 28. 4.

TO HIS ILLUSTRIOUS HIGHNESS
JAMES DUKE OF YORK
LORD HIGH ADMIRAL OF ENGLAND

MAY it please your Highness,

The discourse herewith humbly presented to your Highness's view was for some years past digested as part of the fruit of that observation and experience I reaped in the navy after thirty years' service ; wherein I have endeavoured not only to declare matter of fact in the past government of the navy, and to discover some few of the many obliquities of that government, but also propounded and hinted those ways of its future regulation which I conceive may conduce to its better and more regular administration.

I am not ignorant of my own insufficiency for so great an undertaking, nor that when I and all others have done all that can be done yet there is and will be much abuse in that affair, such and so great are the trusts of subordinate instruments employed therein, and such and so various are the transactions thereof. Yet I held it my duty to do something, not only to prevent some of those intolerable mischiefs that have too long attended a business of so great concernment to his Majesty and the welfare of his dominions, but also to whet and invite others, more able to detect those abuses, to manifest the same loyalty to his Majesty and zeal for their country by a more exact discovery of what is fit to be reformed, and the ways and means conducing thereto.

It is not so much to be admired as lamented that among the great crowd of books upon all subjects, both jocal and serious, the navy hath been so unhappy as not to be thought worthy the pen of one author, though yet I dare affirm that it is as copious a subject for an able pen as most that I know, and would (if done to the life) be far more beneficial to his Majesty and his Kingdoms than most pamphlets or books of another nature. Yea, I dare say that men of as eminent parts and ability for such an undertaking have been employed in the time of your illustrious Highness's Grandfather

and Father of happy memory in the service of the navy, as most in England. But the truth is, the navy is so great a sea, and brancheth itself into so many streams and small rivulets, that it is not easy for an able, much less for an ordinary, pen to treat upon it otherwise than at random ; and such is and hath been the sloth and avarice of the most judicious employed therein, that they chose rather to fish for the profit that might be gained by it than to make it their business to promote the honour and profit of their late Majesties and their country by methodising its government in a regular way.

I cannot say that what I have done hath more than a tendency thereunto ; yet I can say, and say truly, that I have done nothing but with a sincere intention to his Majesty's honour and the navy's welfare ; though hapily¹ it may not answer the expectations of some nor yet concur with the opinion of others—yea, though it may instead thereof anger and provoke many too nearly concerned therein. I am not positive in anything propounded, nor desire to pin any man's faith upon my opinion, but shall submit what is said to your Highness's wisdom, and the wisdom of those his Majesty or your Highness shall think fit to employ as regulators of the navy for the future.

I most humbly beg your Highness's pardon of my plain dealing and rude and indigested style in the whole discourse, it being impossible for me (that am no scholar), or any other though never so learned, to treat upon the administrative part of the navy without more than ordinary reflection ; and the discourse itself being many years past penned according to the dialect of those times, and persons that were then in power, I was necessitated to write according to their temperament, and as things then stood ; it being altogether unsafe to my person, and equally hazardous to my estate, to write otherwise at that time, though I must also say that after I had finished it I dared not make it public. Such was the corruption of those times and the unworthiness of some then upon the stage, that though by its publication I might hapily¹ have saved and prevented the wasteful expense of many thousands of pounds, yet I chose rather to be silent than to expose myself to ruin by endeavouring to serve those that minded nothing less than the welfare of the nation or the navy. Such as it is I humbly lay it at your Highness's feet, being encouraged thereto by your gracious commands ; and do humbly take the boldness to subscribe myself,

Your Highness's most obedient and humble servant,

JOHN HOLLOND.

¹ See note on p. 288, *infra*.

THE CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| OF THE NAVY AND ITS REGULATION IN GENERAL . . . | 113 |

CHAPTER II

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| OF WAGES | 126 |
|--------------------|-----|

CHAPTER III

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| OF VICTUALS | 153 |
|-----------------------|-----|

CHAPTER IV

| | |
|--|-----|
| OF STORES, AND IN PARTICULAR OF HEMP AND CORDAGE . | 187 |
|--|-----|

CHAPTER V

| | |
|---------------------|-----|
| OF TIMBER | 205 |
|---------------------|-----|

CHAPTER VI

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-----|
| OF IRON AND ALL IRONWORKS | 229 |
|-------------------------------------|-----|

CHAPTER VII

| | |
|--|-----|
| OF FREIGHT OF MERCHANT SHIPS | 264 |
|--|-----|

CHAPTER VIII

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-----|
| OF CERTIFICATES AND OATHS | 291 |
|-------------------------------------|-----|

CHAPTER IX

| | |
|---------------------------|-----|
| OF A FREE MARKET. | 280 |
|---------------------------|-----|

CHAPTER X

| | |
|--|-----|
| OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY AND NAVY . | 291 |
|--|-----|

CHAPTER I

OF THE NAVY AND ITS REGULATION IN GENERAL

How great an instrument under God the navy has been and still is to the well-being of this and the neighbouring nations of Ireland and Scotland, is not unknown to all that know anything of government; nor yet how it always was and still is the wisdom of those that have been, or are, in authority vigilantly to intend¹ its preservation, both in ships and stores, in good equipage both as to offence and defence, to prevent the mischief of foreign invasion and intestine commotions. How successfully through the late wars between the King and his Parliament, and the later between the Dutch and the Commonwealth, is fresh in every man's memory!

I shall not therefore trouble myself nor my reader with useless apologies for that honourable esteem that ought to be had of the navy or the seamen in general; every man I hope will easily subscribe to the truth thereof without rhetorical persuasions thereunto. That which I rather choose to design in this discourse is to hint some short discoveries by which the government of the navy (as it is now constituted) may be managed to a better account, both for the nation in general and the State in particular, than either at present it is or of late hath been, if men will be faithful to their own

¹ Aim at.

interest and trust. And this I conceive may be of some small use to my country when I am gone—the alone profit I either expect or desire (under the glory of God) in the navy's welfare.

I know that since the year 1618 there have been many commissions under the Great Seal, acts and ordinances of parliament, and other derivations of power to several men, and those of great wisdom and experience in State affairs, to regulate the navy, besides many other attempts and particular orders from the lords admirals, commissioners of the admiralty, committees and commissioners for the navy,¹ in order to that undertaking, every man

¹ The commission of 1618, at first intended to be temporary, was established in 1619 as a permanent system for the government of the navy, and continued till February 1628, when the four principal officers resumed control, under Buckingham as lord high admiral. During the tenure of this commission another special commission was appointed in 1626 to inquire into the state of the navy. After Buckingham's murder, the office of lord high admiral was put in commission until 1638, when the child Duke of York was made lord high admiral for life, with Northumberland as his substitute during the King's pleasure (*E. H. R.* vii. 481, ix. 476). When the Civil War broke out, the Parliament took control of the navy by means of committees. Subordinate to the parliamentary committee was a financial board, called the commissioners of the navy and customs, while another board, called the commissioners of the navy, discharged the functions of the principal officers other than the treasurer. The Earl of Warwick was lord high admiral from 1642 to 1645 and again from 1648 to 1649 (*ibid.* ix. 480). Under the Commonwealth the lord high admiral and the parliamentary committee were replaced by the admiralty committee of the council of state, and the commissioners of the navy and customs ceased to take any practical part in administration, being finally dissolved in 1654. Their duties fell to the commissioners of the navy. Under the Protectorate the admiralty committee and the commissioners of the navy became the 'commissioners of the admiralty and navy,' nominated by patent, and having control of the ordnance also (*ibid.* xi. 57-8). No less than ten different admiralty commissions were issued between December 1643 and the Restoration (see lists in the Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, xi. 214-220). These

being ambitious in his way either privately or publicly to carry on so good a design as the well managing of that which so nearly concerns the well-being of the whole nation.

I know also that little good hath been produced after much expense of time and treasure, and as much contest who should do best in that particular, and that what was usefully propounded and effectually established, hath by default of some in trust crumbled to nothing, and that things are carried on in the same way as if there had never been any settlement of anything regular in the whole navy.

If you ask why so great and many undertakings for the regulation of the navy had so little success, I can give no other account thereof than this: that either the business was referred to men that knew not the navy, that is to say, so as to reform it, and so could act no further therein than to the extent of their own knowledge, or at the best by the information of other men, which kind of knowledge in governors is so remote that it is often attended with gross mistakes; or else that all or most of the commissions of inquiry, acts and ordinances for regulation of the navy, were gained from the late kings or parliaments more out of design, and to ruin some particular men and exalt others (nay oftentimes themselves) in their rooms, or otherwise to vent private revenges in subordinate instruments each against other, than any ways to advance the common good by discovering or reforming what was too apparently amiss in the navy.

For the first of these I shall only say, that no man can be a good anatomist that doth not know

frequent changes were possibly less damaging to the efficiency of the navy than would at first sight appear, as Blake was a member of the commissions continuously from 1652 to 1655, and Monck, with only a short interval, from 1652 to 1660.

how to direct the dissection of a body ; and that all men (though wise) are not fit for all employments ; and if you will believe the late Lord Strafford (no fool), he said that the reformation or well government of the navy was the most difficult thing that in all his time he met withal, and that he was never puzzled (that was his expression) in anything so much, as in that little navy which he had designed for Ireland while he was lord lieutenant there.

I have observed several commissions consisting of lords, knights, and gentlemen about the Court, and a late act or ordinance of parliament wherein few other than aldermen and merchants of the City of London were empowered to regulate the navy.¹ Yet neither courtiers nor merchants, lords nor aldermen, gentlemen nor citizens, did ever do the business they pretended to, for the reasons before named. I have often thought (what I have sometimes said)² that the navy is a wood wherein a wise man may sooner lose himself than find another. And this, among other things, was that which made Sir Walter Raleigh so sparing upon this subject,³ though a man of no small experience therein, and to handle it more upon the by⁴ and at distance than to enlarge. Yea, this is that which fears me and all others to appear in print upon this subject, as having nothing of other men's labours to be their star or guide in so intricate an affair.

¹ The references here are apparently to such earlier commissions as those of 1618 and 1626, and to the act of 1649 establishing a 'committee of merchants' as described below (p. 122).

² See p. 11 *supra*.

³ Sir Walter Raleigh's *Observations on the Royal Navy and Sea Service*, published in 1650, only occupy 46 small pages of large type. His *Discourse on the Invention of Shipping* is considerably less.

⁴ 'By,' *subs.* = a secondary object, side issue, something of minor importance. The phrase 'upon the by' usually occurs contrasted with 'main.' Cf. 'by-end'—an object lying aside from the main object ; hence a secret or selfish purpose.

It may be truly said of those formerly (and of late) employed in and undertaking to regulate the navy (though otherwise men very able and wise in their way), that they did much eclipse their own worth by meddling with what they never understood; and this was so apparent in the late act or ordinance (intituled an Act of the Commons assembled in Parliament touching the Regulation of the Officers of the Navy and Customs)¹ that when those that were the procurers and promoters of that act saw what a mouse was brought forth after many months' sitting with reference to the navy and customs, they were ashamed to own themselves authors or promoters of that which took so little effect after so great promises to the parliament of doing wonders by the men designed for that purpose. But indeed (to speak plainly) that act was calculated for another meridian than the navy, that is to say, the customs, and the navy was but crowded in to fill up the blank, and blind the parliament with high hopes of great things to be amended in the one, when the other was the thing intended, as too plainly appeared by the actings of those merchants entrusted, and the ambitious desire of some that were procurers of that act to promote themselves and friends to be commissioners and other officers in the customs. More of which by-and-by. In the mean time this may serve for the first reason of the ill success of those that have been employed to regulate the navy, viz. they never understood what they undertook.

For the other, hinted before to be matter of design or private revenge, I could (were it needful) cloy my reader with examples of this kind, almost throughout all the commissions, acts, and ordinances that have been granted to inquire into abuses and

¹ See note on p. 122 *infra*.

to reform the evil government of the navy for almost forty years past. The Grand Commission in the year 1618 was nothing else but a design to crush the then officers of the navy,¹ and advance Sir John Coke, who by his good service in that regulation begat himself to be first a commissioner at large with 300*l.* per annum salary for many years together (though he seldom or never sat or acted), and afterwards to be a master of requests, and in fine secretary of state.² Old Sir Lionel Cranfield had also a share in this commission, and wanted not his share in rising by it from one dignity to another, till at last he arrived to be lord high treasurer of England and Earl of Middlesex.³ How

¹ The Commission of 1618 consisted of Sir Thos. Smyth, Sir Lionel Cranfield, Sir Richard Weston, Sir John Wolstenholme, Nicholas Fortescue, John Osborne, Francis Goston, Richard Sutton, William Pitt, John Coke, Thomas Norris, and William Burrell (Charnock, *Mar. Arch.* ii. 204). When it was renewed in 1625, Cranfield had fallen, but Coke remained a member. The 'then officers of the navy' were Sir Wm. Russell, treasurer, Sir Guilford Slingsby, comptroller, Sir Richd. Bingley, surveyor, and Sir Peter Buck, clerk of the acts. The Commission is called the 'Grand Commission' by Pepys in the *Diary* (March 14, 1669).

² Coke, an official of great administrative capacity and entirely honest, had been connected with the navy from the beginning of his career, for he had acted as deputy treasurer under his patron Fulke Greville, treasurer of the navy, and it was through Greville's influence that he was placed on the Commission of 1618. Here the chief part of the labour fell upon him (Gardiner, iii. 203), and the reform of the naval administration that followed was mainly his work. In recognition of these services he received a special grant of 300*l.* a year charged on the funds of the navy. In 1624 he was knighted, and in 1625 appointed a secretary of state. He was also a member of the Special Commission of 1626 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1625-6, p. 494). He fell in 1638 (*Dictionary of National Biography*).

³ Cranfield's share in this commission was far less important than that of Coke, as he was already occupied with other business. In 1613 he had been made surveyor-general of the customs, in 1616 one of the masters of requests. In September 1618 he was master of the great wardrobe, and in January 1619, when the work

eagerly was that Commission in the year 1626 prosecuted by several lords, knights, and gentlemen of great worth, as if they would have turned the navy upside down. Yet after much time and treasure spent, the result of all was nothing ; and it appeared too plainly to standers-by that the main design in that commission was only to ruin old Mr. Burrell for not building the Victory (as was pretended) by contract according to the dimensions contracted for. And when that storm was over the commission determined.¹

I shall for brevity's sake omit several other of the Navy Commission had scarcely begun, master of the court of wards. In 1620 he was made a privy councillor, and he took a prominent part in the parliamentary session of 1621. In 1622 he was first made a baron, then succeeded Lord Mandeville as treasurer, and became Earl of Middlesex. The text exaggerates the importance of his 'share in this commission' as determining his rise.

¹ Mr. Burrell, who had been previously master shipwright to the East India Company, was one of the three chief shipwrights of the reign of James I. (*E. H. R.* vii. 491). The statement in the text is not inconsistent with the proceedings of the Commission of 1626 as recorded in the State Papers. The commission was appointed on December 12. On December 16 they summoned Mr. Burrell to attend before them in the Star Chamber, and authorised the seizure of his papers. A list was drawn up of the defects in ten new ships built by him, among which was the Victory, described as weakly built and crank. Mr. Oppenheim points out, however, that these were the criticisms of Burrell's professional competitors, and that at least five of the vessels thus condemned are to be found still fit for service in the navy lists of Charles II. (*E. H. R.* ix. 100). In May 1629 Burrell appears to have surrendered his post of master shipwright in favour of Peter Pett, 'being much engaged in his particular estate in Ireland, and in regard of his years unfit to travel' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1628-9, p. 542), but the charges against him must have come to nothing, for he continued to discharge various functions, and in September 1630 he was appointed a member of a commission to consider how the King's ships might be best kept and moored at Chatham, to view the harbour at Portsmouth, and to consider what ships were fittest to be kept in readiness for service (*ibid.* 1629-31, p. 341). He died in the same year.

commissions; as also the particular attempts of private men, who always carried something in their eye, either of private honour, profit, or revenge, that was the weight that set all the wheels of their zeal for public good a-going; and those things being compassed, the navy and its welfare did afterwards no more concern them or their care than the navy of the great Turk. Yet before I pass this argument I shall a little enlarge upon the late act for regulating the navy by the committee of merchants, as that which is most fresh in memory and pertinent to our purpose. As I said before, so I say again, the navy was the least in their thoughts that begat that act from the parliament (that is, the welfare of the navy in its due regulation), unless it were to settle a brother and a friend in two or three of the best places thereof; but the customs was the morsel they gaped for, which, because they could not well compass but upon pretence of regulating abuses in the navy as equally as there, and that they might be thought men unbiassed as to private interest, the power was put out of their own hands (but into the hands of their allies and confederates), and the navy joined with the customs in the same act, to be regulated with the customs by the same men.

It is not unknown to some who promoted that act, though afterwards they were (as I said) ashamed to own it; nor yet how some men that were altogether ignorant of the design (myself for one) were, unknown to themselves, shuffled into the crowd of good fellows, the better to colour what was intended; nor yet that among the many acts and ordinances made by the late Long Parliament there was not any that reflected more upon the honour of the parliament than that act did: yet such was the cry for reformation that out it must come, and wonders it would do, if granted.

The truth is, I sat with them till I smelled and saw the design, but then grew weary. Yet I must confess they used me civilly, and promoted me to be surveyor of the navy, with a good salary, unknown to myself, though I know withal it was in order to the interest of another man that was joined in commission with me, who thought the burden too heavy to bear without my assistance.¹

But after one or two months' expense about the navy, putting out and keeping in whom they pleased, the business of the customs grew ripe for their consideration without suspicion, and to work they went pell-mell,² according to the power given them by their penal act of 200*l.* and 10*l.* a day forfeiture, to rout the poor (and some rich) officers of the customs; who having seen and observed that the navy men had no good luck by crying *peccavi*, or suspending themselves from acting in their places out of guilt, and fear of the penalty of 10*l.* a day upon future conviction (for the merchants spared none but themselves and their friends), and fearing the like usage to them, took heart of grace, kept their stations, and bid defiance to all accusers, resolving rather to swallow the bitter pill of 200*l.* and 10*l.* a day, than to make themselves guilty of their own and families' ruin by a fright or scarecrow.

This unexpected boldness in the officers of the

¹ Hollond was appointed surveyor of the navy in February 1648-9. The colleague alluded to is possibly Colonel Wm. Willoughby, who had been recommended for the surveyorship in September 1648, then vacant 'by the revolt of Capt. Wm. Batten from the service of the Parliament' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1648-9, p. 276). He was a navy commissioner at Portsmouth early in 1649, and was therefore 'joined in commission' with Hollond.

² On May 15, 1649, the Council of State remonstrated with them for removing a custom-house officer without a hearing (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1649-50, p. 141).

customs did a little amuse¹ the contrivers of this design, for by their act they had no power to eject any officer that was not convinced² by good testimony of his guilt, or did not accuse himself for fear of the penalty of the 200*l*. They pretended a private order of parliament for explanation and additional power to their act, but I could never see it. Hereupon private consultations were had, not only among the committee of merchants themselves, but with several parliament men that were the chief promoters of that act and design; and at last it was concluded that, whether they had power or no power, all the old officers of the customs must be removed, guilty or not guilty, convicted or not convicted; and accordingly (like merchant adventurers) they proceeded in the dismissal of all those officers, against whom they had no accusation, and who stood upon their integrity notwithstanding the terrible bugbear of 10*l*. a day.³

¹ *I.e.* puzzle, bewilder.

² *I.e.* convicted.

³ The act referred to was passed on January 16, 1648-9, on the authority of the Commons alone. It provided that all officers of the custom-house, victuallers, ship-captains or other officers of the navy or dockyards, who had aided the King, or embezzled stores, or 'that have taken any reward or gift of any merchant,' should be incapable of holding office, and any such incapable person continuing to hold office 'shall forfeit the sum of 200*l*. for the first day, and 10*l*. per diem for every day after.' To carry out this act a permanent commission was appointed in the act itself, consisting of Alderman Thos. Andrews, Colonel Wm. Willoughby, Major Robert Thompson, and thirteen others (of whom John Hollond was one), together with the 'Commissioners of the Navy for the time being sitting in Mincing Lane, London.' The commission so constituted was empowered to administer an oath to the persons suspected of offending, to deprive them and to appoint others in their places, to suppress 'unuseful places,' to increase salaries, to examine the accounts of the navy and customs, and to select ships for convoy (Scobell, ii. 1). They are described in the last clause of the act as 'the said committee of merchants,' and they appear in the State Papers under this name, and as the 'committee of

I was once among them when a young man, an officer of the custom-house, was summoned before them, who standing upon his vindication, they knew not what to do with him, having no accusation against him ; but being bid to withdraw, they voted him out of his place, and then considered of a successor, whereof they wanted not store ; one of them propounded for this friend, and another for that ; some that stood by moved that the young man might be continued in his place till he were convicted of crime, but that was wholly rejected, and the request of one of the committee renewed for his friend upon this single account, that the party he had recommended to them was a godly man and his wife a precious woman.¹ Whereupon one of that committee took the boldness to ask them, whether they held it just to take away a man's livelihood without any accusation or conviction, nay without any power given them so to do by the act, upon the alone account of having a friend to recommend to his place who was himself a godly man and his wife a precious woman. If this were their justice, he told them that, under the notion of a godly man and a precious woman, they might and would commit any kind of injustice ; and so he left them, and to my remembrance sat not with them afterwards.

By this particular, and what followed afterwards to the rest of his fellow-officers, it was too plain

regulators,' as well as under the fuller title of 'the committee of merchants for the regulation of the navy and customs.'

¹ On December 11, 1651, Commissioner Peter Pett wrote to the Committee of Merchants to complain of serious delinquencies on the part of William Thomson appointed by them master caulker at Chatham under the act, and of Thos. Colpott, boatswain of the yard. 'And because these men pretended to religion you were willing to encourage them ; . . . but . . . I have not found any men in the whole navy more negligent of their duty, and breaking rules as to perquisites, than they' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1651-2, p. 58).

that that act for regulation of the navy was nothing else but design, which when once effected, regulation ceased of course ; the fish was caught, and one had this and another that office, and the game so played that one should be in the excise, another in the navy, and a third in the customs, all able to pleasure a fourth as a merchant, as occasion might require. Wherein I could be endless if I should specify particulars—as the late regulation of the victualling office¹ by ‘confiding men ;’ a pure, or rather impure, design first set on foot by cavaliers ; those set aside by church members ; yet both and others with them cemented again for the common interest of private profit—a story too long (not fit) to be told, though yet you may have part of it upon that subject when I come to handle it.

The like may be said of the then commissioners of the customs, that (forsooth) would serve the State for nothing rather than see them abused by their predecessors that got great estates by their places. This was nothing but design, for after they were settled in the customs not fully four months they must have salary, and that from the first day ; their former zeal was cold, and how some of them have since acted, and been detected as a shame and scorn to religion, is too notoriously known by most men.³

¹ Mr. Oppenheim mentions three attempts to regulate the victualling office during the Commonwealth ; the first in 1650 by a fresh contract with Colonel Pride and others ; the second in 1655, when the victualling was constituted a department of the navy administration under Captain Thos. Alderne ; and the third in 1657, when Alderne died, and was succeeded by three of the navy commissioners, Robt. Thompson, Nehemiah Bourne, and Francis Willoughby. The reference in the text is probably to the first of these (see note on p. 125 *infra*). The victualling appears to have been very unsatisfactory under all these systems (*E. H. R.* xi. 41-44).

² See the chapter ‘Of Victuals,’ *passim*, p. 153 *infra*.

³ On April 24, 1649, Colonel Edmund Harvey, Stephen Eastwick, Robert Tichborne, Mark Hildesley, Daniel Taylor,

But my desire being not to meddle with persons (any more than needs must) but things, and having by these already sufficiently discovered that the main grounds of the evil success of great undertakings as to regulation of the navy hath been either ignorance or design, I shall rather proceed to give my reader some hint of what I conceive (if duly observed) may conduce to enable those that are or shall hereafter be employed as commissioners or governors of the navy to find out and regulate some few of the many miscarriages thereof.

and Edw. Parks were appointed commissioners of customs with full power to displace negligent officers, to discontinue unnecessary offices, and with the approval of the committee of the navy or Parliament to fill vacant places on the staff, nothing, however, being said about salary (*Commons Journals*, vi. 93). But before the end of the year the question of salary came up for discussion, and on January 17, 1650, they were allowed a commission of 4*d.* in the pound on all moneys passing through their hands, the arrangement being retrospective, and to take effect from the date of their first appointment (*ibid.* 347-8, 373). These commissioners held office until May 1655 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1655, p. 189), but frauds were discovered on the part of their cashier, Captain Langham, which led to his arrest, and also in November 1655 to that of Col. Harvey, who was committed close prisoner to the Tower for joining with others in defrauding the Commonwealth of large sums (*ibid.* 1655-6, pp. 8, 16). A committee was appointed to examine into the accounts of the late commissioners, which reported that 'the smallness of the salary, 100*l.* a year only, has been a great temptation to the late cashier' (*ibid.* p. 18). Proceedings were commenced against Harvey's estate, but the matter was not settled until June 1656, when the ex-commissioners agreed to pay 22,000*l.* within twelve months (*ibid.* p. 353). Meanwhile a new arrangement for the customs, modelled on that of 1649, had been adopted from March 25, 1656, and Edw. Horsman, Geo. Foxcroft, merchant of London, and John Upton had been appointed commissioners (*ibid.* pp. 230-2, 238), but the Protector took the precaution of appointing the accountant-general of the customs to act as a check upon them (*ibid.* 241), instead of leaving him to be appointed by the commissioners themselves. It appears from this that the 'late regulation of the victualling office by confiding men,' referred to above, must be the new regulation of 1650, since the regulation under Thos. Alderne did not take place until August 1655, and by that time the fraudulent commissioners were being exposed.

CHAPTER II

OF WAGES

THE navy for method's sake may be distributed into three general heads—that is to say, (1) wages, (2) victuals, (3) stores—or, if you will, men, money, materials—under which three may be comprised almost, if not all that great variety of persons, things, and actions that refer to the being of a navy. Other things that fall in of course as referring to all these jointly, I shall at the close of the tract declare my thoughts of them, or at least some of them, by themselves, and submit what I shall say to better judgments. In the meantime I shall handle these three in their order, and therein take a liberty to branch each general head into such particulars as are proper to that root.

The first general head is wages, wherein I observe these several branches: (1) sea wages, (2) harbour wages.

In sea wages you have that which is called rigging wages and sea pay—that is to say, such pay as is allowed by the State to all seamen after the ship enters into sea victuals. As to harbour wages, it is either a lesser means by the month, allowed to seamen employed to keep, fit, and rig all ships, &c. ; or else that which we call wages upon prick and check, or day wages in all yards, referring to all sorts of manufactors¹ and others employed in the

¹ *I.e.* handicraftsmen.

State's yards respectively, such as shipwrights, caulkers, joiners, carvers, painters, &c., who are to come to their call twice or thrice a day, and according to their attendance all or any part of the day have their time (and so wages) allowed them by the clerks of the check, whose duty it is to keep a perfect prick-book of the names, entry, time of working and discharge of all men and boys in the State's yards respectively. These things are so obvious that every man knows the method of them, and therefore I shall not trouble my reader further with them.

That which is more material and to our purpose, is to show the several abuses fit to be reformed under the point of wages. I shall not meddle with the quantity ; it is fit the State should be masters of their own treasure, and allot what proportion to each man, either by the month or day, that they think fit ; only I could wish that poor men might have such encouragement and the same freedom from the State which they have from private men, viz. to serve by compact and not compulsion, provided they would do their work as conscientiously to the State as they do to private men. But these things will never be done, and are therefore but vainly wished for.

Abuses fit to be regulated in the point of wages respect either the State, the seamen, or both. I shall handle them promiscuously as they come thwart¹ me, and be as equally careful to preserve the interest of the subject as of the State, and shall humbly advise that all future regulations of the navy may as equally tend to the benefit of the one as of the other, or else I shall never expect that prosperity which I heartily wish to the navy.

One thing amiss (that is in my judgment, I

¹ Frequently used in the sense of athwart, across.

meddle no further) in the navy, as to seamen's wages, is the new practised way of detaining three, four, or five months' wages in the State's hands to secure the party to their service.¹ I find no exception of States in the Scripture as to detaining the labourer's hire. It is true that upon emergencies of State affairs, when they have haste of service and want of men to do it, I have often known the late King to secure one or two months' pay in the treasurer's hands till the party went on board and gave his attendance; but this money was always (and carefully) paid to the party whose right it was before the ship went to sea, and not (as now) kept from six months to six months and voyage to voyage till the party be either killed, drowned, dead, or doth run away, and in the meantime his wife and children exposed to want, and starving for want of her husband's wages. I will not inquire whether this treasure thus detained be always saved to the State. I could easily rake in a puddle if I should question the inability of some and the neglect of others that are appointed checks to this and other payments.

An attendant upon this abuse is that of the commissioners denying to sign poor men's tickets upon pretence of private order that they should not be paid, or indeed, to gratify the treasurer, without order, and to keep the beggar from his door—I mean, to take off that clamour that would otherwise attend his non-payment of their wages. I have heard of some that never meant to pay their scores,

¹ An allusion to the attempts made at the time of the Dutch War to retain seamen in the service by carrying forward part of their wages when they were paid off. This caused great 'clamour and discontent' (*E. H. R.* xi. 28). A case is given in the State Papers where Josiah Child, deputy treasurer of the fleet, 'stopped sums of 3*l.* and 5*l.* on paying the wages to compel the men to return' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1655, p. 431).

that yet were very careful to keep exact reckoning with their creditors. But truly not to reckon with a poor seaman after seven, ten, or twelve months' service—that is to say, not to sign his ticket whereby he may have something to show for his money so dearly earned¹—is in some sense worse than never to pay.

Nor is it much inferior to the other abuse, to pay men's wages to a wrong party and not to the party legally interested therein. Wrong parties are either such as have wrought upon the advantage of men's necessities, and are either pursers, clerks of the check, or creditors, whether alehouse-keepers or slopsellers, or else pretended sweethearts.² The

¹ A 'ticket' was a certificate from the officers of his ship, issued to each seaman on his discharge, specifying the quality and term of his service. This, when countersigned by the navy board, was his warrant for demanding his wages from the treasurer of the navy on shore. The original purpose of tickets was to save the necessity of transporting large sums of money on board ship, and in theory the tickets should have supplied the seaman with credit to the full amount of his wages, but in practice the uncertainty of payment caused a great depreciation of tickets. The papers printed in the Appendix illustrate the defects of the ticket system in 1636. Twenty years later, in February 1656, the sailors were losing from 2s. to 3s. in the pound in cashing them (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1655-6, p. 163). After the Restoration we hear of women brokers standing about the navy office 'to help seamen who have any tickets to ready money.' They took them to 'Mrs. Salesbury in Carpenter's Yard, near Aldgate,' who was accustomed to cash them at 25 per cent. discount, 'or more' (*ibid.* 1666-7, p. 426). The tickets were not infrequently counterfeited (see *ibid.* 1639-40, p. 163; 1654, p. 231; 1655-6, pp. 163, 216).

² March 19, 1657-8: Navy Commissioners to Admiralty Commissioners. 'We have daily brought to our office many tickets of persons discharged out of the State's ships in the Downs, Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c., who never personally appear before us, but the tickets are brought in by shopkeepers, tradesmen, and alehouse-keepers, under pretence of debts, relief in sickness, &c., whereas in truth they are bought in these parts for so much in the pound, to the poor men's loss, and for the most part consumed in drinking, tippling, and ill-husbandry ashore' (*ibid.* 1657-8, p. 334).

two first are of all men most unfit to receive wages for other men. The reason is because they are both parties and judges, and have a latitude to make the time which leads to the wages either more or less; their hands¹ being that which leads the commissioner to sign to the treasurer. If it be said the muster-books may and will prevent that abuse, it is true something may be done after the ship is in sea pay, though yet he deserves not the name of a purser that knows not how to prevent it before the musters, or evade it afterwards. But as to clerks of the check in harbour, they are the muster-masters themselves, and their hands¹ are without all control; so that if they please to sign tickets for more men than ever served, or for longer time than they did serve, and these tickets be paid to them, the wit of man is not able to discover whether that money be duly paid, yea or not, because there is no check of the truth or falsehood thereof but themselves, the parties to whom the wages is paid. As for creditors, whether slop-sellers or others, it is not safe nor convenient to pay a poor man's wages to them, especially in the case of the party's death. It is customary for creditors in such cases to take out letters of administration,² and by favour at the treasurer's office to compass the money, whenas it may be the debt was of long standing, or if new, made at an alehouse, or begotten at exorbitant rates for clothes before the ship went to sea. In all which cases the party concerned is under many temptations, either to neglect his duty whilst in the service, or to run away from

¹ *I.e.* signatures.

² These letters of administration were sometimes counterfeited or altered. See *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1656-7, pp. 462 and 465, where reference is made to 'a plot carried on for some time by several persons to deceive the State and many poor people by false administrations.'

the service, as knowing he wrought for a dead horse, having anticipated his wages by debts; whereas if care be taken that no slopseller shall advance any clothes to any seaman before the ship hath been two months at sea at the least, and then only such as are needful, at moderate prices and in the presence of the captain, master, and purser, and that if he doth yet he shall not have the privilege of receiving that debt from any other than the party himself, and that no other creditor (especially ale-house-keepers) shall be capable to receive any man's wages but in the case of sickness or death at their houses, and then only so much as may be judged reasonable for such a party and so long time as he lay so sick, &c., it would much conduce to the preservation of men's persons and affections to and in the State's service.

Under this head also comes that intolerable abuse to poor seamen in their wages by generals of fleets and captains of respective ships employed in the service, who are of late turned merchants, and have and do lay magazines of clothes, linen and woollen of all sorts, and in some cases tobacco, strong waters,¹ and such like commodities into their ships upon pretence of relieving poor seamen in their wants; but indeed for no other reason than their private profit, which as men in such places they can easily make more or less as they please; for what may not a general of a fleet, an admiral, vice-admiral, or rear-admiral do in such a case? Nay, what may not a private captain of a ship do, as to his own company and in his own ship, if this way of trading be allowed to them? All men know that no man is entered or discharged (after

¹ See a case of March 1656, when the captain of the *Grantham* was charged with selling strong drink on board (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1655-6, p. 512).

the ship is in sea pay) without the captain's order, and that all pursers are no better than slaves to all captains, and much more to the general, and yet the captain's and purser's hands to each ticket is all that leads the commissioners to sign and allow all wages ; which, how safe it is when the one is at the other's beck, and the other is a party to most part of the wages for goods sold by himself, let others judge.

If (as aforesaid) it be not equal that a tradesman should vend his goods before the ship is in sea pay, in order to the encouragement and preservation of men in the State's service, much less is it fair for a general that hath the command of all men in the fleet, or a captain that hath the same command in his own ship, and in whom the State reposes the trust of keeping exact musters and checks upon all pursers, to prevent abuses and to do justice between the State and the poor seamen and the slopseller and the seaman, to beget themselves for a little sordid gain into a capacity of being both judges and parties upon I know not what pretence. This is bad in payments by the treasurer and his instruments, but what is or may it be in tickets paid at sea, where oftentimes the general is treasurer for the fleet, or if there be any other it is one of his creatures, and all his payments are limited to the general's hand for his warrant ! But I am very desirous to decline all reflection in this discourse, and hope the great damage that attended both the State and the poor seamen by such practices as these in a late undertaking will save me the labour of detecting the unworthiness of such actions in men of command ; and truly if I should give myself liberty in this particular, I could deservedly lash men of all ranks, and such especially as under

pretence of religion have cloaked the baseness of these and such like actions.¹

The next thing I shall mention is that abuse that attends the treasurer's check in payment of wages, wherein I cannot but blame the commissioners, who as to themselves seldom attend it, and as to their clerks execute it so lamely that the treasurer's instruments themselves have often complained of it, who I dare say, if they be not more conscientious than their checks can and do make them, much water might and will go besides the mill²—I mean, both the State and the subject may be greatly defrauded. I do not list to enquire or determine how it is. This I know and am sure of, that through the ignorance of some and the neglect of others the temptation is high upon those in trust, and whether they be honest or not, that is not the dispute; it is or should be the wisdom of those in power to suppose and prevent the worst by a sober, serious, and exact check upon them.

Much power (if not too much) is committed to the master shipwright in the point of rating all wages of men under his command in the respective yards, and that which I have often observed but

¹ If the 'late undertaking' is a reference to the expedition of Penn and Venables to Jamaica in 1655, an examination of the *Calendars of State Papers* yields no evidence of such 'practices.' That the captains were capable of acting as suggested in the text is quite possible. Mr. Oppenheim's study of the State Papers has given him a low opinion of them (*E. H. R.* xi. pp. 63-4), and a paper of October 1654, dealing with victualling, points out that the chief officers could not be trusted where their interests were affected, and notices 'what powerful influence the commanders have over inferior instruments' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1654, p. 380). But with the generals it was a different matter, for such men as Popham, Blake, Monck, Deane, and Penn are above suspicion.

² 'Besides' was frequently used for 'beside' in this period, and especially in the phrase in the text. For illustrations see *New English Dictionary*.

could never see redressed, was the exorbitant rates and allowances given by themselves to their own friends and servants, to the great regret of men more deserving than they, that were yet pressed into the service. I shall only mention it by the way, and leave it to the regulation of those whom it more concerns; only I say, it is not fit that a master shipwright should have above two or three servants at the most in the yard where he attends (and none elsewhere in any of the State's other yards), and that those should be rated not by himself but some other, and not allowed more wages than the meanest pressed man that is forced to serve.

It often happens that a poor seaman falls sick and is turned ashore or discharged the service. The conduct allowed to all seamen is the same¹—I shall not argue whether sufficient or not; the State is best able to judge; only this I would know, why a sick man discharged the service as unable to perform it by reason of sickness should have no more conduct allowed him than a well man, or a man in perfect health. He that is not able to do his duty aboard (which in harbour is no great matter) is much less able to travel; but must after his turning ashore lie by the sea in an alehouse sometimes ten days together to recover strength, or at least be twice as long in coming up to London for his money as a strong lusty man might or would be; and why he should yet have no more conduct than the lusty men, I do not fully discern. The matter is but small, yet (as the seaman says) 'a louse in the pot is better than no flesh,' and a little to a poor

¹ See note, p. 21, *supra*. An act of February 1649 fixed conduct money at 1½*d.* a mile from the place of press to the port or ship, and the same sum from the place of the seaman's discharge to his home (Scobell, ii. 6). This was the amount paid during the Commonwealth period.

man in case of infirmity and sickness may much encourage his spirit in the service, and gain upon his affection in time to come.

Suppose a ship sent to the West Indies, where there is no money to pay the seamen, and some of them die ; the service requires the ship to continue there ; the muster-master and purser send home their books to the office of the navy, and by both it appears that such a man served in such a ship from such a day to the last of September following and then died. The master, wife, child, or other right heir to or owner of this money comes to the commissioners and desires this man's wages—nay, brings an indenture if a servant, or an administration if a husband, for it. Why should not this man's wages be paid before the ship comes home? Suppose she never comes, shall they lose their money? To delay is to deny, and yet the practice of the office runs this way, except in cases of favour, when some commissioner or their clerks will appear for the party concerned.

But you will say, is not this tending to an unnecessary draining of the State's treasure? For as one, so some hundreds (as at Jamaica) may die, and the ships not return many months after ; shall not the State take the benefit of these men's wages till the return of the ships? If it be due to one it is due to all, and if you pay all, this would drown more money than is in bank, or fit to be issued till the whole ship's company be paid.

Truly this objection hath no weight at all with me—for the question is not whether the State hath money or not, or if they have, whether it be convenient for them to pay dead men's wages with it or not before the ship's return, as having other occasions to employ it in or lay it out upon. The question is, whether they ought not to have money

for all such seamen as they do employ ; and if the party employed be either discharged or dead, why he ought not to be paid, though the ship be yet in service. I know as to discharged men the rule and practice is to pay them, because they bring tickets with them, and the clamour would be great if they were not paid off. But in the case propounded, where the party is dead, and the purser yet at sea, and the party concerned can get no ticket, there a ticket hath been denied to be given by the commissioners, though yet they have had the muster and the purser's books¹ of that ship to justify their action, and determine the entry, service, and death of the party.

In the case of a ship's miscarriage by tempest, fire, &c., where many, most, or all of the men are lost (it holds also in particular men's cases dying at sea), there is no standing rule in the navy for the payment of these men's wages to the right heir of each respective man. It is true that the treasurer will (and it is fit he should) take care of himself—that is, not to pay any of this ship's wages without special order from the commissioners or some of them, and to see the party receiving it be legally enabled by letters of administration so to do for his discharge ; but that which I desire satisfaction in is, whether it be not too hard measure for a poor woman with three or four small children, that hath lost her husband in the service, and to whom there was not due above forty shillings or thereabouts before the ship miscarried, should be forced to spend, besides her time and pains in travel, oftentimes above 100 miles, to London, one-third part of the whole to enable her legally to receive her husband's wages and secure the treasurer. I am sure in other naval cases referring to the interest and

¹ So the Longleat MS. The Pepysian reads 'master's and purser's books.'

concernment of the State, latitudes are taken above and contrary to the letter of the law against seamen ; and truly charity in such a case as this might move more pity than is usually shown either by the commissioners or the treasurer. I desire not to direct, but what if all letters of administration for dead, drowned, and slain men in the service, were required to be given gratis ? or rather, what if the commissioners were enabled to give warrant to the treasurer, and the treasurer to pay all wages not exceeding 10*l.* belonging to dead men without any letters of administration, upon certificate of being the right party to whom it is due ? Such a favour as this might prevent some of those many tears that I have seen shed by disconsolate widows in the case aforesaid, and yet do no wrong to the State, the law, or the service ; yea, I dare say that such sweetenings as these of petty concernment to poor seamen and their interests would much engage their affections to the service, as the contrary usage hath too much discouraged them therein.

I cannot omit the great and insufferable damage to the State in not providing money for the seasonable and timely paying off all men in sea wages, either in great fleets or particular ships, so soon as they are safely arrived and at their moorings. I have known when for want of money so to do several ships have lain full-manned, and some of them in dry dock so manned, so long that the wages (and so consequently the victuals) of that or those ships' companies have cost the State more money than what was due to them for the whole voyage or sea service.¹ The blame of this cannot be

¹ In 1654 the Admiralty Commissioners reported to the Lord Protector and Council of State that in many ships the 'men lie upon dead charges for want of money to pay them off,' and some ships they were obliged for the same reason to keep at sea

either in the treasurer or commissioners, nor can I believe it to be elsewhere but in order to some design either to waste the State's treasure by paying it where it was not attended with an eating charge, thereby to render the State incapable of present satisfaction to the seamen (as in the late Long Parliament when some members of that body could find treasure enough to give away to and among themselves, and in the meantime suffered whole fleets to lie unpaid at an useless and intolerable expense), or else to satisfy the humours of some generals and captains, who upon pretence of present and future service obtained the favour to keep their ships full-manned till they should be fitted out again to the seas, premising that if their men were once discharged they should not be able to man them again but at an excessive expense both of time and treasure. I shall not enlarge much upon this subject. I presume the damage of past times in this particular hath sufficiently convinced the State of the sense of this error, so as to prevent it in future. And truly if they will not, I know no reason why any man should regret their loss, further than as the money comes first out of the subject's purse, in which sense all men have just cause to grieve that no more frugality should be used in its expense, considering who pays it.

I had almost forgot the case of merchant-ships taken up to serve the late Parliament in the year 1643 at freight, victuals, and wages at so much an head by the month by agreement. It fell out that at the return of the ships from sea the State wanted money to pay the owners according to charter-party (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1654, p. 388). This was also the case after the Restoration, during the scarcity of money occasioned by the Dutch War (*ibid.* 1667-8, p. xvi). The same thing has happened later in the navies of impecunious States. In 1860 a Portuguese man-of-war was lying in the Tagus for nearly a year waiting to be paid off.

for the hire of their ships. Some owners that were parliament men and of the committee of the navy, and others that were confiding men (a word much used in those days), managed the business so effectually for the parliament's interest (or rather their own) that if they might not have their money paid them for their freight according to contract, they would not pay off their men's wages, but keep them upon the respective ships in victuals and wages till the State could pay them. This business being opposed as unreasonable by me, a then commissioner of the navy, it flew so high that both parties were enjoined to bring in their reasons to the then committee of the navy for and against the continuing of the men in sea wages and victuals. According to order, we appeared and argued the case in the presence of the then lord admiral the Earl of Warwick;¹ but such was the honesty of some and influence of others of that committee, that though it was made plain and obvious that the State by so doing should pay for the interest of 100*l.* almost 400*l.* a year, yet it was carried in the affirmative, and the men were so continued for some months together, and the wages and victuals paid to the owners over and above their freight, to the great damage of the State. But the truth is, there was one then sat in the chair and others that sat by him that could upon such an account easily help a lame dog over the stile.² He is now gone and has long since I hope found mercy for such offences. I shall not therefore wade any further into discourse upon this particular,

¹ There is no trace of these transactions in the State Papers. Hollond was a commissioner of the navy, certainly in 1644 and probably earlier (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1644-5, p. 223).

² Probably Giles Grene, member for Corfe Castle in the Long Parliament, and chairman of the committee of the navy from 1642.

though I have often smiled at the conceit, and could easily please my reader with clothing my narration thereof with such circumstances as those then in power were pleased to blind the parliament withal, such as the concurrence of opinion from the Trinity Brethren (parties to these presents) and the bringing up several of the ships' companies to Westminster Hall, yea to the Parliament door, to clamour for their money, the better to conciliate the equity of the owners' demands, till the State should find money to pay them. But enough of this.

There is an abuse in the navy commonly called 'dead pays'—that is to say, when either the clerks of the check, muster-masters, captains, &c., shall return names or make tickets for men that never served, or otherwise present men to personate such names as are returned in their books and tickets to receive wages at the pay-table. This in former times, when the entertainment of captains was small, was winked at by the State, and in later times I have known six men in one ship presented by a captain (yet living) at the pay-table in one day to receive wages—some six, some eight months' pay—that never had served one day in the ship.¹ I

¹ The principle of drawing pay for non-existent persons was openly adopted in the navy from the beginning. Professor Laughton has shown how the system of 'dead shares' was applied under Elizabeth to give extra pay to the officers, over and above what was paid to the men (*N. R. S.* vol. i. p. lxix), and the Report of the Commission of 1618, which proposed to abolish all dead pays both in harbour and at sea, gives a list of those that were recognised at the time. According to this, dead pays in harbour were of four kinds: (1) Wages and victuals paid to men for keeping ships 'which long since had no being'; (2) The same to keepers of ships recently discharged; (3) Wages and victuals 'allowed unto pretended shipkeepers which never do service aboard'; and (4) The same 'in the names of men unknown and not serving in the ships.' The total number of dead pays under these four heads was 184, and their value was no less than 3,620*l.* The recognised dead pays upon the sea-books were much less:

replied to me, that there was not half so much as was his due, nor yet half so much as I had paid him for the rest of his retinue. I said it was true—but the reason was, this man died before the voyage was half ended, and the purser had made him dead such a day upon the sea-book, in which regard I could pay him no more. Hereupon he plainly told me, that if he had thought his death would have shortened his pay he would have kept him alive till that day; meaning the sea-book should not have made him dead. I tell this story to let my reader see what a commanding power all captains have over pursers to make them say, write, and do what they please, and that if there be not exact musters kept by able and honest muster-masters, much of this nature may easily be practised by the compliance of a captain and his purser, even in the face of the commissioners, who have no other way to prevent it than by their muster-books.

In the next place, I shall only mention what I have observed, viz., that some men have been employed in the navy that have had a double, triple, yea, quadruple capacity in the State's service at the same time in the same person, and yet have (by a capacity above all these) received wages, that is to say entertainment, for all these all or most part of the year, as if they had acted these several duties by influence and at a distance, as gods and not men, and their merit had been so great that though neither by themselves nor any deputy they came within one hundred leagues of their duties, yet the reward extraordinary was thrown into their laps as all too little to encourage men of such deserts and abilities; though withal the salary or entertainment in the place where they did personally serve hath not been so little as four, five, seven hundred, yea in some above a thousand pounds by the year, besides as

much more by contingent profit. So propitious have the members of the late Parliament and these times been to their servants and creatures, that they first preferred them into places of trust, and then employed them as executors of private designs, to say and do what and no more than some of them would have them say or do, and in recompense thereof to gratify them with wages or rewards, like the four winds blowing a fair gale of profit upon them from all quarters and points of the compass, not at all considering that the fatherless and widows (made so by the late wars) do yet pine and starve for want of that money and due debt that their husbands contracted by their dear service to the State wherein they lost their lives, or by voluntary loans upon the public faith¹ which yet remain unpaid to them; nor that this very money was by extrajudicial courses of excise and public taxes squeezed as so much blood from the subjects' purses upon pretended absolute necessity, and not to be squandered and given away in such gobbets to men that never did, never could, do service for it. I could easily dilate upon this particular, were it as safe as needful so to do. All that I drive at is, that seeing many, most men pretend to the regulation of the navy, and that the main design of this discourse is to discover something wherein the navy may or ought to be regulated, neither person nor thing, though never so great or profitable, may be spared upon any account whatsoever. He is a poor regulator

¹ During the civil war, parliament by act or ordinance frequently raised loans 'upon the publique faith,' to be repaid out of the excise (Scobell). In 1647 an act was passed allowing these debts to be assigned, and thus 'public faith bills' appeared to have served as a kind of inconvertible paper currency, and were sometimes counterfeited (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652-3, p. 378). For some proceedings with regard to these during the Protectorate see *ibid.* 1657-8, pp. xxxix and 74.

(an hypocrite in spirituals) that pretends to reformation and spares the Agag designed as equally, if not more or rather to destruction than the common Amalekites. And truly this very practice in many that I have known and observed, and do still know and observe, to be extremely rigid in petty crimes as to poor men, and highly zealous to reform and regulate persons and things in men of mean trust, &c., so as that if they either swear, be drunk, come not to their call, do not their labour, embezzle a deal, nail, &c., out of the State's stores, are certainly and without remedy whipped out of the service, and if need be otherwise punished for their misdemeanours (which thing I am not against as unfit) hath made me very much doubt that these men, whatsoever they pretend, are not right regulators, in regard they do not equally execute the same justice to all indifferently ; nay some of them are guilty of the same and worse crimes in their own persons which they zealously punish in other men, and are so far from regulating the navy that almost all their actions smell of design, and are attended with self-seeking either to themselves or their friends.

We shall next consider a little that inconvenience that attends the State's service in the point of wages by float-works, that is to say, by repairing of ships riding afloat at their moorings or elsewhere. I am not ignorant that in the point of grounding, graving, washing, tallowing, and careening of ships, there is not only an usefulness, but in many cases a necessity. Nor am I against ordinary reparations afloat of the ships' hulls in petty expenses, but that which I point at is unnecessary and extraordinary reparations to a ship on float. I call that unnecessary which might have been done sooner, better, and better cheap in dry dock than on float ; and I call that

extraordinary, which upon survey is found fitter to be done in dry dock than on float. That float-works are excessive in the expense of wages beyond what the same works are on shore I believe no man will deny, for all men know that 'the eye of the master makes the horse fat,'¹ and where there is a necessity for the master to be absent (I mean the master shipwright) there the men will take a liberty to come and go when they please, work and play as they please; nor is it possible to prevent it, if the ship rides at any distance from the respective yards (as most an end² they do). But this is not all; for by the means of float-works much water hath and doth go besides the mill—I mean, much time and many of the State's materials, such as timber, plank, ironwork, nails, oakum, tallow, tempered stuff, and several other provisions demanded by the master shipwright and issued by the storekeeper, have and do miscarry and go the wrong way. And of what damage, both in wages and materials, float-works are and have been (when great, unnecessary, and at remote places from the State's yards) to the State, is not easy to determine. I shall therefore only advise that no more than needs must of the State's works may be done on float, and for that end that the docks may not be unnecessarily cloyed with new building, but kept free for the docking and repair of the State's ships, as they shall be found upon survey to need it at their arrival from the seas; for if the docks be full, then there is a necessity (and it may be that necessity was begot upon design) of doing the works afloat, which I dare affirm doth cost the State in wages above a fourth penny more

¹ A favourite proverb of our author's; see pp. 20 and 99, *supra*.

² 'Most an end' was often used adverbially during this period, and as late as the eighteenth century, in the sense of 'for the most part' (see *New English Dictionary*).

for all such seamen as they do employ ; and if the party employed be either discharged or dead, why he ought not to be paid, though the ship be yet in service. I know as to discharged men the rule and practice is to pay them, because they bring tickets with them, and the clamour would be great if they were not paid off. But in the case propounded, where the party is dead, and the purser yet at sea, and the party concerned can get no ticket, there a ticket hath been denied to be given by the commissioners, though yet they have had the muster and the purser's books¹ of that ship to justify their action, and determine the entry, service, and death of the party.

In the case of a ship's miscarriage by tempest, fire, &c., where many, most, or all of the men are lost (it holds also in particular men's cases dying at sea), there is no standing rule in the navy for the payment of these men's wages to the right heir of each respective man. It is true that the treasurer will (and it is fit he should) take care of himself—that is, not to pay any of this ship's wages without special order from the commissioners or some of them, and to see the party receiving it be legally enabled by letters of administration so to do for his discharge ; but that which I desire satisfaction in is, whether it be not too hard measure for a poor woman with three or four small children, that hath lost her husband in the service, and to whom there was not due above forty shillings or thereabouts before the ship miscarried, should be forced to spend, besides her time and pains in travel, oftentimes above 100 miles, to London, one-third part of the whole to enable her legally to receive her husband's wages and secure the treasurer. I am sure in other naval cases referring to the interest and

¹ So the Longleat MS. The Pepysian reads 'master's and purser's books.'

concernment of the State, latitudes are taken above and contrary to the letter of the law against seamen ; and truly charity in such a case as this might move more pity than is usually shown either by the commissioners or the treasurer. I desire not to direct, but what if all letters of administration for dead, drowned, and slain men in the service, were required to be given gratis ? or rather, what if the commissioners were enabled to give warrant to the treasurer, and the treasurer to pay all wages not exceeding 10% belonging to dead men without any letters of administration, upon certificate of being the right party to whom it is due ? Such a favour as this might prevent some of those many tears that I have seen shed by disconsolate widows in the case aforesaid, and yet do no wrong to the State, the law, or the service ; yea, I dare say that such sweetenings as these of petty concernment to poor seamen and their interests would much engage their affections to the service, as the contrary usage hath too much discouraged them therein.

I cannot omit the great and insufferable damage to the State in not providing money for the seasonable and timely paying off all men in sea wages, either in great fleets or particular ships, so soon as they are safely arrived and at their moorings. I have known when for want of money so to do several ships have lain full-manned, and some of them in dry dock so manned, so long that the wages (and so consequently the victuals) of that or those ships' companies have cost the State more money than what was due to them for the whole voyage or sea service.¹ The blame of this cannot be

¹ In 1654 the Admiralty Commissioners reported to the Lord Protector and Council of State that in many ships the 'men lie upon dead charges for want of money to pay them off,' and some ships they were obliged for the same reason to keep at sea

for all such seamen as they do employ ; and if the party employed be either discharged or dead, why he ought not to be paid, though the ship be yet in service. I know as to discharged men the rule and practice is to pay them, because they bring tickets with them, and the clamour would be great if they were not paid off. But in the case propounded, where the party is dead, and the purser yet at sea, and the party concerned can get no ticket, there a ticket hath been denied to be given by the commissioners, though yet they have had the muster and the purser's books¹ of that ship to justify their action, and determine the entry, service, and death of the party.

In the case of a ship's miscarriage by tempest, fire, &c., where many, most, or all of the men are lost (it holds also in particular men's cases dying at sea), there is no standing rule in the navy for the payment of these men's wages to the right heir of each respective man. It is true that the treasurer will (and it is fit he should) take care of himself—that is, not to pay any of this ship's wages without special order from the commissioners or some of them, and to see the party receiving it be legally enabled by letters of administration so to do for his discharge ; but that which I desire satisfaction in is, whether it be not too hard measure for a poor woman with three or four small children, that hath lost her husband in the service, and to whom there was not due above forty shillings or thereabouts before the ship miscarried, should be forced to spend, besides her time and pains in travel, oftentimes above 100 miles, to London, one-third part of the whole to enable her legally to receive her husband's wages and secure the treasurer. I am sure in other naval cases referring to the interest and

¹ So the Longleat MS. The Pepysian reads 'master's and purser's books.'

concernment of the State, latitudes are taken above and contrary to the letter of the law against seamen ; and truly charity in such a case as this might move more pity than is usually shown either by the commissioners or the treasurer. I desire not to direct, but what if all letters of administration for dead, drowned, and slain men in the service, were required to be given gratis ? or rather, what if the commissioners were enabled to give warrant to the treasurer, and the treasurer to pay all wages not exceeding 10*l*. belonging to dead men without any letters of administration, upon certificate of being the right party to whom it is due ? Such a favour as this might prevent some of those many tears that I have seen shed by disconsolate widows in the case aforesaid, and yet do no wrong to the State, the law, or the service ; yea, I dare say that such sweetenings as these of petty concernment to poor seamen and their interests would much engage their affections to the service, as the contrary usage hath too much discouraged them therein.

I cannot omit the great and insufferable damage to the State in not providing money for the seasonable and timely paying off all men in sea wages, either in great fleets or particular ships, so soon as they are safely arrived and at their moorings. I have known when for want of money so to do several ships have lain full-manned, and some of them in dry dock so manned, so long that the wages (and so consequently the victuals) of that or those ships' companies have cost the State more money than what was due to them for the whole voyage or sea service.¹ The blame of this cannot be

¹ In 1654 the Admiralty Commissioners reported to the Lord Protector and Council of State that in many ships the 'men lie upon dead charges for want of money to pay them off,' and some ships they were obliged for the same reason to keep at sea

either in the treasurer or commissioners, nor can I believe it to be elsewhere but in order to some design either to waste the State's treasure by paying it where it was not attended with an eating charge, thereby to render the State incapable of present satisfaction to the seamen (as in the late Long Parliament when some members of that body could find treasure enough to give away to and among themselves, and in the meantime suffered whole fleets to lie unpaid at an useless and intolerable expense), or else to satisfy the humours of some generals and captains, who upon pretence of present and future service obtained the favour to keep their ships full-manned till they should be fitted out again to the seas, premising that if their men were once discharged they should not be able to man them again but at an excessive expense both of time and treasure. I shall not enlarge much upon this subject. I presume the damage of past times in this particular hath sufficiently convinced the State of the sense of this error, so as to prevent it in future. And truly if they will not, I know no reason why any man should regret their loss, further than as the money comes first out of the subject's purse, in which sense all men have just cause to grieve that no more frugality should be used in its expense, considering who pays it.

I had almost forgot the case of merchant-ships taken up to serve the late Parliament in the year 1643 at freight, victuals, and wages at so much an head by the month by agreement. It fell out that at the return of the ships from sea the State wanted money to pay the owners according to charter-party (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1654, p. 388). This was also the case after the Restoration, during the scarcity of money occasioned by the Dutch War (*ibid.* 1667-8, p. xvi). The same thing has happened later in the navies of impecunious States. In 1860 a Portuguese man-of-war was lying in the Tagus for nearly a year waiting to be paid off.

for the hire of their ships. Some owners that were parliament men and of the committee of the navy, and others that were confiding men (a word much used in those days), managed the business so effectually for the parliament's interest (or rather their own) that if they might not have their money paid them for their freight according to contract, they would not pay off their men's wages, but keep them upon the respective ships in victuals and wages till the State could pay them. This business being opposed as unreasonable by me, a then commissioner of the navy, it flew so high that both parties were enjoined to bring in their reasons to the then committee of the navy for and against the continuing of the men in sea wages and victuals. According to order, we appeared and argued the case in the presence of the then lord admiral the Earl of Warwick;¹ but such was the honesty of some and influence of others of that committee, that though it was made plain and obvious that the State by so doing should pay for the interest of 100*l.* almost 400*l.* a year, yet it was carried in the affirmative, and the men were so continued for some months together, and the wages and victuals paid to the owners over and above their freight, to the great damage of the State. But the truth is, there was one then sat in the chair and others that sat by him that could upon such an account easily help a lame dog over the stile.² He is now gone and has long since I hope found mercy for such offences. I shall not therefore wade any further into discourse upon this particular,

¹ There is no trace of these transactions in the State Papers. Hollond was a commissioner of the navy, certainly in 1644 and probably earlier (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1644-5, p. 223).

² Probably Giles Grene, member for Corfe Castle in the Long Parliament, and chairman of the committee of the navy from 1642.

though I have often smiled at the conceit, and could easily please my reader with clothing my narration thereof with such circumstances as those then in power were pleased to blind the parliament withal, such as the concurrence of opinion from the Trinity Brethren (parties to these presents) and the bringing up several of the ships' companies to Westminster Hall, yea to the Parliament door, to clamour for their money, the better to conciliate the equity of the owners' demands, till the State should find money to pay them. But enough of this.

There is an abuse in the navy commonly called 'dead pays'—that is to say, when either the clerks of the check, muster-masters, captains, &c., shall return names or make tickets for men that never served, or otherwise present men to personate such names as are returned in their books and tickets to receive wages at the pay-table. This in former times, when the entertainment of captains was small, was winked at by the State, and in later times I have known six men in one ship presented by a captain (yet living) at the pay-table in one day to receive wages—some six, some eight months' pay—that never had served one day in the ship.¹ I

¹ The principle of drawing pay for non-existent persons was openly adopted in the navy from the beginning. Professor Laughton has shown how the system of 'dead shares' was applied under Elizabeth to give extra pay to the officers, over and above what was paid to the men (*N. R. S.* vol. i. p. lxix), and the Report of the Commission of 1618, which proposed to abolish all dead pays both in harbour and at sea, gives a list of those that were recognised at the time. According to this, dead pays in harbour were of four kinds: (1) Wages and victuals paid to men for keeping ships 'which long since had no being'; (2) The same to keepers of ships recently discharged; (3) Wages and victuals 'allowed unto pretended shipkeepers which never do service aboard'; and (4) The same 'in the names of men unknown and not serving in the ships.' The total number of dead pays under these four heads was 184, and their value was no less than 3,620*l.* The recognised dead pays upon the sea-books were much less:

have cause to hope that wages and entertainments being augmented to men of all ranks,¹ such practices as these are abominated by those in trust. Yet in regard such things have been, and for ought I know may be still (men being as equally wicked as ever), I thought fit to hint something touching this miscarriage, the better to inform the State or my reader what great need there is to take care in conferring the muster-master's place, not only upon an able but an honest man, and not leave the choice or nomination of that instrument to the liberty of the general, captains, &c., nor yet to prefer any man unable upon the account of interest or friendship thereunto. For it is a place (in case of fleets) of exceeding great trust, and the miscarriage of a muster-master by compliance with captains, pursers, &c., may cost the State no small sum in a year. I remember what once a captain of a ship told me when I paid him the wages of one of his retinue. He looked upon the money, and asked me what I gave him. I told him, his man's wages. He

'to the three principal officers a dead pay a-piece in every ship,' and 'to the captains for their retinues.' The value of these at the time was only about 700*l*. (Charnock, *Mar. Arch.* ii. 263). The same principle prevailed in the last century, in connection with what were known as 'widows' men.' The captain was authorised to enter one or two fictitious persons in every hundred men of his ship's complement, and the wages drawn in their names, and the value of the victuals to which they would have been entitled, were applied to the relief of the widows of officers and seamen in the royal navy. The reference in the text is evidently to fraudulent applications of a recognised principle. That the principle was recognised, and yet that fraudulent applications of it were made at this time, appears from a letter of the Officers of the Navy to the Lords of the Admiralty, dated April 26, 1637 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1637, p. 27).

¹ For details of the increase of wages to men of all ranks under the Commonwealth, see *Commons' Journals*, February 27, 1650, and March 21, 1652. Also Mr. Oppenheim's article in *E. H. R.* xi. 31 and 70.

replied to me, that there was not half so much as was his due, nor yet half so much as I had paid him for the rest of his retinue. I said it was true—but the reason was, this man died before the voyage was half ended, and the purser had made him dead such a day upon the sea-book, in which regard I could pay him no more. Hereupon he plainly told me, that if he had thought his death would have shortened his pay he would have kept him alive till that day; meaning the sea-book should not have made him dead. I tell this story to let my reader see what a commanding power all captains have over pursers to make them say, write, and do what they please, and that if there be not exact musters kept by able and honest muster-masters, much of this nature may easily be practised by the compliance of a captain and his purser, even in the face of the commissioners, who have no other way to prevent it than by their muster-books.

In the next place, I shall only mention what I have observed, viz., that some men have been employed in the navy that have had a double, triple, yea, quadruple capacity in the State's service at the same time in the same person, and yet have (by a capacity above all these) received wages, that is to say entertainment, for all these all or most part of the year, as if they had acted these several duties by influence and at a distance, as gods and not men, and their merit had been so great that though neither by themselves nor any deputy they came within one hundred leagues of their duties, yet the reward extraordinary was thrown into their laps as all too little to encourage men of such deserts and abilities; though withal the salary or entertainment in the place where they did personally serve hath not been so little as four, five, seven hundred, yea in some above a thousand pounds by the year, besides as

much more by contingent profit. So propitious have the members of the late Parliament and these times been to their servants and creatures, that they first preferred them into places of trust, and then employed them as executors of private designs, to say and do what and no more than some of them would have them say or do, and in recompense thereof to gratify them with wages or rewards, like the four winds blowing a fair gale of profit upon them from all quarters and points of the compass, not at all considering that the fatherless and widows (made so by the late wars) do yet pine and starve for want of that money and due debt that their husbands contracted by their dear service to the State wherein they lost their lives, or by voluntary loans upon the public faith¹ which yet remain unpaid to them; nor that this very money was by extrajudicial courses of excise and public taxes squeezed as so much blood from the subjects' purses upon pretended absolute necessity, and not to be squandered and given away in such gobbets to men that never did, never could, do service for it. I could easily dilate upon this particular, were it as safe as needful so to do. All that I drive at is, that seeing many, most men pretend to the regulation of the navy, and that the main design of this discourse is to discover something wherein the navy may or ought to be regulated, neither person nor thing, though never so great or profitable, may be spared upon any account whatsoever. He is a poor regulator

¹ During the civil war, parliament by act or ordinance frequently raised loans 'upon the publique faith,' to be repaid out of the excise (Scobell). In 1647 an act was passed allowing these debts to be assigned, and thus 'public faith bills' appeared to have served as a kind of inconvertible paper currency, and were sometimes counterfeited (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652-3, p. 378). For some proceedings with regard to these during the Protectorate see *ibid.* 1657-8, pp. xxxix and 74.

(an hypocrite in spirituals) that pretends to reformation and spares the Agag designed as equally, if not more or rather to destruction than the common Amalekites. And truly this very practice in many that I have known and observed, and do still know and observe, to be extremely rigid in petty crimes as to poor men, and highly zealous to reform and regulate persons and things in men of mean trust, &c., so as that if they either swear, be drunk, come not to their call, do not their labour, embezzle a deal, nail, &c., out of the State's stores, are certainly and without remedy whipped out of the service, and if need be otherwise punished for their misdemeanours (which thing I am not against as unfit) hath made me very much doubt that these men, whatsoever they pretend, are not right regulators, in regard they do not equally execute the same justice to all indifferently ; nay some of them are guilty of the same and worse crimes in their own persons which they zealously punish in other men, and are so far from regulating the navy that almost all their actions smell of design, and are attended with self-seeking either to themselves or their friends.

We shall next consider a little that inconvenience that attends the State's service in the point of wages by float-works, that is to say, by repairing of ships riding afloat at their moorings or elsewhere. I am not ignorant that in the point of grounding, graving, washing, tallowing, and careening of ships, there is not only an usefulness, but in many cases a necessity. Nor am I against ordinary reparations afloat of the ships' hulls in petty expenses, but that which I point at is unnecessary and extraordinary reparations to a ship on float. I call that unnecessary which might have been done sooner, better, and better cheap in dry dock than on float; and I call that

extraordinary, which upon survey is found fitter to be done in dry dock than on float. That float-works are excessive in the expense of wages beyond what the same works are on shore I believe no man will deny, for all men know that 'the eye of the master makes the horse fat,'¹ and where there is a necessity for the master to be absent (I mean the master shipwright) there the men will take a liberty to come and go when they please, work and play as they please ; nor is it possible to prevent it, if the ship rides at any distance from the respective yards (as most an end² they do). But this is not all ; for by the means of float-works much water hath and doth go besides the mill—I mean, much time and many of the State's materials, such as timber, plank, ironwork, nails, oakum, tallow, tempered stuff, and several other provisions demanded by the master shipwright and issued by the storekeeper, have and do miscarry and go the wrong way. And of what damage, both in wages and materials, float-works are and have been (when great, unnecessary, and at remote places from the State's yards) to the State, is not easy to determine. I shall therefore only advise that no more than needs must of the State's works may be done on float, and for that end that the docks may not be unnecessarily cloyed with new building, but kept free for the docking and repair of the State's ships, as they shall be found upon survey to need it at their arrival from the seas ; for if the docks be full, then there is a necessity (and it may be that necessity was begot upon design) of doing the works afloat, which I dare affirm doth cost the State in wages above a fourth penny more

¹ A favourite proverb of our author's ; see pp. 20 and 99, *supra*.

² 'Most an end' was often used adverbially during this period, and as late as the eighteenth century, in the sense of 'for the most part' (see *New English Dictionary*).

than the same works would have done in dry dock, besides what is lost by embezzlements of stores occasioned by delivering them out of the yard to be expended in remote places—a matter of no small concernment if duly considered.

I could also wish that the providence of those in trust were such, that orders and warrants might be seasonably sent to the commissioners, and by them to all subordinate instruments, for repair of all ships' hulls, and not neglected or forborne till the service requires the ships to be set to sea, and then to do all their works in an huddle, and spend the State's treasure in a prodigal way for despatch, as if the six months' tax were everlasting, and the exchequer flowed with more money than the Thames with water. I have often been ashamed to think and see the State so much misguided as to do their work at Christmas, either in building or repairing of a ship that has lain all the summer in dry dock without one stroke of work done upon her, and then so to haste and importune their commands, that not only extraordinary wages hath been given but also tide-work and wages for an hour before and an hour after the ordinary times limited to come to and go from the State's works. Is this husbandry? Do these improvident providents suppose that all or most of the money that pays these men comes out of the subjects' purses? Certainly if it came from another channel it would be more frugally expended, and not (as it is) wasted without bounds or reason. Can any man think that the same work (as to quantity) can be done in a day in the dead of winter that may be done in March, April, or May, in all or any part of the summer, as if a candle were a better light to work by than the sun; or that the men do earn half of what is given them for extraordinary works

at extraordinary hours? Have not precedents of this nature in all the State's yards swelled the pay-books to almost double the expense in wages of what was formerly, when yet as many ships have been set to the seas and more work (and I am sure better) hath been done for that money? I cannot without neglect deny the commissioners of the navy that honour as to vindicate them from the guilt of this abuse, as knowing they have been and are constant remembrancers of what is needful to be effected for the State's interest in this particular, and if they cannot obtain orders to proceed, or shall receive orders to the contrary, it is not meet they should bear the blame of other men's faults, though the fault and expense be intolerable. I have sometimes wished in anger upon neglects of this kind after much solicitation, that the whole navy were under a contract as equally as the matter of victuals;¹ for then the contractors would easily find friends and procure orders, not only for the doing but the well timing of all things to be done in the service of the navy; yea, every man would be a servant to promote the interest of the contractor upon another account, whereof I shall, it may be, tell you more when I come to treat of the second general branch of the navy under the title Victuals. In the meantime I humbly and earnestly beseech those whom it doth or may concern to regulate the navy in succeeding times, to think of this as no small thief of the State's treasure.

Unto which I could add that improvidence that attends the service when ships are at a vast charge and expense completely manned, fitted, and equipped, and yet kept many months in harbour in victuals and wages before they be despatched to the seas. But I know that the State's affairs admits of many

¹ But see pp. 35-6, *supra*.

interchanges, long debates and councils, and are oftentimes altered by the access of intelligence from foreign parts from former resolutions; in which regard it is not possible to keep to rules of providence in this particular; nor is it fit for private men to enquire into secrets of this nature, much less to determine the conveniency or inconveniency thereof. In which regard I shall pass it with silence, though I have many times not only observed but lamented the great damage that has attended the State in this particular. Witness the (never-to-be-forgotten) Jamaica fleet, which cost the State above five hundred thousand pounds before the late Lord Protector could resolve whither to send them,—and that after they were completely rigged, manned, victualled, and stored for the seas.¹

I could also willingly pass over the next observation with silence out of that respect that I bear to particular men faulty therein, had I not promised to myself and to my reader impartial dealing in the whole discourse. That which I would hint as fit to be reformed, is the exorbitant expense of the State's treasure in wages and materials for new building, repairing, painting, and fitting of dwelling-houses, stables, gardens, &c., in the State's yards, for the habitation of subordinate instruments, as if their once being a commissioner, a clerk of the check, clerk of the store, master attendant, master shipwright, or clerk of the survey did render them such and so great that nothing can be too little for them at the State's charge.² Whence it is that after

¹ Penn was appointed to the command of the Jamaica fleet on October 9, 1654, when it must have been practically ready for sea, as it was 'entered into sea victuals' a few days later (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1654, p. 562). It did not actually sail until December 25, but the delay was due to considerations of State policy, and not to any abuse in naval administration.

² *I.e.* no detail can be too small for the State to pay for.

accommodation within-doors, some of them by painting, paving, and other ornamental tricking, beget their houses rather into the dress of Bartholomew babies¹ than as fitting habitations for men of their conditions. Hence also it is that one or more of the State's labourers are constantly employed by them to run, ride, or go of errands, weed, dress, and trim gardens, help to brew, keep horses, or otherwise attend upon all or some of these instruments. The thing seems little or nothing to those that know not the navy, and is made less than it either is or would seem to be by charging the expense upon the quarter-books promiscuously among the wages paid to labourers and artificers borne in ordinary or extraordinary in each yard; but if this charge were kept distinct, as it might and ought to be, it would then appear in its colours, and the commissioners' indulgence, contrary to all precedent and former practice, nay, contrary to strict orders in the case in former times, would appear a greater disservice to the State than is imagined by most men. I should only beg of these gentlemen, in the behalf of the State and the poor nation whose money it is that maintains their excess, to say when they have or will have done building, altering, repairing, adding, and adorning their houses, gardens, &c., that the State might once know their charge; for if there succeeds a new man in the place, or the man in being gets a new wife (I had almost said a new maidservant), something must be done to please the fancy of that man, wife, or servant, though

¹ Bartholomew Fair was held at Smithfield on St. Bartholomew's Day (August 24) from early times down to the middle of the present century. The decorated dolls sold at the fair were called 'Bartholomew babies' (*cf.* also 'Bartholomew beef,' 'Bartholomew ware,' &c.). See Brooks' *Works*, vi. 51, 'Men . . . were dressed up like fantastical antics, and women like Bartholomew babies' (*New English Dictionary*).

the same thing had not been done (in another form) six months before by his or her predecessor. Such and so great a vanity attends the spirits of men where the State is the paymaster ; whereas I have observed and do know that some of these men, thus profuse and prodigal upon the State's account or purse, are and have been in their own private habitations so penuriously and sordidly thrifty that they will scarce afford themselves necessary accommodations suitable to their own conditions. I neither am nor ever was against necessary expense or accommodation in any house allowed by the State for such an officer (be he what he will) to live in. But I always was and still am against that wasteful and unnecessary expense, and those overcurious fopperies that are now too common in the State's houses ; and much more against all employment of the State's house-carpenters, joiners, carvers, painters, labourers, &c., to trim gardens, and do other servile works in or about any of their houses. And this is that I propound to be regulated, and no other. But if these exorbitancies (in my more severe thoughts) be fit to be redressed, what think you of the same or the like expenses upon private or men's own houses, where the State's treasure and materials are not only wasted but lost for ever ? These men do only lay load upon the State's own houses more than needs, and the State have something (though not much) for their money, and the materials expended are there for future use to succeeding instruments. But where the expense is upon a house, &c., where the State has no propriety,¹ there is neither the same colour for the expense, nor yet the same capacity of service or benefit to the State by the expense, as in the former case ; for when this man dies or discontinues the service, that is

¹ *I.e.* property.

either a commissioner or other officer of the navy, the house upon which it is expended sweeps all by descending to the right heir or continuing in the right owner thereof. I am ashamed to think of these practices, and yet the thing is so common that some stick not to say (I dare not) that the most part of the houses of Chatham and other places are built with the State's stuff.¹ I hope I shall not need to invite or direct to the regulation of this ; it is enough to name it (if not too much), I shall therefore leave it to them whom it most concerns.

That which much emboldens and encourages many of the forementioned abuses is the neglect of the clerks of the check in the respective yards, who either out of fear, or else to curry favour with the commissioners and others, do bear the charge of all labourers, joiners, carvers, house-carpenters, plumbers, &c., employed upon by-services, either upon the ordinary or extraordinary books, inclusively and without distinction, or expression for what work the State's treasure is paid to those men. I am very confident that if the men that do employ them did but see the total charge expended by some of them upon a distinct head in each quarter-book, as it ought to be and as before was hinted, they would blush for shame that so much money should be expended for so little work, and that little no whit concerning the State's interest ; but it being huddled together promiscuously with those that work upon ships or in the State's yards, it is swallowed as nothing. I am sure that before the late wars all clerks of the check did not,

¹ 'Bishop Goodman used to tell how a friend with whom he was walking at Chatham drew his attention to the stately mansions which had sprung up like mushrooms round the yard. "All these goodly houses," he said, "are built of chips"' (Gardiner, iii. 204). Something of the same kind was said as late as the present century.

dared not, make up their books after this manner ; and till such time as this be regulated, other things necessarily depending upon this will not readily be removed. In like manner the blind way of entering men's wages upon ships' sea-books to which the men did not belong, and not upon the proper sea-book or its post abstract, or at the least in a particular book of tickets paid post abstract, opens a wide door to all abuses of pursers, clerks of the check, treasurer's and commissioners' clerks, and renders the deceit (if any) untraceable and past finding out. Thus the way of paying ministers their wages by a medium out of moneys collected from men's wages paid or to be paid upon that ship,¹ gives a great latitude of abuse to the treasurer, paymaster, or their clerks, and is not easy to be discovered. I could wish therefore that the miscarriages attending promiscuous payments, whether in clerks of the check's or pursers' sea-books, were totally abandoned in the navy, and that to whomsoever and for whatsoever any of the State's treasure is paid, distinct titles as to the thing done, place where, &c., may be made in all books, and distinct sums set out upon these books, without any defalcation or abatement upon the wages allowed ; as also that all moneys be paid upon proper sea-books, and the tickets paid post abstract there set off, or at the least in a particular book of arrears by themselves, and not upon any other sea-book upon any pretence whatsoever.

¹ The chaplain was paid by deducting a groat monthly from the wages of each man on board (see p. 348, *infra*). This appears to have been over and above the wages of an ordinary seaman, which had been the amount of his original pay, the groats being added afterwards 'to make up competent means' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1628-9, pp. 448 and 466). In order to save time and trouble in the office it was usual to calculate this, as well as wages, victuals, &c., by a 'medium,' or average. The term occurs frequently in navy papers both before and after the Restoration.

CHAPTER III

OF VICTUALS

VICTUALS is a special ingredient in the great compound of the navy, and is ordinarily distinguished into two sorts: first, harbour or petty warrant victuals; or, secondly, sea victuals. In both the same species are allowed, with some small variation of quantity.

In sea victuals (which is the main) these particulars are the common allowance for each seaman, &c. : On Sundays and Tuesdays one pound of biscuit, one gallon of beer, and two pounds of beef with salt, for each of the said days. On Mondays and Thursdays one pound of biscuit, one gallon of beer, one pound of pork with salt, and one pint of peas; and for want of pork one pound and a half of beef in lieu. On Wednesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays one pound of biscuit, one gallon of beer, one eighth part of a sized fish,¹ half a quarter of a pound of butter, and a quarter of a pound of cheese.² This

¹ *I.e.* a fish of the regulation size. This was twenty-four inches in length for cod, and twenty-two inches for haberdine. A half-size stock fish was sixteen inches (Pepysian MSS. *Miscellanies*, iii. 416).

² This is practically the same as the allowance described by Monson (Churchill's *Voyages*, iii. 347), and provided for in the victualler's contract of February 1637 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, p. 452), except that in these the men are only to have half-rations on Fridays. The change was made in 1649 on the ground that the observance of Fridays was 'begotten by the covetous desires of the contractors for victuals, though coloured with specious pretence of abstinence and religion' (*E. H. R.* xi. 26).

with necessaries, drawage, and adge money,¹ is the allowance of the State—things so common and well known that I should not have mentioned them at all, had it not been in order to what I shall observe as abusive and fit for regulation in this branch of the navy ; wherein I shall likewise follow my former method in the point of wages, and give my reader something referring to the State's, something to the seaman's, and something to both their losses, in a promiscuous manner as my memory and observation shall prompt them to me.

It hath been an old and great dispute which is the best way of victualling, whether by particular men as contractors at a certain rate, or by the State themselves upon account. I shall in this (as in all things else) desire freedom without offence in declaring my opinion, and yet submit to such as know better and are able to see further in the point. For my part, I always did and still do conceive the best and safest way is to victual upon account—I mean that the State should keep the victualling in their own hands.² My reasons are these :—

First, it is more honourable and suitable to the service of the navy that the State should victual than

¹ 'Necessary money' was money paid to the purser by the victualler 'for providing of necessaries such as wood, candles, dishes, cans, lanthorns, spoones, &c.,' at the rate of 9*d.* a month per man for ships carrying sixty men or under, and 6*d.* for those carrying over sixty. The fund available for necessaries was also increased by an allowance of 2*s.* a month 'loading charges' to each ship ; 4*d.* a tun 'drawage' for every tun of beer the purser received from the victualler, and 16*d.* for every tun of beverage wine ; and ten groats a month 'adge money,' payable as long as the ship was victualled for sea service (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 421). In the contract for 1677 this is called 'adze money,' and 'adge' is a north country form of 'addice' or 'adze.' Thus 'adge money' was probably 'tool money.'

² At the time when this was written the victualling was 'upon account' (see p. 124, *supra*, and *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1654, p. 384 ; 1655, p. 282), and so continued until the Restoration. It then

private men, though never so honest, and the seaman will more readily content himself with a miscarriage of any sort of victual in point of quantity or quality when supplied by the State, than when supplied by contractors.

Secondly, the inconveniences attending contracts in so great an affair are insufferable ; for if the contractor shall for his private profit provide bad victuals, or curtail that which is good, the whole design of a fleet may be destroyed, and this is not safe to commit to hazard by the temptation of that profit that doth or may attend so great undertaking.

Thirdly, let it be considered that all contractors drive their own and not the State's interest, and why the State should choose to do that by other men whom they know seek themselves,¹ and not by their own instruments whom they otherwise pay for their pains, I know not. It is true, that under the notion of names and distinctions lately crept up among us of Cavalier and Roundhead, malignant and confiding, disaffected and well-affected, the church and the world, that is to say members of churches and men in Babylon, or out of church fellowship, with I know not what more, the Parliament hath been made to believe that men of such a strain or cut, men so

passed into the hands of Denis Gauden, as contractor, and appears to have been managed by contract in the old way until 1668, when a modification was introduced, two responsible persons approved by the King being associated with the contractor. In the end, however, the other system triumphed, and on December 10, 1683, a commission for victualling was issued to Sir R. Haddock, Anth. Sturt, John Parsons, and Nich. Fenn, with power to contract for provisions, and appoint clerks and purveyors (Pepysian MSS., *Naval Precedents*, p. 48). Another discussion of the relative merits of the two systems is to be found in the Pepysian MSS. (*Miscellanies*, iii. 733), under date 1673 or 1674. The same question in its application to shipbuilding has already been treated by our author (see p. 35, *supra*).

¹ *I.e.* their own interests.

and so qualified, would cut the knot of all arguments against contracts by their faithful and self-denying carriage in the execution of that service. But however the Parliament were abused and misled with such principles for a time, yet I know it was not so much the error of the House, as the influence of some committee men, members of parliament, that swayed the balance in this point, and after one year's experience of these confiding men, they easily found where their zeal for the public lay, and whither it led them.

Fourthly, to descend from principles to practice, the late experience of victualling by contract is such an argument as might serve for all others, if men would be satisfied with reason ; for (whatsoever was at first pretended to) I would only ask, whether ever the State did gain honour or treasure by the late contract. Nay, I might ask whether they have not lost much of both by it. I am sure it is easier to make out the last than the first, else I presume the late Lord Protector and his Council would never have altered that course.¹ The seaman's round robins, letters, certificates, returns of great quantities of victual, new picklings, bakings, brewings, private satisfactions to pursers, stewards, &c., stoppage of complaints by compliance² with generals, admirals of squadrons, captains, &c., sending victuals to the army into Scotland, Barbadoes, and other places, obstructing all complaints at the committee of the navy, committee of the admiralty, council of state, commissioners of the navy—nay, at the very

¹ In October 1654 the contractors for victualling gave notice of their intention to resign the contract, and on August 27, 1655, the Lord Protector and Council established a victualling department under the navy commissioners, and by patent under the Great Seal constituted Captain Thos. Alderne victualler of the navy (*E. H. R.* xi. 43 ; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1655, p. 326).

² *I.e.* underhand agreement.

Parliament House, whither they have sometimes gone, with many more knacks¹ of this nature—have all spoken aloud the honour and profit, or rather the dishonour and damage accruing to the State and the subject by the late contract ; yea, there is one thing speaks yet louder than all these, that yet cannot speak at all—I mean the blood of those hundreds, I might say thousands of men, that in behalf of their country went cheerfully and did valiantly, and might have done so still, had they not been pinched by shortness, and as good as poisoned by stench of decayed, unwholesome, and ill-cured beef, pork, beer, bread, fish, &c., insomuch that it was much disputed by men of good knowledge and judgment in naval affairs whether the sword of the Dutch or the want and badness of provisions did most execution upon our men in the late wars.²

¹ =Tricks.

² On the victualling under the contract of 1650-4, see Mr. Oppenheim (*E. H. R.* xi. 41-3). Although he compares it favourably with the system of Charles I., the complaints were very numerous (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652-3, p. 35 ; vols. 1653-4 and 1654, *passim*). On May 2, 1653, the officers of the Seven Brothers certified that the fish on board stank, and was unfit to eat, and that there was a want of other necessities, while the beef also was in a doubtful state (*ibid.* 1652-3, p. 577). In another case the beer was so bad that it had to be thrown overboard (*ibid.* 590). On June 16 the generals at sea complained of 'stinking beer,' of 'salt beer which causes sickness,' and of 'mouldy bread from Hull' (*ibid.* p. 428). On July 11, 1653, Capt. John Taylor, the master shipwright at Chatham, attributed the delay in the despatch of the ships to the victuals—'beer, bread, and butter worse than I ever saw in the dearest times.' The men impute their sickness to the state of the victuals (*ibid.* 1653-4, p. 20). About the same time a similar complaint came from Deptford (*ibid.* p. 24). A captain brought his ship into Spithead, 'as the beer stinks, which has caused many men to fall sick and others to run, and the butter and other provisions are as bad as they can be' (*ibid.* p. 465 ; see also pp. 478, 480, and 582). It may not have been this which accounted for 'strange fits, like convulsions or calenture,' which seized twenty of a ship's company in 1654 (*ibid.* 1654, p. 580) ;

Fifthly, add to this, that in the way of contract the justice of such as are in power and complained unto for redress doth not run so freely as it doth and will upon such as act upon trust only, in case of obliquity; nor indeed can it well so do, for men are men, and may and will be tempted, and the victualler's contract hath enough in it to make (as it did) a lame man leap—I mean to endear and engage men of all ranks, both in parliament, council of state, commission of the admiralty, committee of the navy and the commissioners under them to the interest of the contractor. And hence it was wisely provided by the late contractors and their abettors that men of all kinds of influence should be shuffled together in the same contract, that, let the wind blow where it would, they had a port to go to. If the army were dissatisfied, they had a colonel, and he bestirred himself; if the churches took any notice of miscarriages, they had members ready to give satisfaction. If the seamen mutinied, they had a seaman and an elder Brother of the Trinity House to post into the Downs and make pacifying speeches, which by too much custom grew so nauseous to the seamen that he was sometimes glad to retire for his personal safety—as people talk.¹ If complaints came to the Parlia-

but at any rate the connection between the victuals and the sickness prevailing was recognised by the Navy Commissioners, who, in writing to the Admiralty Committee in October 1654, just after the contract referred to in the text had expired, remarked that 'unwholesome provisions hazard men's lives' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1654, p. 380).

¹ The victualling contract of November 30, 1650, was signed by the Commissioners of the Navy of the one part, and Thomas Pride, Thomas Witherings, Nathaniel Andrewes, William Beale, John Limbery, Thomas Alderne, Richard Price (usually signed Preice), and Denis Gauden, 'citizens of London,' of the other part (*S. P. Dom. Interr.* xi. 106). Mr. Oppenheim (*E. H. R.* xi. 41) omits Witherings and Andrewes, and reads 'Beak' for

ment, then they bent their joint strength to members of all sorts to blow it over with reflection upon the seaman, as mutinous, &c. If letters, round robins, &c., came to the navy office, they had such compliance there that they were immediately acquainted therewith, and oftentimes the letters themselves given out of the office to prevent further flames. Yea, I have known that when the commissioners of the navy have in fidelity to their trust remitted complaints of high nature to the committee of the navy, committee of the admiralty, and council of state, and sometimes waited in person, the better to beget a sense of such great abuses both to the State and subject, and that the said letters were read publicly in their own presence and the grievance made patent and plain, yet such hath been the influence of that contract that the commissioners themselves have been checked as men too forward and prejudiced against the contractors by complaints of that nature; insomuch that for almost three years together I never knew any complaint take effect so as to procure justice against the offender though never so culpable; and truly if this be the issue of acting by contract, I should never advise the State to go this way any more; for certainly if justice be obstructed in the fountain, the service cannot prosper in the stream.

Sixthly, if the State doth victual, then all such provisions as prove defective for want of being well made or preserved, together with all such provisions as are returned as left at the end of the voyage, are and will be either sold by the candle,¹ or at least Beale and 'Pierce' for Price. The 'colonel' is evidently Colonel Pride, who was at the time actually in command of a regiment. The 'seaman' is probably Captain John Limbery, to whose appearances on board ship there are frequent references in the State Papers (*ibid.* 1651-2, p. 431; 1652-3, pp. 561, 578; 1653-4, p. 15).

¹ See p. 284, *infra*.

expended in petty warrant—seldom or never sent again to sea to the discouragement of the seamen. But it is otherwise with the contractors ; for they (let it be never so bad) will either mix it among good, gain orders to eat it at the first of the voyage, or charge it upon the State as theirs and not the contractor's victuals, and then pretend thrift to the State in shipping it away and forcing the poor men to eat it, though hereby the State's service doth much suffer ; for the men will, and do run away rather than eat it, and those that do or are forced to stay contract diseases, sickness, and oftentimes death by eating of it, whereby they are either thrown overboard or turned ashore to the great disservice of the State. I list not to spatter men, yet it is not difficult to prove that great quantities of victuals in several and successive fleets, surveyed as bad, defective, &c., altogether unfit for the service, and after survey returned and accepted by the late contractors as such, have yet been, the next ship or voyage, reshipped and sent to sea as good, and the poor men forced to eat that or none ; yea, and in remote places and hot countries, where none else could be had for money, so that what with the badness of victuals and the extreme heat of the place, not only their healths were impaired but also their lives destroyed. I am not ignorant of what is said (and that too truly) against the way of victualling by the State's instruments, viz., that the service oftentimes miscarries for want of timely notice from the State to make provisions (that being no man's care which is every man's care) ; that oftentimes their meat has been to kill at unreasonable times of the year ; that when goods are bought no care is taken for money to pay the butcher, brewer, &c., or at least not half that care that a private contractor doth and will take,

being spurred thereunto by his own interest. These and such like things are urged by such as love to fish in so plentiful a river as a good contract. And truly it is an high reflection upon those in power, that such things as these should be spoken, and spoken as truth. For my part, I cannot but blame such instruments of State as are privy to affairs of State, if they be not as equally vigorous both in timing and paying the debts of that service when done by the State's instruments, as they are or would be for a contractor; and it is clear to me that such men as are not so, are altogether unfit to govern under the State. So that all that is or can be gained by pleas of this nature, is but to confirm what is said in the fifth reason against the way of contract,¹ upon the account of corruption and injustice; which in effect is this: The State's instruments have nothing to give men in trust to accommodate the service with seasonable declarations, orders, &c., and due payments to butchers, brewers, bakers, &c., that supply provisions, but the contractors have (though yet they give nothing but what the State pays with treble damages) therefore the way of contract is the best way. But if this be good arguing, I am to seek²; I should rather propound the regulation of this mischief by employing conscientious instruments, than the cure of it by a remedy ten times worse than the disease. Which that a general contract is, shall yet further appear by those particular abuses in the matter of victuals pointed at in the succeeding discourse, the regulation whereof I shall refer to those whom it may concern.

Before all ships go to sea they are generally in rigging wages, which answers to petty warrant victuals. In which case all warrants are issued upon the single voucher or test of the clerks of the

¹ See p. 158, *supra*.

² 'To seek' = 'at a loss.'

check respectively, upon three days, four days, or weekly musters—a trust so great, that for my part I conceive it too great for one single person, and much more when transacted by servants, boys, and considerable clerks (as most an end it is) not fit for any, much less such a trust without check. I believe the State spends yearly in victuals of this nature not so little as fifteen thousand pounds, and am sure sometimes more in all yards and ports; and why all this treasure should be issued upon the single voucher of one man, without a counter-check, when yet the treasurer of the navy is not allowed to pay five shillings without a commissioner's hand in the case of wages, and that grounded upon a ticket under the purser's and captain's hands, and muster-books to check the truth thereof, and not five groats without two commissioners' hands in the point of provisions, and that grounded upon a bill under the hands of the storekeeper and clerk of the check, I know not.

If it be said that the clerk of the check makes the warrant to another, viz., the victualler, and for him to deliver the victuals to the purser, and not to himself—in which regard the trust is not so great as is premised, nor can the abuse be any unless the purser or the victualler, or both, comply with the clerk of the check or his servants—it is answered that though the warrants be made to the victualler, and for victuals to be delivered to the purser, yet it is not safe to give such a latitude of combination by the clerk of the check (or his clerk that takes the musters) without an able check upon him and his actions, and the warrants issuing under both their hands, especially in case of rigging, where the daily access of seamen pressed into the service calls for warrants of increase, in which case I have observed and known no little damage to the State

by the unworthiness of some clerks that have lain under this temptation for want of due care to prevent it. Moreover, what may not a victualler and the clerk of the check do in this case if they should combine? Or what may not a clerk of the check and purser do in this case, there being no check upon the clerk of the check? All men know that pursers are generally poor, and that some of them have no small charges to maintain, and that yet they live well,¹ and do oftentimes make their voyage before the ship goes to sea by the private profit of petty warrant victuals. Add to this, if you please, that where the State loseth the victuals there also they lose so much wages, for the clerk of the check must make his rigging-book and his petty warrants agree as to number of men, else he may be traced by the commissioners when the victualler passeth his account. But if the book and warrants agree, it is not possible to discover the abuse (if any), and so consequently the clerk of the check hath power and may safely adventure to

¹ On the tricks of the pursers, see Mr. Oppenheim's articles (*E. H. R.* ix. 478-9 ; xi. 66-7). They gave quite as much trouble after the Restoration (see *Calendars of State Papers*, 1660-8, *passim*). The only excuse for them is offered by Pepys in the *Diary*: 'A purser without professed cheating is a professed loser—twice as much as he gets' (November 22, 1665). Their pay was not large, and in 1639 sixteen of them pointed out in a petition to Sir John Penington that though they were 'men bred fit for service of consequence, and able to undergo in matters of accompt and clerkship what his Majesty's service can impose' upon them, yet the salaries of their places were so small that many of them 'cannot afford maintenance in a very mean quality' 'without the continuance of what has ever been tolerated, or else the grant of a competent salary' (September 27, *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1639, p. 524). After the Restoration a purser in a first-rate ship received 4*l.* a month and 36*s.* for two servants ; in a second-rate 3*l.* 10*s.* and 18*s.* for one servant ; in a third-rate 3*l.* and 18*s.* for one servant ; in a fourth-rate 2*l.* 10*s.* (Pepysian MSS. *Miscellanies*, vol. iii.).

give the purser tickets for all time before sea pay, and those tickets shall as equally beget the wages as the petty warrants the victuals ; which trust is not fitting to be solely in the breast of one single man. And this was the ground of my advice not to pay tickets unto pursers or clerks of the check in the seventh and tenth articles upon the point of wages¹ ; to which I refer my reader.

Admit it be replied that the commissioners do take care, either by themselves or their clerks, to prevent abuses of this nature, I shall return that at Deptford, Woolwich, Gravesend, the Hope, and other places, this reply can bear no weight, there being no commissioner residing in all or any of these places ; and yet these are the places of greatest expense of this nature, except Chatham. As for Chatham and Portsmouth, I know not what is practised by the commissioners there residing.² This I am sure, that in all my time in the navy I never saw petty warrants or rigging tickets attested by the commissioners or the clerks otherwise than of course to the treasurer to pay them, but not as checks upon the check. And the truth is, it is not the check of the commissioner's clerk (if any such check be) that I look after ; the business is of higher concernment than the care of careless clerks, and to be settled upon and executed personally and constantly by a sober, staid, and honest man, that neither fears the commissioners, clerk of the check, nor victualler, who both at Chatham and Portsmouth are so confederated in friendship, alliance, and interest in the victualling business itself, that

¹ A reference to the paragraphs beginning on p. 129 and p. 131 respectively. In the Longleat MS. the paragraphs of each chapter of the Second Discourse are numbered.

² During the Dutch War Peter Pett was the resident commissioner at Chatham, and Colonel Francis Willoughby at Portsmouth (*E. H. R.* xi. 59).

the State can never expect a clear account of this business upon a check at large. I know the last refuge against this will be, that this proposition will beget a charge upon the State by a salary to such a person as is premised fit for this trust. But to that I shall only say, that if it be not esteemed worthy a salary to prevent such mischief, I shall be content the State may still be cozened¹; it concerns not me to pity a wilful sufferer in that kind, though yet I must further answer, that a small allowance may satisfy an honest man in this case, the service being not constant but occasional, and if it were given as additional, or by way of increase either to the store-keeper (upon whom the clerk of the check is already, or at least ought to be, a check) where their means is small, or to a clerk of the survey, where they may deserve such a trust, I doubt not but the service that may be done with this small allowance may recompense its expense to the State forty times over in a year, if the parties trusted be faithful.

Although it be (as is already declared) the best and safest way for the State to victual and not to contract with other men so to do, yet where there is an absolute necessity to contract, as in the case of foreign and remote parts and services, there and in that sense it becomes those whom it concerns, as to take special care how and with whom to make their contracts, so to see all contracts equally and justly performed between the State and the subject. I speak what I say upon this account because I know that if the contractors and the State's instruments or any of them shall drive the contract in joint interest, or but for the interest of a third or fourth party, much damage hath and may attend the State and subject in such actions. And hence it hath been that such contractors as have had

¹ Pepysian MS. 'cousined.' This is the older form.

too much influence upon, or interest in those that were or are in power in the navy, either by alliance, friendship, or co-partnership, have had more allowed them by the day and greater latitudes in the service than have become their trust, whom the State employed and paid to be judges and not parties in such cases. Hence also no complaints against either the quantity, quality, or kind of provisions supplied by such contractors could have any redress; for the truth is, it is not easy to do the State right where those that should do it are anyways concerned in the wrong done. For the purpose, suppose the beef, beer, pork, &c., to stink, and the men complain that it is either defective, short-cut, or the like; this is certain, the poor men must eat it or none, and if through clamour and importunity it be turned ashore, yet it shall be new pickled, &c., and sent afresh aboard some other ship, or at the least be distributed by the contractor into small parcels among many ships, and the general prevailed withal to command the men to eat it or starve.¹ The contractor must not suffer, because a friend to (I had almost said a partner with) some of those that should right the State in such particulars. Had I not seen and observed too much of this nature I could easily have passed this by with silence, as none of those abuses that are fit for regulation in succeeding times. But all is not gold that glisters; and therefore as I name none, so I dare not spare any.

However I allow of contracts in case of necessity, yet I am utterly against them in London or parts adjacent, viz., Deptford, Woolwich, or Chat-

¹ It is not likely that such a charge against the Commonwealth generals is true. Perhaps Hollond's animus against them was due to the standing jealousy between the civil and military departments. (See Introduction.)

ham, or for any ships going thence to the sea ; for as to all these places London is the best market, and the State's instruments (if faithful) may as well, if not better, transact the service than any contractor ; for all ships from Chatham may either have their victuals sent from the magazine at London in hoys, at a small charge, or at least into the Hope, whither all or most of the ships issuing from Chatham do come before they go into the Downs or to the seas. The inconvenience of contracts so near the State's magazine is the mixing of interests, exhausting of the store, and enhancing of the market beyond what it would be if all remote services were supplied in those places and ports whither the ships do come, viz., Portsmouth, Harwich, Dover, Plymouth, Kinsale, &c. But as to any place nearer London than these, it is not fit nor safe to entertain contracts, nor yet to suffer contractors for these places to make their provisions in or near London, unless it shall appear to the commissioners in being that the supply cannot, by occasion of dearth, drought, &c., be made in the port contracted for, and then only for that time and that single material that is not there to be had, and not for the whole victualling. Nor is it fair for any contractor to be permitted to issue victuals of one kind and not of another to the same ship at the same time, in fractions and not in full proportions, unless it be in point of beer where the ship cannot stow it, or a southern voyage where it may be supplied by beverage,¹ &c., and then also to deliver money to the purser in lieu, and not for want thereof

¹ 'Beverage' is a term applied to several drinks partly made with water—*e.g.* small cider in Devonshire, or a West India drink made of sugar-cane juice and water. 'Beverage' in the fleet was made with 'small' or 'beverage' wine, with three parts of water added. On a Mediterranean voyage the contractor was required to supply, in lieu of each gallon of beer, a wine quart of beverage

necessitate the ship and company to return into port to receive their beer short delivered at an intolerable expense of victuals and wages to the State, besides the loss of time, and opportunities of doing service at sea. I know it is easy for contractors to plead excuses in this case, and that the State is better able to bear the loss than a private man, if it be (as sometimes it may be) disadvantageous for the contractor so to do. But truly I differ from those that under this foolish charity have suffered the late contractors to supply many ships with beef and pork, &c., at Hull for six months, and then to bring them to the Hope to receive their beer from London; and on the contrary to supply several ships from London full-manned with bread, beer, and fish only, and then send them to Hull to lie there and receive the rest of their provisions, to the excessive waste of time and treasure, and only to accommodate the contractor. And I do very much suspect that had there not been something more than charity in this business, no contractor should have obtained such favour. The truth is, these provisions are cheap and at easy rates at Hull, and beer, &c., always dear and seldom good in that port; on the other side, beer, &c., is cheap and good at London and other provisions dear; and thence it was that though in the passage to and from Hull a ship might lie and spend fourteen or one and twenty days, nay sometimes (in case of cross winds) much more time, full-manned in victuals and wages to sail thither from London, or thence to the Hope to receive their provisions wanting; yet this being in order to the profit of the contractors, was easily winked at and passed over as rather a service than a disservice to the State.

wine 'of Naples, Province, Turkey, Zant, or other places where wine is of like goodness,' or half a wine pint of brandy (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 418, 449; and *Calendars*, *passim*).

I desire not to rake in kennels, nor to look back into past miscarriages, yet I would willingly prevent some for the future, and knew not how to do it without some hint of what I have observed in this particular. But truly if this be good service to the State, then those merchant-ships that were hired and set out from Plymouth and Bristol to scour the western and Irish coasts,¹ and contracted for by owners so to do, did equally as good service to the late Parliament when they were brought from Bristol and Plymouth or Portsmouth about into the Hope, where they rode three weeks or a month's time in freight, victuals, and wages upon the State's account, to take in two or three cables, which because the owners found to be dearer at those places than at London, chose rather to bring about their ships to take them in here than to buy them there, conceiving it better for the State to lose 400*l.* (besides the seas being left naked to the enemy) than the owners 10*l.* ; but had not some of these owners been high assertors of the cause and interest of the Parliament, yea, members of the House itself, I should have as much suspected their fidelity to the State as I do now blame the charity afforded to the contractors by other men.

I should not mention the next miscarriage in the victuals, &c., had I not seen and observed the great detriment to the State and subject by it. The business is this : It hath been the practice of late times for generals of fleets to undertake and act the supply of all ships under their command with victuals in case of want.² This thing hath a specious show both of frugality and fidelity to the State's

¹ Perhaps in the summer of 1649.

² The powers conferred on the generals at sea in this matter were extensive. On April 27, 1650, the Council of State decided to give instructions to Colonel Popham and Colonel Blake to take

and subject's interest, for who is fitter to be entrusted with and employed in this business than he that has the command of the whole fleet? I close with the question as to power, and my design is not to eclipse them in the least in that point; but I deny the argument as to action, execution, or account. My meaning is in short this: I think it fitting that no victuals should be provided, supplied, or distributed to any ship under his command without his warrant, or the warrant of such as the general shall appoint to inspect the same. But that the general himself should be the victualler—that is, by himself or his instruments provide the victual, and when so done issue the same by his own warrant, and at the end of the voyage account for the same to the State or commissioners of the navy as victuals provided by himself, and to have bills passed to himself for the same¹ at his own rates, either by the day or by particulars—this I am altogether against, as highly prejudicial to the service and much below a general.² In the late King's time the manner was to send a commissary-

up goods from any English merchants in any parts beyond sea for the service of the fleet; and on March 1, 1651, the generals of the fleet or commanders of squadrons were authorised to order victuals on their own authority at any port where a victualler was placed (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1650, p. 127; 1651, pp. 67 and 70). Captain Boteler in his *Dialogues about Sea Service* recommends that the captain should act as victualler abroad.

¹ So the Longleat MS. The Pepysian MS. reads 'sum.'

² There is no doubt that Deane acted as victualler during the Commonwealth period. In the summer of 1649 he was acting independently of his colleagues, Popham and Blake, cruising from Portsmouth westward to Milford Haven. His victuals ran short, and he was authorised by the Council of State to provide for himself (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1649-50, p. 256). On this authority he supplied most of the pursers of ships on the Irish coast, and at his request the passing of their accounts was delayed until he had brought in his own (*ibid.* p. 411). He also had dealings with the bakers at Portsmouth (*ibid.* p. 420). But Deane was

general for victuals along with all fleets, who had his commission, and instructions whereby he was to govern himself in all issues and supplies, and for his so doing to receive his warrant from the general or council of war, which at the end of the voyage maintained his account to the State for the same.¹ If this course were now or had been held by the late Parliament in their late or present expeditions, I am confident much treasure had been saved that was (at least accounted for as) expended in the State's wrong. I list not to instance particulars; the thing is notoriously known, both when and by whom too much of this nature hath been practised.

killed in 1653, and the reference in the text is sufficiently mysterious in tone to include the living, especially as there is a hint at 'present expeditions.' At a guess this would point to the expedition of Blake and Mountagu to the coast of Spain in 1656. Mountagu was in debt at the time, and the episode of the prizes after the Restoration shows that he was not as scrupulous in these matters as his greater colleague (*Dictionary of National Biography*). A correspondence in the State Papers (1656-7, p. 273) about establishing a victualler at Tetuan, on the African coast—'the chief place in the Straits for our ships to water and victual at'—shows that he had put into this port to victual, and it is possible that he may have seized the opportunity to make a little profit. But there is no direct evidence against him, either with regard to this expedition or those of the following years in which he was still general at sea. In this connection it is interesting to find a post-Restoration State Paper, under date May 18, 1671, containing an offer from Sir Edward Spragge, admiral in the Mediterranean, to victual his fleet 'with as good provisions as money can buy, or any of his Majesty's ships ever had in these seas,' at 9*d.* a day, instead of Sir Denis Gauden, the contractor (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1671, pp. 251-3).

¹ It was usual for the victualler to send a deputy with the fleet (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1625-6, p. 89), and in the expedition to the island of Ré, Sir Allen Apsley, the surveyor of victuals for the navy, went in person (*ibid.* 1627-8, pp. 264, 295). This functionary is described as a 'commissary' in a paper of 1627 (*ibid.* p. 97), but his status does not seem as definite as the text would suggest. He received no payment, but 'allowances at the pleasure of the lord admiral, and according to the merit of the man.'

But, as I said before in the twentieth Article touching wages,¹ double and triple capacities were (and I fear still are) permitted to some men, that they might be sure to have enough, and to do what they do by authority, there being no check upon their actions, and they that should control and check others being parties. Such actions as these beget that close compliance between the generals and all captains and the contractors for victuals, the commissioners of the admiralty and the navy; and these ways render the poor seamen in a forlorn² as to redress of any grievance in the case of victuals; for if the general be severe against the contractors at sea, and will not impose upon the men in case of want to set five and six to four men's allowance, or in case of defective, stinking bread, beer, beef, pork, fish, &c., to eat and drink it till it be all spent, or to fast, then the contractors, &c., know how to pinch them in their accounts for victuals at the end of the voyage. But if civility or courtesy be shewed to them at sea, they and their confederates know how to requite it on shore in the general's account. But in the meantime the State is (or may be) abused by this latitude both at sea and on shore, and the seamen oppressed without all capacity of relief, for he to whom they must and do apply is a party as equally concerned as those against whom they complain.

It is a new imposition upon all pursers and stewards by the late contractors to force them before they go to sea to sign to their full proportions of victuals, whether they have it delivered to them or not.³ What the inconvenience of this practice is to the State, sad experience hath often told me. For

¹ See note 1 on p. 164, *supra*. The reference is to the paragraph beginning on p. 142.

² *I.e.* 'in a forlorn state.' It is rare in this sense, though 'a forlorn' often stands for 'a forlorn hope.'

³ The purser was required by bond to sign for the victuals

suppose this purser dies before the ship comes in—nay, suppose though he lives, he doth not account (as many of them never did nor will); nay, further, suppose the ship be fired, cast away, or otherwise miscarries at sea, and the purser in her; in all these cases, and several others that might be instanced, the State hazards the loss of the value of all that victuals that was not delivered to that or those ships to complete their proportion; and the reason is clear, because the victuallers have an article in their contract enabling them to have and take allowance of all damage that they shall sustain by casualty at sea, fire, pirates, &c., and another article that the purser's or steward's receipt shall be sufficient voucher for the contractors to pass their accounts, and to demand and receive of the State all such sum and sums of money as shall be due and payable to them for the victuals mentioned to be delivered (though never delivered) in that receipt.¹ I and some others that I know could produce strange examples, in the late accounts of contractors² for victuals, of this nature, and (were it needful) prove no small damage to the State thereby. But, as I first propounded to myself and told my reader, I shall rather choose to point at things for future redress than uncover the nakedness of past times.

The like practice was put upon the pursers and

before the ship went to sea, for the protection of the contractor (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 422), and advantage could be taken of this to compel him to sign on an incomplete delivery. A case is reported in the State Papers under date December 1651 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1651-2, p. 88).

¹ See the victualler's contract of 1677 in Pepys' *Miscellanies*, iii. 416. The second article is not nearly as explicit as the text suggests. The victualler's own account of his issues was verified by the purser's 'indents,' or receipts to him, duplicates of which had to be sent to the comptroller, and also by the warrants from the principal officers ordering the victuals to be delivered.

² So the Longleat MS. The Pepysian MS. reads 'contracts.'

stewards by the late contractors, and countenanced by the commissioners, in forcing them to take all their necessaries of such and such particular men, at their shops and yards and nowhere else, at limited prices and rates; and unless they did produce a receipt from those men of the respective quantities sold and delivered to them at their own rates, they could not have or receive from them their necessary money; nor then neither but by way of assignation of the same to those parties from whom they were forced to buy their provisions. The pretence of this abuse was to prevent another miscarriage as bad as it—viz., the purser's or steward's expense of the money¹ without laying in the necessaries allowed the ship's company by the State. This was good and commendable, both in the commissioners and contractors, had it been real and without design at the bottom; but would you think that nothing less than this was intended? That it was so, I demonstrate thus: The contractors kill much beef, and out of these oxen they have much tallow. This tallow they sell to a chandler at a more than ordinary rate, or than they could get of another man, upon this very account that that chandler should have the custom of the navy and of all pursers for all candles requisite for the State's use, at such a rate; whereby it appears that private gain to themselves and those that had interest with them was the first mover of this wheel of reforming the pursers, and had it not been for that you had not heard of their zeal in this kind. And this appeared too plainly in a particular case of some pursers that, seeing themselves in a dilemma by this restriction, felt the pulse of him to whom they were assigned to fetch their wood and other necessaries, by tendering him money to give them certificates of the

¹ *I.e.* the 'necessary money.' See p. 154, *supra*.

receipt of their necessaries, though yet they supplied themselves elsewhere. This design took with the party, and some certificates were given which afterwards were discovered to be false, and the party accused thereof upon the balance of his account for the same ; but notwithstanding the thing was made plain and proved to his face and before the commissioners, yet both the commissioners and the contractors did afterwards pass and allow that man's account in private, as if the goods had been delivered by him, and the party that detected him was rebuked for his pains in discovering such a knack of knavery. But admit their intentions had been fair in the whole business, I would only ask, Is there no way to secure the purser's fidelity to the service but that which is both destructive to the service and the purser ? For if he be limited to a particular person and place, and cannot have his necessaries there neither but at exorbitant rates, then it is plain that he shall neither have so good nor yet so much as he might have had for the same money in another place at a free market, whereby both the State and pursers are damnified ; and all men know (that is, that know the navy) that the necessary money allowed by the State doth not bear much above half the expense of a purser in a voyage,¹ especially if

¹ This was generally admitted, as appears from a curious paper of 1673-4 among the Pepysian *Miscellanies* (iii. 723) by Stephen Pine, himself an ex-purser, entitled, 'The Expense and Charge of his Majesty's Naval Victuals Considered and Regulated.' He exposes some of the devices adopted by the pursers to increase the money available, especially the custom of receiving on board only seven-eighths of the victuals, taking money from the victuallers in lieu of the other eighth, and then issuing to the men only seven-eighths of the allowance to which they were entitled. Pine's conclusion is that the purser should be abolished, and the victualing placed in the hands of the captains, with the stewards acting under them. His project was presented to Lord Dartmouth, who commented on it sensibly enough. 'It is too troublesome and

stewards by the late contractors, and countenanced by the commissioners, in forcing them to take all their necessaries of such and such particular men, at their shops and yards and nowhere else, at limited prices and rates; and unless they did produce a receipt from those men of the respective quantities sold and delivered to them at their own rates, they could not have or receive from them their necessary money; nor then neither but by way of assignation of the same to those parties from whom they were forced to buy their provisions. The pretence of this abuse was to prevent another miscarriage as bad as it—viz., the purser's or steward's expense of the money¹ without laying in the necessaries allowed the ship's company by the State. This was good and commendable, both in the commissioners and contractors, had it been real and without design at the bottom; but would you think that nothing less than this was intended? That it was so, I demonstrate thus: The contractors kill much beef, and out of these oxen they have much tallow. This tallow they sell to a chandler at a more than ordinary rate, or than they could get of another man, upon this very account that that chandler should have the custom of the navy and of all pursers for all candles requisite for the State's use, at such a rate; whereby it appears that private gain to themselves and those that had interest with them was the first mover of this wheel of reforming the pursers, and had it not been for that you had not heard of their zeal in this kind. And this appeared too plainly in a particular case of some pursers that, seeing themselves in a dilemma by this restriction, felt the pulse of him to whom they were assigned to fetch their wood and other necessaries, by tendering him money to give them certificates of the

¹ *I.e.* the 'necessary money.' See p. 154, *supra*.

receipt of their necessaries, though yet they supplied themselves elsewhere. This design took with the party, and some certificates were given which afterwards were discovered to be false, and the party accused thereof upon the balance of his account for the same ; but notwithstanding the thing was made plain and proved to his face and before the commissioners, yet both the commissioners and the contractors did afterwards pass and allow that man's account in private, as if the goods had been delivered by him, and the party that detected him was rebuked for his pains in discovering such a knack of knavery. But admit their intentions had been fair in the whole business, I would only ask, Is there no way to secure the purser's fidelity to the service but that which is both destructive to the service and the purser ? For if he be limited to a particular person and place, and cannot have his necessaries there neither but at exorbitant rates, then it is plain that he shall neither have so good nor yet so much as he might have had for the same money in another place at a free market, whereby both the State and pursers are damnified ; and all men know (that is, that know the navy) that the necessary money allowed by the State doth not bear much above half the expense of a purser in a voyage,¹ especially if

¹ This was generally admitted, as appears from a curious paper of 1673-4 among the Pepysian *Miscellanies* (iii. 723) by Stephen Pine, himself an ex-purser, entitled, 'The Expense and Charge of his Majesty's Naval Victuals Considered and Regulated.' He exposes some of the devices adopted by the pursers to increase the money available, especially the custom of receiving on board only seven-eighths of the victuals, taking money from the victuallers in lieu of the other eighth, and then issuing to the men only seven-eighths of the allowance to which they were entitled. Pine's conclusion is that the purser should be abolished, and the victualing placed in the hands of the captains, with the stewards acting under them. His project was presented to Lord Dartmouth, who commented on it sensibly enough. 'It is too troublesome and

the ship be either admiral, vice-admiral, or rear-admiral; and if so, how shall the service be supplied, and yet the purser's damages restored or made good? I can give my reader no other account than this: The captains and they must, and do, wash hands¹ (you know what I mean), and because the victuallers could not wash with them they found out this device to wash without them—that is to say, to force them by warrant to fetch their necessities there and nowhere else, the better to vent their own commodities, or at least necessitate them to a compliance another way—viz., in signing for the receipt of whole or full proportions, when it may be not half of some particulars ever came aboard; the inconvenience whereof I hinted in the foregoing article.²

small a matter for the commander to be charged with finding necessities, as fire, and candle. . . . A purser is absolutely necessary, nor is it practicable in our English fleet that the commander should undertake the victuals. I appeal to those that will consider both our captains and the nature of our common men; yet I wish the pursers were better regulated.' Pine's plan is not unlike an experiment which had been tried under the Commonwealth between 1651 and 1655 (*E. H. R.* xi. 67). Perhaps one reason for the abandonment of this method may have been that the stewards received money from the victuallers in lieu of a part of the victuals and then deserted with it (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1654, p. 186). Another proposal for throwing more responsibility on the captains with regard to victuals appears to have been already made by a responsible official. Pepys notes in the *Diary* (February 28, 1668–9) that the surveyor, Thomas Myddelton, presented a paper to the Duke of York 'to have the captains account for all stores and victuals'—'but, Lord! it is a poor silly thing ever to think to bring it in practice in the King's navy.'

¹ Cf. an expression used in the same sense by Seneca (*Apocol.*), *manus manum lavat*, 'one hand washes the other,' thus, 'one helps the other.'

² In 1637 the officers of the navy had called attention to this as an abuse 'usually practised' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1637, p. 286), but they regarded the pursers and victuallers as being in collusion, and the officers of the ship as the only possible check on them. The suggestion in the text, that the pursers were the victims of the victuallers and in collusion with the captains, is novel. The 'foregoing article' is the paragraph beginning on p. 172. (See note 1 on p. 164, *supra*.)

The words of the grand contract for victuals in the third article are, that they shall not serve any of the State's ships in England with any provision of Irish beef.¹ How equitable it was to have such a clause is easy to determine, and as easy on the contrary how unjust and unworthy in them to break it, and yet more in others to countenance it, contrary to their trust. Had they made use of Irish beef upon the account of a dear market in England, yet it had been a breach of contract to the State, though more excusable. But the case was otherwise with them; the market for beef in those three or four years of their service was beyond parallel of any four years of fifty past as to plenty and cheapness, and yet such was their avarice that they did not only send into Ireland to kill and cure beef there, and to Bristol to buy several quantities of beef there sent thither from Ireland, but also deliver the same to ships serving in England, as many men say to the great discouragement of the seamen, who were forced to starve in a cook's shop—I mean to feed upon Irish beef in a place and time of plenty. I hope the next contract the chairman of that committee that made it shall make, he will either prevent such articles prejudicial to the contractors, or take more care to see them kept than he did.

I might enlarge in the abuse not only of victuals in general, but also touching the particular miscarriage of each respective species of victuals as the contractors handled the matter. The truth is, they did not stick to cleave hairs to compass profit, and for that end there was not almost any kind of victual or material looking that way that they did not enter to the extremity of improvement for the interest of their contract, without regard had either

¹ As in the contract of 1677, which requires both the beef and pork to be English (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 418).

MR. HOLLAND HIS SECOND

to the interest of the State and their service, or the welfare of those poor men that must and did eat it. I shall not trouble you with any reader with long discourses upon each particular species, and the several ways of thrift or rather oppression used to give life to the contract. But rather include them together, and by a taste of some of the most gross passages of this nature, leave the whole to the wisdom of the judicious regulators of the navy in the future.

In former times there were several parcels of the ox, such as troughs, shins, shin-bones, marrow-bones, &c., thrown by and sold, as not fit to be given to the seamen for meat, being most an end bones. These were, very providently, for the greater part cut and cast in among the seaman's victuals. Thus in the case of pork, the cheeks, ears, feet, and other offal of the hog, that heretofore were saved and sold to the State's use, were by these good husbands thrown in (not over and above but) as part of the men's allowance; and such was their influence, not only upon the commissioners of the navy but also the committee of the navy and the then commission of the admiralty, that they had countenance in this pretended thrift; and hogs' cheeks and bones with little flesh on them were reported, nay justified by some to be good victualling. Yea, all captains, commanders, and pursers had special order to know and take notice of the cask wherein these provisions were packed, and to take special care to expend

¹ In a letter dated May 13, 1678, Pepys, commenting on the presence of twenty-one legs in fifty-eight pieces of beef, remarks that this 'hath always been excepted against' (Pepysian MSS., *Admiralty Letters*, vii. 153). In the victualling contract of 1677 it was expressly provided that 'at no time' should there be 'any unusual piece put up with the other flesh . . . such as leg-bones, shins of oxen, or the cheeks of hogs, or ox hearts' (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 446).

them whilst yet they were in the first of the voyage, either in the Hope or the Downs, which among other things caused that frequent running away of the seamen from the service,¹ rather than to live upon bones and crag-ends,² souse³ and hogs' feet, when they knew the State allowed them better meat, especially having no power to complain, or if they had, no redress upon complaint of these and much worse than these grievances. Thus in the matter of beef and pork, they had cutters of Queenhithe that in a piece of four or two pounds, the common allowance of the State, you should not have above three pounds and a quarter, or three pounds in the one and one pound and a half, or one pound three quarters at the most, in the other. These things were notoriously known, and it cannot be denied that they were oftentimes complained of,⁴ and the beef and pork brought by the seamen to the office and viewed and weighed by the commissioners,

¹ 'Englishmen, and more especially seamen, love their Bellies above anything else, and therefore it must always be remembered in the management of the victualling of the navy that to make any abatement from them in the quantity or agreeableness of the victuals is to discourage and provoke them in the tenderest point, and will sooner render them disgusted with the King's service than any one other hardship that can be put upon them' (Pepysian MSS., *Naval Minutes*, p. 274).

² This is the older form of what is now 'scrag-end.'

³ 'Souce,' or 'souse,' was a pickle made with salt; it was also applied to what was pickled, especially to the head, ears, and feet of swine. Cf. Tusser, *January's Husbandry*, st. 2 :

And he that can rear up a pig in his house
Hath cheaper his bacon and sweeter his souse.

(*Century Dictionary*.)

⁴ In their letter of June 20, 1653, the generals at sea complain of the 'smallness' of the meat. In the same year the captain of the Unicorn writes to the Admiralty Commissioners: 'the beef and pork is cut so small that it is a shame to see it' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652-3, pp. 428, 585).

but never regarded nor redressed by the victuallers, further than by acknowledgment that it might be a mistake in the cutter, and promise of care in future, to take off the present clamour of the seamen; though yet the next voyage, and indeed in all voyages whilst I sat as a commissioner, we had constant and renewed complaints of this nature. As to the fish, it is not one ship in twenty that has three quarters of the State's allowance, either for quantity or goodness; for under the notion of not having sized fish (though yet it should be made size by addition, or serving three for two, or four for three, &c.) they would and did thrust upon the service all sorts and sizes of fish as sized fish, and when it was so small that two for one, nay sometimes three for one, would scarce beget it to a sizable fish, the purser was a favourite if he could get four for three, or three for two to content the men. It is true I do believe the pursers did and do share with the victualler in this profit; but what of that? The poor men were as equally cozened and the State as equally wronged, though they divide the spoil between them, as if the victualler had swallowed the whole. Upon this account it is that most of the fish is wasted or flung overboard in most voyages of any length of time, and that pursers do generally not receive half their proportions of fish on board, but appease and satisfy the seamen some other way.¹ I could also instance in

¹ In case of shortness the purser was required to make an allowance in money to the seamen at the victualler's expense (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 446). The seamen expected this also in cases where the shortness was not the contractor's fault. In 1650 Penn, in order to be able to remain longer at sea without revictualling, put his squadron upon short rations, 'getting six to four men's allowance and drinking water,' but Deane, reporting the matter to Vane on June 19, writes: 'If there be not special care taken that they may have 8*d.* per diem for their

the particular of beer so small, that as the seaman says, it was scarce 'water frightened,'¹ nor could it well be otherwise considering the price given to the brewer by the contractor, which made him live as rich but die a beggar. Thus their not brewing of beer till a week or such a matter before its shipping, and then putting it into wine casks to delude the gauge, according to the State's allowance, or save the charge that would attend new and full-gauged or good cask, with many things of this nature, of petty concernment as to the main, yet of import to the victuallers, were stooped to and grasped at too eagerly by the late contractors, whom I yet desire to spare by enumerating any more particulars, as desirous not to burden my reader with all the——of the navy, but to give him a taste of some to whet his zeal for the amendment of all.

In the case of petty warrant victuals, it is and hath been a dispute and contention between the pursers and the contractor whether the contractor should deliver his provisions aboard at his own charge, or the purser or ship's company fetch them at the State's or purser's charge.² I know that this question hath been resolved for the contractor, and certificates from those that knew the practice of

victuals and 2*d.* a man a day for their beer, those days that they had short provisions and drank water, you will make the seamen that they will mutiny hereafter' (J. B. Deane, *Life of Richard Deane*, p. 422).

¹ In sailors' slang, weak tea or coffee served on board ship is called 'water frightened.' Cf. the landsman's use of the expression 'water bewitched' for weak tea.

² In the case of sea victuals the victuallers had been required by an Order in Council to bring them to the ship's side and deliver them to the purser; and a letter from the Lords of the Admiralty, dated April 20, 1635, had instructed the Officers of the Navy to take care that this order was observed (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 35). But it was contended that, with respect to harbour victuals, the contractor was in a different position.

former times in the case produced to back and strengthen that opinion and resolution ; yet for my part I always did and still do conceive it an injury to the State's service and the purser, to be imposed upon in this particular. The matter before me is not what other men have done, especially as contractors, being in the same predicament with these and driving the same design of profit as these ; but what is equitable, just, and fit to be done in this case. Now that it is not equitable to lay the charge upon the State or purser, I prove by these reasons : 1st, The charge of delivering it on board the State's ships is inclusively allowed to the contractor in the rate given him by the day. 2ndly, The late contractors were bound by their contract to deliver all harbour victuals as well as sea victuals on board all ships free of all wastes, damages, losses, costs, and charges whatsoever.¹ Now I say, if they were to bear the cost and charge, then they were to do the thing, and if they were to bear the loss and damage, then the purser in carrying it aboard, acts not as the State's but the contractor's instrument. 3rdly, How can it be expected that the purser should do his duty as he ought in attending on board for the entrance of men, the receipt of sea victuals, and other the duties of his place, if yet he must spend his time in waiting at London upon the contractors (and it may be with the ship's boat and a dozen of men) to fetch his harbour victuals ? And if he be charged therewith, with what justice can he be punished for his default when yet he shall plead the commands of them in bar that now accuse him for his absence. 4thly, Suppose a ship rides at Erith, Woolwich, or Blackwall, and the victualler

¹ As in the contract of 1677 ; but it was provided that if the contractor failed, the pursers should do it at the contractor's expense (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 442).

will take no care either to send the victuals from London or to settle the supply of it at those respective places, nor yet the purser look after it further than to send the muster-warrants to the victualler, as conceiving it not his duty (as indeed it is not) to do more; and that by this means the men are altogether without victuals for one, two, or three days (as I have often known), does not this cause the men to go on shore, neglect, and run away from, the service? And is not this the ground of so much time spent more than needs in rigging and fitting several ships to sea; and when they are rigged, to lie for want of men, and all to gain the contractor a little money in a needless and endless dispute with the pursers, who could never yet gain right in this particular from the commissioners but in the wrong way? 5thly, Admit again that the purser be forced to do it, and to bear the charge of doing it out of his own purse, where do you think the burden will lie at the last—upon the purser or the State? Assure yourself, if there be any way left him (as there are too many) to right himself, the State shall pay the reckoning, though yet they have done it already in the victualler's contract inclusively.

I know what is and hath been said against all these and other arguments that might be used in the case by such as are too near of kin to the contractors, as also what they themselves have pleaded, viz., that the words of their contract were to deliver all harbour victuals as hath been formerly used, whereby they argue that if it hath been formerly used for the purser to fetch them, then they are not bound, &c.; but, &c.; *ergo*. But this is no good argument in the case in question; for I desire to acquaint my reader that there are two sorts of harbour victuals—that is to say, ordinary victuals,

or victuals to shipkeepers attending upon ships riding in ordinary (the thing intended in the contract), and extraordinary, petty warrant victuals or rigging victuals, that is to say, victuals to extraordinary numbers of seamen pressed and sent aboard each ship commanded to the seas, in order to their rigging, manning, and equipping for sea service. Now, though both these sorts of victuals be the same with reference to quantity, kind, and price, and may not improperly be both called harbour victuals, yet as to the way of delivering or the purser's fetching them from the contractor, they may and ought to differ; for though it be true that it hath been formerly used, and still is at Chatham and other places, for the shipkeeper's victuals to be taken from the contractor's house or warehouse or the butcher's shop, nay, most an end to be eaten and spent on shore, yet it does not follow thereupon that when a ship is commanded to the seas, and hath it may be 100, 150, nay 200 men upon her in petty warrant, that the purser should dance every three days to the contractor for the victuals; there being a vast difference between the shipkeeper in ordinary and pressed men, and so consequently the victualling of the one and the victualling of the other, though the victuals of both be the same. Besides, the warrant for ordinary shipkeepers issues but once a month, and the pursers or shipkeepers fetch their victuals for the whole month (all but their bread and beef which they take weekly at the butchers' and bakers' shops because they eat it fresh); but the warrants for rigging victuals issue for every three or four days at the most, and oftentimes the increase and access of men pressed into the service begets more expense of victuals than the last petty warrant maintains, and if there be no magazine of victuals delivered by the contractor

aboard the ship, these new pressed men must and will neglect, if not run away from, the service. I confess the thing is but small in itself and of but small charge to the victualler, and (did not profit bite hard) I much wonder why he should stickle so much as I have observed him to do for it ; yet the consequence of the neglect thereof by the contractor is of great concernment to the State, and oft-times a greater retardment to the service than all the petty warrant victuals of that ship is worth, and therefore fit to be regulated.

I must not omit what advantage the contractors for victuals may and did make, to the State's great damage, by issuing the same victuals they had supplied according to contract for the State's use to merchants' ships in the State's service or their own private employments. I will only suppose what in practice was too true to be told. I imagine the contractor supplies the store with victuals of all sorts for 10,000 men for six months for the winter guard, and according to contract with the State receives his money for the same victuals ; afterwards suppose several merchants' ships hired into the State's service, or bound to sea on private designs, to want victuals, and the owners make application to the contractor to furnish them with six months' victuals for 200 men out of that magazine of victuals in his hands for the State's use. May not such a thing be done ; nay have not several ships been thus victualled, and have not some of the late contractors been part-owners of the same ships, and received the money for the same victuals twice over from the State under the notion of a double capacity, viz., once as a contractor, and a second time as a part-owner of the merchant-ship? Was not this the case of the Reformation, Anno 1652? And was not Captain —— (what shall I call him?) both a con-

the ship be either admiral, vice-admiral, or rear-admiral; and if so, how shall the service be supplied, and yet the purser's damages restored or made good? I can give my reader no other account than this: The captains and they must, and do, wash hands¹ (you know what I mean), and because the victuallers could not wash with them they found out this device to wash without them—that is to say, to force them by warrant to fetch their necessities there and nowhere else, the better to vent their own commodities, or at least necessitate them to a compliance another way—viz., in signing for the receipt of whole or full proportions, when it may be not half of some particulars ever came aboard; the inconvenience whereof I hinted in the foregoing article.²

small a matter for the commander to be charged with finding necessities, as fire, and candle. . . . A purser is absolutely necessary, nor is it practicable in our English fleet that the commander should undertake the victuals. I appeal to those that will consider both our captains and the nature of our common men; yet I wish the pursers were better regulated.' Pine's plan is not unlike an experiment which had been tried under the Commonwealth between 1651 and 1655 (*E. H. R.* xi. 67). Perhaps one reason for the abandonment of this method may have been that the stewards received money from the victuallers in lieu of a part of the victuals and then deserted with it (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1654, p. 186). Another proposal for throwing more responsibility on the captains with regard to victuals appears to have been already made by a responsible official. Pepys notes in the *Diary* (February 28, 1668–9) that the surveyor, Thomas Myddelton, presented a paper to the Duke of York 'to have the captains account for all stores and victuals'—'but, Lord! it is a poor silly thing ever to think to bring it in practice in the King's navy.'

¹ Cf. an expression used in the same sense by Seneca (*Apocol.*), *manus manum lavat*, 'one hand washes the other,' thus, 'one helps the other.'

² In 1637 the officers of the navy had called attention to this as an abuse 'usually practised' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1637, p. 286), but they regarded the pursers and victuallers as being in collusion, and the officers of the ship as the only possible check on them. The suggestion in the text, that the pursers were the victims of the victuallers and in collusion with the captains, is novel. The 'foregoing article' is the paragraph beginning on p. 172. (See note 1 on p. 164, *supra*.)

The words of the grand contract for victuals in the third article are, that they shall not serve any of the State's ships in England with any provision of Irish beef.¹ How equitable it was to have such a clause is easy to determine, and as easy on the contrary how unjust and unworthy in them to break it, and yet more in others to countenance it, contrary to their trust. Had they made use of Irish beef upon the account of a dear market in England, yet it had been a breach of contract to the State, though more excusable. But the case was otherwise with them; the market for beef in those three or four years of their service was beyond parallel of any four years of fifty past as to plenty and cheapness, and yet such was their avarice that they did not only send into Ireland to kill and cure beef there, and to Bristol to buy several quantities of beef there sent thither from Ireland, but also deliver the same to ships serving in England, as many men say to the great discouragement of the seamen, who were forced to starve in a cook's shop—I mean to feed upon Irish beef in a place and time of plenty. I hope the next contract the chairman of that committee that made it shall make, he will either prevent such articles prejudicial to the contractors, or take more care to see them kept than he did.

I might enlarge in the abuse not only of victuals in general, but also touching the particular miscarriage of each respective species of victuals as the contractors handled the matter. The truth is, they did not stick to cleave hairs to compass profit, and for that end there was not almost any kind of victual or material looking that way that they did not enter to the extremity of improvement for the interest of their contract, without regard had either

¹ As in the contract of 1677, which requires both the beef and pork to be English (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 418).

to the honour of the State and their service, or the welfare of those poor men that must and did eat it. I shall not trouble or tire my reader with long discourses upon each particular species, and the several ways of thrift, or rather oppression, used to give life to the contract, but rather huddle them together, and by a taste of some of the most gross passages of this nature, leave the whole to the wisdom of the judicious regulators of the navy in the future.

In former times there were several parcels of the ox, such as houghs, shins, shin-bones, marrow-bones, &c., thrown by and sold, as not fit to be given to the seamen for meat, being most an end bones.¹ These were, very providently, for the greater part cut and cast in among the seaman's victuals. Thus in the case of pork, the cheeks, ears, feet, and other offal of the hog, that heretofore were saved and sold to the State's use, were by these good husbands thrown in (not over and above but) as part of the men's allowance; and such was their influence, not only upon the commissioners of the navy but also the committee of the navy and the then commission of the admiralty, that they had countenance in this pretended thrift; and hogs' cheeks and bones with little flesh on them were reported, nay justified by some to be good victualling. Yea, all captains, commanders, and pursers had special order to know and take notice of the cask wherein these provisions were packed, and to take special care to expend

¹ In a letter dated May 13, 1678, Pepys, commenting on the presence of twenty-one legs in fifty-eight pieces of beef, remarks that this 'hath always been excepted against' (Pepysian MSS., *Admiralty Letters*, vii. 153). In the victualling contract of 1677 it was expressly provided that 'at no time' should there be 'any unusual pieces put up with the other flesh . . . such as leg-bones, shins of oxen, or the cheeks of hogs, or ox hearts' (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 446).

them whilst yet they were in the first of the voyage, either in the Hope or the Downs, which among other things caused that frequent running away of the seamen from the service,¹ rather than to live upon bones and crag-ends,² souse³ and hogs' feet, when they knew the State allowed them better meat, especially having no power to complain, or if they had, no redress upon complaint of these and much worse than these grievances. Thus in the matter of beef and pork, they had cutters of Queenhithe that in a piece of four or two pounds, the common allowance of the State, you should not have above three pounds and a quarter, or three pounds in the one and one pound and a half, or one pound three quarters at the most, in the other. These things were notoriously known, and it cannot be denied that they were oftentimes complained of,⁴ and the beef and pork brought by the seamen to the office and viewed and weighed by the commissioners,

¹ 'Englishmen, and more especially seamen, love their Bellies above anything else, and therefore it must always be remembered in the management of the victualling of the navy that to make any abatement from them in the quantity or agreeableness of the victuals is to discourage and provoke them in the tenderest point, and will sooner render them disgusted with the King's service than any one other hardship that can be put upon them' (Pepysian MSS., *Naval Minutes*, p. 274).

² This is the older form of what is now 'scrag-end.'

³ 'Souce,' or 'souse,' was a pickle made with salt; it was also applied to what was pickled, especially to the head, ears, and feet of swine. Cf. Tusser, *January's Husbandry*, st. 2 :

And he that can rear up a pig in his house
Hath cheaper his bacon and sweeter his souse.

(*Century Dictionary*.)

⁴ In their letter of June 20, 1653, the generals at sea complain of the 'smallness' of the meat. In the same year the captain of the Unicorn writes to the Admiralty Commissioners: 'the beef and pork is cut so small that it is a shame to see it' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652-3, pp. 428, 585).

but never regarded nor redressed by the victuallers, further than by acknowledgment that it might be a mistake in the cutter, and promise of care in future, to take off the present clamour of the seamen; though yet the next voyage, and indeed in all voyages whilst I sat as a commissioner, we had constant and renewed complaints of this nature. As to the fish, it is not one ship in twenty that has three quarters of the State's allowance, either for quantity or goodness; for under the notion of not having sized fish (though yet it should be made size by addition, or serving three for two, or four for three, &c.) they would and did thrust upon the service all sorts and sizes of fish as sized fish, and when it was so small that two for one, nay sometimes three for one, would scarce beget it to a sizable fish, the purser was a favourite if he could get four for three, or three for two to content the men. It is true I do believe the pursers did and do share with the victualler in this profit; but what of that? The poor men were as equally cozened and the State as equally wronged, though they divide the spoil between them, as if the victualler had swallowed the whole. Upon this account it is that most of the fish is wasted or flung overboard in most voyages of any length of time, and that pursers do generally not receive half their proportions of fish on board, but appease and satisfy the seamen some other way.¹ I could also instance in

¹ In case of shortness the purser was required to make an allowance in money to the seamen at the victualler's expense (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 446). The seamen expected this also in cases where the shortness was not the contractor's fault. In 1650 Penn, in order to be able to remain longer at sea without revictualling, put his squadron upon short rations, 'getting six to four men's allowance and drinking water,' but Deane, reporting the matter to Vane on June 19, writes: 'If there be not special care taken that they may have 8*d*. per diem for their

the particular of beer so small, that as the seaman says, it was scarce 'water frightened,'¹ nor could it well be otherwise considering the price given to the brewer by the contractor, which made him live as rich but die a beggar. Thus their not brewing of beer till a week or such a matter before its shipping, and then putting it into wine casks to delude the gauge, according to the State's allowance, or save the charge that would attend new and full-gauged or good cask, with many things of this nature, of petty concernment as to the main, yet of import to the victuallers, were stooped to and grasped at too eagerly by the late contractors, whom I yet desire to spare by enumerating any more particulars, as desirous not to burden my reader with all the——of the navy, but to give him a taste of some to whet his zeal for the amendment of all.

In the case of petty warrant victuals, it is and hath been a dispute and contention between the pursers and the contractor whether the contractor should deliver his provisions aboard at his own charge, or the purser or ship's company fetch them at the State's or purser's charge.² I know that this question hath been resolved for the contractor, and certificates from those that knew the practice of

victuals and 2*d.* a man a day for their beer, those days that they had short provisions and drank water, you will make the seamen that they will mutiny hereafter' (J. B. Deane, *Life of Richard Deane*, p. 422).

¹ In sailors' slang, weak tea or coffee served on board ship is called 'water frightened.' Cf. the landsman's use of the expression 'water bewitched' for weak tea.

² In the case of sea victuals the victuallers had been required by an Order in Council to bring them to the ship's side and deliver them to the purser; and a letter from the Lords of the Admiralty, dated April 20, 1635, had instructed the Officers of the Navy to take care that this order was observed (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 35). But it was contended that, with respect to harbour victuals, the contractor was in a different position.

former times in the case produced to back and strengthen that opinion and resolution ; yet for my part I always did and still do conceive it an injury to the State's service and the purser, to be imposed upon in this particular. The matter before me is not what other men have done, especially as contractors, being in the same predicament with these and driving the same design of profit as these ; but what is equitable, just, and fit to be done in this case. Now that it is not equitable to lay the charge upon the State or purser, I prove by these reasons : 1st, The charge of delivering it on board the State's ships is inclusively allowed to the contractor in the rate given him by the day. 2ndly, The late contractors were bound by their contract to deliver all harbour victuals as well as sea victuals on board all ships free of all wastes, damages, losses, costs, and charges whatsoever.¹ Now I say, if they were to bear the cost and charge, then they were to do the thing, and if they were to bear the loss and damage, then the purser in carrying it aboard, acts not as the State's but the contractor's instrument. 3rdly, How can it be expected that the purser should do his duty as he ought in attending on board for the entrance of men, the receipt of sea victuals, and other the duties of his place, if yet he must spend his time in waiting at London upon the contractors (and it may be with the ship's boat and a dozen of men) to fetch his harbour victuals ? And if he be charged therewith, with what justice can he be punished for his default when yet he shall plead the commands of them in bar that now accuse him for his absence. 4thly, Suppose a ship rides at Erith, Woolwich, or Blackwall, and the victualler

¹ As in the contract of 1677 ; but it was provided that if the contractor failed, the pursers should do it at the contractor's expense (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, iii. 442).

will take no care either to send the victuals from London or to settle the supply of it at those respective places, nor yet the purser look after it further than to send the muster-warrants to the victualler, as conceiving it not his duty (as indeed it is not) to do more; and that by this means the men are altogether without victuals for one, two, or three days (as I have often known), does not this cause the men to go on shore, neglect, and run away from, the service? And is not this the ground of so much time spent more than needs in rigging and fitting several ships to sea; and when they are rigged, to lie for want of men, and all to gain the contractor a little money in a needless and endless dispute with the pursers, who could never yet gain right in this particular from the commissioners but in the wrong way? 5thly, Admit again that the purser be forced to do it, and to bear the charge of doing it out of his own purse, where do you think the burden will lie at the last—upon the purser or the State? Assure yourself, if there be any way left him (as there are too many) to right himself, the State shall pay the reckoning, though yet they have done it already in the victualler's contract inclusively.

I know what is and hath been said against all these and other arguments that might be used in the case by such as are too near of kin to the contractors, as also what they themselves have pleaded, viz., that the words of their contract were to deliver all harbour victuals as hath been formerly used, whereby they argue that if it hath been formerly used for the purser to fetch them, then they are not bound, &c.; but, &c.; *ergo*. But this is no good argument in the case in question; for I desire to acquaint my reader that there are two sorts of harbour victuals—that is to say, ordinary victuals,

or victuals to shipkeepers attending upon ships riding in ordinary (the thing intended in the contract), and extraordinary, petty warrant victuals or rigging victuals, that is to say, victuals to extraordinary numbers of seamen pressed and sent aboard each ship commanded to the seas, in order to their rigging, manning, and equipping for sea service. Now, though both these sorts of victuals be the same with reference to quantity, kind, and price, and may not improperly be both called harbour victuals, yet as to the way of delivering or the purser's fetching them from the contractor, they may and ought to differ; for though it be true that it hath been formerly used, and still is at Chatham and other places, for the shipkeeper's victuals to be taken from the contractor's house or warehouse or the butcher's shop, nay, most an end to be eaten and spent on shore, yet it does not follow thereupon that when a ship is commanded to the seas, and hath it may be 100, 150, nay 200 men upon her in petty warrant, that the purser should dance every three days to the contractor for the victuals; there being a vast difference between the shipkeeper in ordinary and pressed men, and so consequently the victualling of the one and the victualling of the other, though the victuals of both be the same. Besides, the warrant for ordinary shipkeepers issues but once a month, and the pursers or shipkeepers fetch their victuals for the whole month (all but their bread and beef which they take weekly at the butchers' and bakers' shops because they eat it fresh); but the warrants for rigging victuals issue for every three or four days at the most, and oftentimes the increase and access of men pressed into the service begets more expense of victuals than the last petty warrant maintains, and if there be no magazine of victuals delivered by the contractor

aboard the ship, these new pressed men must and will neglect, if not run away from, the service. I confess the thing is but small in itself and of but small charge to the victualler, and (did not profit bite hard) I much wonder why he should stickle so much as I have observed him to do for it ; yet the consequence of the neglect thereof by the contractor is of great concernment to the State, and oft-times a greater retardment to the service than all the petty warrant victuals of that ship is worth, and therefore fit to be regulated.

I must not omit what advantage the contractors for victuals may and did make, to the State's great damage, by issuing the same victuals they had supplied according to contract for the State's use to merchants' ships in the State's service or their own private employments. I will only suppose what in practice was too true to be told. I imagine the contractor supplies the store with victuals of all sorts for 10,000 men for six months for the winter guard, and according to contract with the State receives his money for the same victuals ; afterwards suppose several merchants' ships hired into the State's service, or bound to sea on private designs, to want victuals, and the owners make application to the contractor to furnish them with six months' victuals for 200 men out of that magazine of victuals in his hands for the State's use. May not such a thing be done ; nay have not several ships been thus victualled, and have not some of the late contractors been part-owners of the same ships, and received the money for the same victuals twice over from the State under the notion of a double capacity, viz., once as a contractor, and a second time as a part-owner of the merchant-ship? Was not this the case of the Reformation, Anno 1652? And was not Captain —— (what shall I call him?) both a con-

tractor and part-owner at the same time ?¹ And did he not confess upon examination of the business before the commissioners of the navy, that the victuals were the State's victuals, and supplied out of the State's magazine then in store? This is bad, and very bad, yet familiarly practised both before and since by confiding men, and that not only when the State had paid for the same victuals beforehand, but also when the State had present use thereof, and for want of the same several of the State's own ships were forced to ride in harbour full-manned three weeks or a month together in petty warrant victuals, before they could obtain sea victuals from the contractors to despatch them to the seas. Yet I cannot so much blame the parties interested as the connivance of those that had the trust of control of such abuses, who yet (for ends best known to themselves) were so far from checking, that they countenanced such practices, and discouraged all such as complained of the State's insufferable loss thereby.

¹ Merchant-ships hired by the State without any certain contract were usually victualled by the State (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1651-2, p. 463). The suggestion in the text is that in some cases the same victuals are paid for twice over—once by contract and again when supplied to merchant-ships victualled by the State. The *Reformation*, 444 tons, 36 guns, was owned jointly by Captain John Limbery, the victualling contractor, and Anth. Earning. She was taken by the State as a private man-of-war at 400*l.* a month. The contract is dated April 7, 1652 (*ibid.* 1651-2, p. 521). The Limberys owned other ships also, and sometimes traded as Captain Limbery & Co. Another contract for the hire of the *Reformation*, dated March 9, 1651, was signed by William Limbery and Anth. Earning (*ibid.* 1651, p. 507) ; and the *Loyalty*, 440 tons and 34 guns, was taken up on April 12, 1652, at 400*l.* a month from Captain John Limbery, senior (*ibid.* 1651-2, p. 521).

CHAPTER IV

OF STORES, AND IN PARTICULAR OF HEMP AND CORDAGE

HAVING spoken what I thought fit to say touching the second general head of the navy, Victuals, I shall now proceed to the third and last head, concerning Stores. Upon which it cannot (must not) be expected by my reader that I should handle each individual species or material used in the navy for stores (that would be an endless work), but I shall make choice of some few of the most material provisions used in the navy, and by what I shall say of them leave my reader to judge of the rest. I am not of opinion with him that, in a survey of the navy, held it requisite to take all the small nails by tale, and not by content as they were packed up into barrels, rather than the storekeeper should have one nail more than was in the survey. It shall content me if I can content my reader with something said of the more gross commodities proper to the magazine of the navy, and leave all petty provisions to the enlargement of his own meditation, and a better pen; though yet every particular, though never so small and of little use and concernment, may properly and truly be called a store.

I shall begin with hemp, and therefore speak something as considered in its native being, and something as considered in its being spun into yarn, laid in tar, and wrought up into cordage of all sorts and

sizes. I know that in this particular, and also in all the rest, I shall but cobble at the best, it being impossible for me that have had no other insight into provisions than what my observation as paymaster or commissioner of the navy might have led me to, to write methodically or exactly of all or half the mysterious secrets of other men's callings. I know also, that in that regard I shall render myself ridiculous to the more exact judgments of those whose callings this and the rest refer unto; yet considering that what I shall say is not so much to satisfy or inform those that know the things better than myself (who as men of those callings will never discover the secrets of their respective trades), but for the information and satisfaction of such as now are, or hereafter may be, employed in the navy as governors or regulators thereof, and who I may, without reflection on them or vanity in myself, premise to be as equally empty or shoal-witted as myself in all callings to which the State's stores may refer, I shall therefore venture at something for the future benefit of the navy, and, if it be possible, by my folly provoke other men more able in each particular trade to give a true history or account of the knack or mystery of their respective callings,—a thing yet never communicated to the world, and that which might, if done by men of parts (each man for his own mystery), tend much to the prevention of that abuse that is too practical in all callings to men of all conditions, and not a stranger to the State's damage in naval affairs, as shall be hinted in some particulars in the succeeding discourse.

I will not trouble myself with the various kinds of hemp principally used in the navy, viz. Russ and Rhineband or Riga hemp.¹ I know that the

¹ See p. 74, *supra*.

merchants want not distinctions to set off their commodities. That which is before me to consider is what sort of hemp is best for the State's service, whether Russ, or Riga, or both mixed. In answer whereto it was always conceived, both by the Trinity masters, the King's masters attendant, and the most able boatswains of the navy, that the best way was to work them in halves—viz. half Russ and half Rhineband hemp; and according to this opinion the practice hath been for about 30 years past. One abuse that attends this commodity is when the State shall buy the one for the other—I mean when the merchant shall sell Riga and serve Russ; for however the place, price, and goodness do and should distinguish the hemp, yet it oftentimes falls out that some of the best of the worst sort is much better than much of the worst of the better sort; and if the commissioners of the navy be not in some measure skilful, and the subordinate instruments entrusted by them to view the same both skilful and faithful, it is an easy matter for the State to be defrauded of 3*l.* or 4*l.* in every ton, by the supply of one kind for the other.

You may add to this the supply of damaged hemp (though of the right kind contracted for)—that is to say, hemp that has either taken wet or heat, and is by reason thereof begotten into a musty savour, or direct rottenness or tenderness, whereby when it comes to spinning it will not endure the twist, but breaks short off. This kind of stuff is too often by power or favour shuffled into the stores undetected, and if at any time discovered the best redress is but to qualify the price; whereas it is below the service of the State and the trust of those that are employed therein to pester the stores with any such provisions, especially considering that the State always gives a good price, and that the lives of the men and the

preservation of the ships are much concerned in the goodness or badness of the cordage, which can never be good if the hemp be first bad.

The next of kin to this is the false packing of hemp—I mean when in the same bundle there shall be packed good Riga in the outside and Russband in the middle, or good Riga without and short ends, damaged, or otherwise defective, tender, or decayed hemp in the midst. I have seen enough, if not too much of this in the navy; and all that hath been said in excuse thereof was that the factors beyond sea were either cozened by the natives, or else betrayed their trusts to their correspondents here; which however it might have some relish of truth, yet those in trust ought carefully to prevent the supply of such hemp into the stores, and where they find it, to return it to the owner, and not to suffer it to be wrought out, as it is too often.

It is not amiss to consider whether is best for the State—to supply this provision by contract beforehand with the merchant, or to run the hazard of the market and buy it out of storehouses at London, &c. For my part I always was against the latter of these, and shall only give my reader my reasons and leave the point to future practice upon better judgment.

First, this commodity is the most absolutely necessary provision, as it relates to cordage, of all other commodities in the navy both for kind and quantity. Now how safe it is to hazard the service of the State to an uncertain market by neglecting pre-contracts is not easy to determine.¹ Secondly, merchants that deal for hemp by pre-contract are

¹ In January 1634 the Officers of the Navy writing to the Lords of the Admiralty described cordage as 'a commodity not to be had at all times without special pre-contracts for hemp' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1633-4, p. 422).

generally such as stand upon their reputations to comply with their contract ; and if not, yet such as are more responsible to the State's damage than others. Thirdly, by pre-contracts those abuses of mixing hemp of several kinds, and mixing bad with good of the same kind, with the matter of damaged hemp, may be much prevented, or at least discovered ;¹ for if the ship delivers her full lading at Chatham, Portsmouth, or Woolwich, all the damaged hemp will appear (if any be) upon delivery ; and for the other miscarriage, it will clear the merchant that they were not his by compliance with his factor, or if his, or whosoever, yet it may better be refused and returned upon the contractor when served in by a ship's lading from the first market, than when supplied out of storehouses by lighters, &c. Fourthly, in all parcels of hemp there is some particular bundles better and of more special use than others, and by laying it up in storehouses the hemp-dresser at Bridewell and other places has the liberty of choice out of the whole parcel, and oftentimes doth buy and select what serves his turn before the rest is sold to the State. Nay, I could wish I could not say that even the hemp-dressers themselves had not sometimes sold the refuse of their whole parcel to the State, after they had wrought out what was fit for their own turn. Fifthly, you may add to this that a pre-contract is as equally advantageous to the State in case of the rise of a market, as it is for the merchant with reference to its fall, whereas if the State runs the hazard of the market, they not only expose the service to the want of that commodity in case the common market will not afford it, but also

¹ In 1668 complaint was made that out of 58 tons of hemp bought from Sir John Shaw only a few hundredweight were answerable to contract, and all was of two, three, or four sorts mixed (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1668-9, p. 81).

to the extreme rate of the market and avidous¹ desires of the merchant, if the market be up. Sixthly, by pre-contracts supplies may be made at Chatham and Portsmouth (remote ports from London and the river of Thames) at half the charge the same supplies can be made out of any storehouse, when once the goods are laid up at London ; nor is it only more chargeable, but also the hazard at sea, both by the sea and pirates, is borne by the merchant at a small rate to Portsmouth (and nothing extraordinary to Chatham) inclusive in the first price.

I know what is objected on the other side, viz. that pre-contracts drain the Treasury by imprests to the merchants six months before the State receive their goods into store, and that this money would stop a gap elsewhere, and pay more necessitous creditors to the State, &c. But the answer to this is easy and plain.

First, I affirm that the advance of money to the merchant invites them to a low rate ; for money is the life of their trade into these parts and for that commodity ; whereby the State has more than the interest of the money comes to, inclusive in the price. Secondly, I say that the State is oftentimes sooner supplied with goods upon pre-contracts than out of storehouses ; for if supplies be made from London, then they are never made till absolute necessity compels it, and then only for the accommodation of some present service, and not for a magazine for the future ; and what profit the State gets by petty and fiddling supplies of their wants, both in this and other provisions, is obvious to easy judgments. Thirdly, as for the payment of other men, more necessitous, with that money, I am not against their due and timely satisfaction, and it's fit the State should take care therein. But to make their want

¹ = Greedy. The more usual form is 'avidious.'

an argument of neglect of the State's service in a business of so near concernment as hemp is to the navy, and under that pretence to hazard the ruin of a nation and the loss of the navy, is that which no man in trust can answer in case such a thing should happen. But to proceed.

It hath been the practice of former times to supply the navy with Russia yarn or cordage, whereby some did gain great estates, and the manner was to serve it in by survey¹ (of which I shall speak more hereafter). This yarn and cordage was generally so bad, especially for ground-tackle, that the late King was extremely abused, and his service retarded by it.² I list not to name particulars nor persons, though I could do both; that which I drive at is to advise all future governors of the navy to decline that provision as a thief to the State, though I know some merchants and ropesellers will, for their own interest and private profit, oppose all gainsayers to its goodness. But the Russia trade (as to that particular) being lately much laid aside, I shall not need to say more thereof; only I cannot with silence pass by what I remember was held and said by some then in trust, after conviction of the unserviceableness of that sort of cordage for the navy, viz., that if they bought the best it would be wasted, embezzled, and

¹ Thus in December 1634 the Lords of the Admiralty instructed the Officers of the Navy to survey two shiploads of Russia cordage belonging to a merchant named Job Harbie, 'and so much as they find serviceable to cause the same to be received into his Majesty's storehouses' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1634-5, p. 342).

² 'Ill cordage' was specially complained of in the ships at sea in 1636 (see Appendix). This appears to have been Russia, and it was admitted by the officers of the navy to be 'not altogether so strong and good as home-made cordage' (*ibid.* 1637, p. 35). The officers described Russian spun yarn as 'fair on the outside of the winch,' but 'often false and ill-conditioned within' (*ibid.* 1631-3, p. 586).

stolen by the boatswains, who would not lose their clenches,¹ nor leave their filching, though never so good ; and if what they bought into store were bad, yea the worst (as Russia cordage is), yet it would serve a voyage, and the best would do little more. A desperate kind of arguing ; as if because others, as boatswains, are false in their trust, therefore I, as an officer or commissioner, may be so in mine ; or as if because the boatswain will clench and filch that which is good, after the ship and men's lives are thereby secured, therefore I may expose both ship and men to hazard by supplying bad upon pretence to save the State a little money in the price, but indeed to get a little more to myself from the merchant, and cozen the boatswains with that as nought, of which he would deceive the State of as good. I could tell when cordage (I mean Russia cordage) hath been surveyed and certified under the hand of a master attendant as good and fit for the service upon the account of private advantage, and the same cordage refused and returned from the fleet as unserviceable within two months after its delivery into store by the same master attendant that formerly approved it, acting in the capacity of master of one of the King's ships.² Such was the enlightening power of his own preservation, that he could easily see (when concerned therein) that to be bad, yea base stuff, which but two months before he either could or would not discern or certify in another capacity to be other than good, so great a blind is profit to the judgments of sordid men.

The next thing considerable upon this subject (supposing the hemp good and well bought) is where, when, and by whom to work it out into cordage.

As to place and persons, it is without all ques-

¹ See note on p. 76, *supra*.

² See p. 76, *supra*.

tion the safest and best way for the State to work it in their own ropeyards at Chatham, Woolwich, and Portsmouth, and not by private rope-merchants in their private yards, as is too often of late practised.¹ I love not to be singular in my opinion in this or anything else, and shall therefore only lay down my reasons, and leave them to bear what weight they can in other men's judgments.

First, in all sizes of cordage wrought in the State's yards there is a known and limited number of threads allowed to each cable, hawser, &c., which, whether they be fully wrought as to number in cables, hawsers, &c., laid by private rope-merchants, is much to be suspected and difficult to be determined after the cordage is made. Secondly, the strength of cordage lies principally (next to the goodness of the hemp) in the well-spinning of the yarn, which cannot be well imagined to be so well spun by a private yard as by the State's, and the reason is, because the State's instruments have only their wages for their work, and though it be true that they work task-work, viz., so many threads in a day of such a length, yet it is without reference to any rate for the cordage by the ton ; whereas private yards work not only task-work, but also much of that by boys and young men, that the State's master workman would not employ as spinners in their² yards. Now these men work for small wages, and, so they spin their quantity, it matters not to the ropeseller whether it be well or ill spun, his

¹ In 1656 there was a large contract running with a number of private rope-merchants for rope made 'from good Riga and Queenborough hemp' at 42*l.* a ton (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1656-7, p. 250), and additional bargains were being made with individual ropemakers, both for cordage ready for use and to work up the State's Riga hemp into cordage at 2*s.* 6*d.* per cwt. (*ibid.* p. 428).

² *I.e.* the State's yards. The State is often treated as plural ; see *infra*.

profit lying in the rate by the ton, and in advancing the cable to a full size with fewer threads, which, among other things, is done by slight and gouty¹ spinning. Thirdly, it is known by experience how many men are requisite to be employed in the well-laying or closing of cables of all sizes, in which consists much of the goodness or serviceableness of that material, and it is also known that a private rope-merchant will not—yea, cannot—afford the same number of men to the closing of a cable of the same inches that the State employ in their respective yards; and indeed, if he should, it would eat out his profit, or a great part thereof. Now for want of workmanship bestowed by strength of hands in the closing of a cable, it comes to pass that when a cable so wrought comes to be strained, it either breaks, and hazards ship and men, or else it gapes in the strands—or (as they say) is long-jawed²—so as that you may lay your hand between them, and this quickly renders it unserviceable for a future voyage; and to supply that defect at sea the captain and master are forced to, and do often, ride the ship by three, when two cables would otherwise serve, or at least to splice³ two together to give the ship scope, and ease the straining of the cable, as not daring to trust it, though I know in foul weather there is a necessity so to do for the ease of the ship when yet the cordage as to strength and workmanship might be trusted.

In the State's yards (if the master workman

¹ Applied figuratively to anything swollen out of the proper proportion; or to irregular thickenings in something that should be uniformly thin. Thus it is commonly applied to a line badly drawn with a ruling pen.

² A cable is said to be 'long-jawed' when it untwists under a great strain, and shows one revolution where there were four before (Smyth, *Sailors' Word-book*).

³ The Pepysian MS. reads 'split.'

understands his way and does his duty) there is no more tar expended upon a cable than is useful, and may render the cable fit for preservation and service, whereas the main profit of a rope-merchant lies in giving their cordage more tar than needs. And, indeed, how can it well be imagined to be otherwise, for they contract with the commissioners to deliver into the State's stores cordage for hemp, or else they take the State's hemp and deliver cordage for it, with allowance of four or five shillings by the hundred for the workmanship. In both cases their payment lies in weight, and this weight is begotten by the tar as equally as by the hemp. Now all men know that whereas hemp is ordinarily worth four and twenty, thirty, and forty shillings an hundred, tar is seldom worth ten shillings, and often not above seven or eight shillings.¹ So that, look, how much tar is put into a cable more than is fitting, or the State's master workman would have put into the same cable, so much the State pays for tar as if it were hemp, whereby they lose above half or three-quarters of the price in every hundred, and so in proportion in every ton, and yet have their cordage (by much) worse conditioned by overtarring than otherwise it would be if it were made as it ought to be, or had been made in the State's yard. I list not to mention what yet I have sometimes heard, viz., sand has been (I am sure it may be) mixed with the tar to beget the cordage into weight, and if so, the State pays so much an hundred for nothing. I know nothing of this by any man in particular, but this I know, that profit is such a bait

¹ The price of hemp in 1658 varied from 33s. for English, and 38s. for Russia, to 46s. for Riga (*E. H. R.* xi. 81). Even as early as 1635 the King was paying 32s. to 33s. for Russia, and 37s. to 38s. for 'Rine' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 258). Thus, 24s. would be a very low price. Tar at the same date was 13l. a last of fourteen barrels (*E. H. R.* xi. 81).

to sordid men that I cannot but blame those in trust that give the latitude of deceit when no necessity of the service calls for it.¹

I might add that by working the State's hemp by private rope-merchants, all the former abuses of working Russ for Rhine, mixing Russia yarn, damaged hemp, &c., are made patent to the contractor, so that he may exercise what liberty he pleases in those particulars without control ; and I shall only refer myself to my reader to consider whether, if all or most of those inconveniences may be prevented by working the State's cordage in their own yards, it would not become the wisdom of those in trust to prevent those mischiefs that attend its making by private men.

I could also add, were it needful, that by working the State's cordage in their own yards, prevention might be made of that compliance of the ropeseller with the commissioners of the navy, or of the commissioners of the navy with them, to wink at all the former abuses, either of bad hemp, number of threads, well-spinning, well-closing, overtarring, &c., of the State's cordage, upon the account of share in the profit produced by the contract, or otherwise to give the contractor sixpence or twelve-pence per hundred more than ordinary, or so much more to this man than to another upon the same account of private interest and sharing profit between the rope-merchant and the commissioner. That

¹ A petition of Alexander, Lord Saltoun, to the King for the office of 'sealer of cordage,' dated May 4, 1635, complains that 'great abuses are daily committed by deceitful making of all sorts of cordage and cables, and selling for new what is made of old, rotten, and outworn stuff, smoothed over with tar so that it cannot be discovered ; by occasion whereof owners are put to double charge for tackle, and tall ships, rich merchandise, and hundreds of the King's subjects are cast away' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 58).

such things have been done is not unknown to some, and that such things may be done is known to all. I desire not to dispute the one so much as to prevent the other, and could wish I had had no reason to insert this as a reason of my assertion.

That which is said against this opinion is not so much gainsaying as plausible pleading—the necessity of the times, greatness of the service, &c., whereby they say it is not possible to supply the stores with so much cordage out of the State's own yards as the service may and doth require, &c.¹ I confess that where the necessity is real and cannot be prevented this plea will bear water²; but where it is only in pretence, or begotten real³ by design or neglect, there both the plea and the pleader for it deserve the benefit of a little of this material to send him to heaven in a string, if he be a man in trust. But give me leave to ask, is there no way to supply the necessity of the State's service but by buying hemp and cordage of the rope-merchant at the second or third hand, or by lodging the State's hemp in the hands of rope-merchants, to be wrought by them into cordage for the use of the State? Does the State want storehouses, and can they not as equally build them as private houses for petty officers? Are they wanting of men, and cannot they as equally supply themselves as the private rope-merchant? Have they not the power or privilege of the press? Do they want commissioners to foresee the supply of the magazine,

¹ This was sometimes a real difficulty. On July 7, 1635, the Officers of the Navy informed the Lords of the Admiralty that 'if the service requires a great quantity of hemp it must be forthwith contracted for, and the converting thereof into cordage undertaken by private men. The ropeyards at Chatham and Woolwich will neither spin so much nor so soon as they conceive the service will require' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 258).

² = Hold water

³ Pepysian MS. 'really.'

and know what is fit to be done, and when and how to do it? Certainly nor the one nor the other of these can be imagined real in the great affair of the navy. They have able commissioners; these have the power of the press, and may hire or build storehouses if they want them, rather than expose the service to the supply of private men, when attended with so many known (and five times as many more concealed) deceits and abuses. But the truth is, something of design is in this transaction; else, how comes it to pass that sometimes the State's stores should be drained and their men discharged for want of hemp, and yet the State have hemp enough in private storehouses to comply with contracts with private men? Whence is it, that in the same pretended or real necessity particular men shall be permitted to contract, when other men of the same calling shall be rejected? What should be the meaning that one man should have fourpence, sixpence, or twelpence upon an hundred more by contract for the same thing than another at the same time? That if the market rises after a contract made, some men shall be forced to supply, and others be spared? And, on the contrary, if the market falls, the parties spared shall have liberty to supply, and others to be put off upon pretences? What is the meaning that the old surveyors and the State's instruments should be set aside, and strangers appointed to view the rope-merchants' cordage? That the surveys should be only made in their hemp-grounds and storehouses (where after survey both hemp and cordage may be exchanged), and not at all surveyed when it is brought into the stores, as formerly? Do not these things savour of too much partiality at the best? And are not these practices strong presumptions of something more than an absolute necessity? Else, what meant the buying of

cordage from the East India Company by private men by the candle after it had lain ten or twelve years, and some part of it longer, and the State's buying the same cordage of those men after it was rejected by one or two surveys as fake-rotten,¹ and altogether unfit for the service? Certainly had not the vendor had more than ordinary favour with some, other men that at the same time had good and new cordage to sell might have had an equal liberty to have served the State, and it had become the fidelity of such in trust rather to have supplied the pretended necessity of the State's service with new, than with decayed and fake-rotten cordage.

If it be said that this parcel was sold at a low rate, and so was a good service to the State by saving so much money in the price, I shall only say that since the late wars we have had too many of these good services; and if some that promoted them for the State's interest (or rather their own) had had their just reward, their savings to the State had been bountifully recompensed; but for want thereof they were forced to supply themselves another way. Shall ships and men (the life under God of our nation) be exposed to manifest danger by base ground-tackle, &c., upon the pretence of savings to the State, when at the same time it may justly be suspected that double of what was saved in the price of the market was lost in the goodness of the cordage, and gained by the first buyer by the candle? It is not safe nor handsome in a State's service to expose to hazard the State's ships upon any real account whatsoever of single profit to the State where the hazard may otherwise be prevented, much less where particular profit is designed and

¹ A 'fake' is one of the circles or windings of a coiled cable. 'Fake-rotten' cordage would be cordage rotten, not at any one point, but through whole fakes of the coil.

driven, and the State's profit made only a stalking-horse to compass the other gain the better.

I shall not stir puddles, but conclude this chapter with serious advice to all that shall succeed in the navy's government, to have a severe and strict eye to the well-ordering of this material, whether considered in hemp or cordage, and to prevent what in them lies the serving of the State with any cordage other than what they make in their own yards, and to know that though there is, and may be, too many abuses in their own ropeyards, yet not the tenth part of what attends the rope-merchant's supply, most whereof are untraceable, and more easily detected by the pen than prevented by all the care you can take, if once you admit of contracts with them upon any pretence whatsoever. All which hath too manifestly appeared upon a late complaint made by the generals of the fleet of the badness of the cordage shipped in the fleet sent to the Straits in the year 1656,¹ which was much (if not most) of it made by private rope-merchants. This complaint begat an order from the commissioners of the admiralty to the commissioners of the navy to inquire into this abuse, where it was, and whence it sprung; and accordingly warrants were by them issued to several men, who, Scoggin-like,² searched

¹ There is no reference to this matter in the State Papers.

² The reference is to 'The first and best part of Scoggin's Jestes . . . gathered by An. Boord, Dr. of Physicke,' first printed in 1626. Under the title 'How Scoggin's Wife came to the Queen, and how Scoggin was banished the Court,' a long story is told, in the course of which Scoggin lets a hare loose before the King's hounds, and is ordered by the King to find the same hare again. "Why," said Scoggin, "I cannot tell where or whither I should go to look him." The King said, "Thou must go to look for him as well where he is not as where he is." "Well," said Scoggin, "then I trust to find him out." Scoggin in the morning did go upon the King's leads, and took with him a pickaxe and a great Beetle and . . . tore up the leads, and did beat down the

for it where it was not, that they might be sure not to find it where it was; and accordingly the rope-merchants were (as is reported, I know not how truly) returned white boys,¹ and their cordage so good that none could be better. Only the State's cordage made at Woolwich in their own yards was faulty, and must bear the blame; for which end a strict search and inquiry was made into the spinning of the yarn, laying of the strands, closing the cables, &c., in that yard, but none to any purpose (if any at all) into the cordage of the rope-merchants, of whose fidelity to the State's interest the commissioners had then such confidence that it was superfluous to mistrust them as guilty of such a miscarriage—yea, they rather thought fit that two of the rope-merchants themselves that supplied the stores with a great parcel of cordage the same year should by their warrant be made inquisitors into and judges of that miscarriage, the better to assure his Highness the Lord Protector that all fair play should be used in the discovery, and the rope-merchants that none of their cordage should be found guilty, unless they would be so sottishly simple as to accuse themselves.

Battlement.' When the King wanted to know why he had done this, he replied, "You said I must look him as well where he was not as where he was; and peradventure he is crept under the leads of this place." A certain 'Skogan' is mentioned in Shakespeare's *Henry IV.* (2 H. IV. iii. 2), and, according to Ben Jonson, a humourist of the name

'made disguises

For the king's sons, and writ in ballad royal
Daintily well.'

But the relation of these individuals to each other appears to be uncertain, as also whether Scoggin was not a fictitious person on whom all jests were fathered. Dr. Furnivall doubts whether the collection of jests referred to above has been rightly attributed to Borde (*E. E. T. S.*, extra series, No. 10, p. 31).

¹ 'White boy' was a term of endearment for a favourite son or dependant (Nares, *Glossary*). There is also a play on the idea of innocence in the text.

Was not this an handsome come-off, and are not the generals obliged in honour to be suitors to the Lord Protector for another reward of 250*l.* a man to all the commissioners for their extraordinary service in the management of this discovery, which hath not only satisfied their doubt, but after all left the stone in the State's foot where it was before? Certainly if they regard their own lives, which are as equally concerned in the badness of the cordage as the meanest seaman's under their command, they can do no less than procure a letter of thanks to be returned them from the commissioners of the admiralty for so signal a service.

CHAPTER V

OF TIMBER

I NEED not tell my reader the necessity and usefulness of this material in the navy. As the navy hath no being without ships, so nor ships without timber. That which I shall rather design shall be to show, first, the way or course that is taken by the State to supply themselves with this commodity of all sorts and kinds ; secondly, the several uses to which those kinds of timber are applicable after conversion ; in both which I shall enlarge upon the discovery of some miscarriages and abuses fit to be reformed.

First, for the way of supply, it is either by contract from the commissioners with private men that bring it to the market, or by employing purveyors to all parts to inquire and find out where it may be had in the country, who have commission to treat for and buy bargains for the State. These purveyors have also power to consult all the State's woods, parks, chases, forests, &c., and by instruction to fell all or any part of the timber thereon standing, fit for the use of the navy. Sometimes also the same purveyors do not only fell and convert in an ordinary way of purveyance the same timber, but also frame and mould it in the woods, the better to ease the charge of land and water carriage.¹ The trust of

¹ See in *Miscellanies*, x. 571, a paper entitled 'Benefits accruing to the King and kingdom from the framing of ships in the woods.' On April 13, 1632, the Officers of the Navy suggested to the Lords

these instruments is very great, and in times of great action cannot be prevented.

Secondly, as for the kinds of timber of our English growth, they are oak, ash, elm, and beech. The first is converted into straight, compass, and knee-timber.¹ The straight, if long and good, is either cut² into plank of two, three, or four inches, as it will bear, or else kept entire and whole, if fit for beams, wales, &c., and so sent into store. Knee-timber is either raking or square, and are so distinguished with reference to their goodness and usefulness upon decks, &c., and the price more or less accordingly. As for ash, it is seldom altered from its first growth or property in the woods, but sent in round as it grew, and is fit for blocks, tholes, &c. Elm and beech are hewed and planked as oak, and serviceable in plank in ships under water, and in timber for keels, tops, caps, and several other ways for the blockmaker. All which, and many other things more fit for a shipwright than myself to distinguish and discourse upon, are obvious to any that understand anything of this provision. But

of the Admiralty that 'if the plots of the ships' for next year 'were resolved upon, the timbers might be moulded in the woods, which would save near one-third in carriage.' An estimate for two ships was made on this basis, and of 280 trees that were felled in Alice Holt, eighty-two timbers were 'hewed to the mould' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1631-3, pp. 308, 368, 410). The land carriage of timber was a duty of the county, and the justices found the necessary carts, paying the 'King's price' of fivepence a load per mile (*ibid.* 1637-8, p. 479), and sometimes more (*ibid.* 1636-7, p. 27). Sometimes the county discharged its service by contract (*ibid.* 1637-8, p. 303). Only the excess above the 'King's price' came upon the county (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, x. 401), but it was often complained of as a heavy burden. During the Commonwealth there is no trace of this system, and the State appears to have paid the whole of the carriage. Purveyance was abolished by an Act of 1656 (Scobell, ii. 383).

¹ See p. 78, *supra*.

² Longleat MS. reads 'put.'

this is no part of my design to run division¹ upon this subject, and make flourishes of that which every shipwright's boy knows better than myself; yet by way of introduction I could not speak less than I have, to give my reader some light in what shall be further said of this provision thus distinguished, who (it may be), though otherwise able and wise, may be altogether to seek in the knowledge of this commodity.

It is observable that the State's service, notwithstanding the present employment of double the number of purveyors and the accommodation of their own timber, is, through I know not whose default, destitute of timber in their yards of Chatham, Deptford, and Woolwich.² The damage and inconvenience of not supplying the magazine with this provision, both as to quantity, kind, and

¹ In music to make florid variations upon a theme.

² From various causes the royal forests had greatly deteriorated. In 1632 the Forest of Dean was said to be 'wasted and ruined,' and the New Forest was 'so decayed' that there were not 2,000 serviceable trees in it (*E. H. R.* ix. 481). In East and West Beere Peter Pett could find only 400 trees (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1631-3, p. 308). A similar complaint is made of the decay of timber in Waltham Forest; 'Shotover and Stow Wood are the only places for supply of his Majesty's service' (*ibid.* p. 491). During the period of the Interregnum also, complaints of the decay of timber and of unauthorised pillage of the forests are frequent (*ibid.* 1649-50, pp. 31, 443, and elsewhere). In a paper of March 26, 1649, the Council note that the Forest of Dean is the only place in the West of England 'where there is any timber for shipping, which is much decayed in most places in England' (*ibid.* p. 54), and on April 16, 1651, they comment again on the 'general want' of ship-timber, and recommend that steps should be taken to preserve the New Forest from wastes and spoils as 'one of the principal magazines of timber fit for shipping' (*ibid.* 1651, p. 151). The result of this scarcity of timber was that the State was obliged to rely to a larger extent upon the contractor (*ibid.* 1636-7, p. 199; 1641-3, p. 433; 1651-2, pp. 143, 146), and notwithstanding the fact that an Act of July 16, 1649, for the sale of Crown lands, had provided that all timber fit for

time, is very great to the State ; for over and above the retardment of the service till provisions can be supplied, there is too often a necessity to make that supply out of private yards and at exorbitant rates and prices. I cannot believe that the commissioners of the navy are or can be either so negligent or ignorant as not to make demands from the State of what is fitting to recruit the magazine in season ; and truly if they have done their duty, as I hope they have, the reflection must fall upon those above them, who if they were truly sensible of the loss the State sustains by brewing in a bottle and baking in a bag, as to this or any other provision of the navy that ought to be in constant magazine for all emergent services, they would rather advise to take up money at fifty in the hundred than suffer the stores to be wanting when the service requires them.

I will only instance in this case of timber : all purveyors know that they may buy good and sound timber of all sorts promiscuously at 40s. the load or thereabouts, laid at the State's crane free of all charge, and plank at 3*l.* or thereabouts ; but for want of seasonable supply thereof, the State doth pay for the same, if not worse timber and plank out of private yards, above twenty in the hundred in the price more than the rate before mentioned.¹ And if this were all it were well, or at leastwise not so

the navy growing on such lands within fifteen miles of a navigable river should be cut down and carried away by the commissioners of the navy before July 10, 1657 (Scobell, ii. 63), the yards complain of deficiencies (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1655, p. 493 ; 1655-6, p. 543 ; 1656-7, p. 557).

¹ This is an enormous increase on earlier prices. In 1618 straight timber was 25s. the load, plank 36s. 8*d.* In 1631 timber had risen to 30s., and oak plank to 42s. a load or more. In 1657 plank was 65s., and in 1659, when money was very scarce, the navy was paying no less than 75s. (Charnock, *Mar. Arch.*

bad ; for this is done where whole or great parcels are bought on wharves in the country, viz. Hamhaw,¹ Reading, &c. But if the supply be neglected till winter time, and the thing to be supplied be not timber in general, but such a kind of timber—suppose knees or compass-timber, and those of the best sort and of such a size or scantling, growth or bigness—then I dare affirm the State doth and hath paid above 50*l.* in the hundred excess in the rate, and I would I could not say to their own master shipwrights and other instruments in trust, whose duty it was to prevent such abuses and damage to the State. Nay, that which was worst of all, these excessive rates have not only been given, and given to the State's own servants by bills made in other men's names, but the goods for which they were so given have been bad and unserviceable in their kind, though certified by the vendor himself (in the capacity of a master shipwright and not as the merchant) as good, when other men as purveyors had refused to certify them either such or worth so much as upon his own certificate was paid for them.

Myself (to prevent the inconveniences of an idle life) have adventured, since I left the navy my little stock of money in this commodity,² and I can

ii. 206 and 224 ; and *E. H. R.*). A contract of March 19, 1670, however, provided oak trees at 37*s.* 6*d.*, ready money, and knee and compass-timber at 38*s.* 6*d.* a load (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1660–70, p. 126) ; see p. 80, *supra*, also.

¹ Hamhaw in Surrey was the nearest point on the Thames to the Hampshire forest known as Alice Holt ; the distance was about twenty miles.

² Hollond resigned his post in the navy at the end of 1652, and by June 1653 was offering 'plank, treenails, and knee timber, fit for the stores at Deptford and Chatham' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652–3, p. 618). Other references to his operations also occur in the State Papers (*ibid.* 1655–6, p. 508 ; 1656–7, p. 479).

say, and say truly, that for the same commodity tendered to the commissioners from the woods, to be delivered at the State's yard free of all charge at such a rate by the load, which they (for ends best known to themselves) have refused, they themselves have within six months after or thereabouts given me and my partner almost double of what was demanded, to supply the necessity of the State.

Besides the first price, when goods are sold out of private yards, the charge of purveyors doth as equally go on for the supply of twenty loads, as if they were in the woods and had sent into store two hundred, and the charge of labourers, horses, lighters, &c., to cant,¹ lade, and send it in, is added to the first price, and borne by the State, which if it were not paid inclusively in quarter-books would prove much of what I say as to this improvidence. Nor are the purveyors to be blamed for it, their employers refusing in time to send them elsewhere, or, if they do, to supply them with money to pay for what they buy.

Add to this, that oftentimes timber desired for special uses and of such kinds is not to be had in any yard for love or money; and when it so falls out, the State's own yards are made fellow-feelers of each other's wants, if it be there to be had, though the same yard where it is can ill spare it. Now for the State to be at the charge to purchase and send in timber (for the purpose) to Deptford, and when there to crane, cart, and carry it away into their timber-yard, and there to cant and stock it at no small charge, and within two or three months to

But these do not seem to have been his first dealings in timber, for in September 1639 the navy took up 'about 270 loads of timber and plank in Essex of the goods of Thomas Brown and John Hollond' (*ibid.* 1639, p. 525).

¹ To 'cant' timber is to turn it over so as to see both sides.

be at the same charge to unstock,¹ re-carry, crane, and lade away the same timber, plank, &c., either in lighters to Woolwich or in hoys to Chatham, or otherwise from Chatham to Woolwich or Deptford, is such a mysterious kind of thrift that if private men should use it would beggar them, and that which with other things of like nature has rendered the State so much in debt in the navy as it is.

This is that which among other things makes some commissioners, master shipwrights and their² assistants, boatswains of the yards, and others the State's servants, to turn timber-merchants, well knowing that once a year the State will certainly want what they have, and their influence with others can or may sooner supply what they want than other men, and that not only at good (that is to say great) rates, but also for good payment, whereof though other men may fail, yet rather than they will fail thereof the treasurer shall in prudence be made a partner.

Attendant upon this is the foisting into the State's stores much of this commodity that is not fit or serviceable, or at the best not suitable to the price given, or what other men might and would supply it for. And how indeed can it be otherwise? For if the commissioners, master shipwrights, &c., be (whilst commissioners, master shipwrights, &c.) traders in this provision, they will never regard seriously to represent or vigorously to prosecute the supply of the wants of the magazine by the common purveyors, but wilfully permit a want, and then not only serve but also make it a service to supply the State, and obtain excessive rates upon the account of the State's necessity.

¹ So the MSS. The sense would seem to be 'stack' and 'unstack,' but the words are closely connected.

² The Pepysian MS. reads 'other.'

I shall at the close of this discourse ¹ handle how unsafe it is for any man in trust for or by the State to deal for any provision whatsoever whilst his trust remains, and shall therefore pass it over here without further enlargement ; only by what is already said the judicious regulator may easily see what mischief attends the service by not supplying, or unseasonable supplies thereof, with this provision.

It shall not, I hope, be lost labour in this particular to discuss this question, and inquire why the State should not as equally purchase or buy their timber by the lump ² (as other men do) as by the load.

For my part, though I know the practice of the navy is and always hath been to the contrary, yet I see not so great difficulty in the matter as is premised by some, and am sure if it were put into practice the State's stores might not only be better supplied, but the former inconvenience of buying out of private yards and of the State's instruments much abated and prevented. It is true the trust of the purveyor would be increased, and yet not much more than now it is ; for now he buys by the load 1,000 loads together, and the commissioners do and must credit him as to the price and product as equally by the load as by the tree ; only when he buys by the lump or tree, they have the additional trust of the top and bark, which truly for my part I would not think him unfit for that at the same time I think fit to trust with the body of the tree.

If it be said that the purveyor may overshoot himself in his bargain, and beget the State a damage by his rashness or weakness, &c., I shall only say that the commissioners must then employ rash and weak purveyors, else it is not to be expected but that an able shipwright employed as a purveyor, and

¹ See p. 309, *infra*.

² =As a whole, in gross.

versed in buying of timber, is better able to cope with a lord or his steward, or a country gentleman and his assistants, in a bargain than they are with him ; and why they should not be as equally frugal and wise (if faithful) for the State as they are for themselves I know not. Only this I know, that seldom or never any of them make bargains for themselves that turn to loss ; and they are the same men when employed by a State as for themselves.

But suppose the bargain great as to quantity (in which lies all the profits of a bargain, and for which the State is the fittest chapman) whereby the wisdom or experience of one purveyor might be trumped, &c., I say in this case the consult and advice of the commissioners might be necessary, and I am sure some of them are able to buy good pennyworths for themselves, and I hope the like for the State.

Besides, timber—that is to say timber fit for the navy, viz. long and great timber, fit for beams and wales, keels, &c.—grows very scarce near London, and is not to be had but in small parcels, except from some few lords, knights, and gentlemen, that are so great admirers of the beauty of their parks and woods, as they are adorned with great and goodly oaks, that it is not easy to tempt them out of their interest till a great necessity pincheth them, or the young heir comes to disturb their silent whispers, and makes them whoop and hallo each to other. Now in this regard, though the way of the navy was formerly to purvey by the load, yet at present the best way is certainly to purchase by the lump or tree, especially considering that the scarcity near London hath opened the eyes of most gentlemen within three score miles of London, that they, or some for them, are masters of the art of measuring, valuing, and selling timber as equally as the most able purveyor.

There is also this conveniency by buying by the lump or tree, more than by the load : the State hath the privilege to convert their timber so as may best suit with their own occasions or service, and may either grub for knees, or if they fell, prevent the butting of their timber by cleft for paling, barrel-boards, ship-boards, &c.,¹ which as it is now ordered is no small waste of timber fit for the State's service and no other. They may also frame and mould their timber in the woods, having a parcel fit for that purpose, which they can never have from private timber-brokers or by buying it by the load. But that which mainly concerns their interest : they may have the refuse² of all the great bargains in England, in which (as was hinted before) lies all the frugality and profit of dealing for timber ; for if once the commissioners of the navy by their purveyors should declare that they are willing to deal by the lump or the tree, as it stands for the State's service, the particular interest of the vendor will invite³ him to seek his market where he can best have it ; and if he finds the State's either price or payment as good as private men's, they may be sure to save thirty in the hundred of what they now pay in the price, besides the former accommodations of the service, which (as far as I am able to judge) is worth as much more to the State ; and I demonstrate it thus.

First, there is no gentleman, &c., but would rather (if he be forced to sell) fell a great quantity together than in small parcels. Secondly, if he

¹ The sense appears to be that the State can prevent the waste of timber good enough for the navy in the manufacture of 'cleft' (*i.e.* cleaved wood) for paling, &c., for which inferior timber would suffice. 'Butting' is an expression still used in the United States for cutting down rough timber into logs. The other meanings of the word do not fit the apparent sense of the text.

² *I.e.* refusal.

³ Pepysian MS., 'lead.'

parcels out his broke,¹ he must then advance in the price so much as will countervail his trouble and charge in so doing, together with his stay for his money from poor men. Thirdly, these poor men that buy small parcels must and will gain of the State, either by bad hewing, serving red, rotten, waney,² or shaken³ goods, or else in the price, that, and more, which may recompense all their adventure, pains, forbearance, &c., or else they cannot live. Fourthly, in the ordinary valuation of timber by the lump, if the bargain be very great, suppose to the value of 5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.*; this, all men know, is not every man's money, and consequently the fewer buyers the better bargain; yea, the vendor himself, though he be not pinched with want, yet, if he understands his own interest, will sell to such a chapman the same bargain twenty in the hundred cheaper than to several men. And as if it were my own case I would do it, so if I were the purchaser I would not deal at all unless I could have it with that allowance or abatement in the value. And this some of the commissioners know by experience to be good doctrine, having tasted the sweetness thereof in their own way of dealing.

Now lay all these together, and I know not why the State should not be as good husbands for the common interest as a private man is for himself; nay, why they should not by their commissioners prosecute this way of dealing rather than private men, having such advantages by so doing that no private man can propound to himself. For, first, they want no means or money to procure great

¹ *I.e.* bargain. The word is very rare as a substantive.

² 'Wane' in timber is an imperfection involving want of squareness at one or more of the corners when cut.

³ 'Shakes' are cracks or rents in a piece of timber occasioned by the sun or weather.

bargains. Secondly, they have ties and obligations upon great men (that are the usual vendors) beyond any private man. Thirdly, they have use of what they buy in their own yards, whereas others buy to sell to them or other men. Fourthly, they by buying save or prevent that advantage that private men now take of their want, to hoist and screw them in their price, &c., as was pointed at before.

If it be objected (as I know it will) that the way propounded will exhaust the State's treasure, and beget them into a more than ordinary expense, &c., first, I shall answer, that I do not advise to buy at all unless they want it, and if they want it, as I am sure they do, then we differ only in the manner of buying it—whether cheap by the lump or great quantities, or dear by retail or small parcels. And as to that I shall refer my reader to what has already been said. Secondly, the State do as equally want hemp, masts, tar, and many other materials as they do timber, and do expend as much and much more of their treasure in the supply of these provisions than they do timber. Now I would only ask why the State's treasure should not as freely be issued for this as those, without this cavil or objection? Is it because these are foreign and this a native commodity? Are not those as equally bought of English merchants as this of English gentlemen? Or is it because the State have greater want of those than this? Nothing less,—for though it be true that no ship can sail without masts, cordage, &c., yet it is as true that no ship can be without timber.

Yea, but timber may be always had for money, being a native commodity, but it is not so in the case of hemp, masts, &c. First, does it not appear that one-third part of the money now paid might be saved if paid in a right way, with prudence and providence, and shall we be so wise as to put the

State to so great a loss in the principal, by gaining the forbearance for a short time? Secondly, will not the lop and bark of each bargain, if well bought, pay the charge of all purveyance, which is now issued in ready money to no small charge to the State?¹ Thirdly, are not the State at present forced to trot and trudge by their instruments to the Forest of Dean to pick and cull² some few trees and small parcels of the timber at a vast expense and with ready money both for purveyance, land and water carriage (besides the hazard of the sea and enemies to bring the same about for Chatham), when the same or as good might have been bought this way in great parcels from private gentlemen for two-thirds, if not half, the price (pardon me if I err, it is my opinion)—nay, when the same or as good timber might have been bought out of private yards at as cheap if not cheaper rates than that cost the State? If this be good husbandry, for my part I am to seek; and yet for this last I will beg no pardon, being able by mine own particular experience to prove what I say, though the thing be sufficiently known already by those in trust.

I know it will be said, that since I left the navy I and my partner have (as I said before) bought several bargains of considerable quantities of timber by the lump, and a great part thereof was at the penning hereof upon our hands; why then should I be so eager to put the State upon this way of thrift, and thereby not only prejudice the sale of what I have, but also destroy myself as to future

¹ The 'tops, lops, and bark' of trees were usually employed to pay the charge of felling and transporting the timber (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1649-50, p. 356). In one case in 1657 in the New Forest, the lops were claimed by the woodwards as perquisites (*ibid.* 1656-7, p. 521).

² The Pepysian MS. reads 'cut.'

bargains, &c.? To give such an answer to this as I both might and could, would savour of too much vanity in the construction of my back-friends.¹ I shall only therefore say that I shall trust that God that never failed me, with the sale of what I have, and providing for me and mine, if not by this yet some other way, and hope to have more comfort in the discharge of my conscience which tells me this is good and profitable for the State, than I can expect by concealing (as the manner of most is) that which may conduce to public interest for my private profit.

The next thing fit for a regulator's eye in this material is the unworthy carriages of some that pretend to be great husbands for and servants to the State, who cannot content themselves to be parties and judges—I mean to sell the State their own timber, plank, &c., at their own rates and prices—but the better to colour their actions, pretend to the State, or those with whom they make their contract for the State's use, that their geese are swans—that is to say, their goods are such as no man hath the like, the better to beat off dealing with other men, and not only to pretend it such, but arm themselves with the confidence, or rather impudence, to contract under hand and seal that they shall hold or make out such and such dimensions that are beyond the growth of the timber sold, for the purpose that their plank of four inches shall be from thirty to five and forty foot long and sixteen inches at the top end, and none under, and to meet at seven and thirty foot and an half one with another; that their three-inch plank shall be from six and twenty foot long to forty foot, and none under, and bear fifteen inches at the top, and to meet at three and thirty foot; so to warrant that all their timber and plank shall be free from all redness, rotten-

¹ *I.e.* false friends.

ness, wanes, shakings, &c. ; and none to be delivered into the stores under such a number of feet in a piece, and this for five hundred; yea, a thousand loads together in one contract. These high undertakings and warranties carry such a colour of great and good service, that indeed no commissioner would refuse the tender, especially when they shall see and know that all men besides will not or cannot undertake the same conditions for small quantities, much less for so great a parcel. But will you know where the pad lies ?¹ These high and great undertakers (of indeed impossibilities), the better to colour and carry on their design, are at the worst the State's own servants—I had almost said some of their own commissioners—who for the purpose join their pates and their purses together to buy a bargain of timber, and by their influence and bold undertaking of impossible things gain their contract (I hope I may safely say in the simplicity of the commissioners), who when the contract is made have nothing to do but to send down its copy to Chatham, Deptford, or Woolwich, to the storekeeper, clerk of the check, and master shipwright there respectively, to see to the receipt of those goods, according to the intent and undertaking of the contract both for length, breadth, bigness, goodness, &c. And what can be more fair than this ? and how can the State desire to be better served than thus ? for

¹ Halliwell-Phillips (*Dictionary of Archaic Words*) notes the expression 'a pad in the straw' in the sense of 'a screw loose,' 'something wrong,' and illustrates it by a quotation from an old ballad, 'Here lyes in dede the padde within the strawe.' Palsgrave also in 1530 gives as the French equivalent of 'There is a padde in the strawe,' *il y a de l'oignon*. He gives as an example, 'Though they make never so fayre a face, yet there is a padde in the strawe' (see the French reprint, p. 595). That the original sense of the expression had been lost appears from the author's use of it on p. 233, *infra*, 'If there be not something in the pad.'

these men are not only trusted in their respective places to view the provision upon its receipt, but also to make bills for the same, and to certify upon the back-side of each bill or debenture the quality of each particular, how it suited and accorded with the letter of the contract, the better to lead the commissioners to sign the same. A man cannot imagine a more just and equal way between the State and the subject, were it not that these men, or some of them, were not only the State's servants but also partners in the bargain, who, though they know that neither timber nor plank was so or so as it was contracted for, nor indeed could be (being as I said impossible), yet all is well, and the contract fulfilled to an hair, which is also as easily believed as said, being said or certified by confiding men, and served by men of high and approved integrity to the State and their interest, whom (were it not for form's sake) the commissioners would believe upon their single testimony.

I hope none will hereafter be thought worthy to regulate the navy but wise and judicious men, and to such I may say one word is enough, according to the proverb, else I could tell strange stories in this particular, and stuff my discourse with too much matter of this nature ; but, as I said at first, I am not willing to drive the nail too close, to avoid offence, the design of this tract being to prevent future and not to detect past miscarriages, nor yet so much as to mention or question any person guilty where it can possibly be avoided ; though yet, if they find themselves aggrieved, that which is said and much more may be sufficiently proved, having myself partaken as a private man (but never as the State's servant, which is the thing I detect ¹) of the profit of one contract of this nature.

¹ *I.e.* which is the very thing I am exposing.

The next thing I shall consider in this material is the trust of measuring all timber, plank, sawyer's work, &c., in all the State's yards. This trust is very great, and generally committed to an ordinary shipwright, sometimes upon the commendation of the outstore-keeper, whose instrument, indeed, he is and whose work he does. I am not against the way, for I know that storekeepers cannot attend all particular duties of their places, and that if they should be tied up to this duty in person, the service may as equally suffer in another kind by their absence from their duty in another place, this being a full employment for an able man. That which I drive at is, that special care be taken to discover and approve of the honesty and fidelity, as well as the ability (if not more), of the man so employed, and to be sure that no man serves the State with any of this provision that hath influence either of power or affection upon this man, nor that any man be recommended to such a trust by any that contract with the State for anything that relates to timber, especially the State's own servants. I have not only suspected but known too much miscarriage through default in this particular; and it is not only requisite that the man thus employed be an able shipwright and an honest man, both to measure right and to set down what he measures, but also that he be well skilled in his pen, to keep his accounts right of what he so measures and receives, for as the storekeepers' and clerks of the check's hands lead and govern the commissioners in signing all bills, so these men's hands respectively lead and govern the storekeepers and clerks of the check, and if there be an error in the first it is not reparable in the last certifier. The last abuse referred to the quality of provisions of this kind, whether according to or short of the conditions of the contract. This refers to the

quantity, and if this trustee, through ignorance, negligence, or the influence of contractors, shall write fifty for forty, or an hundred for four score, an easy understanding will make the balance of profit and loss to the State. I shall, therefore, advise that in all regulations of the navy, special inquiry and observation be made of and into the parties thus employed, as having too great a trust for one single person that is not exceeding just and careful. I know what I say, and could say more to this point than I should have thanks for my labour, if I should write all I know ; but let this suffice.

In the purveyance of this provision it is (as I said) sometimes from the State's own woods, parks, and chases, &c., where the purveyor hath the same latitude of trust and abuse that I pointed at in buying timber by the lump, if not more ; and in this case, as there ought to have been great care who was employed, so also in calling such as were employed to strict accounts, both before their deaths, and before time might or did eat out the memory of their good or bad service. I speak this because I know that the neglect of both these hath begotten the State no small damage in this particular, and the more by the help of some in trust, who did not only thrust such as were altogether unfit for such a service into the trust thereof, but after they had, by their ignorance or—— worse, run the State into great losses, were yet by the same men bolstered up to persist in their way, merely to beget employment to those men, who rather than they should want it, the State must and did pay their salary (by damage) twenty (I might say forty) times over ; and that which added to this good service was, that whereas other purveyors were strictly called to account, and (as it ought) their accounts stated and balanced in a timely and orderly way, by the same men these

friends of court have been tenderly handled, as friends ought to be, and their accounts neglected for many years past, insomuch that the chief undertaker was called several years past to an account in heaven, and if he hath his *quietus est*¹ there, it is well. I am confident the State shall never have an account here, or if they have by his surviving partner, it shall be as defective in truth as the timber sent into store was in goodness ;² which, had it not had more heads to contrive its expense,³ and hands to help it away from Deptford to Woolwich and Chatham after it was landed there, the State (as to quantity) needed no supply of their magazine of timber for some years after it was served into store. I cannot say the same thing as to some other purveyors, that are as equally winked at as to passing their accounts as these, but this I can say, that were there not something in the wind, this man or men had not, after seven years' lapse since their first employment, received that civility which was denied to other men in keeping the State's treasure in their hands now seven years together without any account given for it. If you ask what that thing is, I must not (I dare not) tell you, though yet I have the happiness to guess as near the business as most men in England, except him

¹ This was a technical expression for a discharge given in the Exchequer to officials who had passed their accounts.

² During the years 1650-60 the principal purchases of timber on account of the navy mentioned in the State Papers were made by George Cooper, Thomas Eastwood, George Maplesden, and Edward Mundy, acting either as contractors or purveyors ; the names of Giles Andrews, Francis Barham, Richard Fletcher, and Skinner Ryder also occur ; and one Augustine Aldridge, a shipwright, was purveyor in the Forest of Dean ; but there is nothing to identify the person alluded to in the text. Eastwood, whose operations were on a very large scale, was acting ten years after the Restoration, though 'aged.'

³ *I.e.* the expending of it.

that received the courtesy ; and it is well if that will stop his mouth. There is a righteous God that knows all these things. I do but hint, not to reflect upon persons, but to point at what is fit for regulation in future, and to show my reader where the hare sits, if he have any mind to hunt her.

In all accounts with purveyors, whether for the State's own timber or for goods bought by them for the State's use, special care ought to be taken by those in trust to the manner of their accounts—that is to say, to consider how it was bought or taken into charge, whether converted or unconverted, whether girt measure¹ or square, whether planked or in timber, whether by the load or by the ton. In all which cases, not only the goodness and usefulness of the provision ought to be inspected—that is to say, whether it be found home-hewed, free from rottenness, redness, shakes, wanes, &c., in all which cases the State may and have too much suffered—but also, what is the advance to the State upon the hew of timber bought girt measure, which though it cannot be exactly determined, in regard some timber grows more full and some more taper, and that according to its growth it will yield more or less, yet this may be affirmed as a general rule to all in trust, that all timber will at the least advance ten feet in every load ; and if the purveyor bring in his account for more he deserves encouragement, if for less he may justly be suspected to abuse the State. Thus, if plank be bought by the hundred foot and accounted for by the load,² the State may be abused, in regard all those countries, viz. Suffolk, Norfolk, &c., where it is so sold, do always allow one hundred and twenty feet to the hundred ; and the same so bought and accounted for to the commissioners by

¹ See p. 77, *supra*.

² A load of timber was 50 cubic feet.

the load, will advance in four inches thirty, in three inches forty, in two inches sixty foot upon every load, which in great quantities will be a considerable profit to the purveyor, and no less damage to the State. Thus if the purveyor buys timber and serves plank, or the master shipwright saws timber into plank in the State's yards, it is worth the labour to know the waste upon the saw, and whether the purveyor's account be reasonable as to that particular. I know it is difficult to determine it exactly, but this you may build upon: that one load of timber girt measure will make a load of square plank, if the timber be well grown and fit for plank, and if it be not, the purveyor plays the fool to cut it.

It is a disputed case whether foreign or East country plank be fit for the State's service or not.¹ For my part, I am not able to resolve the point, though I see no reason why it should not, if sound wood and well cut; and this I am sure of, that when any merchants have brought the provision to the

¹ 'East country plank' was plank from the Baltic. It always had the reputation of being inferior to plank of English growth, though useful for some purposes. The 'disputed case' was destined to be speedily decided, for after the Restoration the decay of English timber made the use of foreign plank inevitable. In 1677 an Act was passed in Parliament for building thirty new ships, but Sir Antony Deane reported that there was not enough timber within twenty miles of the Thames or the dockyards to supply curved timber for two first and six second-rates under four years, or straight timber in two; and Pepys came to the conclusion that it would be difficult to find either curved or straight timber for twenty third-rates under four years, 'stripping all the forests and gentlemen's timber within twenty miles of any land or water carriage, or navigable place of England' (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, vol. ii.). The result of this scarcity was that foreign plank was largely used in the construction of the thirty new ships, and to this their speedy decay was attributed. Extracts from the journal of Phineas Pett, when he travelled in Norfolk and Suffolk in May 1677 in company with Sir Antony Deane, in order to buy up timber for the new ships, are printed in Charnock, *Mar. Arch.* ii. 491.

market, if not the State, yet the shipwrights of the Thames have bought it ; only I have observed that both private shipwrights and the State's¹ master shipwrights have, by a reserved and dubious opinion as to its usefulness, wrought upon the merchant, and discouraged him from bringing any more by their unworthy carriages towards him ; for I have known that the same plank that hath this day been refused as unfit to come into the State's stores,¹ hath within ten days after not only been received, but received upon the certificate of the same men that refused it. I could wish that either men were more honest, or else that they had more wisdom in their knavery than some have discovered. I know the wood is poorish and 'frow'² as they phrase it, and it's probable (and I believe it) in that regard not so lasting as our English oak, but I know withal, that they are generally gallant long plank, and well grown at the top ends (which is the life of good plank), free from wanes, knots, &c., and that the master builders of the Thames not only know this, but also make use of it for their private profit, in building with this plank upon the sole account of its length, breadth, and growth at the top end, wherein the profit of a contractor is much concerned. I am not an adviser to anything that may prejudice the service, or in any way disparage the commodity of our own growth ; yet, considering that timber grows scarce with us at home—I mean long timber for plank—especially near London, and that supplies may be made from foreign parts if the merchant was encouraged, I would thus far advise that *bonâ fide* the State's master shipwrights and the master builders of the Thames would declare their opinions as to the goodness and usefulness of that sort of plank, that so the commissioners might know

¹ The Pepysian MS. reads 'service.'

² *I.e.* brittle.

whether it be fit to buy it or not for the State, and the merchant might not be deluded as to his market ; as I have known some to be six months together, upon this pure account of seeming conscience to take it into the store, though afterwards the same men's consciences have been satisfied without a divine.

I would also encourage, upon the same account, the transporting of knees or knee timber from New England, they being scarce commodities here and very useful for the State's service ; only I could wish that men of religion that bring them hither would not (when brought) cull or garble them¹ by selling the best to private men, and when the refuse will not off, then to sell the remainder as a great service to the State at an excessive rate, and send them to Chatham to be forthwith spent to prevent further survey of them, though certified as good under the hands of those that were the proprietors, or their friends, and both proprietor and certifier the State's own servants. I desire highly to honour religion and religious men, but when such things as these shall be done by those that pretend themselves so, my charity towards them is laid aside, and I cannot pass them (lying so opportunely in my way) without a lash or two of the severe discipline of that country, where if they should appear in the practice of such things, they would be whipped to purpose, which, it may be, some of them well knowing are gotten into a more temperate climate, to prevent the worst.

The like encouragement I also desire may be given to those that trade for masts, pipe-staves, barrel-boards, &c., from New England, as provisions of special use to the navy and the nation ; but I altogether dislike that any of the commissioners (whilst yet commissioners) should have any part or

¹ 'Cull' = to select ; 'garble' = to select with a sinister intent ; *i.e.* to pick out the best pieces.

share with those that trade for them ;¹ the inconveniences whereof I shall endeavour to demonstrate when I handle that subject at large upon the title of the Commissioners of the Navy, to which I refer my reader,² and in the meantime could heartily wish I had not too much cause to mention them either here or there.

¹ By the Duke of York's 'Instructions,' issued in January 1662, the members of the navy board were forbidden for the first time, under pain of dismissal from the service, to trade in any commodities that are used in the navy, 'it being supposed that of late times persons employed in the affairs of the navy . . . traded' (Pepysian MSS., *Naval Precedents*, pp. 359-60). The prohibition does not occur in the Earl of Northumberland's instructions of 1640, on which these were founded (Sir William Penn's *Naval Tracts*, Sloane MSS. 3232, pp. 171-271).

² See chapter x. p. 291, *infra*.

CHAPTER VI

OF IRON AND ALL IRONWORKS

MUCH of this provision is used in the navy and bought by the commissioners for the State's service. Sometimes the material itself is bought in gross, which is either forest or English iron,¹ or else Spanish iron. When it is thus supplied as a magazine, it is either that the State may be sure to have

¹ English iron-works were generally in the neighbourhood of a forest, in order that fuel for the furnaces might be easily obtained, and this was one of the causes of the spoiling of the forests. By an Act of 1558 (1 *Eliz.* c. 15) the using for fuel for making of iron of oak, beech, or ash timber 'of the breadth of one foot square at the stub, and growing within fourteen miles of the sea' or of any navigable river, had been prohibited under a penalty of forty shillings. In 1636 it was calculated that there were 300 iron-works in England, and that they consumed about 300,000 loads of wood annually (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 400). In 1649 it was complained that there were 'twelve furnaces and forges' in the Forest of Dean, 'kept on foot by forest wood, beside others in places adjacent. It is conceived by those who have seriously considered of these wastes that the State has been defrauded of at least 20,000*l.*, besides the destruction of so much timber, and the goodliest forest in England' (*ibid.* 1649-50, p. 444). By an order in Parliament, dated January 1, 1650, iron-works within Dean Forest were 'suppressed and demolished' (*ibid.* p. 465), but in 1653 authorised State iron-works for the making of great shot and ordnance for the use of the navy were established in the Forest of Dean, under Major John Wade. He was instructed, however, only to cut 'dotards,' to make charcoal, and not timber fit for the navy (*ibid.* 1653-4, p. 107). The accounts of this department were examined in 1656 and approved, and a new commission was drawn up by which Major Wade was placed under the admiralty commissioners instead of the council of state (*ibid.* 1656-7, p. 155).

good iron wrought, or else the better to stock the smith who works the same, and is oftentimes poor, who hath it delivered to him out of the stores, and doth allow so much for the price thereof in discount of his bill upon his balance with the State; but most an end the smith serves and supplies his own iron, and delivers it wrought into all manner of ironworks the service may require, which if I should particularise would savour more of show than use in this discourse. It shall suffice that I tell my reader, that the several species of ironwork are sufficiently known to all clerks of the check, who have particular lists of all or most of them, together with the particular rates set upon all rated or rateable works by the piece; as for other ironworks (except anchors and grapnels) they are for form's sake distinguished into ordinary and extraordinary ironworks, and delivered into store by weight at so much an hundred by agreement.

It is true all nails (except spikes) are sold by the thousand, and have a limited price and weight by the statute to each thousand.¹ It is not to be believed what various ways of abuse and deceit there is or may be in the State's service in this provision, nor am I able to hint or detect the tithe of them, being by reason of the smallness of most and the extreme greatness of some kinds of this provision so easy to be executed and so difficult to be discovered; yet I dare not pass it over with silence, as knowing this material of great concernment in the navy, and to prevent a tacit judgment of security in those abuses by such as are guilty, as if nothing was seen or known by any man, because that which is both seen or known by a man is not the tenth part of what is both suspected and practised.

I told you before that for form's sake petty iron-

¹ See p. 260, *infra*.

works in the State's service are distinguished into ordinary and extraordinary, the one usually rated at thirty, or two and thirty shillings the hundred, and the other at seven and thirty shillings and fourpence, or forty shillings the hundred. What was the ground of this way of dealing at the first I know not, nor am I solicitous to inquire ; this I am only sure of, that this way gives a great latitude of deceit, and renders the smith singly considered, and the smith and clerk of store or check jointly considered, too much masters of the State's treasure ; for though it be true that such ironwork is distinguished by a list of particulars (as I said before) always lying with the clerk of the check into ordinary and extraordinary ironworks, whereby he knows what sorts to put on the ordinary and what upon the extraordinary rates, yet it is as true that the storekeeper that makes out the bill never mentioneth the fourth part of the kinds of ironwork wrought in that bill, but for brevity's sake, after the mention of half a score species, cuts the rest short with an etcetera. Now if the storekeeper's clerk shall enter upon his book that which is ordinary upon extraordinary, the smith gains at the least seven shillings and fourpence in every hundred by that mistake or miscarriage.¹ That such things may be done is undeniable—nay, that such things have been done even in the bodies of the bills themselves—that is to say, ordinary ironwork shuffled

¹ Cf. a letter from Francis Hosier, muster-master at Gravesend, to the Navy Commissioners, written from Deptford, November 24, 1669. 'Two bills of Mr. Foley's for spikes supplied were brought me, and I signed them with the rest of the officers, though contrary to reason ; ordinary spikes are included with extra, and both cast up at the same rate, although by his contract he is allowed less for the ordinary than the extra ; by that means he gains 19*l.* 10*s.* more than his due. I let the bill pass that I might beg your advice, as should I endeavour to hinder the officers, I should reap much envy and trouble' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1668-9, p. 589).

amongst the extraordinary, of purpose to gain a greater rate to the smith—hath been seen and observed more than once ; and for my part I cannot imagine that those that would not stick to insert it into the bill, which they knew must come to the test of public view, would much less boggle at it in their books of receipt, which are seldom or never consulted, or if they be, to little purpose, for that the trust is solely in the storekeeper, who commits it to his clerk, and sometimes to a labourer, instruments altogether unfit for such a trust.

I would only ask this question, why the State should not buy their ironwork in the same way that all other men that have the same use thereof do theirs. The alone use the State hath of it is for shipping, houses, storehouses, &c., and the merchant hath the same use, and doth spend the same species of ironwork on their ships that the State doth on theirs. It is true the State's ships are greater, but that cannot vary anything in the way of rating, but rather gives the smith an advantage, by its bulkiness, of profit in one entire rate. Certainly (though I know not what it is) there is a mystery in this way of distinction of rates, and I rather believe it because no man else in the whole River of Thames do take it up. I am sure that were there either profit or safety in this way more than in the way practised by all master builders, their own interest would long since have invited them to imitate the commissioners' frugality for the State's service ; but seeing they do it not, but rather decline it, it is a convincing argument to me that the way used is neither safe nor profitable, especially considering that many of them have been and are the State's immediate servants, and do at the same time build for themselves and for the State, and yet at the same time buy their iron-

work for themselves in a different way from the State's.

The way the merchant or master builders go is to agree with the smith for all sorts of ironwork (except nails) at a certain rate, and by that means have nothing to do more than to demand what they would have, and to see what they demanded well wrought and justly weighed off upon delivery ; and why the State should not manage their service in the same way, I know not. I am sure it will be more safe, and less trouble to the clerks of the store and check in the respective yards. The smith doth exactly know what kinds of ironwork are requisite for one ship as well as another, for a great ship as well as a small, and why the way of rating should be different is a riddle to me, if there be not something in the pad. I shall not positively affirm what it is, yet, besides what was formerly said, suppose the rates distinct, and that the storekeeper's clerk keeps the books right, and enters every species upon its proper head, and as it ought to be, yet by this distinction the smith hath a great latitude given him to make his extraordinary works (wherein lies his profit) gouty or more ponderous than it might or ought to be, and in all the State's yards there is not any man appointed to view its well workmanship, but the goods are weighed off in the presence of, it may be, a drunken clerk, or a poor labourer, and either whipped away into the store, or immediately spent upon ships in dry dock or on the stocks, to avoid inspection and put all things out of dispute as to bigness, goodness, &c.—nay, that which is more, the master shipwrights, whose duty it is to certify upon the back of all smiths' bills, do either refuse or neglect it, or if they do it, it is of course, and for provisions they never saw, and much less strictly surveyed, as they ought to have done.

And more than that, I could name some (I will not say commissioners) that have refused to suffer the master shipwright's test to the smiths' bills, yea, opposed the same (being smiths of their own preferment), when yet high suspicion of what I say (and more) hath been had upon those bills, and instead thereof, not only signed themselves, but also gained others by influence to join with them in this particular ; and that which is worst of all, for a man that since that time hath been dismissed the service upon the account of unworthy carriages. If you add to this, that by double or distinct rates the smith hath a latitude of profit, by working forest iron in extraordinary ironworks upon the account of the extraordinary rate, either altogether, or more than is fit, you may conclude that whatever else may be the mystery of this way, not obvious to the capacities of men unskilful in that calling, yet that there is a deceit or knack of profit to the smith in this way, and that by this and these before mentioned it appears unsafe for the State to continue it.

If it be said that the way of the merchant or master builder is to reduce the distinct prices of the smith into a medium, and if the State should take up or practise that way¹ yet they would gain nothing by it, in regard the smith would have his price by the medium, equal to his present profit by distinct rates—I shall answer : First, that the certain rate would not, nor indeed cannot be the medium of the State's rates, for they, as I said, give thirty, and thirty-seven shillings and fourpence, the medium whereof is thirty-three shillings and eightpence, but the master builder doth not give so great a rate, but thirty, thirty-one, or thirty-two shillings at the utmost, and then hath also several sorts of work

¹ See note on p. 236, *infra*.

that in the State's service (for want of better take-
heed)¹ do pass for rated work by the piece, and is
not rated by the hundred at all : Secondly, that
there is no reason why the medium of both rates
should be the price of all together, because the
quantity served of the ordinary ironwork exceeds
the extraordinary above one third part, and if it
doth so, as it generally doth, as far as I remember, in
most of the smith's bills, notwithstanding all the
shuffling and cutting premised as aforesaid, how
much would it exceed if the iron were truly wrought
and the bills duly made ?

But to this it will be replied, that if the ordinary
ironwork exceeds generally the extraordinary by
one third part in quantity, then thirty-one or thirty-
two shillings, the price the merchants give, will
come near the medium, and so the State shall gain
little by their variation of their way, &c. To this I
must first answer by supposition, that I believe the
extraordinary ironworks in the State's service are
both for kinds and quantity made more than indeed
it is, for the reasons aforesaid ; and if so, then the
State shall save, though not in the price yet in the
quantity of extraordinary ironwork ; now paid for,
and yet have as much thereof as their service may
require ; and it may be far better, and better
wrought and made than formerly, because then it
will be the smith's interest to make as little extra-
ordinary ironworks (and that little as small) as he
can, there being no more price given for it than the
other, whereas now his interest lies to make the
ordinary extraordinary, and to make the extra-
ordinary so weighty that it may by weight beget
him more money than otherwise it would or of right
ought to do. Secondly, besides (as I take it) all the
rated works by the piece (I mean rated works

¹ Rare. Usually = caution, prudence, circumspection.

wrought at the forge, and not bought out of shops) are included in the general price given by the master builders, and they know nothing of difference but in point of nails; and if this be so (as I am partly confident it is) then the State must needs be great gainers by this way beyond the other, over and above the prevention of frauds, &c. But I shall refer what is said to the more judicious regulator, and pass to what follows.

It is a question worthy of the serious debate and consultation of those in power and trust, whether it be safe or convenient for the State to suffer any smith commonly called a nailer to work and make nails and other petty materials of iron used in the navy, such as locks, casements, &c., in or near the State's yards as now they do.¹

For my part I am utterly against both the one and the other. My meaning is, I do not only think it unreasonable that they should be permitted to live and keep their houses or shops in the State's yards, but also unsafe to inhabit in that town or village where the State hath a yard—I mean upon that account to make nails, &c., for the State's service. I shall only lay down my reasons for this opinion, and leave what I say to those that are best able to judge.

First, it is not unknown that opportunity doth oftentimes make the thief, which is as highly given by this advantage as can be imagined, being seated (as it were) in such a place for such a purpose, and

¹ On July 13, 1649, the Navy Commissioners received an offer from one John Smith to 'serve in all the ironwork above a tenpenny nail, with the carriage &c., except grummage and staples, cagements, locks, and hinges,' at a uniform rate or 'medium,' as described in the text (p. 234, *supra*). The rate was to be 34s. per cwt., 'all good Spanish iron,' but one of the conditions of the contract was to be 'the privilege of a smith's forge, with the provisions in the State's yard at Portsmouth' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1649-50, p. 230).

having by his so being a capacity of compliance, not only with all storekeepers' clerks, or others employed under them, but also with the meanest shipwright, caulker, scavellman,¹ labourer, carver, joiner, &c., that hath any trust in the State's service, and by that trust is made capable of any embezzlements of provisions of this nature.

Secondly, dependent upon this, is the capacity given hereby, not only to steal and embezzle but also to convey and carry away all goods of this kind so stolen, and truly men had need to be more than ordinarily honest that have not only an opportunity to do a thing but also after it is done cleverly to carry it away. We usually say that the receiver makes the thief, and if there were no receivers there would not be so many thieves. This is true where yet the thing is but in supposition—namely, where yet the receiver is not known to be or dwell; but when it is or shall be known that no man is so fit to be a receiver as such a man, and that this man is beyond all other men commodiously seated and accommodated in the State's own yards or near them (suppose I said on purpose) for little or no other end or service to the State than to compass matters of deceit without the least suspicion, surely this is an high temptation, and will try the principles of many of the State's labourers and workmen of all sorts.

Thirdly, (to carry it a little higher) by this permission there is not only an opportunity to embezzle the State's stores, and when embezzled to convey them away, but also being so conveyed there

¹ Wright (*Dictionary of Obsolete and Provincial English*) gives 'skavel' = a sort of spade, a natural variant of 'shovel.' The word 'scavellman' does not occur in the glossaries, but it appears as a dockyard rating in a paper of April 1650, dealing with the raising of wages. 'Scavellmen' are classified above 'labourers,' and receive 1s. 3d. a day instead of 1s. 1d. (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1650, p. 501).

is an impossibility of discovery of the thing so embezzled or stolen ; my reason is, because the State's nails or ironworks have no ear-marks to distinguish them from ironworks of the same kind,¹ and being sold to a smith that hath store of the same goods in his shop, who is able to say what he hath is none of his, or was evilly come by ? yea, admit they had an ear-mark, or some distinguishing character whereby they might be known from goods of the same kind, yet being lodged with him that makes the same goods for the State, and stamps the premised character of distinction upon them, what suspicion can you have of this man, though yet you find the provision in his custody ? or if you have any, how can you make out your charge, unless you took him in the fact, or can prove it by other testimony ? Upon this account it is that for almost thirty years past whilst I have known and lived in the navy, I do not remember that ever any of the smiths in all or any of the State's yards were detected for receiving of stolen goods, though nothing is more certain than that these sort of men are the greatest receivers in the navy as to this material.

Fourthly, (yet further) these men, of all men

¹ The systematic marking of navy stores was begun immediately after the Restoration, if not earlier. A proclamation of November 19, 1661, requires certain modes to be adopted in the manufacture of the King's rope, sails, and pendants ; other goods are to be marked with the broad arrow where possible (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1661-2, p. 152). A little later, timber felled for the navy in the Forest of Dean was being thus marked on the butt and top (*ibid.* p. 350). The State's mark was placed upon anchors as early as 1657 (*ibid.* 1657-8, p. 407), but nails and some other sorts of ironwork could not be thus marked, and were very easily disposed of ; thus they were often the object of petty depredations. In 1663 an illicit storehouse was discovered at Deptford for nails, iron shot, and other embezzled ironwork—'the gulf that swallows up all from any place brought to him' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1663-4, p. 249. See also *ibid.* 1650, p. 492 ; 1653-4, p. 121 ; 1655-6, pp. 444, 452 ; 1663-4, p. 549 and elsewhere).

that live in the State's yards or near them, have by this means a capacity beyond all men to empty their shops or houses of all stolen or embezzled goods; for the same man that buys them shall at the same time, or suddenly after, sell, serve, and deliver the same goods again into the State's stores, though the compliance be but with thieves that act at a distance and upon the by—I mean, that have no immediate, but a remote trust and by-occasion as to such stores. But if the compliance be between the storekeeper or his clerk, and the smith,¹ then there is no absolute need of interchange, further than by receipts given from the one to the other for the quantities agreed upon, and the smith according to those receipts may call for his bill at the end of the quarter for these provisions as equally as if he had received them into his shop from the purloiner and delivered them *de novo* into the State's stores; yea, and so doing, the storekeeper (if honest) is not able to detect his man, though guilty, nor yet the commissioners to find out any deceit in a bill that is nothing but deceit, if the storekeeper be guilty.

All that can be said against this last argument is that the same fraud may be used by the store-

¹ In one of the petitions presented against the Pett family in connection with the Chatham scandal of 1651 (see. *E. H. R.* xi. 78) it is suggested that there is a 'confederacy in regard to the iron-work' between Thomas Whitton, the keeper of the out-stores at Chatham, and certain smiths there, whereby 'the State is much abused.' Thomas Symons, house-carpenter at Chatham, 'upon being asked if he knew anything of that black shop, pointing to the smiths' forge at the dock, he said that black forge made a white purse to some of them, which Robert Preston, clerk and foreman to Mr. Downing, the master smith, must needs know, for he compared the books; and further, that they were all so knit together, that the devil himself could not discover them, except one impeached the other, and that he would be hanged before he would do so' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1651-2, p. 37). Whitton was discharged by the Council of State on March 5, 1652 (*ibid.* p. 169).

keeper's clerks, though the smith should live twenty miles distant from the State's yards; and truly against this I have nothing to say but this, that if the State may be so grossly abused at so great a distance, of what concernment is it to the State's instruments to prevent it what they can, by not suffering the smith to live in or near the State's yards, when as yet they cannot prevent it as they would, though he lived elsewhere. And I shall only advise in this particular that (seeing the State is so liable to abuse in these petty provisions, and that beyond other provisions served into store) the clerks of the check respectively be required to keep a more strict check upon the storekeeper, as to the receipts and issues of these provisions, than they do, and not to suffer (as they do), the storekeeper's clerk or labourers to take them in, and then (it may be a month after) to send their men to the storekeeper's clerk to consult and copy his books as to the species and quantities of each kind delivered. Yea, I could also wish that, these provisions being so subject to embezzlement as they are, none might be permitted to the trust of their receipt or issues but the storekeeper himself, being a trust not fit for clerks, labourers, or others whose necessity may expose them to lie under the temptation beyond other men.

I know what I say in this particular, and could instance in some, not only smiths and their foremen but also storekeepers' clerks,—yea, labourers themselves,—that have suddenly raised to themselves considerable estates out of nothing, by (as may be justly suspected) such courses as these. Nor do I speak or write these things as desirous to uncover their nakedness, or in the least to blemish those that gave them trust (of whose fidelity to the State I am very confident), but to make out and prosecute my

argument as to the inconvenience that attends the smith's living in or near the State's yards ; and to let my reader see and know that what hath been done formerly by some, not only may be but is done at present by others, both smiths and clerks, &c., and all upon the account of that insufferable sufferance of the State's yards and places adjacent to be pestered with men of that calling. And if it were not so, some that I could name could not cock it as they do, buy and build houses, entertain private, or rather too public meetings at feasts and drinkings of no small expense, if there were not something of this nature to bear it out, especially considering that the same men are but of yesterday, and had not that day (I mean very lately) either money or credit, house or wherewith to keep one. But I am loth to rake in puddles, and shall therefore pass this argument, and leave what is said thereof to those in trust.

I know it will be objected by some, why I, being for sundry years together not only a commissioner at large but also surveyor of the navy, whereby I had by particular duty a more immediate trust than my fellows as to stores of all sorts, did not prevent or reform this abuse by removing all nail-smiths from the State's yards, &c. To this I shall only say thus much (though I could say much more if need were) that though this miscarriage be great in itself considered, yet it is little or nothing compared with others, wherein I did endeavour to do the State that right that became my trust ; but I found such cold comfort therein, and so many discouragements from some that acted with me, and others that were above me and should have protected me, that I thought it my wisdom to decline the service wholly, rather than to contract the odium of all sorts of men upon me, and hazard the ruin of myself and

family by endeavouring to do the State faithful service.¹

I know also it will be objected by others, that if you remove upon these pretences the nail-smiths from the State's yards, or the villages where the State's yards are, that this removal will much obstruct the service of the State by exposing the works to a stand, oftentimes for want of a few nails, till they can be supplied from London or other places where the contractor lives ; whereas now they can but ask and have, and that what quantities they please, upon all emergencies, in timely and seasonable manner to serve the State's interest and comply with all demands, &c. To this I shall answer—

First, I desire not to contend in this nor any other particular suggested in this discourse. I have given you my reasons, and if they bear no weight, or not so much as to counterpoise, yea, outbalance all that can be opposed against them, let the business stand as it is. I am contented, having no design but the State's interest in what I have or shall propound.

Secondly, Is it not as equally possible to supply the magazine or stores with nails and petty sorts of ironworks from London, as with stores of greater bulk and quantities from foreign countries ? And though the nailer or smith be permitted to live in or near the State's yards of Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham, and Portsmouth, is he not the instrument of the grand contractor in all or most of these places at London, and are not the bills made out to him and in his name, and not to the workman ? If so, why cannot the same contractor as equally send his nails, &c., from London, where they are made in great and vast quantities, as settle a smith in the State's yards to supply petty demands ? Nay, do not all or

¹ See note on p. 296, *infra*.

most of the ironmongers of London buy all or most of their nails and petty ironwork either at Birmingham,¹ almost an hundred miles from London, where they are made, or at London, as brought from thence to be sold there, and can we imagine that all England should be served by that single market, and yet the navy cannot be supplied unless there be more than one or two smiths settled in each yard to answer demands of the master shipwright, &c. ?

Thirdly, Moreover consider, are not all the nails and small ironwork now made in or near the State's yards, brought and delivered into the stores before their expense, and from thence delivered again to the persons and places where the service requires them ? and is it material to the service whence they come, if it be resolved and agreed that thither they must come before they be expended ? Doth not the master shipwright know by what works he hath in his hand what sorts of nails and ironworks are fit to be in store to carry on those works ? and may they not be as equally demanded from London in whole parcels, as from the forge in small pittances ? Will any man nourish in his family a man that is no servant, upon the pretence of accommodating the necessities of the family upon sudden demands, whenas it is a known thing that that man doth debauch all the servants of that family, and is the receiver of all the frauds and embezzlements in that family ? Surely the master of that house would rather expect that his steward should take care to provide for the family at the best and common market, than thus to betray his estate by a little ease to himself.

Fourthly, If after all this you shall yet say that nails and these petty provisions of ironwork are not always brought and delivered into the stores (as

¹ MSS. 'Brummidgham.'

regularly they ought to be), but are oftentimes issued from the forge itself to supply emergencies, &c., then I must tell you that this pretended emergency is the cheat of the whole business in settling this man there, and under the notion thereof all the abuses before mentioned, and many others whereof I am ignorant, and which nor I nor the wisest man in the world is able to detect, are committed without control; and if there were no other reason to discharge them but this that you bring as your main reason to continue them, I say that itself is sufficient to convince the equity of what is urged. Grant but this absurdity, that under any pretence these petty provisions shall be delivered from the forge and not be first brought into the stores, and an easy brain in naval affairs will make the inference of what will follow, &c.

The next thing I shall discuss upon this subject is, whether it be fit, safe, or advantageous to the State's interest, to admit of anchor-forges in the State's yards respectively, yea or not. That they are permitted is without dispute; that they have been so for many years past, even time out of mind, is not at all questioned—yea, that the forges themselves are and have been built by the State at no small charge, the better to encourage the anchor-smiths and accommodate the service with supplies from their own yards, is also granted. But what of all this; must it needs therefore follow that it is safe and advantageous to the State so to continue them?

What the grounds of this practice were or are in those that first erected, and have since continued them in the State's yards, I know not; only I believe the principal ends were accommodation in general, that boatswains and carpenters might have their anchors and stores at hand and in readiness for the service upon all commands, &c., and that

there might be no retardment thereunto for want thereof. This, for ought I know, was and is all that the wisdom of past times foresaw in this settlement, and truly it hath far more colour of advantage to the State than the former of nails, and is necessary (if not of necessity) to be permitted in places near the State's yards. But yet I am totally against their being seated in the State's yards, which though you may say is so small a difference (as 'in' and 'near' import) as is scarce worth my time or my reader's patience, yet I doubt not to evidence to all impartial standers-by these two propositions, that is to say :—First, that it is highly disadvantageous to the service to continue anchor-forges in the State's own yards ; and secondly, that the service may be supplied with anchors and other provisions of ironwork as equally and as well from forges conveniently situated near the State's yards as in them.

For the first of these, I shall in the first place remind my reader of what was formerly said in the point of nail-forges in the State's yards, and to save a labour of repetition of the same things, say that which gives a latitude of abuse to all subordinate instruments, that which covers that abuse, and that with such secrecy as renders the discovery exceeding difficult, if at all possible, must needs be a great disservice to the State ; but all this do the anchor-smith's forges. Therefore &c.

In the next place, I affirm that it is superfluous for the State to keep a watch in their respective yards, if yet the smiths must be permitted, as they are, access into the same yards at all hours of the night ; for this access renders the watch incapable of doing what they come for, namely, the preservation of the State's provisions in safety, and withal gives themselves a latitude to practise all manner of abuses. Nor indeed are they any more watch-

men, but storekeepers, and have the command of the whole yard and all therein at their own will and pleasure, to do or suffer to be done therein what they think fit ; for under this notion of opening the gates for the smiths, the keys are constantly left with them that are not *compos* for such a trust, and so consequently the gates do in a manner stand open all night, or at leastwise are opened for all comers at all seasons¹ of the night, and what those comers are, who knows? what they may be, I know. That there may be embezzlements, &c., I told you before. Now if you add to the advantage of working in the State's yards, the smith's access to the same yards at all hours of the night, who is not able to judge what advantage is hereby given him for compliance either with the storekeeper or any of his instruments, watchmen, labourers, shipwrights, boatmakers, &c., who have hereby not only mutual accesses, each to other, but also at such hours of the night when no man else stirs, and in such a place where no suspicion can be had of the least discovery ; or if they feared it, the same thing embezzled at midnight may be wrought out into another form or species before the morning? Which how unsafe it is to suffer, let others judge.

If you add to this the intolerable abuse that is or may be by weighing off provisions of all sorts at the smith's forge, without so much as admission into the State's stores, I think the argument will be undeniable, for whatsoever is pretended for this practice, yet I am confident it is one of the most unworthy ways of the whole navy, and that which is only occasioned by permitting the forges to be in the State's yards, which, if they were seated elsewhere,

¹ The Longleat MS. reads 'seiles.' 'Seil' or 'seel' = 'opportunity,' 'time,' 'season' ; as to 'pass the seel of the day'—the Norfolk equivalent for to 'pass the time of day.'

no storekeeper would be so supine or careless as to suffer any boatswain or carpenter to go to the smith's forge and take what they please (as they do daily), and—it may be ten days after—charge what was delivered upon the storekeeper's or his man's books ; nay, I must in faithfulness to the State's service say that the being of the smith's forge in the State's yards doth not only occasion sloth and negligence in the storekeepers and their instruments to see the stores supplied with what they want, but also gives the smith a fair opportunity to delay the supply of what is wanting, of purpose to beget a necessity of present use, and so of weighing the provision at the forge, upon the account of haste, either to send it aboard ships commanded to the seas, or immediately to work it out upon ships new building or repairing in dry dock.

Besides what was formerly hinted in the case of nails, &c., I shall tell you a few of those many abuses that may and do attend the State's service by weighing provisions at the forge. First, the beam may be false ; or if not, yet secondly, the weights may be false ! Thirdly, the party receiving it may charge more than was delivered, or give receipt for that he never had. Fourthly, here can be no inspection into the goodness of the iron, whether Spanish or English, whether new or old new-wrought, nor yet the workmanship of the material, whether too big or too little, whether gouty or clean and handsome, &c. Fifthly, upon this it will follow that no master shipwright can certify upon the smith's bills otherwise than at random, and for the goods which they never viewed or surveyed. Sixthly, upon this also the State must pay for what they never had, or if they had anything, yet it was but bare iron without workmanship, or more iron than might have served, with

many other things that are secrets to this indulgence. Seventhly, moreover, the same things may be weighed twice over, by an easy compliance. Eighthly, yea, goods weighed in the forge may never be spent in the service, but embezzled and sold to the smith, and by him re-sold to the State.

I do not say these things are so, yet I can and do aver that by this indulgence they may be so, and do know that in all State's affairs it is their wisdom by supposing the worst to prevent it; and the reason is good, because he that is honest to-day may be dishonest to-morrow, and that office that at present is supplied with an honest man may in the next succession be filled with a knave; else why are so many checks kept upon the treasurer's payments? Now if, under the notion of an honest man in being, no care should be taken in an affair of this consequence, but all men permitted to take what, how much, and when they please, and all from the smith's forge and not from the stores, truly this is the highway to all manner of abuse; and an inch given by those in power in this sense shall advance boldness enough to take more than an ell, if occasion serves.

This among other things is that which so much drains the State's treasures beyond former times and precedents, and makes the expense of all new buildings and old repairs almost double to what was formerly. I told you upon the point of wages that the pay-books are swelled beyond measure, and can you think there shall be wages paid and no materials spent? Yes, be confident this remissness is the foundation of all manner of waste in the State's service, and renders them so much in debt in the navy, and if ever the State shall think fit to be more frugal in their expense, they must take special care to stop the passage of those things,

especially that under the notion of necessity or conveniency are made the inlets of all manner of lewdness and miscarriages in the navy.

But when you have said and done all, may not all or most of these deceits be exercised after the delivery of the provisions into the storehouse, and if so, what have you gained by this long discourse? I answer: First, all cannot be practised.¹ Secondly, many may, but with much more hazard, difficulty, and manifold compliance. Thirdly, none can, with that ease and security that the present indulgence affords, especially if the smith be removed the State's yards. Lastly, admit the worst, that all may, doth it therefore follow that the State should rather trust the smith than the storekeeper, the vendor than the accountant? or that the storekeeper should permit the smith to do what he pleaseth, and deliver goods when and to whom he thinks fit, and that from his own beam? Is not this a temptation beyond all reason?

For the second thing propounded, namely, that the service may be supplied with anchors and other provisions of ironwork as equally and as well from forges conveniently situated near the State's yards as in them, I shall demonstrate by the ensuing arguments. First, there is nothing but a supposed small distance of place from the State's yard that puts the difference between the forge where it now stands and where it may be supposed to be hired or set, and how a quoit's cast distance should render the service incapable of supply, I do not discern. Secondly, if the smith builds or hires his own place or forge, his own discretion and interest will invite him to settle it at or near the waterside, for accommodation of charge in receiving iron, anchors, coals, &c., and delivering ironworks—which accommo-

¹ *I.e.* tampered with.

either at the nail or the anchor-forges, as that which is highly destructive to the State's interest. I know the commissioners do keep several men upon the State's charge as scouts or look-outs, to prevent and discover embezzlements either of provisions or time by those that are in pay and actual service in the yards, but all they do in this particular signifies little or nothing so long as these forges are permitted; for the main disease is within the yards themselves, and till they be purged there is little expectation of any good or great service by such instruments. He is a poor thief that having so good a covert so near at hand shall expose himself to hazard by wandering from the nest.

I shall not mention anything of anchors simply considered, only I am altogether unsatisfied in the way of buying anchors for the navy at distinct rates, according to their distinct bigness—that is to say, from one to ten, from ten to twenty, from twenty to thirty, from thirty to forty, from forty to fifty, and from fifty to sixty hundredweight in an anchor. And of this I must needs say that it cannot but be attended with more profit to the smith than is either fit to be given him, or the commissioners are able to discern. It is the unhappiness of the navy to take up things by tradition rather than by any satisfactory or rational account, poisoning the judgment of those that are trusted to give away the State's treasure; and the reason of this is, because most men employed in that trust must and do, for want of experience in the navy, act more by precedent than any grounded knowledge in that way. It is true that this way of rating anchors hath been ancient, though yet the rates given were never so great or exorbitant as now they are;¹ besides the latitude taken by all

¹ The scale of payment in the earlier part of James I.'s reign is given in the Report of the Commission of 1618: for anchors

being so useful and commodious for the service in case of haste, and of so much ease to the store-keepers, and profit to them that are borne by the State for the receipt of all ironwork from the forge, &c. But I hope none of them will or can think that I have the least design against any man's particular in this undertaking, nor am I so wedded to or fond of my opinion in this particular but that I could willingly subscribe to the conveniency of the thing, if under the notion of that conveniency the State were not too grossly abused, or if those of the contrary opinion can produce or propound a way how to remedy or prevent those abuses fore-mentioned without removing the forges, especially that of Chatham. I must and shall readily confess that as to anchors, (especially great anchors), there is much use of them, and I do believe that at the forges' first setting up or building in the State's yards, much of that inconveniency that now attends them was not so much as foreseen, much less intended to be permitted; and were I not assured that by abuse of them, all their usefulness otherwise doth not nor cannot near balance the State's damage, and that the State might not be as readily supplied in their service if they stood elsewhere, I should never have cast such a bone of contention amongst those whom this opinion may contradict. But seeing I know that they are the very thieves and receivers of the navy as to this material, I could not pass them with silence, though I am very sensible of some singularity of opinion in this particular—I mean for anchor-forges being or standing in the State's yards. As for the nail-forge, I am clear against their standing either in or near them, and do totally dislike the weighing of any of the State's provisions (except anchors) or issuing them from thence immediately to the ships or for present service or expense,

either at the nail or the anchor-forges, as that which is highly destructive to the State's interest. I know the commissioners do keep several men upon the State's charge as scouts or look-outs, to prevent and discover embezzlements either of provisions or time by those that are in pay and actual service in the yards, but all they do in this particular signifies little or nothing so long as these forges are permitted; for the main disease is within the yards themselves, and till they be purged there is little expectation of any good or great service by such instruments. He is a poor thief that having so good a covert so near at hand shall expose himself to hazard by wandering from the nest.

I shall not mention anything of anchors simply considered, only I am altogether unsatisfied in the way of buying anchors for the navy at distinct rates, according to their distinct bigness—that is to say, from one to ten, from ten to twenty, from twenty to thirty, from thirty to forty, from forty to fifty, and from fifty to sixty hundredweight in an anchor. And of this I must needs say that it cannot but be attended with more profit to the smith than is either fit to be given him, or the commissioners are able to discern. It is the unhappiness of the navy to take up things by tradition rather than by any satisfactory or rational account, poisoning the judgment of those that are trusted to give away the State's treasure; and the reason of this is, because most men employed in that trust must and do, for want of experience in the navy, act more by precedent than any grounded knowledge in that way. It is true that this way of rating anchors hath been ancient, though yet the rates given were never so great or exorbitant as now they are;¹ besides the latitude taken by all

¹ The scale of payment in the earlier part of James I.'s reign is given in the Report of the Commission of 1618: for anchors

smiths of making anchors of one or two hundred more than twenty, thirty, or forty hundred, of purpose to beget the rate or price of the last division, as if one hundredweight of iron added to twenty, thirty, or forty hundred were a sufficient ground for the commissioners to add to the smith's price for the whole anchor more than the iron of the whole anchor is worth. I must needs confess that whilst I acted as commissioner I could never be satisfied in this particular, and though I have had many bickerings with several smiths, yet I have been overborne by their influence with some of my fellows so far, that rather than to be in constant contention I have joined with them in passing their bills, to the State's prejudice ; though I believe never at such rates as are now given for great anchors ; the reason whereof they best know that give them. For my part, I always believed they had too much before—I am sure they had enough, else they would not have been contented with what they had—and why they should have almost double the price of what they formerly had for anchors of the same weight, as I am apt to believe they have, is beyond the fathom of my reason and fit for the search of a judicious regulator.

Upon the building of the Sovereign in the year 1637,¹ the greatest anchor made for her weighed but from 1 to 9 cwt., 28s. or 30s. per cwt. ; 9 cwt. 32s. ; 12 cwt. 35s. ; 13 cwt. 37s. ; 16 cwt. 44s. ; 20 cwt. 50s. ; 23 cwt. 55s. ; 27 cwt. 3l. (Charnock, *Mar. Arch.* ii. 223). But these prices were much too high, and the commissioners hoped to be able to buy them at merchants' prices—a 'medium' (see p. 234, *supra*) of 30s. per cwt. below 12 cwt. ; 33s. from 12 to 20 cwt. ; 35s. above 20 cwt. (Charnock, *ibid.* ii. 255). In 1626 30s. to 2l. per cwt. was being paid (*E. H. R.* ix. 492), and in 1656, 34s. to 37s. (*ibid.* xi. 81), but the weight of the anchors for which this price was paid is not given.

¹ An account of the Sovereign of the Seas is given by Mr. Oppenheim (*E. H. R.* ix. 100).

sixty hundredweight, and the price given for it was (as I remember) not above five and fifty shillings an hundred,¹ and that was then looked upon as unreasonable—I am sure unprecedented,² because the navy never had an anchor of that weight or price before.³ At present I find the master attendant to covet anchors of greater weight for the same ship,⁴ and so in proportion for most ships of her and other ranks. I dispute not with them the ground of their demands; they best know what they have to do therein; but that which I strange at⁵ is the price beyond all precedent or reason of standers-by. Were it lawful to inquire into secrets, I would ask why an anchor of thirty hundred should cost the State but sixty pounds, or forty shillings an hundred, and an anchor of three score hundred should cost the State from the same man three hundred and three-score pounds, or six pounds an hundred. Where lies the difference in the anchors, that begets so vast a difference in the price? It must certainly be in the weight and the workmanship, including the extraordinary charge of fire; more than this I cannot imagine, for as to other things, that is to say, the forge, the bellows, crane, chains, and screws necessary to the making of both these, are equally the same, and most or all of them the State's own. And the same crane that can poise an anchor of forty hundred, will raise and turn (with a small

¹ The weight of the largest anchors used in the navy in 1809 was 90 cwt., and the price paid per cwt. was 4*l.* 12*s.* 4½*d.* The bower anchor of a 64-gun ship was 57 cwt. at 3*l.* 8*s.* 6*d.* (Falconer modernised by Burney; edition of 1830). The heaviest anchor made under Elizabeth was 30 cwt., and they were usually much smaller (*E. H. R.* vi. 494).

² Longleat MS. 'unprecedentall.'

³ But see note on p. 252, *supra*.

⁴ In Mr. Battine's *Table of Naval Calculations* (Pepysian MSS.), dated December 1684, the largest anchor of a first-rate is 66 cwt.

⁵ *I.e.* wonder at.

strength added) an anchor of sixty hundred. Now admit you allow the smith for his anchor of sixty hundred after the first rate of forty shillings the hundred; for the anchor of thirty hundred here is the price of the iron and the value of the workmanship for the whole sixty hundred included, and yet the anchor will cost the State but 120*l.* of the 360*l.* before mentioned, so that the remainder, viz., 240*l.*, is given him neither for weight nor workmanship (that is to say, ordinary workmanship)—for that was paid for before in the 120*l.*—but for extraordinary workmanship, and that also but for thirty hundred-weight of iron, added to thirty hundred formerly allowed as ordinary, to make that up an anchor of sixty hundredweight; for which purpose you allow the smith (that which no man can reasonably imagine, viz.), double the men, double the time, and double the fire (all other things understand themselves), yet the charge extraordinary of all these cannot amount to 40*l.*, nor near that sum, because the whole workmanship of the anchor of thirty hundred did not cost above 32*l.* at the rate supposed, and for the iron, it is the same in sixty hundred as in thirty,¹ and cost no more by the ton than I can buy it for by the hundred—nay, I will buy it cheaper by great quantities and constant custom than another man shall in small parcels and for a present occasion. Moreover, what if I should say that the greatness of the anchor (set aside the extraordinary labour of men) is rather the advantage than the loss of the smith, though paid for but at the same rate as for a smaller anchor. I would willingly be understood clearly. My meaning is that if I were a smith, and the commissioners of the navy would allow me somewhat extraordinary by the lump or in the total for my extraordinary expense of fire, labour, &c., I

¹ The MSS. read '60*l.*' and '30*l.*'

had rather (that is to say, for my profit) undertake with them to make ten anchors of sixty hundred each at forty shillings per hundred, than twenty anchors of thirty hundred each at the same rate. My reason is, because I spend no more iron in the twenty than in the ten, and I work but ten rings, ten shanks, and twenty flukes and palms (pardon me if I mistake the proper terms)¹ in the one, and double the quantity or number in the other ; and if this be rational where yet the weight of iron expended or wrought is the same, I humbly conceive it much more equal and advantageous to the smith where the quantity of iron differs or exceeds. As for the purpose, I should think it the interest of an anchor-smith rather to choose to make an anchor of sixty hundred than of thirty hundred at the same rate, because in the first he expends double the quantity of iron he doth in the last, and by consequence hath double the quantity of workmanship allowed him, provided he hath (as in all the State's yards he hath) the accommodation of the State's crane, forge, &c., and some small matter allowed him for extraordinary workmanship and fire ; for in these, and nothing else but these, the equity of enlarged rates or prices doth lie, so that (as I apprehend) all the dispute lies in what is fit to be given or allowed him extraordinary for these, and not for the anchor distinguished from thirty to sixty hundred, as is now practical and the rule of the navy.

I know that every trade hath its mystery, and in that regard I desire not to be positive in my opinion in this nor anything else, yet I know withal that the mystery of most callings is generally attended with much deceit, or in plain English, knavery, if not itself such. Upon which account I was the more

¹ 'Flukes' or 'palms' are the broad triangular plates on each arm of an anchor.

willing to declare my folly, in arguing that for which I can give myself no better reason, rather than be silent in a thing of so great concernment to the State, and to suffer them to act upon an implicit faith of the smith. Who knows but that my simplicity may so far start the question as to beget its dispute and serious discussion by such as are able to give a better judgment in the case than myself? And if thereby the equity of the price or rate now given shall be made patent so as to continue it, the smiths have no wrong from me, but are rather bound to thank me for the inquiry, being for the future justified in the price given; but if it shall appear that the prices given are unreasonable, and the State shall be the gainer in the future by this discovery, I have both my end and my reward in their advantage, that being all I seek for.

From this I shall descend to consider of old iron and ironworks, whereby something may be yet further collected as to the truth of what was formerly said touching new ironworks and their weighing at the smiths' forges. If the expense of new iron be consulted, a man would think that some good part of that expense might be recruited by old iron, &c., found upon the new building, repairing, or ripping up of all or any of the State's ships, frigates, &c., or upon the return of all ships from sea at the balance of all boatswains' and carpenters' accounts, that being a commodity that outlasts the ships upon which it is wrought, and if not really spent upon the service, cannot be said to be wasted, broken, or otherwise impaired by carrying it to sea. But instead hereof, so little is returned to the State, and of that little so much embezzled from them, that it is strange to consider. I know there is care taken by the commissioners to prevent what they can of this abuse, by appointing one or more men in each yard

to collect the old iron and to have the particular charge thereof for the State's use. But generally this man is some poor labourer or other indigent person, begotten into some forlorn fortune, and recommended to them by some grandee or other, who by his trust (too big for him) finds a new way to pay old debts, and get himself and his a living to boot. It is strange to me, why these men should not only be entrusted to gather it up but also to keep it, and not bring it immediately into the State's store and deliver it over to the storekeeper's charge. Surely it was never intended by the State that such men as these should have such a charge upon them, that are neither accountants¹ to the State, or if they were, are yet able to give them any account for what they do. This is that which begets so slender a product of all the State's old ironworks. This is that which makes and seals up that firm league of amity, notoriously known and observed to be between these sort of men and others that I could name, with both the nail-smith and the anchor-smith, or their foremen, in all or most of the State's yards. Yea, this is that which makes the pretended necessities of weighing off the State's ironworks at the forge upon account of haste and present use ; for if the State's old iron be sold to the smith, and shall need but little or no workmanship, especially bolts, pins, plates, &c., then if they be not shipped from the forge and spent immediately, or at least sent out of sight to the seas, an easy observation will discover it to be what it is ; but by being weighed there, where all parties are agreed, the State is not only cozened of their ironworks, but also of the charge of workmanship thereof, for it is first bought by the smith from the purloiner for a small matter and as old iron, and then with a little help of heating, righting, rounding, &c., re-supplied to

¹ 'Accountant' here = one liable to give an account, *i.e.* responsible.

the State as new, and almost twenty shillings for every hundred included in the price for workmanship.

I desire not to charge or particularise any man ; that which I design is, to advise those whom it may concern not to permit the provision to lie one night in the collector's hands, but to give him order to deliver by weight what he gathers up every night into the stores, and to receive from the storekeeper a note for what he delivers, by which the storekeeper and his service to the State may at the end of every quarter or year be consulted and rewarded. It is not handsome that the State's stores should lie in any private man's keeping, either ashore or on board the State's ships or hulk, where opportunity of embezzlement is given more than ordinary, and whereby an honest man is made a thief against his will. I am sure this way of acting as to this material is of a late edition,¹ though I know when formerly it was brought into the stores much of it came short thither, and that which was put there was too often connived at—yea, warranted by some to be taken out of the stores in great quantities as old iron by the smith, and discounted upon his bills to the State at thirteen or fourteen shillings the hundred, when yet the same iron might have been sold at a free market by the candle or otherwise for much more money ; to prevent which practice for the future I am apt to believe that the late new device was set up, which mended the matter so well that it made it ten times worse than it was.

I shall conclude what I shall say upon this subject with something touching nails, and therein only advise that they be taken into store in a double way or capacity, viz., by weight and by tale, both. It was the wisdom of parliament in former times to limit their making after that manner, viz., that every sort of nails, suppose tenpenny, sixpenny, four-

¹ *I.e.* a novelty.

penny, &c., should respectively weigh so many pounds to every thousand,¹ and if the storekeeper shall have liberty to receive them by the thousand, and not limit the number to weight of every thousand, according to the statute in that behalf, there may be much injury to the State, and especially from those forges that are permitted to be in or near the State's yards, both in working old iron, and making them too great or gouty, or too slender or weak nails of each sort and proportion ; as I have often known and observed. Nor would I permit the storekeeper barely to say he does his duty herein, but also in all smiths' bills to specify under his hand as equally the weight as the number of all sorts of nails ; and by order command him to make trial of the weight and number of the smiths' casks of nails sent into store by content. Not that I mean he should, or think he can possibly tell them all, but that for satisfaction to himself he should, when he sees convenient, take notice of the content of one or more casks, and, as before the delivery of those nails to weigh the whole cask, so in their delivery to keep an exact account whether their number answered the content or card, and then, comparing the number and weight together (abating the tare of the cask), to see whether they be made both for weight and number according to the statute, yea or not. I know there have been several abuses in the matter of spikes and nails in the State's service, such as making spikes too great

¹ The ordinary nails used in the navy were twopenny, four-penny, sixpenny, tenpenny, twenty-penny, twenty-four-penny, thirty-penny, and forty-penny, ranging from one to four and a half inches in length. They were so called because a thousand of them weighed two, four, six, ten, twenty, twenty-four, thirty, and forty pounds, 'penny' being used in the rare sense of 'pound weight.' They appear to have been made in these sizes by invariable custom, but there is no trace of any statute dealing with the matter.

or gouty, to beget weight, permitting small spikes to be sold not by weight but by the thousand, advancing a vast price upon the thousand of spikes under the notion of a new title or name, viz., deck-nails.¹ These and many other not so pretty as petty devices have been long since detected, and I hope are amended. I only hint them by the way, that the supposed regulator may know what hath been and may be (if not at present is) practised in the navy.

Thus I have finished what I thought fit to write of these three principal materials or provisions used in the navy, by which my reader may see how easy a thing it is to injure the State, and yet I dare say with confidence that I have not (nor indeed can) discover the twentieth part of that deceit that attends these particulars, neither indeed was it my intention so to do, but by a few (as I said before) to give some light to those that should be trusted for the regulation of the navy, how to do the State a service by preventing of these, and discovering others for the future. If I should proceed to speak what I could say touching masts, blocks, lead, oars, flags, buckets, scuppers, lanthorns, boats, deals, tar, rosin, pitch, tallow, glass, canvas, leather, reed,² twice-laid stuff,³ copper, bricks, lime, hamaccoes,⁴

¹ 'A kind of spike with a snug head, commonly made in a diamond form ; they are single and double deck-nails, and from four to twelve inches long' (Smyth, *Sailors' Word-book*).

² Specially prepared with melted composition and sulphur for fireships (Falconer).

³ New rope made from the yarns of old rope. 35 *Eliz.* c. 8, 'An Act for the avoiding of deceit used in making and selling of twice-laid cordage' describes the abuse alluded to in the text. 'Forasmuch as it is found by common experience that sundry persons using the trade of making Cables, Halsors, and other kind of cordage within this realm, have of late for their private lucre and gain used to make the same of old, cast, and over-worn Cables, Halsors, and Cordage, and have craftily and deceitfully uttered and sold the same, being tarred, as new, good, and strong. . . .'

⁴ Span. *hamaca*. The modern form 'hammock' does not

kerseys,¹ tap-houses,² back-doors in all the State's yards, the false rule to measure ships by, waste of the State's timber by chips, provant clothes,³ the vice-treasurer at sea, imprests upon the treasurer's account, carving, joining, painting, the actings of the commissioners at Portsmouth and Chatham in their distinct capacities upon the place, the office of the ordnance, with many other things and provisions of necessary use in the navy, and for which great sums of money are yearly paid, I should not only swell my discourse beyond my first intention, but also tire myself and my reader with too much matter upon one and the same subject, though every one of those have such variety of tricks and jingles, that might admit some pleasure to the reader, as well as profit to the State, if they were set out to the life by a skilful pen. Let it suffice that I have laid open my weakness in breaking the

come into use in the admiralty papers until the middle of the eighteenth century.

¹ A coarse material used for various purposes on board ship. In Battine's *Tables* they are carried by the first three rates only, and three kinds are distinguished, 'accommodation,' 'top-armour,' and 'waist-cloth' kerseys.

² In an important paper presented by John Hollond to the Navy Commissioners, dated from Deptford, August 9, 1652, he sets forth eight reasons against permitting the master shipwright to keep a private yard. One of these is that 'if private trade necessitates his absence from the yard above half his time' he will be unable to properly control the tap-house, which, though it 'had a good ground for its first institution, and is yet fit to be continued if the master shipwright perform his duty by limiting the men to their time, forbidding the sale of strong beer, and not above a certain quantity of small beer at one time to one man, and that without-doors,' yet 'for want of order' it has become 'one of the greatest abuses in the navy' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1651-2, p. 362).

³ 'Provant' is applied to what is supplied as part of a regular allowance; hence contemptuously, as in Ben Jonson 'A poor provant rapier, no better' (Nares, *Glossary*). 'Provant clothes' were the regulation kits supplied to sailors. These are described by Mr. Oppenheim in *E. H. R.* xi. 45.

ice as to these three. A wise regulator (for whom I principally intended it) may know the body by the foot, and enlarge his meditations by what is said upon these so as to improve his judgment and advantage the State's service upon the rest ; and if by my folly others more able would be provoked or invited to let future times partake of their pains and experiences for the common good of the navy (a thing that highly concerns the common good of the nation) I should think my pains in this well rewarded, and be the better able cheerfully to undergo the scorns of some and malice of others that I know will be ready to oppose what is said, the men of these times being for the most part unable to bear plain dealing—especially those who make it their design, by fishing in the troubled waters of a disjointed and at present perplexed State, to rake and gather great estates to themselves, it matters not how nor from whom, so they have it and can carry it away without suspect or detection, under the notion of high zeal for public interest and forwardness in ways of religion—the common cloak of these times (oh lamentable!) for all manner of unworthy carriages.

CHAPTER VII

OF FREIGHT OF MERCHANTS' SHIPS

BEFORE I shall proceed upon this or the succeeding chapters, I must remind my reader that upon my first dividing of the navy and my discourse into Wages, Victuals, and Stores, I premised that when I had finished what I had to say as to them in particular (being the thread that runs through the woof of the whole navy) I would then speak of some particulars that referred to them all three in a joint way; amongst which this of freight and those succeeding are the principal, so that now he must not expect much method from me, but a jumbling discourse of all together, by which yet a judicious regulator may hapily¹ spy out some light for the future government of the navy.

Freight is nothing else but the hire of a ship into the State's service by the ton or by the month. The usual way of the navy is by the month, accounting eight and twenty days to the month; when they go by the ton it is commonly to transport victuals or other provisions, and then they are not looked upon as men-of-war but sutlers,² &c. Freight of ships as men-of-war is sometimes for the hull of the ship only, and the State victual and pay wages; but most commonly the merchant pays all, and the State knows nothing but so much a month

¹ See note on p. 288, *infra*.

² MSS. 'subtillers.'

for the freight, victuals, and wages of the ship and company.

In the late wars between the King and his Parliament, and the Parliament and the Dutch, the State had occasion for and did employ many merchants' ships as men-of-war, and by the treasurer's accounts it is too apparent what great sums of money were issued and paid upon this head.¹ At the first of the war it was accounted an high character of a well-affected man to accommodate the service with ships for their money, and truly had those that did it driven no other design in doing of it than the welfare of the then bleeding nations of England and Ireland, I know no man would have grudged them that honour that their zeal for the public procured them ; but I must tell my reader and them that their zeal burnt as hot in another chimney as the State's interest, and this appears too plainly by those many unworthy practices that were used by some that I could name in this particular, who for ends best known to themselves, after they had thrust unserviceable ships upon the State at dear rates, did by their influence (I could tell you where and with whom) keep out those ships at sea, which at first were hired but for six or eight months at the most, by the space of four and twenty, yea, thirty months together without any intermission, and in the interim by the same influence received all or the most part of their freight by way of imprest in good money before their ships were called in.

Had not the owners been parliament men, commissioners of the customs, commissioners of the navy, committee men of the navy, and (as the healing question saith) such as had gained to them-

¹ See *Commons' Journals*, *passim* ; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1645-7, pp. 431, 510, 511 ; 1651-2, pp. 253, 286 ; 1652-3, pp. 142, 172, 261 ; 1653-4, pp. 555, 564 ; *et passim*.

selves this character, to be the honest party of the nation, by their constant adhering to the Parliament in their persons, purses, and affections from the year 1640 till now, I should very much have suspected that some of them would not have died martyrs for the cause, if the King had gotten the victory. Yet I cannot so much blame those that were owners that acted singly as owners, without any other trust in or under the Parliament, for it is a known thing that all men design their profit in letting ships to the sea, but when the same man shall be an owner, a commissioner, a committee man, nay, a chairman of that committee, and in these capacities hire to the State (as a signal service) his or their ships by order from themselves to a third man, as to themselves, and then continue those ships so long time together at sea, not only beyond the necessity of the service requiring but also all capacity of the ships to perform any service—this certainly was below men of such high zeal as some of them pretended to be. Nor were the commissioners of the navy that then acted altogether in blame as to these practices; for they were not so much outwitted as overpowered by the then committee of the navy, who because they would meet with no interruption in the business by those whose trust it was to inspect the fitness of the ships and to make all contracts with the owners, they would and did make their contracts among themselves without the consult¹ of the commissioners of the navy, and after the contracts made, pay themselves their money by special order from that committee, or at the best, give a positive order to the commissioners of the navy to make bills of imprest to such or such men upon the freight of

¹ Often used for 'consultation.' The sense is 'without consulting.'

such and such ships without further dispute or enquiry.¹

A man would wonder how some of these ships, that were (as the seaman saith) old toads and leeward jades long before they were hired into the service, could continue out at sea twenty or thirty months together, without so much as new graving, rigging, &c., had not some of them had the happiness to ride six or eight months together at an anchor to guard a castle, and some owner as a friend to the cause to cackle at the committee of the navy the great and good service of that ship, that in all that time never wagged² from her moorings. I have often smiled at the grave and demure carriages of some in so gross undertakings, and more often pitied the poor nation that lent their moneys so freely to those that mis-spent it so unworthily—mistake me not, I mean not the Parliament to whom it was immediately lent, but some members thereof, to whom in a more remote sense it may be also said it was lent. But what is past cannot be helped, nor had I so much as mentioned it at a distance, had it not been to enlighten all future regulators where to begin as to reformation of abuses of this nature.

If it be asked why a parliament man, a commissioner of the customs or the navy, that were or are owners of shipping, should not have the privilege of strangers to hire their ships into the service, nay rather and sooner than strangers, I shall answer:—First, truly I see no reason why they should not, if they be not sole owners, or shall not as part owners extend their power to the breach of their trust and

¹ These charges of unfair dealing in connexion with the hiring of merchant-ships during the Civil War and the war with the Dutch are discussed in the Introduction.

² = Moved, stirred. Cf. Bunyan, *Pilgrim's Progress*: 'They made a pretty good shift to wag along.'

the oppression of other men, that could never obtain the same favour that they give to themselves, viz :— First, to shuffle in old decayed English bottoms into the State's service. Secondly, to give the same rate for a Dutch bottom that they do for an English bottom, upon the bare account that a commissioner is an owner, &c. Thirdly, to employ their own ships in all profitable ways, ports, and places where profit may accrue to the owner in point of saving of victuals, cordage, &c., expense of time, riding in harbour, declining¹ the enemy, and like advantages. Fourthly, in procuring and advancing money to themselves and their friends, when other men as equally interested as themselves, and whose ships have done the State far more and better service than theirs, must stay without it. Fifthly, to procure their ships to be measured and certified thirty or forty tons more than they are, or indeed ever were in burden. Sixthly, to undertake that their ships shall carry so many guns more than they are able, of purpose to beget great freights, and then to fill up their number with cuts² and murderers³ for compliance with their contracts. Seventhly, to send their ships into foreign countries where no inspection can be had of their service. Eighthly, to keep their ships out at sea and in the service when other men's are called in, and to ride them at anchor when other men's are in fight at sea. Ninthly, to order their ships to the sea without a clerk of the check or muster-master as to their men, or if they permit one, to quarrel him out of the service by the captain's insolent usage, that false musters and short numbers may be taken, kept, and returned as to that ship's

¹ Decline = avoid, shun (archaic).

² A short cannon of any calibre. Thus a shortened demi-culverin would be called a 'demi-culverin cut,' and so on.

³ A small piece of ordnance so named.

company for many months together, and the owners paid accordingly. Tenthly, to take the advantage of victualling their own ships when the market is low, or that they may have it from the State's stores by compliance with the contractors for victuals, either as their own victuals, or as so much money imprested by the State to them to victual, when other owners shall neither get liberty to victual, or if they do, yet no money for victuals to carry on the service according to contract. Eleventhly, to continue their ships in the service, one, two, three, yea sometimes four years together without intermission, or at the most but for ten or fourteen days in every eight months, to wash, tallow, rig, and victual, when all men know the profit of a voyage lies in the length of time, and at the same time other men's ships be forced out of the service at every six or eight months' end, according to contract. Twelfthly, to put the State to pay victuals and wages to whole ships' companies for want of treasure to comply with the owners according to contract, though the ships be commanded into port, and lie at anchor at Black-wall, &c., and the owners be bound by contract to pay off their men within three days after their arrival there.

But, secondly, if they either do or suffer to be done such things as these, as is too much to be suspected and not difficult to be proved they have both done and suffered, to the State's insufferable damage, I know no reason why they should enjoy that liberty or privilege. All men are so great lovers and seekers of themselves and their own interests, that it is a difficult thing for men in trust and power to carry themselves without partiality and selfish ways. Upon which account, I should rather incline (as to my private opinion) to infringe them in the use of that which otherwise I

am not against, as lawful in itself, rather than suffer the high inconveniences that attend liberty to men in trust to be at the same time parties and judges; especially in the freighting of ships, which is a vast, expensive, and eating charge to the State; witness the huge sums of money paid and due to men then in and out of trust for the hire of ships in the late wars. But this is only private opinion, wherein also I desire not to be positive. Other men may see farther into the point than as yet I discern, to whose judgments I freely submit.

CHAPTER VIII

OF CERTIFICATES AND OATHS

I HAVE often thought and sometimes said that certificates are the grand cheat of the navy. The ground of their use is to lead and enlighten the commissioners of the navy to the truth of what is desired or certified, either as to persons or things, and to enable them to make a right judgment of both in dispensing rewards, promoting to subordinate offices, rating provisions, and in general, signing to all bills, books, tickets, contracts, accounts, and other things whatsoever, referring to any person, provision, service, or employment in the navy. These certificates are in all clerks of the store, check, pursers, &c., the immediate trust of their places, and that without which the service of the State cannot be managed; but in other men not so, but as called upon by the commissioners of the navy upon the occasion of some particular or special service; and are sometimes made by such as are immediate servants of the State, such as captains, masters, &c., at sea, or else master shipwrights and their assistants, master attendants, clerks of the survey, ropeyards, victualling office, &c., on shore; they are also sometimes made by those that have no dependence upon the service at all, such as the masters of the Trinity House, master builders of the Thames, &c.

I shall not run division upon these things, nor yet

handle them in any distinct manner. You see their rise and use, and I am not against their continuation in the present way and use of them, as well knowing that there cannot be too much caution used to find out and prevent the abuse of the State by those that are in trust, and whose hands do pass away the State's treasure. Yet give me leave to ask, are not these very things, which in prudence were first made use of for the fuller satisfaction of a commissioner, oftentimes used in design by commissioners the better to colour their giving away the State's treasure, either to wrong parties, or for bad and unserviceable provisions, especially where the commissioner is himself a contractor? Shall I think, because all commissioners are ignorant of some things, and therefore deal prudently in fortifying their own judgments with the opinions of skilful men in particular cases, that therefore in no case a commissioner should act in his trust without a certificate, or so pin up his judgment to the certificate of a fool, or a knave, or both, that he will not act against what is certified, though he be convinced that the certificate is both simple and false? Surely for any man thus to act renders him under an high suspicion of compliance, and that he only makes use of the certificates as stales or panders to his design, that if at any time the thing should be questioned, the certificate may be produced for its justification and vindication, whenas yet the intention thereof was only to colour the unworthiness of parties concerned.

Thus for the purpose in the case of victuals. Suppose beef, pork, beer, &c., shall be returned from sea as unserviceable for the State, being either stinking, short-cut, &c., and that the commissioners will not receive it, though certified by the captain, master, boatswain, quartermaster, &c., of the ship's company, and this certificate produced by the purser,

but a new survey by new men must be taken of it, and a favourable certificate made thereof in order to its future expense, if not in that, yet in some other ships after a new pickling, &c.—is not this last certificate a good warranty to the commissioners for compliance with the contractor to necessitate the eating of that by men which a dog would loathe, rather than the contractor should suffer by the loss of his provision, or be questioned for his neglect, &c.? Did not all or most of the beef and pork stink in the Resolution in her voyage to Lisbon in the year 1650 or thereabouts, insomuch that the then general, Colonel Popham, resolved to send home the ship, and threatened to hang the contractor, till such time as he was otherwise pacified by the influence of some, and the victuals certified for good and serviceable provision after it was distributed by order of the general to the whole fleet the better to despatch it out of the way, and the men forced to eat that or none, and that in the first place, though they had better aboard?¹ I have seen such wonders (I had

¹ When Col. Edw. Popham was ordered, early in 1650, to join Blake at Lisbon with a reinforcement, there was great delay in completing the victualling of the Resolution, Andrew, Phoenix, and Satisfaction. Wm. Holt and Hugh Salesbury, the victuallers at Plymouth, who were already busy shipping victuals for Blake's fleet, reported on May 5 that they had done their utmost, but if their lives lay at stake they could not provide for Popham also 'upon so short a warning, in this unseasonable time of the year, when serviceable flesh is not to be had upon any terms' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1650, p. 142). It was accordingly decided, with the sanction of the admiralty committee, to take two months' beef, pork, and peas out of the Paragon and Rainbow to make up two months' victuals for the Resolution (*ibid.* pp. 151, 157). This made it possible for her to sail almost immediately, and by May 14 she had sailed (*ibid.* p. 161). But on June 12 Popham wrote from on board her from Carrick's Deep, Lisbon, to Sir Henry Vane, 'Our provisions fall out to be extremely bad; of eight months' beef and pork in this ship there was not a fortnight's meat fit to eat; the Andrew is the same, and that part of the victuals that was

almost said miracles) done by certificates, both as to goodness and price of provisions and as to qualifications of persons, both for parts, trust, godliness, &c., in the eyes of some commissioners, especially when concerned, that all the pills, salves, or powders of all the mountebanks of England or France were nothing in my esteem compared with the approved balsam of a daring certificate from a confiding man or a church member. This shall make dead beer alive, stinking meat sweet, light meat heavy, black bread white, weak hemp strong, rotten cordage sound and good, a ship three score tons bigger than ever the shipwright made her or the custom-house book found her, a gentleman usher an able clerk of the check, a drunken sot an humble saint, a boy of fifteen an able seaman, plank ten foot longer than ever the tree grew and broader by three inches at the top than ever the sawyer cut it. What is it that certificates cannot do? I dare undertake that rather than the credit of a master in his art should sink, after the expense of many thousand pounds of the State's treasure to build them a ship, a certificate shall make her swim, and carry her guns higher from the water by two foot than ever she did. And if I had been as frugal of keeping papers of this nature as I have been of observing the great wonders they have wrought, I might have been furnished with monuments of

last provided at Plymouth. The victuallers send word they very much fear it, as it was saved last May in so hot a season of the year' (*ibid.* p. 200). The matter was at once brought under the notice of Parliament, and a resolution was passed 'that it be referred to the Council of State to take a severe account in the abuse in the defective victuals sent in the fleet, and likewise to take care for the punishment of the offenders' (*Commons' Journals*, vi. 437). There is no reference in the State Papers to the way the victuals in question were ultimately disposed of, but a quantity of biscuit was returned from the Resolution, a part of which upon survey was declared to be good (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1650, p. 500).

greater rarity than John Tradesken's rich magazines can afford.¹

But to let these and the like things pass, I would ask again, are not the commissioners, notwithstanding their utmost care and fidelity, too much abused by certificates? and doth not the service much suffer by inferior instruments giving under their hands misguiding certificates, wherein yet there cannot be imagined the least compliance, &c.? Were not yourself often abused this way whilst yet a commissioner, &c.? I answer affirmatively to all, but yet I must tell you, that much of that deceit that attends certificates is grounded upon the ignorance, indulgence, neglect, or inexperience of the commissioners to whom they are returned, who for want of better knowledge,² or eyes of their own, are forced to see by other men's, and if they mislead them either as to quantity, quality, price, usefulness, &c., of any provision, must and do sign of course, and have no other reason for their action than the

¹ Cf. Flatman, *To Mr Austin*, 16.

'Thus John Tradeskin starves our greedy eyes
By boxing up his new-found rarities.'

John Tradescant was a Dutch botanist of some distinction, who in 1620 was appointed gardener to Charles I. His son also was a distinguished botanist, and succeeded his father on his death as keeper of the King's gardens at Oatlands, at a salary of 100*l.* a year from Midsummer, 1638 (*Signet office Docquet Book*, Nov. 1639). Theirs was the first cabinet of natural curiosities ever formed in England. It was established first at Lambeth, but afterwards formed the nucleus of the Ashmolean Museum. At the time when Hollond was writing the Second Discourse the catalogue of this collection had not long been published under the title '*Musæum Tradescantianum* : or a Collection of Rarities preserved at South Lambeth neer London by John Tradescant.' Lond. 1656, 12mo. This contained two portraits of the elder and younger Tradescants, and is notable for one of the earliest notices of gutta-percha in England under the name of 'mazer-wood' (*Encycl. Dict.* ; *Encycl. Brit.* ; Lowndes, *Bibliographer's Manual*).

² The Longleat MS. reads 'know.'

certificate premised ; and were it not so they dared not be so bold to certify such gross untruths, exorbitant rates, or make such unreasonable demands as they do. Hence it was that a master carpenter demanded and had warrant for three bolts of canvas¹ from a late officer or commissioner of the navy containing ninety-six yards to woold² a mainmast, when five yards of the same canvas would have served the turn. Hence also it comes to pass that subordinate instruments take the liberty of presenting false tickets, delaying³ passing of their accounts, clearing of imprests, and driving underhand dealings with men of all sorts that serve provisions into the navy, not so much because they know that what they say or certify shall be believed as gospel, as because they presume that all the brains of some are not able to prove it apocrypha. And upon this account I have known several certificates presented then and then only when such and such men were at the Board who they knew would sign of course, and were honest and believing men ; yea, I have known several bills and accounts presented when myself was present, and the certificates of those bills, &c. questioned and refused to be allowed, as much in the State's wrong, yet the same bills have passed at another meeting in my absence without the least dispute ; which if they were so signed through ignorance or inadvertency was too much, but if upon design or compliance was intolerable.

If you ask what course is best to be taken to oblige men in trust to fidelity, and to prevent the daring boldness of false and unworthy certificates

¹ A bolt of canvas contained 28 ells (35 yards). The term was applied to any roll of woven material, but generally with reference to a definite size and length.

² To 'woold' a mast is to wind rope and canvas round it to support it where it consists of more than one piece.

³ Longleat MS. reads 'delay in.'

from all sorts of instruments, I know not any course more likely than to prescribe an oath for all instruments of trust,¹ from a commissioner to the porter of the gates, to be taken by them respectively at their first admission into the service, and the same or like oath to be given by the commissioners in being to all men they shall employ upon the occasion of any extraordinary service to view, rate, and certify their opinions as to any person, provision, or thing whatsoever ; and this oath to be administered before they go about the work and not otherwise. It is the practice of all the custom-house and excise officers, as also all courts of justice as to all subordinate instruments, thus to be sworn to a due execution of their respective trusts before they be admitted—yea, poor and inferior officers are not exempted, who at the best have but a trust as to the customs or excise of what they are trusted withal (for the proprietor will look to the thing itself well enough) ; and yet in the navy, where men are trusted with giving away the State's treasure and have vast estates under their charges, and that in an untraceable way as to trust, and some without all possibility of accounting for what they have in keeping, yet there is not one officer in all the navy that takes an oath for what he does but the treasurer, and he in such an overly² way as will not stumble the most straight-laced man that ever acted in that office.

I know it hath been the practice of late, where accounts of pursers, stewards, purveyors, and others

¹ This view of the efficacy of an oath was taken by the Council of State in 1649, when they agreed with the Navy Commissioners that steps should be taken to require it from the purveyors of timber, since the 'trust to be reposed in' them is 'very great' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1649-50, p. 347). The admiralty commission, appointed in November 1655, was empowered 'to administer oaths on navy affairs' (*ibid.* 1655-6, p. 11).

² *I.e.* negligent, inattentive.

have been doubted or questioned by the present commissioners, to send them to a master of the chancery to make oath of the truth of their accounts ; but this is a lame way of acting. Who knows whether the oath were made or not, or if made, whether to that purpose or intent for which the commissioners rejected the account or not ? Circumstances do much vary oaths, as all men know ; nor is the same oath given to or exacted from all men acting in the navy, nor yet to some of these men that the commissioners intend a courtesy unto ; or if it were, would all men dare to take it ? Do not the victuallers torture all poor pursers and stewards upon the rack of swearing for every petty demand they make as to leakage, stinking beer, and other defective and short-cut victuals (though yet I know no power they have from the State so to do), and yet did you ever know the victuallers themselves put to their oaths as to the truth of their accounts, though almost eight hundred thousand pounds thick ; and if they were, dared they have sworn to them ; or if they had so done, had they not rendered themselves perjured men in many particulars ? Is it not a known thing that they have mischarged several things presented in their accounts ? that they have twice charged the same provision in the same accounts ? and when detected for so doing, have they not excused the fact by ignorance, inadvertency, or the like, when yet other men have been squeezed for such kind of ignorant mistakes, and reward given to the informer for his good service ? If oaths or swearing must be the rule to one or a few, I should advise it may be the rule to all, and to all indifferently and in an equal manner, without any partiality or latitude in the commissioners to swear those and those only that they think fit, for by this

means the poor are and shall be pinched for petty things, and rich men or favourites shall swallow their unjust gains without control. Not that I delight in propounding this way, for I know an oath to be a sacred thing, and tremble to think how desperately men undertake it; yea, if I could have devised any way that might have secured the State's damage in any measure, I should have declined this of all other; yet in regard it is already taken up and practical for some, and that there is no other way advisable (as I think) to prevent these intolerable abuses that attend false certificates and accounts, I thought fit to propound this way, provided it be as equally administered (if not rather) to the commissioners themselves, and other the chief though subordinate officers of the navy, as to poor or mean instruments that scarce understand what it is to swear in righteousness and judgment. And till this be settled, and so settled that all men may alike partake of its justice, certificates may and will work more and greater wonders than I have mentioned.

CHAPTER IX

OF A FREE MARKET

By a free market I understand a mutual liberty of the buyer and the seller—that is to say, when I am not tied to him to buy nor he tied to me to sell, but when, if I can supply myself better or cheaper elsewhere, to be free to find or choose my chapman, and when he can sell dearer or for quicker payment, to use his liberty in the choice of his customer.

That the State doth both buy and sell by the commissioners of the navy no small quantities of provisions of many kinds and sorts, amounting to great sums of money by the year, will not be denied by any ; but if it be queried whether the State hath a free market, either in buying or selling, as every private man hath or may have, I must needs deny it. The way of the navy in buying was in the late King's time to grant commissions by the lord admiral to several men of several callings to serve the State with those provisions that referred to their callings. Thus for all East country and Norway commodities, such as hemp, masts, tar, deals, &c., there was settled by commission one under this title of the King's merchant,¹ and from him for many years together I have known the navy supplied with those provisions. So also other were called the King's flagmaker, sailmaker, iron-monger, blockmaker, slopseller, &c.

¹ See p. 59, *supra*.

The ground of this practice was (as I think) more for honour than profit, being carried on in allusion to the practice of the then court, where the King had men of all trades to serve his occasions at court under appropriated titles, of the King's vintner, saddler, apothecary, &c., and it may be the same honour was affected for him in the navy; or rather I think it was brought up by the lord admiral's secretaries, the better to bring grist to their mill for the purchase of their respective warrants or commissions.

I shall not trouble myself nor my reader with fancies about its rise; that which is before me is to show my reader what the practice is at present, and the great inconvenience to the State's service to be debarred of a free market for any provision in the navy. The late Long Parliament blasted, together with the power of the lord admiral, such warrants and commissions as these were, and the commissioners of the navy then in being did not a little assist therein, as finding them very prejudicial to the service. Since that time the service hath not been so tied up to this or that man as formerly it was; yet I cannot truly say that the State hath at present a free market. For whereas heretofore the commissioners themselves were limited by the lord admiral's orders, now they themselves do limit all subordinate instruments, whom they have as much at their beck as ever they themselves were formerly at the beck or command of the lord admiral. It is true they do not give warrants at large, as the lord admiral did, without limitation of time, but their manner is to publish five or six days beforehand that they resolve to contract for one whole year the supply of the navy with such a provision, and that all those that desire to deal with the State for it may have access to the office to treat, and by their

papers compete¹ with other men for the contract for that year; and he that proffers at the lowest rates shall have the contract for that year. This a man would think is very fair, and nothing more fair than this way to accommodate emergent occasions; especially if the commissioners themselves be fair and disengaged in the management of it, as they ought to be. But when they shall first design the men that shall serve the State, and then to colour their design with a specious pretence of a free market, by competition or papers with one or two more that will rather lose the service than anger a commissioner—nay that will come and bid an higher rate of purpose to gratify the commissioners and carry the deceit cleanly for his friend—I say when things are thus, whatsoever is pretended, this is no free market.

Of all men a commissioner should be free from engagements, either to men or the provision itself; if either of these appear in the transaction, let the pretence be what it will, and the carriage of the business never so smooth and seemingly fair, I shall never believe but there must be design of profit or friendship as the ultimate end of that action. And admit this way hath much of a free market in it, yet nor is (nor never was) it held forth by the commissioners as universal to all men of all callings and for all sorts of provisions, which renders their practice of it the more suspicious, because the same justice which is due to one is or ought to be free to all. But instead thereof the manner is to observe and find out where any man hath a contract by which there may be a supposed profit at the rate given, and (under pretence of thrift or frugality for the State) to set up one or two more to compete¹

¹ MSS. 'compete.'

with that man for that contract at the end of the year, not so much to do the State a service as to give that man a gentle wipe or back-blow upon another account, especially if he be one that doth not please or serve some men's interests. Yea, it may be the same zealot for the State may have a friend, a brother, or a son, that knows (or may soon be taught) how to supply the State with that commodity, and if so, I will not give the other sixpence for his contract, so impatient will they be till the year comes about, that the commodity contracted for by another shall yet be supplied during the term of that contract by the premised friend, and when the year expires, my son, &c., must have it, and that not only for a year but for ever. For after that he is once settled the bird is caught, and there is no more good husbandry pretended for the State. The man that serves is a most able, and honest, godly man, can hardly live upon the price given, supplies better than ever his predecessor did, trusts the State with great sums of money which another man cannot or will not do, makes it his care to have the provision always in a readiness for emergent services, &c. Such glosses as these shall fend off all future competition by any man, or if any man be so bold it shall be told him, you will anger the commissioner to make such a tender, and those whom he pleases, another time, another way, will not refuse to pleasure him for such a courtesy as this to one so nearly related, &c.

By this trick of boxing,¹ or competition by papers, the State's service is indeed so far from a free market that it is bought and sold to whom and how the commissioners please. I have heard that

¹ 'Boxing' is a term applied to the lodgment of pleadings or other documents in a court of law, and might be used also for the depositing of tenders.

in the bishops' time the prebends were never without two or three benefices *in commendam*,¹ and did generally marry their daughters to young scholars that wanted one to set up their trade ; not so much to help their son-in-law to a good living, as to ease themselves of all or a part of their daughters' portions. Now if this way should be used by any in trust, I am sure they can never want a good contract to pleasure a friend withal, and yet pretend high service to the State. It is not seven years past since this way was introduced into the navy, and the commissioner that first broached it knows well upon what account he did it then, and hath continued it ever since. The truth is, at the first I was surprised with it, and thought nothing more fair than such a proposition. But merchants seldom act without design, and when I saw and considered the unworthy carriages that did and might attend it, I totally disliked it as a snare to entrap plain-meaning men under a notion of cross and pile.²

Just such another piece is that way whereby the State (or the commissioners for them) do sell their old, decayed, defective, or unserviceable provisions, such as anchors, old iron, junk, cables, timber, ships, &c., arising to considerable sums of money. The manner is this: to publish five or six days beforehand that they resolve to put to sale by the candle such and such provisions on such a day, and to invite all those that will to come the day

¹ *I.e.* to hold along with their other preferment.

² 'Cross' was applied to one side of a coin, and 'pile' to the reverse. Hence 'cross and pile' = 'head and tail,' *i.e.* 'by mere chance.' The reference was originally to a particular coinage stamped with a cross, and thence to coins generally, which were often called 'crosses.' The origin of 'pile' seems uncertain. *Cf.* the American dollar, which is tossed with as 'cap or eagle.'

appointed to the office at London, or their meeting at Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham, or Portsmouth, where he that speaks last and bids most when the candle goes out hath bought the provision, be it more or less, sold by that candle.¹

Who would imagine the least deceit or abuse in this way of sale, so public and so much above-board? For my part, I am not against it simply and in itself considered, and do know that it is the way used by the East India Company and the prize office in all or most of their sales; though withal I know there is a vast difference between selling at public courts for the Company and a public office, where they have little or nothing else to do than to sell, and whereof all men take notice and come as to an office or fair for to buy, and the office of the navy, who it may be make a sale once in two years, and then only for ships riding at Deptford, Chatham, &c., or goods lying there—yea, such goods as is not usually every man's money, nor indeed fit for more than a very few. I say, this much alters the case, though the way of sale be the same; and this both some that do sell and those that do buy do very well know; and therefore before the day of sale comes, though they be men of different callings and have no insight in or immediate use of such provisions as are to be sold, do yet confederate or combine as one man to make at the day of the sale a general appearance at the office with resolution to buy, but still with this limitation that all that is bought shall be so bought upon a joint interest or common stock amongst them all, and that none of them shall exceed such a sum either in gross or by the hundred or ton for any commodity than the price agreed upon amongst themselves; and, moreover,

¹ Sale 'by the candle,' or 'by inch of candle,' was a common form of public auction. It is sufficiently described in the text.

that they shall have all freedom to bid and buy, but still with caution that they exceed not so much upon the pound, ton, hundred, load, &c., for any provision above the last bidder, that so the price agreed upon may not be exceeded before the candle be out; yea, it shall be agreed that they shall all stand in distinct places at some distance each from other, to avoid all discourse or suspicion of compliance; that they shall be very eager and watchful after the bargain, as if they would outbid all comers and have it whatsoever it costs them; and for a need they shall quarrel who bade most when the candle went out, with supposition that two of them spake at the same nick of time.

I have often made myself merry with the observation of passages of this nature, and of purpose gone to several sales to see and observe the unworthy carriages of this kind, both before and since the late wars; and had I not both seen and discovered them, I should have never believed what I shall tell my reader. About the year 1636¹ there was a sale of old cordage, &c., at Deptford, and thither came to buy just nineteen men of several trades and callings, and some of them men of good quality and repute yet living. The officers set up the candle, these men did all bid, and in fine buy all the provisions the State had then to sell. But after the sale was over, and that the officers had thought they had done the King a good day's service, the purchasers by the candle went all to the tavern, consulted their bargains, rejoiced in sack at their profit, and declared themselves to be eighteen of the nineteen but one man, that is to say to have

¹ Probably this should be 1637. The State Papers contain correspondence about a sale of 'decayed and unuseful materials' at Deptford, under dates July 28, August 10, and August 14 of that year (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1637, pp. 334, 368, 371), though there is no record of the sale having actually taken place.

bought all upon one account or joint stock. Now I would only ask whether any man thinks this a free market? It is true, as to the commissioners it might be free, and they intend nothing but fair in their trusts. Nay, I will say further, that as to matter of combination it might be free, for I do not think it unlawful to combine or join partnership in such bargains, and as equally lawful for twenty or thirty as for three so to do. But here lies that which stumbles me in this particular, viz., that it is not just nor conscionable that above one or two at the most of any combination should be permitted to bid by the candle at the same time, and that with declaration of their joint interest before the candle be set up; and had the then officers been so careful for the then King's interest as to have declared themselves in that point before the sale, under a penalty of forfeiture of their bargains or some other punishment, they had then found they had but two customers in that great crowd of chapmen for above two thousand pounds' worth of provisions then sold.¹ And truly, till such time as more care be taken than is by the present commissioners as to sales of this nature, I cannot believe but the same thing is still practised to no small damage to the State, though yet the commissioners may be ignorant thereof and innocent therein.

But can this be a free market when there shall not only be goods of a great value sold when so few are present to buy, or, if many, those all are one man, but also some one or other of the commissioners themselves that sit as judges for the State to sell these provisions shall go a share with those that buy—nay, it may be shall bring those men that buy so to do of purpose and in design for himself, and have no share nor interest at all themselves in

¹ The State Papers say '700*l.* or 800*l.*'

the thing bought? Hath this the least colour of a free market? Is not the State grossly abused (to say no worse) by such ways as these? Can any man think there was fair play in the first valuation of the goods to be sold, when the commissioners that ordered it are the designed purchasers? Or if they were moderately valued, yet can you believe the sale husbanded to the best improvement for the State, when but few chapmen shall appear, and all or most of them one man, and hapily¹ for the use of another then in trust? If the bargain had been for themselves, would they so easily have parted with it to the party premised, and that without any profit to themselves, but a bare resignation or assignment merely to gratify a commissioner? Doth not one good turn require another? Must not, may not this be requited another way, another time? May not friends meet, though hills and dales cannot? Certainly such courtesies as these are not frequent were there not something more in the business than a free market—yea, than a good bargain; for a good bargain may be made bad enough if the payment be bad, &c. But if I as a commissioner shall not only gain a good commodity at a good rate in a plausible manner, but when I have it pay for that commodity in bills (and not in money) for goods sold by myself to the State, though a commissioner, as ready money, when other men are forced to dance for their money with bills in their pockets fifteen or sixteen months together, and can neither get money nor a good bargain to discount them; certainly this must not only heighten the profit of the bargain, but also the abuse in compassing it, and whether it be a free

¹ 'Hapily' or 'happily' stands for 'haply.' Cf. Shakspeare, *Taming of the Shrew*, iv. 4:

'Besides, old Gremio is heark'ning still;
And, happily, we might be interrupted.'

market or not, let the judicious regulator judge. Nor do I believe but the same or like abuses are or may be in sales by the candle at the East India courts, and am sure they have been too common at the prize office, not only in London but also at Portsmouth and other places, where such strange things have been done in this way that it would scarce be credited if they should be told. But that being out of my watch, and no part of mine intention to meddle with anything that is not proper to the navy, I shall rest silent therein, and leave the discovery and redress thereof to those whom it concerns.

I cannot forget one pleasant passage of this nature in the year 1639 or thereabouts, when the Spanish fleet rode in the Downs. They were forced in their fight with the Dutch to let slip many anchors for want of time to weigh them. These anchors were afterwards seized by the then lord admiral Northumberland, as a royalty or perquisite of his place,¹ and when they were brought up in divers of the King's ships to Chatham and Deptford they were exposed to sale by the candle, and several men (that I could name) entrusted by the Lord Admiral to improve them to the utmost price or value. Some that were made judges in the case, and others that

¹ On October 11, 1639, Tromp attacked the Spanish fleet in the Downs. Twenty of the Spanish ships ran ashore to escape the Dutch, and the rest reached Dunkirk in safety (Gardiner, ix. 68). Five days after, on October 16, the Lord Admiral instructed Sir John Penington, who was in command of the English fleet, to prevent any steps being taken to sweep for anchors and cables in prejudice of his jurisdiction (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1639-40, p. 42). On October 19 Penington was ordered to employ the boats of the King's ships in recovering anchors and cables, which were to be kept 'for his Lordship's use' (*ibid.* p. 47), and by the middle of November several had been taken up (*ibid.* p. 99). These anchors are occasionally picked up at the present day, and advertised for sale as relics of the Armada.

came as chapmen, pretended high services to his lordship in that particular, but the truth is, when they came to Deptford to make the sale, I easily perceived that all or most of the buyers were in combination, and, as one man, intended to have the anchors for a song, and yet carry the business with high pretence of service to his lordship. This thing was so plain to me that in plain terms I told them I would spoil their design, and turn merchant for anchors rather than suffer such gross abuses. Accordingly, when the candle was set up, I did not only bid but also outbid the whole combination (who were about ten or twelve in number). These men, perceiving that I was resolved either to buy them myself or else to mount them to a moderate price, voluntarily and in design suffered the candle to go out rather than to compete with me for the price ; and so I had them, though at a dearer rate than ever they intended to give for them, being all one man (and, as I have heard, some of the then judges sharers with them) ; and yet these very men did, within half an hour after, contract privately with me for them, and gave me twenty pounds to relinquish my bargain, which I thought a fair compensation for my service, the whole not exceeding 400*l.*; though yet his lordship never heard of it, nor had my reader at present, had it not been to let him see that this way is and is not a free market, being oftentimes made the stalking-horse to the basest knavery and fraud that can be imagined.

CHAPTER X

OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY
AND NAVY

It cannot be expected that what I shall say upon this head or title will be pleasing to those gentlemen that heretofore were or at present are employed as commissioners of the admiralty or the navy. Greatness hath no faults, or at least must not be told them. It is a *Noli me tangere*, which in the seaman's English is 'come no near;'¹ and truly for their sakes I could willingly have declined the subject, having already been in the wind of them, or some of them, all along in the former part of this discourse, had I not premised to myself and reader, in the beginning of this discourse, that freedom that might become the design of the whole tract, without respect of persons; in which regard I must crave leave to lie a little more close-hauled (to speak in the seaman's dialect) that I may be the better able to double the point that lies before me, as the great rock or remora² to the regular government of the navy; though yet I shall endeavour, as far as the matter I shall treat upon shall give leave, to give them all that honour and respect that their places justly call for.

¹ 'Near' for 'narre' = 'nearer.' Nares (*Glossary*) illustrates this use by a quotation from an old play, 'Pardon me, Countess, I will come no near.'

² *I.e.* obstacle.

There is no constant stream but hath a spring to feed it, and truly that flood of abuses that hath broken the banks of all regular government in the navy hath received much of its rise and force from those that have been employed as governors thereof. Whatsoever is said in the point of victuals, as to the unworthy carriages thereof, highly prejudicial to the honour and welfare of the State and subject, might in a great part have been spared, had some in place and power when that contract was first made, been but half so zealous for the State's interest as they were for their friends, if not their own ; nay as they seemed then to be for the State's.

I shall speak nothing of the power of the commissioners of the admiralty in general. I know they are in the room and absence of a lord admiral, and have the same or equivalent power that was given to him in the late King's time, only I do not remember that ever any lord admiral did or dared to take upon him to impose upon the commissioners of the navy in the execution of their trusts and duties by positive orders—a new rule of a late edition begotten and practised by some that I could name, to no small detriment to the State. I know there is and ought to be a subordination between the commissioners of the admiralty and the commissioners of the navy, as there is and ought to be between them and all inferior instruments in the navy ; and that in things that barely refer to action, such as building of ships, setting them forth to the seas with such a number of men for so many months, calling them in or continuing them out, establishing by warrant all sorts of inferior instruments, and many other the like commands, for which in their obedience thereunto they dispense or give away none of the State's treasure, positive orders have always been given and obeyed, though yet I

must tell my reader that all lords admirals, even in those very things, would so far regard the then principal officers or commissioners of the navy, that they would seldom or never send their orders to them till they had privately consulted them therein and received their opinion (at least) in matters of that nature ; yea, as to offices or places for subordinate instruments, they were so cautious that they would rarely dispose any place without their recommendation of the party under their hands, as their warrant so to do and vindication in so doing ; yea, it is said by some it was one of the articles of high treason in parliament against the then lord admiral the Duke of Buckingham, that contrary to his trust he did impose upon the then officers of the navy such instruments as they had not approved under their hands, according to the duty and trust of their places.¹ All which considered, it is plain to me that it is not in the power of the commissioners of the admiralty to give a positive order to the commissioners of the navy to dispense the State's treasure to any man, till their judgments be first satisfied that it is just and equal that this or that man should have that money for his service or provisions.² And hence it was that the principal officers

¹ There is no such article in the impeachment, or in the speeches printed in the *State Trials*. In his defence on the second article concerning 'buying the Admiral's place,' the Duke takes credit to himself for having done nothing of moment without the advice of the navy commission (*State Trials*, ii. 1426), so it is possible that some accusation of this kind was thrown out in debate.

² The navy commission under the Commonwealth, of which Hollond was a member, had always been disposed, as Mr. Oppenheim points out, to resent the interference of the admiralty committee. 'From the first they adopted a tone towards the admiralty committee which would hardly have been endurable, but that it was excused by an obvious honesty, and justified by superior knowledge. . . . In some ways the relative position of

(in whose rooms the commissioners do now act) had their places by patent under the Great Seal without dependence upon the lord admiral, and were responsible to the King for all obliquities in their joint or respective trusts, and could not, nor did not receive their salaries but by a *liberate* from the chancery, signifying their due and constant attendance thereupon.¹

It is true that the lord admiral had the power of determining the entertainment of all generals, and their vice and rear admirals at sea (their pay being above and beyond the settled rates) what it should be by the day more or less; but they never gave order for payment for provisions to any other man, and much less for the entertainment of generals that never served personally at sea, or for longer time than they did really serve, as I have known some have had. And as it is beyond the one to command things of this nature, so it is below the other to obey them, though yet they have a warrant for what they do; but such is the tameness of men in trust, that they regard not the interest of the State nor yet their own consciences further than [to] say or be able to show they had an order for what they did, though they know the State hath and doth sustain much damage by their obedience to that order, and that if they were questioned for their neglect of their trust with reference to that damage, they have nothing to plead for themselves but the premised order—as if a positive order were enough to excuse their indulgence in the State's wrong. Such commissioners as these the State needs not be

superiors and inferiors seems to have been reversed . . . and it frequently happened that the council of state communicated directly with the navy commissioners, ignoring the intermediate admiralty committee' (*E. H. R.* xi. 59).

¹ See note on p. 32, *supra*.

careful to gain into their service ; an easy brain is as fit for an implicit faith or a passive obedience as the best of them. I am not against any the just power or honour that is due to the lord admiral or the commissioners of the admiralty in their places ; only I would not so far dote upon their power as to deny myself the use of mine own reason, and that in a business that concerns not them but me to determine, and wherein I have an immediate trust, and for which I receive my salary—nay, I would be so far from acting upon a blind obedience in matters of my particular trust, though commanded thereunto by the parliament itself or the council of state—that though I would not disobey their commands, yet if my reason or my conscience told me that the State was abused, or must and would suffer by such my obedience, I would at least suspend my obedience till I had discharged my duty in acquainting them with the inconvenience thereof.

That such orders are at present granted I cannot say ; this I am sure, they were too frequent in the time of my sitting as a commissioner, and for my disobedience thereunto or refusal to act thereupon (as my fellows did) I contracted the frowns and secret underminings of many then in power, and had not easily avoided their designed revenges, had I not totally relinquished the navy. I could instance particular orders of this nature whereby the State hath not a little suffered in the late wars, but, above all others, that deserves the bell that required (in terms) the commissioners of the navy to sign and seal the late victuallers' contract as it was then and there sent them engrossed without alteration ; by which those then in power did not only impose upon the then commissioners to act against the State's interest and their own light and consciences, but also to make themselves guilty of all the damage

sustained by the State by that contract ; inasmuch as what they did was not barely or so much upon the account of any order of that committee that then enjoined it, as upon the account of their own act under their hands and seals to the contract after they had once signed it ; though yet I dare swear that some of those commissioners that so signed and sealed that contract knew very little, if anything at all, of the contents of that contract. It is true others of them knew too much, as appeared afterwards, and had reason upon that account to sign of course.

What the sad effects of that positive or imposing order have since been, both with reference to the State's treasure in its improvident expense and the poor seaman's loss, hath in part been already handled in the third chapter upon the title of Victuals, to which I refer my reader, and had said no more of it here had not the matter of positive orders led me thereunto. Yet if any man doubts of anything there or here said, as either incredible or improbable as to the State's wrong, there wants not those (besides myself) that are able to demonstrate the truth of what is said ; and if the medium of the expense of that contract were but truly and impartially cast by knowing men, the State would then easily see the mischief of such kind of orders as I speak against, and what tendency they have to all manner of abuse in the government of the navy, especially when more cards are shuffled in the game than appear to play above board. I bless God for it, as I abhorred the secret contrivances of that contract so I refused to sign or seal it, though I was both in a friendly manner solicited and in a surly way menaced thereunto, and though the contractors by their influence never left till they had totally wearied and almost worried me out of the navy.¹ Yet the

¹ Hollond resigned his office of commissioner of the navy on

comfort of my fidelity to the State in my trust is of far greater value to me than all the unworthy profit of that contract ; and I am so much above it that I would not be guilty of the signing thereof, and the evil effects that attended its signing both to the State and the poor seamen, for all the world. And I much fear that the hand of God, that hath already called to account the first projector thereof in an eminent way of displeasure by sudden death, and four more of the eight undertakers,¹ all or most of the five in their prime and strength of body and years before their accounts were finished here, will also one time or other let the surviving three (if not their underhand undertakers) know and feel what it is, under the vizard of religion and pretended reformation, in a time of such deep calamity as then lay upon this poor nation, to abuse the State and subject, and that the seaman's blood, though never so poor and helpless—yea, drowned in the ocean and sea of forgetfulness as well as the great ocean of the sea (whither they were after death thrown overboard)—will and doth yet cry for speedy wrath and vengeance (without as speedy repentance) upon those that virtually shed it.

I know it will be said, was not this contract

December 14, 1652, in consequence of charges brought against him by Captain John Limbery, one of the victualling contractors. (See Introduction.)

¹ The 'late victuallers' contract' referred to, is evidently that of November 30, 1650 (see note on p. 157, *supra*). The 'eight undertakers'—Thos. Pride, Thos. Witherings, Nathaniel Andrews, Wm. Beale, John Limbery, Thos. Alderne, Richard Preice, and Denis Gauden—appear to have suffered the judgments described in the text, for the deaths of three at least are recorded in the State Papers. Witherings died in 1651 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1653-4, p. 67); Alderne (perhaps the 'first projector') after a very short illness, on April 10, 1657 (*ibid.* and *E. H. R.* xi. 43); and Colonel Pride on October 23, 1658 (*D. N. B.*). Gauden and Limbery survived the Restoration.

(before it was backed with the premised positive order) presented in its draft to the then commissioners to consult and advise upon, and were they not required to give their opinions thereupon for the best behoof of the State? and did they not accordingly do it to those then in power, and was not yourself as one of that body concurrent with the rest in what was returned as the opinion of the whole board touching that contract? If so, where lies the offence of the positive order that sticks so fast in your gills, &c.?

I answer, all this is true; the draft of the contract was sent us and we both were consulted in it and did return our opinions about it; but, I ask, dare any man say that the contract sent us to sign and seal *totidem verbis* with the positive order was the draft that was first sent to us, or made according to the returns that we made touching it? Are not divers clauses inserted that had no being there before, and as many varied to the interest of the contractor that, though they were inserted and approved, yet not in those words nor to the present sense? If these things be not true, let the chairman, that was the main agent in this contract, produce our returns and compare them with the present contract, and I shall give up the bucklers¹ as to this dispute. Yea, did not most of the contractors debate and determine the letter or wording of the whole contract at the Dolphin Tavern, in Tower Street, after our return was made, and for that end sat up all or most part of the night, and had to their assistance the clerks of the then committee and commissioners of the navy? and will any man think that a contract thus polished by those that were participants, and that in a tavern, was the act of the commissioners of the navy (except before

¹ *I.e.* own myself beaten.

excepted),¹ and that they were bound to own it as their act by signing and sealing it, because it came to them clothed with the robes of a positive order? The truth is, those that begat and sent that positive order knew well enough that some of our board would not easily swallow such gudgeons as did swim in that contract, and therefore designed the positive order to effect that by force or command which they doubted they could not compass by fraud; though withal they knew they wanted not a strong party amongst us, as hath since too manifestly appeared.

Much of what hath been said as to positive orders to the commissioners of the navy considered in a joint body, in things concerning their immediate trust and duty, might be urged as to the same or the like orders to the treasurer of the navy with respect to his single capacity; but I shall decline repetitions, and only say that what is done in that particular is very irregular, and that which gives a latitude of much deceit and abuse in the navy; yea, I must say that the lord admiral never had nor took upon him to have that power, and if at any time he was petitioned by any man in any case proper to the trust of the commissioners of the navy, though after hearing thereof he was satisfied the party might deserve so or so much, yet he rarely (if at any time) made any positive order to the treasurer to pay it, but to the commissioners to make out bills for it to the treasurer, that it might be paid in the due form of the office; yea, this practice was always held by him in the case of generals', vice and rear admirals' entertainments, wherein yet (as I said before) he claimed and had the right of ascertaining what it should be by the day, and if at any time the lord admiral had sent immediate orders to the treasurer,

¹ Apparently a translation of *exceptis excipiendis*.

I have known when the treasurer hath refused to obey them, as being no legal or regular warrant to him, till the principal officers or commissioners of the navy had granted the same money, or what they thought fit, and given warrant for the payment thereof under two or more of their hands. Nor indeed had the then treasurers, and I believe the present treasurer hath not (I am sure ought not to have) any authority by his patent to pay any of the State's treasure but upon the hands of two or more of the then commissioners of the navy, who were his warrant, and none other whatsoever; and thence it was that the Lord Treasurer and Privy Council that then acted did, in all naval affairs, issue their commands to the commissioners of the navy then in being, and not to the treasurer.

Grant but this liberty that two offices¹ may have the same power to give order to the treasurer for the same payment, and I shall not doubt to infer that though all the men employed in both these offices were beyond parallel honest to their trust, yet the service must of necessity be attended with much confusion by double orders for the same thing; but if some of those supposed honest men be but willing to strain their consciences to do themselves or their friend a courtesy, the same man shall procure one order for money in the navy office and another for the same money or more money upon the same account from the commissioners of the admiralty—yea, the same man that had a full hearing before the commissioners of the navy, and been denied the allowance of his demands, as totally in the State's wrong, shall apply to the commissioners of the admiralty who are altogether ignorant of what hath passed in the navy office, and by inad-

¹ Pepysian MS. reads 'officers.'

vertency, favour, or what else I know not, obtain a positive order to the treasurer for his whole money, without the privity of the commissioners of the navy. And this is the reason why some owners of ships have fingered great sums of money by way of imprest on their ship's freight, after they had received what was justly due to them in the navy office in the regular way of that office and according to their contracts,—even their influence with some of the committee of the navy or commissioners of the admiralty, from whom they did obtain by private orders what was more than their due, and more than other men that were in the same capacity and condition could obtain. And hence it was that they did not only arrive to more money than was paid to other men in the same condition with themselves, but also to more money than their whole freight did amount to, and all by way of imprest not yet cleared, as may yet appear by the treasurer's accounts. This is that which hath rendered the commissioners of the navy of low esteem in their places, when men by friendship at the committee of the admiralty have bearded them and their power in dispensing the State's treasure by a positive order from those commissioners to the treasurer of the navy, and leapt into their money, not only against their consents but also without their privities. Yea, this is that which hath rendered the State's treasury so poor and empty, when the money assigned for the navy hath been paid by private orders to particular men for service that no whit referred to the navy, if for any service at all. It was the design of some in the late Long Parliament so to drain the treasury, that for want of money the service of the navy might be at a stand; and they had no way to compass that design but by superintending orders to themselves and their friends in a clandestine way, by which they

had so far prevailed that I could instance the time when and the place wherein the service of an whole summer's fleet had like to have been lost by this jingle,¹ had not some, more zealous than wise, given the State credit for ten thousand pounds' worth of victuals to carry on the service. I say more zealous than wise, because the party that did it had almost ruined himself and his family by so doing, by the influence of such as were then in power.

It is not easy to say what great sums of money have been paid in this nature not many years past ; but if the treasurer's accounts were strictly consulted, I am apt to believe more and greater discoveries might be made in this particular than is fit for me to mention—though yet I could say something. I shall rather advise for the future that all offices may move in their own sphere, without interfering or imposing upon each other, and that the State's treasure designed for the navy may be paid for naval affairs only, and not be diverted to any other use upon any pretence whatsoever ; and also that what is so paid may be also paid by the order of the commissioners of the navy according to their duties under three or more of their hands, after a full and public debate, and not by any private or positive order whatsoever, further than to the commissioners of the navy to pass bills in due form of the office according to the merit of the case. If this rule were duly observed, the State would then know where and from whom to have an account of the expense of all their treasure ; and if they find any wasteful expense, where and upon whom to lay the blame and require their reparation ; and (as I think) the treasurer would be more safe in his payments than he either is, or indeed can be in his passive obedience to these extrajudicial orders.

¹ MSS. 'gingle.'

The next thing worthy consideration and reformation in the commissioners of the admiralty and the navy, is that of undertaking in their own persons the management of the affairs of the navy in remote ports,—suppose at Plymouth, Yarmouth, Harwich, Dover, or elsewhere,—and by special order, either to themselves from themselves or from others in power above them, to victual, man, rig, and set to the seas many of the State's ships, as the service may require—a practice so new and contrary to all precedent of former times, both in the commissioners of the admiralty and in the commissioners of the navy, that all men that understand anything of the navy are amazed to see it. That the same man should at the same time be both clerk of the check, clerk of the stores, merchant or factor to buy and pay for all provisions, treasurer to pay all moneys, muster-master, victualler, &c., is one of the monsters of the navy; but that this same man that is all these and more, should be one of the commissioners of the navy, or, which is worse, one of the commissioners of the admiralty, is the wonder of wonders. It is true, and I have known it, in the Ré and Rochelle voyages, Secretary Coke, then one of the commissioners of the admiralty, was sent to Portsmouth by the late King and his Council to assist, both by counsel and command, the despatch of the fleet to the seas, and did accordingly give order to all subordinate instruments in their respective stations; ¹

¹ When Denbigh's fleet returned after the failure of the attempt to relieve Rochelle, made in May 1628, Coke was sent to Portsmouth by the King with instructions to reorganise the fleet (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1628–9, p. 116). He remained there during the whole summer doing his best to get the ships ready for sea, though his efforts were almost fruitless, owing to the disorganisation of the navy. He complained, not unnaturally, 'of the indignity of a King's Secretary being made a clerk and accountant to the Officers of the Navy' (*ibid.* p. 150), and took a special dislike to Portsmouth, fearing for his health 'in that loathsome place,

but he never took upon him the immediate duty of any of those instruments, nor begat himself to be an accountant to the State for all or any materials bought by himself into the service, nor made the State debtor to him for moneys paid by himself either for wages or victuals, upon musters, petty warrants, or prick-books of his own making. Such an ugly thing as this was never seen in the navy till of late days.

If it be said that at Portsmouth there is a settlement of all inferior officers, but it is not the same case in the other ports before named, where the State hath no yard, docks, &c., it is confessed; but doth it therefore follow that those men that should settle other men in those trusts, in those places, and call them that are so settled to account for their actions, should not only neglect the duty of their places in so doing, but also engross and centre all those places and trusts in their single persons upon their own warrants, or orders given to or from among themselves? Admit the trust were fit to be communicated to one single person (which yet I do deny and have always opposed), must this person needs be a commissioner of the admiralty or the navy, that is able to warrant himself for what he doth, though he doth never so much amiss; and if he be not, yet hath such influence upon, it may be power over, his fellow-commissioners that are to pass and allow his accounts, that either they will not or do not deny to him what otherwise and to other men they would scorn to grant in the State's

subject to ague and the infection of so many poor sailors' (*ibid.* p. 182). Nevertheless he was obliged to remain there until the end of September or beginning of October, as the fleet did not sail until September 7, and then there was business still to be done. Coke was not concerned in the fitting out of the Ré fleet of the previous year, as stated in the text (see *Calendars*, and Gardiner, vol. vi. *passim*).

wrong? I have heard of their justice upon a private man employed by them in the same capacity, but I never heard that the account [s] of themselves so employed were so much as regularly examined before their passing, much less brought to the test of a strict enquiry; which some think if they either had been or yet were, the party that should be employed therein might make as great a discovery and deserve as equal reward as was made or given for the other service.

If it be said that these men are men of honour, trust, and repute, and in that regard none are so fit (if at all fit) as they for such a trust, I answer, First, that the State is very hard driven or ill bestead of men of trust, if none can be found worthy of that trust unless he be a commissioner of the admiralty or the navy. Secondly, that of all men, a man in those capacities is the most unfit for such a service, for the reasons before mentioned, it being altogether unreasonable that the same man should be both party and judge, accountant and the allower of his own accounts, or at least one that hath too great an influence upon those that shall allow them. Thirdly, that the State might at a far easier expense settle and pay the salaries of two or three able and honest private men in each of those ports for the time of their attendance as the service might require, to be counter-checks upon each other's actions, as it is in all the State's yards, than the salary of one of these commissioners, who for the time they are in those employments have their salaries as commissioners for doing nothing that refers to their proper trust, which is far more than would satisfy two or three able men. And it is said by some (how true I know not) that they are not content therewith, but under the notion of extraordinary service they have had good rewards given them as men of high merit,

and moreover an additional allowance of 2*d.* or 3*d.* upon the pound for all moneys they have issued upon the State's account, which very allowance were enough for an honest man in the same trust, and is the alone salary of another man in another place.¹ Fourthly, it is not easy to say what the State doth or may suffer in other things by their absence from the place of their immediate trusts, sometimes five or six months together. This I am sure I may safely say, that either they do suffer, or else the service that may without damage spare them so long from their duties may as equally spare them for altogether, and save the expense of their salaries to the State; but the truth is, when once they are seated fast as commissioners, and know that whether they attend their duties or not they shall have their entertainments, they beget (I will not say design) to themselves employments at a distance, not only to colour their absence from their proper trusts but also to grasp at adventitious profits as additional helps to their mean allowances from the State, though yet the same allowances are above double as much as were formerly given to men of as high desert as themselves in the same places by the late King, besides their additional rewards, &c.²

I shall conclude this argument with an humble advice to themselves, that they would, being regu-

¹ The navy commissioners appointed in 1649 received a salary of 250*l.* a year each. In the arduous year 1653 they each received an additional reward of 150*l.* (*E. H. R.* xi. 58), and again in 1657 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1657-8, p. 117). In March 1656 the Council of State approved an arrangement by which a salary of 100*l.* was to be allowed 'to each of the three commissioners, and to the treasurer, and comptroller,' 'with 2*d.* in the pound out of all clear money coming in, to be equally divided between the five' (*ibid.* 1655-6, p. 224).

² On the remuneration of the 'principal officers' in Charles I.'s reign, see note on p. 19, *supra*.

lators themselves of the navy, save the labour of all future scan of this matter by any that shall be appointed thereunto by abandoning all practices of this nature, and finding out such men as they themselves should deem worthy of such trust, whereby that scandal that now attends the navy and their actings in it after this manner may be wiped off, and all men may see that they act like themselves, and do not go a-fishing for private profit below their places and trusts, and contrary to what they disallow and as justly as severely check and punish in other men as to other things, though not of this concernment to the State's interest.

As it is not fit to impose upon the commissioners nor the treasurer of the navy in an irregular way in things and payments referring to their immediate trusts, so I conceive it is as equally unworthy in the commissioners or the treasurer to obey all or any orders or warrants, whether regular or irregular, that are justly under the suspicion of fraud or wrong to the State's interest; and especially in the treasurer, whose act in obeying such orders by payment of the State's treasure leaves the State to play the after game with a knave at the best, and it may be with a knave and a beggar to boot.¹ If this be all the duty of a treasurer, to pay whatsoever he is warranted to pay without consulting the equity of its payment, the indirect ways and means used to procure the order, or the exorbitant rates or allowances in the bill, more than is either fit to be given him or is given at the same time to other men for the same provision—truly I think an intelligent porter (pardon the comparison, it is pat though homely) would make as good a treasurer for the State as he, and indeed he himself by so doing doth

¹ A play on the two senses of 'knave' and 'beggar.' In card-playing 'beggar' is applied to the small cards, from two up to ten.

make himself little better than a porter of the State's treasure, and hath nothing else to do but to deliver his burden where, when, and to whom his order shall direct him. And if I be not mistaken, the chief end and design of the State in making the treasurer not only treasurer but also a commissioner, or in joint fellowship and power with the rest of the commissioners of the navy, is that he may, by his daily commerce with them at their meetings, communicate with them in the equity of their making all contracts and disposing the State's treasure by order to himself, and that when he comes to obey those orders he may be able to satisfy himself as to the justness of their payment, and not act upon an implicit faith, and take all for Gospel that comes to him under the sanction of two or three commissioners' hands. And if this be not the end of his sitting with them, I know very little or no service he doth or can do the State by coming amongst them. Yea, certainly it were better and safer (as to himself and the justification of his obedience to their orders) that he were totally secluded from them. I list not to dispute the inconveniences of a treasurer's being a commissioner at large, though I could say something in that point, and it may be more than every man thinks of; but, taking the case as it is, yet I am apt to believe that the wisdom of the State in so doing was that he might be further serviceable to them than in a passive obedience, especially where there is any just ground of suspicion. Can any man think that either the commissioners of the navy or others above them would or could be so bold with the State's treasure to themselves or their friends (as it is not difficult to prove some to have been) if the treasurer did discharge his duty as he both might and ought in this particular, and were backed by

the State for and in his so doing? I know it will be objected that this strict observation of the commissioners' orders would contract upon the treasurer the odium of all the commissioners of the admiralty and the navy, and he would be looked upon as an informer, pragmatical, or meddling man in things beyond his cognisance, and that if they should combine or set themselves against him, they would quickly give him a lift out of his place, or at least make his place by their discouragements to him no better than a porter's place indeed; as also that the treasurer's place is a warm thing, and not a place for a wise man to lose or hazard by seeing, much less by taking notice of, all that may be seen and taken notice of in all orders proper to his payments, especially whenas he knows the loss is not to him but to the State, and for his part, if anything should hereafter be questioned, he hath his warrant to plead in bar to all personal blame. But by your leave, though this be good worldly wisdom, yet all this time there is but little conscience in the thing, and that by this worldly wisdom or prudence the State (I do not say is) I am sure hath been sufficiently wronged, and for ought I know may be so still, and hereafter too, if no redress be made in this point by those whom it most concerns, and to whom I leave it.

The last (though not the least) of those irregularities of the navy that I shall mention, and with which I shall conclude this chapter¹ and my whole discourse, is that lawless liberty the commissioners of the navy assume to themselves to be at the same time commissioners of the navy and private merchants or otherwise traders and dealers both by sea and land in foreign and home commodities;² by

¹ The Pepysian MS. reads 'paper.'

² The 'liberty' was not always 'lawless,' as in 1650, Peter

whose example they indulge and encourage all subordinate instruments to dance after their pipe and to do the same things. I am sure it is that which the wisdom of past times would never suffer, nor the officers of the navy in the late King's time dared ever practice. All men know that if I be a merchant and a commissioner at the same time, that as a commissioner I am able to pleasure my fellow-merchant that deals with me for the State, either in price, time of payment, quantity or quality of the goods sold, and by that means engage the merchant to wash hands with me in the like civilities in my trade as a merchant at large, and without meddling with the navy as to the sale of my own goods; yea, I can take the advantage of being privy to the State's wants in the navy (which other merchants are not) either to supply myself with them, or inform my friend what, how much, and against what time to make provision of them; but if I as a commissioner and a merchant shall close so far with that or any other merchants as to join my stock with theirs for the same commodities they trade in, and shall treat with them for the same commodities as a commissioner, then I do not only pleasure my friend as to his commodity, but also myself, in buying mine own goods as a commissioner of him that is my partner, and that sells them to me for the State's use as if they were his, when indeed they are my own.¹ What fraud and unworthy carriages this liberty doth and may expose the service unto is not easy to say, and yet such is

Pett, although a commissioner, was contracting to build frigates for the navy, apparently with the full sanction of the Admiralty Committee and the Council of State (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1649-50, p. 472). The practice of commissioners acting as merchants was prohibited after the Restoration (see note on p. 228, *supra*).

¹ The Petts did this on a large scale.

the confidence of some that they stick not to appear publicly and avowedly in this way of trade ; and that not only for goods that refer not to the navy but for such provisions as the State must of necessity buy every year in great quantities, and, which is more, of themselves and partners or not at all, no man else having that commodity to sell, at least in no considerable quantities, making it nothing in the public face of the Exchange to be known to trade in and for those provisions, and to sit as parties and judges at the same time of the price of their own goods bought by themselves of a third person for the use of the State.

Had I not known the contrary, I should have been highly suspicious that the State's salary did not afford these gentlemen a common recompense for their service in the navy, or that it was far short of what the late King in former times gave his principal officers in the same places ; but knowing it is otherwise—yea, that they have almost triple of what they had, besides extraordinary rewards of good round sums and adventitious profits of remote ports formerly hinted,¹ I cannot but admire² why they should so eagerly grasp at profit of this nature, and thereby lay themselves open to the censures of all men, not to be the men they would seem to be for the State's interest—yea, to be most ambitious seekers of their own interests.

I have heard that there is a statute that no merchant should be permitted to be a customer,³ of

¹ See note on p. 19, *supra*.

² *I.e.* wonder.

³ A clause of 20 *Henry VI.* c. 5, provided 'that no Customer . . . nor their servants . . . shall have any ships of their own, or shall buy or sell by way or by colour of Merchandise, nor they shall not meddle with Freighting of ships, nor have or occupy any such Wharfs or Keys . . . nor shall be any Factors or Attornies for any Merchant, denizen or alien.'

and that for provisions referring to their particular and joint trusts, yet the State is no sufferer by their so doing, in regard they deal in joint stock with private men that have no interest in or influence upon the navy, and that these men and not the commissioners in trade do make the contract with the rest of the commissioners of the navy—yea, that such is and hath been their candour sometimes, that when the contract hath been in debate the commissioners concerned in that contract have declared themselves parties and risen from the board, as refusing to meddle in that for the State wherein they have had a private concernment, &c. But I know withal that it is very seldom so fair, and could tell when bills have been passed for goods sold by some in a third person's name, when yet the party in whose name the bill was made had no property in those goods. But admit the best and fairest construction, and that the commissioners concerned were always so genuine in their dealings; I would only ask, is it handsome, think you, that one commissioner should this day rise from the table as a party concerned in this commodity treated for, and another commissioner should do the like the next day for another provision, and so a third and a fourth, taking their turns for most or many of the most material provisions of the navy? Will not an easy brain standing by, conclude that whatsoever candour is pretended to the service by these men to blind the world withal, yet, indeed, they drive their designs in the whole business, which is their private profit, and that not only in an ordinary way of gain, but also beyond the rates given to other men at the same time for the same material? Will they not imagine (at least) that though the party concerned absents himself from the debate when the contract is concluding, yet that the rest of the commissioners

debating will look upon their fellow-commissioner as virtually present with them, when they reflect upon themselves and can truly say that what is his turn to-day will be mine to-morrow, and if I expect a favour (to say no more) from him then, I can do no less than invite him thereunto by the like favour now? Can there be better justice than to do as I would be done unto? Yea, will they not say that if it be lawful for one commissioner to trade, then it is lawful for all? And if all may trade, may it not be suspected that they may trade in joint stock among themselves as well as in joint stock with private men? And if so, may not one of them rise from the board and declare himself concerned, in design to carry on the business smoothly and without jealousy by the rest that are as equally concerned as he? But admit that some of the commissioners (for I do not, will not charge all) should be innocent as to this crime (if it be not a crime to call it so) of being either a public trader or a private dealer for provisions referring to their particular trusts, yet are there no civilities¹ that may be done by the commissioners concerned to the commissioners disinterested? Is the navy so barren of courtesies that there is nothing wherein a courtesy received to-day this way may not be requited another day another way? If so, then let the pretence be what it will, and the business carried never so smoothly by the premised withdrawing brother, yet a judicious regulator will be apt to think that the State is not fairly dealt with in these indulgences each to other. Moreover, admit that all things be carried fair as to the price, and that the party concerned, though a commissioner, hath no more than a mere stranger to the navy hath or may

¹ The Pepysian MS. reads 'privileges.'

have at the same time for the same provision ; yet may there not be high advantages of profit given to the commissioner concerned, as to the quantity of goods to be supplied, the time of continuance of the contract—suppose for three or four years together, though in the interim the market falls half in half in the same commodity—the day of payment, the strictness of survey of those provisions upon delivery, &c. ? Are not these and the like good sweetenings ? Do not all men know that these and other circumstances wherewith a contract may be clothed do vary the contract, as to the price given, above twenty—yea, sometimes thirty and forty pounds in every hundred ? And is it fit that the service should be thus put to sale, and be as it were prostituted, to accommodate the private interests of those that receive salaries from the State to prevent such abuses in other men ? Was not this very thing the shoeing-horn that drew or pulled the victuallers' contract on the navy's feet ? Did they not undertake the whole business for as little, nay, for an halfpenny a day less than the then commissioners expended for the same service,¹ and were they not cried up at Westminster and elsewhere to have saved the State by so doing at the least thirty or forty thousand pounds by the year ? If so, where lay the snake ? Truly I must in faithfulness to the contractors say, not at all in the price agreed upon, for

¹ The contract prices before the Civil War, when John Crane was victualler, had been $7\frac{1}{2}d.$ a man per diem in harbour, and $8\frac{1}{2}d.$ at sea. During the war, and until December 31, 1650, the victualling was managed by Stephen Allcock 'upon account,' probably at varying prices. The new contract referred to, signed with Colonel Pride and others, on November 30, 1650, and taking effect from January 1, 1651, was at $7d.$ in harbour, and $8d.$ at sea, 'the State bearing all charges of transport.' It was reduced after the first year to $6\frac{3}{4}d.$ and $7\frac{3}{4}d.$ (Pepysian MSS., *Miscellanies*, vi. 99 ; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1650, p. 450).

that was low enough, but in circumstantial articles foisted purposely into the contract to gain them that profit which in the first price they had seemingly renounced; for they and their confederates knew very well that if they had not stooped to so low a rate by the day they had never compassed the contract, as propounding nothing to the State's advantage below the present expense; but when they proffered to undertake it at above an half-penny a day less than was expended by the then commissioners, and that by so doing the State should save thirty or forty thousand pounds a year of the present expense, the committee of the navy (except those that knew the design) were easily satisfied with the contract as a good and great service to the State, and accordingly passed other things of course, as petty matters of no concernment, to the State's damage; though yet I dare aver and will maintain that by one article in that contract they have gained in the State's wrong above ten thousand pounds clear profit to themselves; and if so much by one article, what may be supposed by the rest, which are both many and great, as to their profit? Yea, so great that I do not doubt, if need were, to demonstrate to all unbiassed men that the State gave them by their contract so clothed, as good as (if not more) than ninepence a day for a man, for the same thing which by contract they undertook at eightpence and sevenpence three farthings. And it were well for the State if that ninepence had carried about their expense for that provision, as I formerly hinted; whereof I would not have mentioned any more here, having said enough there, had it not been to let my reader see that a contract may be made seemingly with a commissioner himself for the high advantage and service of the State, and yet nothing be more dishonourable and prejudicial to their

service than that contract. Such and so great is the inconvenience of permitting those in trust to be parties and proprietors in things referring to their trusts. Not that I am against a merchant being a commissioner, nor yet a commissioner being a merchant when once he ceaseth to be a commissioner, though yet I could say something of concernment to the State's interest of the choice of fit men to be commissioners, and that of all men of all callings a merchant is the most unfit man to be a commissioner of the navy, and that his calling and his employment in the navy as a commissioner, and the State's interest and welfare are almost if not altogether incompatible. But I am desirous to decline that dispute, it being not so much to me and the design of my discourse whom the State employs, as that those they do employ should be faithful to their trusts, and act in a single capacity of men so trusted, and not in the triple capacity of two trades and a mystery.

For upon this account it is that all or most of the master shipwrights and their assistants, purveyors, and other inferior instruments of the navy do take a liberty to turn merchants and keep private yards whilst yet they are employed by the State, and not so much to husband for the State as for themselves, and when they have bought a good bargain, to make it better by selling it to the State as a good service, and if they cannot arrive to it in their single persons, to join hand and heart, persons and purses, rather than to lose it ; well knowing that some of the commissioners themselves are guilty of the same thing, and in order to their own interest will not, cannot well oppose them in theirs. Yea, they can tell you that the commissioners themselves do not only trade as merchants with merchants upon the Exchange for goods they buy for the State, but

as partners with these subordinate instruments that are employed by their own warrants to view, rate, certify, and supply all sorts of provisions. And this is that which renders all goods or provisions from private men tendered to the commissioners for the State's service useless and unserviceable, and invites the commissioners to tell the owner or vendor that the State hath no want of such provisions, or no money to pay for them, or else the purveyor shall be ordered upon view to certify them bad and unfit for the State's service, and yet afterwards the same purveyor shall come as a private man and buy them for himself, and then proffer them to the commissioners for the State, and not only certify them as good, but gain almost double the price for them that the first vendor offered them for, and all because they are now the goods of a master shipwright, a purveyor, &c., and one or more of the commissioners are part owners with him and shall share with them in the profit of the whole bargain. And this is that which hath begot the employment of some of the State's frigates, manned with 150 men, as men-of-war at sea, to fetch from France and other places and bring up to Deptford, &c., several sorts of provisions, wherein friends (I must not say commissioners) have been concerned, whenas the charge of the victuals and wages of that frigate hath cost the State almost twenty pounds a day, besides the neglect of the guard of the seas, and wear and tear of the ship's hull, rigging, stores, &c. All which is so notoriously bad and prejudicial to the service that the very naming of them is enough to render it ugly, were not men not only wilfully blind, but also penally blinded in sordid ways of profit. Yea, upon this account it is that the commissioners themselves do not stick to turn merchants for the State's old

ships and other provisions sold by the candle, and either by themselves or a third party for them, at the same time when they sit as judges for the State, to bid for and buy the same provisions that they sit to sell for the State; which, however it carries the boast of a great service in regard sometimes they hoist the price, yet it cannot be denied but that this way of acting is highly dishonourable and scandalous to the State's service, and gives a liberty of much fraud and abuse, if those that are in trust shall please to make use of that liberty, as I could instance in many particulars; yea, it is much suspected by some that most sales of this nature are more in design to beget the commissioners the profits of such a bargain, than that all men should have a free market to bid for and buy the commodities to be sold; and if so, then the candle is nothing else but a nose of wax¹ to give light to that bargain. I have heard of a late sale of this nature of three of the State's ships, valued the first penny² but at one thousand three hundred pounds or thereabouts, for which there was delivered by the commissioners, in their order for sale, freedom to all men that should buy to make payment of their money in old bills of freight long since due from the State, the better to advance the price and to drown some considerable part of the State's debt

¹ Used of a person or thing that is very pliable or yielding. Cf. Massinger, *Unnatural Combat*, v. 2 :—

‘ But vows with you, being like
To your religion, a nose of wax,
To be turned every way.’

Hence a ‘laughing-stock,’ as when one of the Petts complained, in 1671, that he was being deprived of his authority over his workmen, and was unwilling to be made ‘a nose of wax’ any longer (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1671, p. xxvi). The sense in the text seems to be ‘a mere pretext.’

² *I.e.* at the first bid.

in that kind.¹ Who would imagine but that those or that commissioner that procured that order from the commissioners of the admiralty (the like whereof, as I think, was never obtained before, though I know it hath been importunately solicited),² and upon the day of sale did give three thousand six hundred pounds for those ships that were valued but at one thousand three hundred pounds, did not do the State a great good service in this particular? For my part I thought it so upon the first view, and so I believe did and do many others much wiser than I; but if that be true which people talk (and some say was then told that commissioner by some to his face), that that commissioner had first prepared himself for the bargain by buying of several poor people and others that wanted money, and were made to believe their debts from the State were desperate, this three thousand six hundred pounds and more in bills of freight, and then procuring this order of sale in order to his design to pay the State with it for those

¹ There are in the State Papers for 1657 three orders of this kind from the Admiralty Commissioners to the Navy Board. The first is to dispose of the *Mary* flyboat, *Adam* and *Eve*, *Gillyflower* and *Primrose* hoy; the second, the *Tulip*, *Wildman*, *Hope* flyboat, *Nicodemus*, and *Wren*; the third, the *Plover*, *Little President*, *Westergate* and *Hector*. In each case they are to be sold 'by the candle' on the ground that they are 'decayed,' and unfit for further service, and notice is to be given 'that all persons to whom the State is engaged for any naval debts since 1642 may buy them towards satisfaction of such debts, the bills or money received after the sale to be paid in to the navy treasurer.' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1657-8, pp. 389, 427, 429).

² In 1650 the Navy Commissioners had suggested that some decayed ships might be sold by the candle 'upon discount of freight, or of money due to the victuallers upon their contract.' The Admiralty Committee had objected to this, but they had sanctioned an attempt to get master builders of the State's ships to make an offer and discount the purchase-money upon what was due to them for building the last frigates, provided that the sum was greater than the offers in ready money already made (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1650, p. 355).

ships, this in mine (I know not what it is in other men's) eyes was very dishonourable to the State's service, and very much below and reflecting upon the integrity of that commissioner ; for though no man would nor did proffer to give so much as he, yet those that would have given anything were not in the same or an equal capacity of bidding with him that bought, and so were surprised and abused in the first proposition, which was that all men in the same capacity should have liberty to buy ; and though that commissioner gave more, yet it was not so much his love or zeal for the State's interest that whetted him on so to do, as his own personal and private profit ; for if reports be true (I cannot think it, I dare not say it), this three thousand six hundred pounds did not cost him nine hundred pounds in money, nay, some do not stick to say seven hundred pounds, being all bought at five shillings in the pound at the most, and a good part of them at four shillings and three shillings in the pound, whereby it plainly appears that the purchaser gains near six hundred pounds in the first value of those ships, besides what he gained upon their sale within ten days after he bought them, and had not been six months, if six days, out of purse of all or any part of his money, the design being laid, as may well be supposed, before his first adventure. But why should I trouble my reader with this, seeing there have since been made several other sales of the same nature, and bought by the same commissioner, which that he might the better compass with profit, not only several men have been employed as brokers to purchase the debts of freight at five shillings in the pound for the use of the said commissioner, but also (as reports say) the treasurer hath been enabled by private orders from the then commissioners of the admiralty to furnish and supply

that commissioner with such moneys as he should want from time to time to pay for his compounded debts, whereby whatsoever profit was made to that commissioner was so made without the disbursement of one farthing of his own money.

I shall wade no further in this argument, as being ashamed that such things as these should be told in Gath, or amongst those that are enemies to God and good men, as done and practised by such as are high pretenders to God and goodness, and shall only say that such practices as these are so scandalous and offensive even to men of no religion, that it is not easy to persuade them to believe men in trust to be what they pretend to be, though otherwise they know them to be (like sugar) double-refined by the air and doctrine both of old and new England; but, on the contrary, are apt to believe and say with Demetrius that by this craft they have gotten their wealth.

Thus I have adventured to sail in an unknown and troublesome sea, and to ransack and rip up, discover and lay open, some few of the many chinks, rents, leaks, defects, and miscarriages of that great vessel of this nation, the navy, wherein much of the State's treasure is embarked, and whereby not a little thereof hath miscarried, leaked out, been lost, and cast away. The end and purpose of all caulkers ripping and ransacking of the seams of all ships and vessels is not altogether to discover defects, but chiefly and principally that they may stop and amend them by new and good caulking, and thereby prevent that hazard that either did or might attend both men and goods sailing or imported in them.

If this may be the success of my poor endeavours

as to the navy in general, one of the greatest and most leaky vessels of the nation, from those that are in power, and ought as pilots and master caulkers of that vessel carefully to intend¹ the same, I shall think my labour herein highly recompensed. and not much regard the murdering of (to say my good name) without noise I have been too nearly concerned in thi with the white powder² of a secret whisp

¹ = Attend.

² *I.e.* p



A DISCOURSE
UPON THE
PAST AND PRESENT STATE
OF
HIS MAJESTY'S NAVY

BY
SIR ROBERT SLYNGESBIE
KNIGHT AND BARONET
LATE COMPTROLLER THEREOF

Presented to His Royal Highness Anno 1660

DISCOURSE OF THE NAVY

BY SIR ROBERT SLYNGESBIE

THE situation of this kingdom being so much more commodious for shipping than any other in this part of the world, and the inhabitants not inferior to any other nation in spirit and industry, and being so circled by the sea that there was no other way to make themselves considerable to their neighbour nations than by shipping, it is no wonder that our ancient kings for so many ages have maintained an absolute sovereignty in the Narrow Seas. Yet we do not find that they employed any but their subjects' ships, which, though built for trade, upon occasion were made use of for public expeditions, till of latter ages (when other nations endeavouring to be competitors with them) our former kings built some ships of their own as a standing arsenal, to be ready upon all occasions, and accordingly settled some standing officers for the regiment¹ of them. The most ancient establishment whereof (that I can find) was in the reign of Henry the Eighth, wherein the officers that were under the lord high admiral were the vice-admiral of England, the master of the ordnance, the treasurer, comptroller, surveyor, and clerk of the acts,² called principal officers of the navy; the surveyor-general of the victuals, store-keeper, two clerks of the check for the several yards of Deptford and Woolwich (there being then

¹ *I.e.* government.

² The Harl. MS., B.M. copy, and Charnock read 'Accompts.'

no more, the storekeeper of Woolwich being but a substitute to him at Deptford, though since a distinct office),¹ the master attendants, the master shipwrights, and boatswains of the yards, &c. As the navy increased, some new officers were erected. The clerks of the ropeyard, formerly a branch of the clerk of the check's duty, were made distinct places,² with many other petty officers according to the new occasions³; but as it increased in some, so it was abridged in others, the master of the ordnance of the navy being discontinued, and his office contracted into the general office of the ordnance. Those two great officers of the admiralty I do not find have of a long time past sat or acted with the rest of the principal officers of the navy, the occasion whereof, and the conveniences or inconveniences which have been or may be by their discontinuance or restoration (before I proceed further in this discourse) may be worth your consideration.

The principal officers, besides their distinct duties in their original constitution, appeared to

¹ Monson, in his list of navy officials, gives, in addition to the ancient office of 'Keeper of the Great Store,' a storekeeper of later appointment at both Portsmouth and Woolwich, holding in each case by patent, and 'storekeepers' at Chatham holding by warrant from the lord admiral; but there is no corresponding place at Deptford (Churchill, *Voyages*, iii. 319, 328). But by 1645 John Wells was holding a post at Deptford described as that of 'clerk of the in-stores' with a fee of 78*l.* 5*s.* 10*d.* payable out of the Exchequer. It was said by the commissioners of the navy to be 'as useful as any place in the navy, and of as great charge and trust.' His duty was 'not only to keep the stores at Deptford, but to supply all other yards from thence' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1644-5, pp. 517-18). A John Wells had been 'storekeeper for the navy,' lodging in St. Martin's Lane, in 1629 (*ibid.* 1628-9, p. 471).

² Monson gives 'A clerk of the ropemakers at Woolwich for keeping the stores and check of the workmen twice a day; 2*s.* per diem,' and the same at Chatham, both holding by warrant from the lord admiral (Churchill, *Voyages*, iii. 319).

³ These can all be traced in Monson (*ibid.*).

have been as a council to the lord high admiral in his government of the affairs of the navy,¹ the vice-admiral as a president of that council under him ; but that office was a long time vacant in the beginning of the reign of King James, till Sir Robert Mansell, formerly treasurer of the navy, was enforced to resign his place of treasurer to Sir William Russell, as a person most suitably qualified to the rest of those that were then employed in the (then) new projected model of government of the navy,² and the office of vice-admiral conferred upon him merely as an honorarium, without charge or employment (saving in one voyage to Algiers), both his person and office being otherwise thought very inconsistent with that project.³ And when it was set aside and the ancient model restored,⁴ he being very old and in no great favour, contented himself with being nominally vice-admiral, though I have heard him say he would come and reassume the duty of his place, and sit in council with the rest of the principal officers, yet he never after did. The defect whereof (it is very likely) was the occasion why soon after there was two commissioners added to the principal officers,⁵ as it may be presumed it was

¹ See Monson.

² The Commission of 1618.

³ Mansell was appointed treasurer of the navy in 1604, for life, on the surrender of Sir Fulke Greville, though he did not reap the full benefit of his office for ten years. In May 1618 he sold his place, being appointed vice-admiral of England, a title newly created in 1604 for Sir Richard Leveson, which had been in abeyance since his death in 1605. His appointment to the command of an expedition against the pirates of Algiers took place in July 1620 (*D. N. B.*). Mr. Oppenheim takes a very unfavourable view of Mansell as treasurer (*E. H. R.* vii. 476).

⁴ The principal officers resumed control in February 1628.

⁵ In 1629 Wm. Burrell and Phineas Pett were made assistants to the principal officers. Burrell died in 1630, and in October of that year Sir Kenelm Digby was made a principal officer without distinct duties. Pett acquired the same status in

thought the business of that office was not fit to be intrusted with so few persons without some others to supervise them; whether more properly by commissioners (who having no distinct charge or trust, &c., therefore seem to be something¹ less than the officers, and so if any abuse appear to them do not with the same authority openly correct or reprehend it as a person whose superior quality and place might do, but rather by private information, which frequently happens to be aggravated, extenuated, or feigned according to the humour of the informer) is considerable.² Nor can it be any under-valuation for his lordship that is now vice-admiral³ to descend and sit, and join with the rest of the principal officers, since the former lord high admirals (namely the Duke of Buckingham sometimes, and the Earl of Nottingham very often) did so; besides that there would be a further conveniency⁴ that his lordship (when there shall be occasion for sending any great fleets to sea wherein he is personally to be employed) may better foresee what preparation and provision is necessary, so that there need be no defects or further demands, which often happens to the great prejudice of designs which are not, or perhaps may not be, fit to be communicated to all the rest of the principal officers.

the following January (*E. H. R.* ix. 475), with a salary of 200*l.* a year (see p. 336, *infra*). Though he was technically a principal officer, Digby on his appointment was empowered to do 'all . . . things which concern a *commissioner* or principal officer' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1629-31, p. 358). A principal officer was *ex officio* a commissioner of the navy.

¹ Misc. MS., 'nothing.'

² *I.e.* worth consideration.

³ The office of Vice-Admiral of England or Lieutenant of the Admiralty was revived at the Restoration (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1660-1, p. 462) and was held from Michaelmas 1660 by the Earl of Sandwich, though the patent constituting the office was not passed until April 1661 (*ibid.* 1663-4, p. 176).

⁴ Misc. MS., 'inconvenience.'

The last master of the ordnance of the navy distinguished from the master of the ordnance by land was Sir William Wynter,¹ after whose death it was thought fit to unite that place in the same person with the mastership of the ordnance by land, whereby the navy office and the office of the ordnance have since become so perfectly distinct that there hath many inconveniences happened by it. In all great expeditions, their orders for preparations being distinct, and the councils apart, it always happened that one of them stayed for the other, which occasioned both a great expense of time and money, besides many differences in judgment between the two offices; and interlocutory messages and letters between them occasioned still greater retardation;² and at the returns of the fleet, the officers of the ordnance having still need of the assistance of the mariners or shipkeepers for taking out and disposing of their ordnance, carriages, and ammunition, they being subordinate only to the officers of the navy will not move without their orders, whereby there often happens differences and complaints between the subordinate officers of both offices. To remedy which it hath been often proposed to disjoin the officers of both offices of the ordnance again by land and sea, and to unite the office of the ordnance by sea to the general office of the navy.³ But the masters of the ordnance of England, having been

¹ See note on p. 58, *supra*.

² As early as 1637, Mr. Oppenheim tells us, 'the ordnance office had already obtained that evil pre-eminence in sloth and incapacity it has never since lost' (*E. H. R.* ix. 482). It was destined to give quite as much trouble after the Restoration, and was one of the principal difficulties in the way of James II.'s naval preparations in 1688, when Pepys complained bitterly of the 'backwardness and unreadiness' of the office 'in sending guns and stores abroad' (Pepysian MSS., *Admiralty Letters*, xiv. 417).

³ It was proposed in 1639, but the change was not actually made until a few years ago (*E. H. R.* ix. 482).

ever since of great quality and interest, would never suffer such a collop to be cut out of **their** employment. I can find no trace in the navy of any subordinate officers to the master of the ordnance, and therefore presume that though there were two distinct masters of the ordnance, one for the land service and the other for the navy, yet the office of the ordnance and all the subordinate officers were the same as now they are ; nor was it inconsistent for them to act by distinct warrants from distinct masters, each in their several spheres, nor can it reasonably be imagined that the uniting of those two officers was intended as the extinguishment of one, but rather the accumulation of the duty of two offices in one person, and if so, then certainly he continues an officer of the admiralty and navy still, and ought to perform the duty of both ; and doubtless if he should reassume his place of session with the rest of the principal officers, as his predecessors did, (which was next to the vice-admiral) the inconveniences above mentioned would be avoided, and a single warrant from the lord high admiral for the setting out of any ships would serve, which now are multiplied. But certainly since the two principal officers of the navy have discontinued their session in that office, it hath been, more than any other, subject to question, inquisition, or accusation by many pragmatic discoverers of abuses and deficiencies,¹ wherein though there was often much reason, yet the design centred in themselves, thereby to create to themselves employment. Nor was it unreasonable in some measure to encourage such men, since it was not possible to constitute such a model of regiment of the navy but by the increase of it, or experience of the success.

Some necessary alterations or additions must be

¹ Misc. MS., 'differences.'

made, but a total subversion and alteration into a model (how exquisite soever in the most cunning man's contemplation) must needs be dangerous in the execution, as it happened in the fifteenth year of King James. The Earl of Nottingham, then lord admiral, being very old, and the then Earl (afterwards Duke) of Buckingham, ambitious of that high command, to gratify that young favourite, Sir Fulke Greville,¹ afterwards Lord Brooke, and Sir John Coke, afterwards secretary of state (the one having been formerly treasurer of the navy and the other his paymaster)² projected to do great service to the King by introducing a new model of the office of the navy under that new admiral.³ The inconveniences they exposed of the former model, though many, may be rendered into these two. The lord high admiral had claimed and enjoyed as his due the cast ships (as the master of the horse and other great officers do in their several places the cast provisions under their charge), and the subordinate officers of the navy, as perquisites due to their places, all other decayed and unserviceable stores—which they either really did, or might reasonably be suspected they pretended, they were unserviceable before they were so.⁴ The principal officers being usually gentlemen (they have been before ancient sea-captains), though they might be experienced in sea affairs, yet were not well versed in matter of pro-

¹ Pepysian MS., 'Grivell'; B.M. copy, 'Greenvill'; Charnock, 'Grevelle'; Misc. MS., 'Grevill'; Harl. MS., 'Sir Folilke Grivell.'

² Greville, the friend of Sidney and favourite of Queen Elizabeth, was made treasurer of the navy in September 1598. Coke became his patron's deputy-treasurer about the same time (*D. N. B.*).

³ Another reference to the Commission of 1618.

⁴ The sense is: 'which they either did pretend, or it might reasonably be suspected they pretended, were unserviceable before they were so.'

visions or husbanding the stores (more proper for merchants), whereby the King paid excessive rates both for provision and manufacture, and more than the merchants did, by the precedent of the accounts of the East India Company at Blackwall, that company then having a number of ships not much inferior to the navy royal.

In pursuance of which project the principal officers were suspended, and a commission granted to several of the most eminent merchants, with considerable salaries, for the government of the navy:¹ the event of which was, the distinct duties of the former officers (the treasurer only excepted) were promiscuously referred to the execution of one man (Mr. Burrell)² under the notion of husband for the navy—a person certainly of incomparable abilities, but an employment of too great trust for any single person to be without check or control, the commissioners referring all to their general meetings, where the representations of all things was from him, and their concurrence for form only, except in great contracts, wherein always some of them or their partners were concerned—an inconvenience inevitable if any that shall be entrusted to make bargains for the King shall drive a trade, either by himself or others, for the same commodities. As for instance Sir William Russell, formerly a Muscovia merchant and then treasurer of the navy,³ there being then want of cordage and a pretence of greater want of moneys to buy it, obtruded upon the King a bargain of cordage (pretended Alderman Freeman's)⁴

¹ See note 1 on p. 118, *supra*.

² See note on p. 119, *supra*. Burrell was in charge of all shipbuilding and repairs until 1628 (*E. H. R.* ix. 475).

³ Sir Wm. Russell purchased the treasurership from Sir Robert Mansell in 1618 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1611-18, p. 538).

⁴ The date of this transaction is fixed by a letter from the Commissioners of the Navy to Buckingham on October 10, 1626,

of the value of fifteen thousand pounds, for which the King should have credit, and lands to be assigned in lieu of it which are since valued at thirty thousand pounds. It is true that cordage may be said to be the most lasting of any that ever came into the King's stores, for there was never above one cable of that provision sent to sea in one ship at a time, and that only wet for form in fair weather (not daring to trust a ship upon any stress with so false a friend), and so returned into the stores for junk, being indeed good for nothing else at the first.

By this means the navy was in effect taken to farm by the merchants, and the remaining old sea-commanders being most of them gentlemen (not so suitable to the then commissioners) were set aside; and in all things requisite to be advised on concerning the sea the Trinity House was only consulted, and the masters of it introduced in most eminent commands, as persons most knowing—at least of whom the commissioners¹ had best experience and most conversation with in their former mercantile¹ affairs.

The great conducting end of this project was at the first the saving of charge, which was at that time very acceptable, there being then little or no employment for the navy but only to preserve it. Yet if the accounts of those years be compared with the former (considering the numerous² salaries) the charge will appear to be very much increased.³ Besides that, the works that by them

in which allusion is made to 'provision of cordage' made by Alderman Freeman in 'Muscovia' for the King's stores (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1625-6, p. 452).

¹ So the B.M. copy, Harl. MS., and printed text. The Pepysian MS. reads 'commanders' and 'martial'; the Misc. MS., 'commissioners' and 'martial.' ² Misc. MS., 'innumerosus.'

³ But the efficiency of the navy was increased also. For an

were projected to be done by contract did appear afterwards to be so superficially performed, that when the war happened in the beginning of the reign of his late Majesty, the defects of the ships and the confusion that then grew in the navy, with the tardy and disorderly supplies, was imputed to be the occasion of the ill-success of some of their great expeditions. Whereupon a commission was granted under the Great Seal to the Lord High Admiral, divers of the Privy Council, and some others, to enquire into the defects and disorders of the navy, the causes of it, and the remedies.¹ The commissioners met but twice at the Star Chamber, where, after many informations and examinations, it was dissolved without any appearing result or return of it—as was supposed to preserve the projectors of the new model and their instruments from obloquy or punishment. But the former commission was soon after dissolved, and the navy reduced into its ancient method of particular officers,² whereby each might be answerable for the defects in his particular duty. Yet two commissioners, Sir Kenelm Digby and Captain Phineas³ Pett, were soon after added as assistants to them, without particular charge, but only to join with them in consultations, and (as may be presumed) inspect how faithfully each of them did perform his particular duty.⁴ But by the ten years' discontinuance of the ancient method during the Commission,⁵ and the disorder the navy was then in, the business of that office could not easily or suddenly be reduced into the ancient channel, till the office of

estimate of the work of this Commission see Mr. Oppenheim's articles (*E. H. R.* viii. 481, 495 ; ix. 473).

¹ The Commission of 1626 (see p. 119, *supra*, and note on p. 114). ² February 1628. ³ MS. 'Phinesse.'

⁴ See note on p. 329, *supra*.

⁵ So Misc. MS. The Pepysian reads 'confusion,' as also the Harl. MS. and printed text.

high admiral was conferred on the Earl of Northumberland,¹ who taking much pains in the regulation of it and enquiring into the ancient duties of each office, published by way of instruction to the principal officers in general and to each office in particular their joint and several duties,² which though as to this discourse is most pertinent to be here inserted, yet lest it might make this too prolix I choose rather to refer to it as a tract by itself.

Whether these instructions were exactly performed by the particular officers, I think not fit (so long after) to examine; but it was very probable that that exactness which by those instructions was required was not afterwards punctually observed. The reasons whereof were:—There was then an house called the office,³ but of so small receipt that there was seldom more than one, and never but two officers residing in it, which occasioned that each officer kept his books at his own residence, where not being always ready for inspection of the rest they were more superficially kept; nor indeed was it possible they could be exactly by so few clerks, and that with so small salaries as they then kept or were allowed. As for instance, it was required of the comptroller to keep exact counter-books with the treasurer, with the victualler,⁴ and likewise such accounts of receipts, issues, and expenses of stores as to be able to charge the several storekeepers, [and] to take frequent musters thereby to check the clerk

¹ Northumberland was appointed lord high admiral in 1638, during the King's pleasure, as acting substitute to the child Duke of York (*E. H. R.* ix. 476). His commission was revoked in 1642 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1641–3, p. 346).

² See note, p. 342, *infra*.

³ The office in Mincing Lane, first rented in March 1630, for 30*l.* a year (*E. H. R.* ix. 476).

⁴ These are noticed among the comptroller's duties by Monson (Churchill, *Voyages*, iii. 323).

of the check. How these could possibly be exactly performed by two clerks, when every one of those other officers with whom they are to keep counter-books employed many,¹ it is obvious; and therefore, not without much reason, some have lately projected some new erected places, which though intentional (as to gain themselves employment) yet in respect of the service proposed to be done to the King each of them deserves a particular consideration.

One proposed an office of check upon the victualler, in respect (as it is alleged) the former principal officers in the taking of the victualler's accounts did only take in such warrants as they had before given, and (upon the purser's receipt) allow them upon account; whereas it being impossible to keep the complement of any ship's company so completed, but that between the discharge of some and entry of others there must be often some vacancies, and sometimes very many, whose victuals ought to be saved to the King, and charged as remains upon the victualler's or purser's advantages.² If it had been so, the person certainly deserves thanks, but whether it may be fit to erect a new officer or to reform the old, is worthy of further consideration.

A second projection is to keep a check upon the

¹ According to Monson, though the comptroller was only allowed two clerks, the treasurer had the same number, and the victualler one (*ibid.* 319).

² According to Monson, it was the duty of the comptroller, 'more especially than any of the other officers,' to 'examine, and keep a note of the remainder of victuals returned by pursers at the end of their voyages' (*ibid.* p. 323). The 'projection' described in the text was carried out in January 1667, and, naturally enough, by a change in the comptroller's office. Owing to the increase of naval business, two assistant comptrollers were appointed, one, Lord Brouncker, to control the treasurer's accounts, and the other, Sir Wm. Penn, to control the victuallers' and pursers' accounts (Penn, *Memorials of Sir W. Penn*, ii. 435).

clerks of the check, who indeed have a very great trust, and may by conniving with the pursers defraud the King of very considerable sums in the year. This officer (if such an one should be established) would be in the nature of a muster-master general,¹ which whether it were more advantageous than the former rules prescribed, if well observed, is worth consideration, were the principal officers engaged to employ some of their clerks to muster the several yards and ships in petty warrant victualling. And though it might be thought a muster-master (whose particular office it were) would be more exact, yet the inconveniences would be these—if his place were general through all the four yards the check could not be perfect; and if there should be distinct ones² in each yard with such salaries as might encourage them to be faithful in their charge, it is questionable whether the augmentation of charge by so many salaries would not exceed the advantage which would be made by their service, especially when they shall once come to be known and tempted. Whereas by frequent musters according to the ancient rules, the persons employed in it and the times not foreknown or expected, it is almost impossible there should be any corruption.

A third projection is for more exact auditing

¹ A similar office for ships at sea already existed. In 1650 Deane and Blake, in a letter to the Navy Commissioners, had commented on 'the prejudice accruing to the State by the appointment of not only a general muster-master of the whole fleet, but muster-masters of each squadron,' and suggesting that for the future a general muster-master may be spared (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1650, p. 491). The suggestion does not seem to have been adopted, for from 1652, or earlier, to 1664, Richard Dermott was holding the office of 'muster-master of ships' (*ibid. passim*), and in 1656 we hear of a 'muster-master to the fleet and purser-general,' with a salary of 200*l.* for himself and his clerks (*ibid.* 1655-6, p. 141).

² B.M. copy reads 'distinctions.'

accounts of stores, which [it] is most true hath been very superficially kept hitherto.¹ And the reasons were: most of those provisions are bulky commodities, and so not easily embezzled without a joint concurrence of all the officers in the yard; besides that by the transmutation of them (as for instance hemp and tar delivered by the clerk of the ropeyard, returned again in cables or coils,² those issued again by fathoms, and returned a quarter worn or decayed; the like of canvas for sails and many others), the account became so intricate that though as to inspection, or direction of the expense and saving of the stores, was properly the surveyor's duty, the abridgment whereof to be transferred to the comptroller for the stating of the account, yet the surveyor heretofore having but two clerks, one whereof constantly attended at the office, it was very difficult (if not impossible) for the other to perform that duty so exactly throughout all the yards as might reasonably be required, which [was] occasioned under the late usurped power. Though the regiment of the navy by particular officers seemed then unsuitable to the form of a commonwealth government in this State, and all public business reduced to committees so likewise the navy to commissioners, yet to avoid confusion they appointed distinct clerks for distinct duties, and so did place in each several yard a clerk of the survey with competent stipend to each of them,³ which are yet continued, and I suppose so

¹ This was carried out in 1671, when Sir John Ernle was made comptroller of stores (Duckett).

² Pepysian MS. reads 'quills,' a most infrequent form—perhaps from 'quoile,' which often occurs.

³ In Monson's time there was only one clerk of the survey, holding by warrant from the lord admiral at a fee of 12*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*, and a 'reward' of 30*l.* more (Churchill's *Voyages*, iii. 320). Under the Commonwealth the clerks of the survey, at Chatham and Deptford at any rate, received 60*l.* a year (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652-3, pp. 556, 558).

necessary that they cannot conveniently be discontinued. But it seems their part is not that which this projector aims at as an employment to himself, since he doth not propose a residence in a particular yard, but residing in London to audit the several storekeepers' accounts, which amounts to no more than hitherto hath been observed of that part of the comptroller's duty, and certainly may deserve much thanks and encouragement.

And though there may be many other abuses and inconveniences in the navy, yet doubtless they may be all summed up in one of those three heads to which these projections tend. And though it be very probable the abuses in all these may proceed from the deficiency in the principal officers in the due execution of their places, yet whether it be more convenient to ease them of so much of their duty, or to rectify¹ them in the execution of it, is considerable, though the difference will be no more than this.

It is not possible for the principal officers to perform their duties according to their instructions without the assistance of so many pens as will be necessary for them, nor such pens to be procured without such reasonable encouragement as every merchant allows to his book-keeper ; so that in effect, though the substance of all these three projects must be acknowledged very reasonable and necessary, the only question will be whether as distinct places, or as substitutes, or as clerks to the principal officers. Nor is it very material, only with this proviso, that if as distinct officers, or clerks imposed upon the principal officers (which I suppose none of them will scruple readily to submit to) then the principal officers not to be responsible each of them for their several clerks' misdemeanours, but only to inspect

¹ Misc. MS., 'as to certify.'

and correct them ; but if as their immediate clerks of their own election, then the principal officers to be responsible for their several clerks.

In order therefore for the regulating of that office, which by the frequent vicissitudes of form is still in great confusion, whereby neither are accounts exactly kept, nor sufficient order taken for the rectifying of known abuses or preventing the like for the future, it is therefore humbly proposed: That his Royal Highness would vouchsafe, according to the precedents of his predecessors the Lord High Admirals of England, to regulate the navy by his princely instructions, to be preserved in the office in a book fairly written, as a direction for every officer to walk by in the execution of the duty of his place¹—wherein (if his Highness so think fit) I conceive the ancient model is most safe, with such other superscriptions (only additions or alterations) as hath been experienced were heretofore deficient, and might not alter the frame ; of which sort these subsequent proposals are humbly submitted to his princely consideration.

The Earl of Northumberland, taking notice in his time of the inconveniences that happened by the remote habitations of one officer to another, that despatches from him to them were retarded in their execution, besides other inconveniences to the subject in the business they had to solicit in that office,

¹ These were issued by James, Duke of York, on January 28, 1662. They were framed on the model of Northumberland's instructions of 1640, and they were not superseded until the admiralty was reorganised at the beginning of the present century. They were printed in 1717 from an imperfect copy under the title of *The Economy of H.M. Navy Office*. Two copies occur among the Pepysian MSS., one in *Naval Precedents*, and the other in *Sir Wm. Penn's Collections*. A copy of Northumberland's instructions is among Sir William Penn's *Naval Tracts* (Sloane MSS., No. 3232, pp. 171-271. This copy is wrongly dated 1646.)

in one of his instructions did therefore require them to live as near together as conveniently they might.¹ Yet the house then called the office being of so small receipt² (though the officers did in observance to that instruction reside as near as they could find commodious habitations) the inconveniences were not quite taken away in the tardiness of despatches, but especially in the exact keeping of the books. It was therefore most prudentially considered by the former Lord High Admiral that all such officers of every yard (whose constant attendance was requisite for the service) should have some commodious habitation within the yard, thereby to take away all excuse for their neglect or absence. The principal officers (their business being then but little comparatively to what it is now) were loath to confine themselves to that strictness, and therefore, though there was always an office, it amounted to no more than a house of meeting, the now navy office (being his Majesty's house, purchased by the late usurper),³ being but a part of a house, the other part in other hands. Which being either purchased

¹ 'They are for the common benefit of the subject to live as near together as conveniently they may, and appoint and publish a certain and known place for their meeting, and there to meet at certain and appointed days twice every week at the least' (Northumberland's Instructions). This instruction was repeated in 1662. The desirability of the officers living together had been recognised and discussed as early as 1635 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 315).

² See p. 337, *supra*.

³ Sir John Wolstenholme's house in Seething Lane, purchased in 1654 for 2,400*l.* and used as a navy office until about 1780, when the Board removed to Somerset House (*E. H. R.* xi. 60; Robinson, *The British Fleet*, p. 153). Samuel Pepys lived here after the Restoration, and in his earlier days the diarist thought well of the accommodation provided. On July 4, 1660, he went with Sir George Carteret, the treasurer, and Commissioner Pett 'to view the houses in Seething Lane belonging to the navy,' and found 'the worst very good' (*Diary*).

or rented and so united, would be capacious enough to leave the principal officers (and present commissioners likewise) without excuse for their daily attendance and their due keeping of their books in good order and method; and though the addition of charge in the reuniting of that house may be thought inconvenient, yet the consequences of it would abundantly recompense it, or at least each officer or commissioner might out of their stipends default¹ or allow proportionably to it.

That each officer may appoint one room or office within the general office where the clerks under him may continually attend for the keeping of their books exactly, which are now confusedly together, and that each office may at all seasonable hours be open to all other the officers and commissioners, their clerks, and all others concerned, for inspection.

That upon examination of the quality and quantity of each officer's particular duty, he may be appointed by his Royal Highness such a number of clerks as may be proportionable to the duty required of that office.

That the commissioners (though of late introduction as coadjutors to the principal officers, without any particular distinct charges)² whilst his

¹ *I.e.* defalcate, deduct.

² When the administration of the navy was recast at the Restoration, Lord Berkeley and Sir Wm. Penn were appointed extra commissioners, in addition to the four principal officers and a special commissioner resident at Chatham, without special duties assigned to them. This was afterwards spoken of as a great advance, since they were 'not limited to any, and yet furnished with power of acting and comptrolling every part, both of the particular and common duties of the office,' and thus 'have full opportunity given them' of 'understanding the defects of the whole, and applying their assistance where it may be most useful' (Paper of April 17, 1669, printed in Charnock, *Marine Architecture*, ii. 406). On May 12, 1662, another extra commissioner was appointed, and though these appointments were allowed to lapse

Majesty and his Royal Highness shall think fit to continue them, may not be insignificant, but may give their attendance at meetings to advise with and assist the principal officers in all their consultations, and jointly and severally to inspect every one of the officers in the due execution of their places ; and to that end each of them by their patents being allowed two clerks, they may appoint one of their clerks to attend each several distinct office, as assistants to the principal officers' clerks, and to inspect the due performance of their duties.

That monthly (and oftener if there be occasion) the principal officers and commissioners may appoint two of their clerks to take musters of all the yards and ships in ordinary and petty warrant, to enquire into all abuses, and to make their returns to the principal officers and commissioners—the same clerk not to be employed twice together, nor any certain day prefixed—and the principal officers to make report of such abuses to the lord high admiral as there shall be occasion.

But that such a regulation may take the better effect, the causes of the present confusion of the office and the remedies are worthy consideration.

The great cause¹ of all is the great arrear of pay still due to the seamen on board of several ships now in harbour and some of them in dry dock, which being a constant growing charge, the victualling only of those men do so exhaust the treasury that the officers are forced to wink at or dispense with several disorders, which for want of money to supply the ordinary expense of the navy are inevitable ; amongst which is not the least that the principal

in the zeal for retrenchment displayed after the first Dutch war, they were revived again at the beginning of the second Dutch war.

¹ Misc. MS., 'issue.'

officers are enforced to employ purveyors for the buying of small provisions, especially of timber and plank, as there are demands made to them from the several yards to keep their men at work, which are bought at the second hand, and at exorbitant prices.

The ancient custom of the office of the navy as to their treasure¹ was, every year the principal officers did make up an estimate of the ordinary charge of the navy for the year ensuing—how much of that money was to be paid to² the treasurer and how much to the victualler, and at what several times of that general estimate it would be necessary. And in like manner upon every warrant for extraordinary service, estimates were drawn up and presented to the lord high admiral, and by him signed and transferred to the treasurer, whereby money might be provided in seasonable³ time (the defect doth oftentimes multiply the expense in this office more than any other), by which means the principal officers, knowing the state of the treasure, could best order their emptions and preserve the credit of this office. The treasurer every quarter used to present his ledger-books, which being first examined with the vouchers and comptroller's counter-books, were signed by all the rest of the officers, and then transferred to the auditor. This method during the time of the late usurped power hath been so altered under their commission, that there appears no preceding estimate in their confused books remaining in this office, nor any charge appearing upon the treasurer, save only for such old decayed provi-

¹ Misc. and Harl. MSS., 'the treasurer.'

² *Ibid.* 'by,' but the reading in the text is the better. The Exchequer paid what was due on the navy estimates to the victualler and to the treasurer of the navy separately (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, pp. 467, 516).

³ Misc. MS., 'reasonable.'

sions as have not long since been sold, nor any accounts passed with the auditor.

I do not conclude it necessary to ravel into ¹ the accounts already passed (though not regularly) yet wherein the subsequent accounts and they may interfere, it is necessary to consider how far they should be revived. It hath lately been required of this office by the late Parliament to give an account of the debts of the navy,² which have been returned, and by his Majesty's gracious permission left to the Parliament to consider the discharging of them ; yet whereas there have been old provisions sold to some persons for moneys payable to the treasurer, the same persons' bills for other provisions delivered by them may have been transferred to the treasurer in lieu of payment, and yet by him or others again presented ³ to the principal officers and demanded amongst those debts. Whether the auditor could charge the treasurer with his receipts at all, further than he would charge himself with the price of those old provisions, appears a matter of doubt, unless he should voluntarily charge himself ; so as many of those debts may be doubly charged upon the public.

There hath been usually twelve pence a month out of every man's wages serving at sea defaulted in the treasurer's hands, whereof twopence per

¹ *I.e.* investigate, explore.

² On October 4, 1659, the Admiralty Commissioners were instructed by the Council of State to report an estimate of all navy debts to March 25, 1660 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1659-60, p. 237). This was supplied to them on the following day by the Navy Commissioners, who estimated the debts to November 1, 1659, at 722,000*l.*, and the expenses from November 1, 1659, to March 31, 1660, including the yards, at 555,142*l.* 17*s.*—a total of 1,277,142*l.* 17*s.* (*ibid.* p. 494). This proved to be too low an estimate, for on March 6, 1660, another estimate of the debts of the navy to February 1, 1660, only, was 1,284,452*l.* (*ibid.* p. 383).

³ Misc. MS., 'prescribed.'

mensum is payable to the surgeons, fourpence to the chaplains, and sixpence to the Chest, which defalcation hath not been usually mentioned in the treasurer's account, but the full wages charged. It is not likely the surgeons would release their twopences without some clamour, which we hear nothing of, nor the chaplains their groats, whose places if they were vacant the groats were due to the King; but it is not likely there were any vacant since there were so many gifted men¹ (which could not want) to take upon them that employment. Of the sixpences only due to the Chest for the support of the maimed seamen, there appears to have been for many years past ten thousand pounds paid to those that then assumed the government of it, and have not yet (though often required) given any account, though the poor maimed persons are many years in arrear for their pensions; the treasurer alleging he had orders from the former powers to pay the great wages only—a thing very improbable, since the defalcation must as well touch the surgeons and chaplains as the Chest—so there is no means for the governors of the Chest to audit their accounts or relieve their pensioners without inspection of the preceding treasurer's account, whereby they may fully charge him with the debt due to them, a work wherein I am the more zealous, since it is to approve[d] use. During the short (but sharp) war with the Hollanders, the then usurped power, pretending great care of those that should be wounded or maimed in that service, made certain commissioners to provide for them;² who, besides the provision heretofore established by the acts of former

¹ From the printed text. The MSS. read 'merchants'!

² The 'commissioners of sick and wounded at Little Britain,' established September 29, 1653. Mr. Oppenheim gives an account of their work (*E. H. R.* xi. 38).

parliaments out of the several counties for such occasions, received by way of imprest from this office about one hundred thousand pounds and besides the assistance of the then governors of the Chest (who, notwithstanding there was a revenue of lands purchased to it by the former governors, and the access of the accruing sixpences,¹ which during those great fleets must needs amount to a very great sum, assuming so many pensioners, they are yet indebted to them about ten thousand pounds) yet those commissioners presented to the now principal officers a schedule of debts for the relief of those maimed persons amounting to about three thousand pounds, which was accordingly presented to the parliament, and the maimed persons, their nurses, and guardians still clamouring, and pretending further debts for their relief, and yet there is no account passed by these commissioners, but a debt required.²

In the victualling office there hath been no account passed these five years last past, and yet there was imprested to Major Alderne above two hundred thousand pounds, who being since dead, his executors or administrators pretend no assets. After his death the victualling office was settled in a strange method; the same persons that were commissioners for the navy were likewise by a distinct commission for the victualling,³ as it is said in their commission itself by which they acted, nor to be subject to account, but had other inferior officers in the victualling office, one whereof was the cashier,⁴ another purveyor or disposer of the

¹ The printed text and B.M. copy read 'expenses.'

² For the condition of the Chatham chest under the Commonwealth, see Mr. Oppenheim's article (*E. H. R.* xi. 40).

³ See note on p. 124, *supra*.

⁴ Printed text 'chashire.' The cashier of the victualling office

victuals, and a third auditor or accountant. We find imprest to that cashier out of this office above four hundred thousand pounds ; besides that there may be more which cannot be here charged, by reason that the commissioners, sometimes sitting at the navy office and sometimes at the victualling office, might charge the treasurer with further imprest than doth appear here. The great clamour that lies upon this office by almost all the pursers of the navy, besides many others, for debt due upon the victualling, is not possible to be remedied or they reasonably to be relieved till the general account be stated, that it may appear whether they be creditors to the public or to the victualler ; nor is it possible duly to charge the present victualler till upon stating the former account it may appear what remains in victuals, cask, or other provisions¹ which are left to him at his entry, either on board ships or in the stores within the several ports. There hath been some other victuallers (distinct from these) in the remoter ports, and many other employed without check or control have had very great sums imprested, some of which have made very extravagant accounts, and some none.

The office being once regulated in form and method, the principal consideration that is to be had is the seasonable provision of what moneys shall be necessary to prevent such inconveniences as are now obvious to all men. And although it hath been heretofore the usual proportion limited to the stores to be replenished with all sorts as might serve twelve months in harbour and six months to

under this arrangement was Captain Edw. Allen (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1656-7, p. 546).

¹ 'Provisions' meant stores as well as, and more often than, victuals.

all the ships at sea, yet, in respect some of those provisions are not at all times to be had (and especially timber and plank, the first owners of which do seldom cut it down but for present want of money, and therefore choose any chapman rather than the King, so as the King upon any occasion is enforced to buy at the second and third hand those, and sometimes some other provisions of like nature), it is observed that all officers employed in it find more advance¹ in a penurious time than when payments are punctual, the opportunity of buying such at the best hand being lost.

Before the war in the beginning of the reign of his late Majesty, the seamen's pay (besides the twelve pence defalcation money) was but nine shillings per mensem, yet the medium according to the number of men of the several rates of ships was exactly calculated, that a medium of the officers' wages included with the common men was fifteen shillings per mensem, so as estimates might be made brief and yet exact. In the beginning of his late Majesty's reign a foreign war happened, when it was thought necessary to increase the seamen's pay from nine shillings (their net² wages) to fourteen shillings per mensem; upon our exact calculation, including the officers, it amounted by a medium to twenty shillings per mensem. The Long Parliament in the beginning of the late troubles, as a bribe or reward to the seamen for their first rebellion, again increased their wages, and during the Dutch war made yet a further increase of it,³ but the medium

¹ Misc. and Harl. MSS., 'advantage.'

² *Ibid.* 'neat'—the older form.

³ The seaman's monthly pay during the reign of James I. was 10s. For the expedition to Cadiz in 1625 it was temporarily raised to 14s., and after 1631 it was permanently raised to 15s. (subject to the 1s. 'defalcation' for chaplain, surgeon, and the

was never exactly calculated. The established rule for wages of seamen in the King's navy was the rule by which the merchants was always forced proportionably to exceed it, and foreigners to exceed them. I dare not adventure to give my judgment how convenient it might be to retrench it, though we find now there is no need of pressing seamen, they being solicitors to be admitted into the service,¹ which may rather be imputed to the small employment the merchants have for them (compared to what they had heretofore) than to the greatness of the pay, which if they had the like employment as heretofore they must necessarily exceed. But, however it were fit the medium were more exactly calculated and a new book of rates established, the distinction that is made (contrary to former usage) of able seamen and ordinary seamen² is subject to great abuses, those that are entered able upon the books being more by favour or interest than merit, each captain (besides their retinue) hiring many servants for small wages, which stand upon the books as able seamen, so as

chest at Chatham). From January 1643 it was raised to 19s., and from January 1653 to 24s. (*E. H. R.* viii. 475, 490 ; xi. 31. See also note 2, *infra*).

¹ This was perhaps true at the time when it was written. The first order for a press made after the Restoration is dated June 7, 1664 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1663-4, p. 607), and at the time there was no great scarcity of mariners (*ibid.* p. 597). But later in Charles II.'s reign the delays in payment made it very difficult to man the fleet, and the press was in constant requisition (Pepysian MSS., *Admiralty Letters*, *passim*).

² This distinction appears first in 'Propositions for the Encouragement of Seamen,' made by the Admiralty Committee upon reference from the Council of State, dated December 20, 1652. It was there proposed that the wages of 'able seamen, fit for the helm and lead, top and yard,' be augmented from 19s. to 24s. a month, the wages of 'all not capable of the aforesaid duties'—*i.e.* ordinary seamen—being continued at 19s. a month (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1652-3, p. 43).

that increase of pay goes much of it into the captain's purse. If therefore it should be thought fit to give some additional encouragement to the most able seamen, it would be convenient that they were limited to a number in each rate by which the medium may be calculated, and those to be no other than such as have served out their apprenticeship.

But a greater abuse, lately much practised by the captains of the ships, is most fit to be regulated. Those ships which have been employed in remoter voyages, especially into the Straits, have taken freights of merchants' goods from one port to another, and the captains themselves and other officers by their example still driving a trade,¹ wherein it appears often they sell some of the King's stores out of the ships under pretence they have bought the like in some other port, which is easily helped by the captain's connivance in their accounts of expense of stores. Besides by that means they take occasion to spend much time in port which might be better spent at sea, and the ship's hold often so filled that they have no room to throw by their chests and other cumbersome things upon occasion of fight, whereby the gun decks are so encumbered² that they cannot possibly make so good an opposition to an enemy as otherwise they might; and at their return, coming home freighted with merchants' goods, have greater opportunity to defraud the customers³ than any merchants have.

¹ This grew to be a very serious abuse. The MS. *Admiralty Letters* in the Pepysian Library contain correspondence on the matter which seems to show that in 1674 the admiralty made an attempt to put a stop to the practice. One of their grounds of objection was that given in the text, that it caused the King's ships to delay in foreign ports (*Adm. Letters*, iv. 254).

² Misc. MS., 'pestered.'

³ *I.e.* custom-house officers.

There is another branch of the navy which cannot properly be called his Majesty's, yet though it hath been the use of his royal predecessors it would be a paradox to affirm the contrary. And yet if it be true that those only are rich that have more than they have need of, and those only poor that have need of more than they have, I doubt it will appear that his Majesty's naval affairs are not so considerable (in case any great foreign war should happen) as his royal father's were in the year 1640, when his Majesty might upon all occasions have a hundred merchant-ships suddenly fitted for his service, of such burden and strength as were little inferior to his own, without any charge of maintaining them longer than they were in his service—as long before appeared during the war with France and Spain, when few in all those great fleets were of the King's own ships ;¹ and yet the merchants continued their

¹ In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the relation between the ship of war and the armed merchantman was sufficiently close for the latter to be available for service in the royal fleets. Soon after the accession of Elizabeth there were twenty-one ships of the royal navy in a serviceable condition, their burden amounting in all to 5,510 tons, and forty-five merchantmen available for use with men-of-war, with a burden of 7,000 tons. A return dated 1560, of large merchant-ships of 100 tons and upwards, though apparently incomplete for the western ports, gives a total of seventy-six. A similar list for 1588 gives 175 ships of this class (*E. H. R.* vi. 466–8, 477). Only a very few of these, however, could have been as large or efficient as the ships of war. Professor Laughton has shown that out of the 197 ships that fought the Armada only forty-nine were of 200 tons and upwards, and upon these the brunt of the fighting fell ; and he sees no reason to doubt the truth of Wynter's statement as regards the fighting of July 29, that the greater number of the merchant-ships were of little use 'otherwise than that they did make a show' (*N. R. S.* vol. i. pp. li–lii). In the expeditions of 1625–8, 'the war with France and Spain,' alluded to in the text, hired ships were very extensively used. A few of these may have been large and heavily armed, as we know that in 1628 East Indiamen of 700 to 900 tons, and ordinary merchantmen of 400 to 500 tons, were re-

trade without expecting or desiring convoys,¹ if there could but two or three consort together, not caring who they met with, unless it were the colliers or small vessels trading upon the coast. But since these late distractions began at home, foreign trade decayed, and merchants so discouraged from building that there hath been scarce one good merchant-ship built these twenty years last past,² and of what were then in being, either by decay or accidents, there are very few or none remaining, the merchants, having found their private conveniences in being convoyed at the public charge, taking no care of making defence for

turned as fit for the royal service in a survey of shipping (*E. H. R.* ix. 108). But as in 1588, so now, the most efficient ships must have been those of the royal navy. And this must have been the case still more in 1640, when the Sovereign, of 1,522 tons and 100 guns, represented an altogether more formidable kind of engine of war. It is quite easy to believe that in that year the King might have had 'a hundred merchant-ships suddenly fitted for his service,' but a comparison between Mr. Oppenheim's list of the royal navy (*E. H. R.* ix. 95), and his lists of merchant-ships of ten years earlier (*ibid.* 109), makes it impossible to believe they were 'of such burden and strength as were little inferior to his own.'

¹ But this may have been due to the difficulty of obtaining convoy, and the vexatious charges it involved. This was reformed in 1649, and convoys were supplied without charge (*E. H. R.* xi. 29-30).

² By a regulation of Henry VIII.'s reign, a bounty of 5s. a ton was paid to the builders of ships of 100 tons and upwards. This was discontinued in 1624, but was renewed again in 1626, when a great increase took place in the number of ships built, partly due to this, and partly to the number of vessels taken up for the royal service (*E. H. R.* vi. 472 ; ix. 109). Under the Commonwealth the great increase in the royal navy, and the number of Dutch prizes that were refitted, diminished the demand for hired merchantmen. That fewer were built of the required size is probable enough, and Mr. Oppenheim notes that out of sixty-three merchantmen of 200 tons and upwards in the Thames in 1653, only one was of 600 tons, four of 500, two of 450, and five of 400 (*ibid.* xi. 54), and these do not appear to have been in the State's service ; but the statement in the text is too strong as it stands.

There is another branch of the navy which cannot properly be called his Majesty's, yet though it hath been the use of his royal predecessors it would be a paradox to affirm the contrary. And yet if it be true that those only are rich that have more than they have need of, and those only poor that have need of more than they have, I doubt it will appear that his Majesty's naval affairs are not so considerable (in case any great foreign war should happen) as his royal father's were in the year 1640, when his Majesty might upon all occasions have a hundred merchant-ships suddenly fitted for his service, of such burden and strength as were little inferior to his own, without any charge of maintaining them longer than they were in his service—as long before appeared during the war with France and Spain, when few in all those great fleets were of the King's own ships ;¹ and yet the merchants continued their

¹ In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the relation between the ship of war and the armed merchantman was sufficiently close for the latter to be available for service in the royal fleets. Soon after the accession of Elizabeth there were twenty-one ships of the royal navy in a serviceable condition, their burden amounting in all to 5,510 tons, and forty-five merchantmen available for use with men-of-war, with a burden of 7,000 tons. A return dated 1560, of large merchant-ships of 100 tons and upwards, though apparently incomplete for the western ports, gives a total of seventy-six. A similar list for 1588 gives 175 ships of this class (*E. H. R.* vi. 466-8, 477). Only a very few of these, however, could have been as large or efficient as the ships of war. Professor Laughton has shown that out of the 197 ships that fought the Armada only forty-nine were of 200 tons and upwards, and upon these the brunt of the fighting fell ; and he sees no reason to doubt the truth of Wynter's statement as regards the fighting of July 29, that the greater number of the merchant-ships were of little use 'otherwise than that they did make a show' (*N. R. S.* vol. i. pp. li-lii). In the expeditions of 1625-8, 'the war with France and Spain,' alluded to in the text, hired ships were very extensively used. A few of these may have been large and heavily armed, as we know that in 1628 East Indiamen of 700 to 900 tons, and ordinary merchantmen of 400 to 500 tons, were re-

themselves. If a war should now happen, computing what would be the necessary convoys to the traders to the several parts of the world (which must be of the King's own ships since there are no other) it were doubtful whether upon a great expedition that may be requisite, the residue of his Majesty's whole navy might be sufficient to perform that and leave any considerable force for service (as hath always been used), especially if the Hollanders should be an enemy, which I conceive cannot be avoided, unless they were mutually joined with us in the war. For it is observable whilst during the war which his late Majesty had with France and Spain both at once (though the great expedition had but ill-success) the nation hath rather been enriched than impoverished by that war, yet during the time of the late usurped powers, though the nation was grown much more martial, and though they were firmly leagued with France, Portugal, and Sweden,¹ and though the King of Spain's naval force was much more considerable than formerly, by the loss of Portugal and Dunkirk, the nation was by that war impoverished above one thousand sail of ships taken and destroyed, and the trade of this kingdom almost ruined.² The reasons were obvious : during the former war several noblemen and gentlemen made use of the merchants' ships upon their own accounts and³ advantage in such considerable manner and equipage as that the Earl of Warwick with one fleet did make an honourable defence and retreat against the whole force of the Spanish galleons, upon their own coast ;⁴ Sir Kenelm

¹ Harl. MS. and B.M. copy 'Sweedland.'

² As Mr. Oppenheim points out, this statement is directly contradicted by the customs receipts (*E. H. R.* xi. 54).

³ For 'accounts and' the Misc. MS. reads 'private.'

⁴ This refers to the expedition of 1627. On March 18 the Earl received a commission authorising him 'to undertake a voyage, tending to the service of the King and realm, and the

Digby baffled the Venetians pretending to protect the French in the Mediterranean seas ;¹ Sir David Kirke and his brother took not only some of the King of France's best ships from him, but his best plantation, Canada ;² whilst many other smaller ad-

increase of the Earl's own experience' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1627-8, p. 98). On April 17 these euphemisms were abandoned, and a warrant was issued to prepare 'such an enlargement of the commission granted to the Earl of Warwick, as would authorise him to invade and possess any of the dominions of the King of Spain or the Archduchess in Europe, Africa, or America' (*ibid.* p. 138). He accordingly put to sea from Plymouth on May 9, with a 'fleet' of five ships, with Sir Francis Stewart as his vice-admiral in the Hector, James Mountagu as his rear-admiral, and accompanied by Sir Michael Geere (*ibid.* p. 170). Notwithstanding the royal commission, the expedition was a private venture, and it is probable that some at least of the ships were the Earl's own property (*ibid.* pp. 18, 135). He returned in the Little Neptune on July 26 (*ibid.* p. 272), after having made a demonstration upon the coast of Spain. A narrative of his voyage by the master of the Hector, dated October 1, is among the State Papers, under the title 'Might, and Would not ; or The Observation of the Right Honourable the Earl of Warwick his voyage, made upon the coast of Portugal in the year of our Lord God, Anno Domini 1627 : with the passages which principally happened, and the proceedings thereof ; but especially of the rule and government in the good ship called the Hector, under the command of Sir Francis Stewart, Knight, captain of the said ship : and a true relation of the manner of his fight with the Vice-Admiral of Spain, the 12th day of July, 1627 ; three more of the Spanish Armada giving her chase in sight, very near at hand. Written by William Ball, mariner, clearing himself of an aspersion falsely imputed upon him on the voyage' (*ibid.* p. 366).

¹ Sir Kenelm Digby sailed as a private adventurer, on December 22, 1627, in command of two ships, to seize some French ships anchored in the Venetian harbour of Scanderoon. The expedition was successful, after a fierce engagement on June 11, 1628 (*D. N. B.*). Like the Earl of Warwick, Digby received a royal license authorising him to undertake the voyage 'for the increase of his knowledge.'

² The French had settled at Port Royal in Nova Scotia, and had established a trading port for the purchase of furs from the Indians at Quebec. As Sir William Alexander claimed the whole district under a grant from the Crown, Captain Kirke, acting as

venturers did as it were besiege all the ports of the dominions of both those kings, so as I believe it may be truly affirmed that the lord admiral's tenths of the prizes then taken by this nation did exceed the full value of the prizes taken from it, so numerous then were the merchants' ships fit to make men-of-war of ; besides the continuation of a trade with little less confidence and security than in the time of peace, which may be the reason why those two great kings, being then at peace between themselves, were willing to make a peace so honourable and advantageous to his late Majesty, though at that time reduced to such straits for money by the malignant humours then prevailing in the several Parliaments by him called, that it was thought not possible for him to continue the war longer ; whereas in the time of the late usurper there was neither shipping fit for such private adventures, nor persons able or willing to undertake it, or if they had, they would have been suspected by him to have some other design, all that was then in favour or trust being persons only sharking upon the public.

A second great reason was, during the former war the Hollanders mutually engaged with us in that war against Spain, with whom there was then no hope for them of reconciliation ; whereas in the latter war the Hollanders being neutral, and yet more jealous of our rivalship¹ in trade with them, supplied the Spaniards with such great proportions both of shipping and men upon their own adventure, with Spanish commission under the notion of Flemings, that they did this nation more damage under that colourable peace than during the open war before.

his private agent, in 1629 seized Port Royal and stormed Quebec (Gardiner, vii. 155). The description of the enterprise given in the text is rather inflated.

¹ Misc. MS., 'rival ships.'

whilst this nation, having no such colourable pretence, could not take their shipping without open breach of the peace but a little before made with them.¹ Nor can it be imaginable that for the advantage of their own trade they will not be ready to do the like for any nation with which hereafter his Majesty may have a breach, and how much more encouragement it may be to any enemy to make a war upon us when they shall know what the utmost strength of the King's navy is (which possibly may not be difficult for them to gain intelligence of), knowing there is little or no recruits to be expected from his subjects' shipping, as heretofore there were when there were such numerous warlike ships in the merchants' employment whereof they could make no computation.

Since therefore the whole naval force of this nation is now comprised within the King's arsenals, and the whole charge, both for defence of the kingdom and protection of trade, is out of the King's revenue only, how to encourage or enjoin each Company of merchants to build two or three ships at least every year, whereby in twenty years more it may be possible to recover what in twenty years past we have lost, is a consideration of the most high concernment that can be proposed to his Majesty or a Parliament, and may deserve a particular tract by itself.

¹ April 5, 1654.

APPENDIX

[The Appendix contains : (1) The testimony of a number of officers to the truth of the charges contained in the Earl of Northumberland's Articles (pp. 361 to 389) ; (2) the Answer of Sir William Russell, Treasurer of the Navy (pp. 389 to 396) ; (3) the Answer of John Hollond, Paymaster of the Navy (pp. 396 to 398) ; (4) the Answers of the Principal Officers—Sir Henry Palmer, Comptroller ; Kenrick Edisbury, Surveyor ; and Dennis Fleming, Clerk of the Acts (pp. 399 to 403) ; (5) the order taken by the King in Council (pp. 403 to 406).]

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvi. 13.]

The Attestation of Sir John Penington, Knight, Vice-Admiral of the late fleet, concerning the Articles presented to his Majesty by the Earl of Northumberland touching the defects and abuses of the Navy,¹ by his Majesty's Commandment

To the first article this attestant saith that divers of his Majesty's ships are, through age, very much decayed, and of little use, and, as he verily believeth, unfit to be repaired, by reason of the great charge and the continual reparation that will be requisite, and yet not made perfectly serviceable, as namely the Assurance,² the Adventure,³ the Black George,⁴ are the worst. And after them the Defiance,⁵ the

¹ The substance of the Articles themselves is quoted on pp. 376–387, *infra*.

² A ship 'of the second rank,' rebuilt in 1603. (*E. H. R.* vii. 484, note 58.)

³ Built in 1594 (*ibid.* p. 485), and therefore not very far short of half a century old.

⁴ Date uncertain, but was on the navy list in 1629 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1628–9, p. 482). In April 1637 she was given by the King to the Earl of Arundel, and in June of that year was being used for carrying timber (*ibid.* 1637, pp. 2 and 251).

⁵ Built 1589 ; rebuilt 1613. The term 'rebuilt' did not necessarily imply more than extensive repairs. (*E. H. R.* vii. 484)

Repulse.¹ And he verily believeth that the St. Denis² and the Dreadnought³ now in the dock, and divers other ships lately repaired, are not worth the charge bestowed upon them.

To the second article this attestant saith that the Triumph,⁴ the Charles,⁵ the Victory,⁶ the St. Andrew,⁷ and the Garland⁸ want girdling, which would not only make them to carry up their sides and to use their lower tier, but to last many years longer. And if the Triumph, the Charles, and the Garland, and such other as have great galleries, had them retrenched they would be more serviceable.

To the third this attestant saith that many of the ships this last voyage were leaky before their first going out of the river, as namely, the Assurance, the Mary Rose,⁹ and one or two of the Whelps;¹⁰ and there proved leaky in the voyage the Repulse, the Mary Rose twice after her going out, the Adventure, and the Fifth, Second, and Tenth Whelps.¹¹ And the masts and yards of many of the ships were very defective, which he leaveth to the several captains to express.

¹ The Due [Dieu] Repulse was built 1596; rebuilt 1619 (*E. H. R.* vii. 485).

² A prize of 528 tons and 38 guns, taken 1625 (*ibid.* ix. 95).

³ Rebuilt, 1613 (*ibid.* vii. 485).

⁴ 922 tons and 42 guns; built in 1623 (*ibid.*).

⁵ 810 tons and 44 guns; built in 1632 (*ibid.*).

⁶ 875 tons and 42 guns; built in 1620 (*ibid.*).

⁷ 895 tons and 42 guns; built in 1622 (*ibid.*). She was reported in April 1635 as 'much decayed' in the planks and wales under the sheathing (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 15), and in November as much worm-eaten in keel, rudder, and bows (*ibid.* p. 499).

⁸ 683 tons and 34 guns, built in 1620 (*E. H. R.*). The Victory and Garland [often written 'Guardland'], built by Burrell, were condemned, in a report of January 1627, as weakly built and crank. The St. Andrew and Triumph, also, were not highly spoken of (but see note on p. 119, *supra*).

⁹ 394 tons and 26 guns; built in 1623 (*E. H. R.*).

¹⁰ See note on p. 41, *supra*.

¹¹ The leak of the Mary Rose was attributed 'to the box-pump having sucked the oakum out of the seams under it,' that of the Swallow to defective caulking, and that of the Assurance 'from the oakum under the sheathing being rotten or spewed out of the seams' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 381).

To the fourth article this attestant saith that he hath found for this five or six years the cordage of Russia very defective, of which there hath been great store furnished.

To the fifth he can only say that he finds very unserviceable men pressed, and such as never were at sea, and he hath heard a general complaint of the prestmasters for taking of money to discharge serviceable men.¹

To the sixth this attestant saith that few or none of the King's ships are able to take in six months' victuals of all proportions,² and such as are able would be unfit for present service which in the Narrow Seas is hourly to be expected; but he conceiveth that a course might be taken that with a smaller proportion laid in at first the service should not be interrupted, and the men better contented and preserved in health.

To the seventh he saith that in his ship³ the butter was very bad and the cheese not good, and much of the beef and pork wanted much of the weight beyond the ordinary allowance, which gave much discontent to the ship's company.

To the eighth he saith that the want of a treasurer is very inconvenient for the poor mariners who are discharged either for sickness or insufficiency.⁴

¹ Other complaints of this abuse occur in the State Papers for this year. On March 28, 1636, Sir Henry Palmer wrote to the Lords of the Admiralty: 'For the men, either by the connivance of mayors or other officers, or by the corruption of prestmasters, there has been a very great abuse—many being sent that are altogether unfit for service.' The worst offenders were two experienced boatswains, who, having pressed seamen, deliberately freed them, and obtained insufficient persons in their stead (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635–6, p. 332). They were imprisoned, and the prest and conduct money they had spent was deducted from their wages (*ibid* p. 365; see also p. 338).

² Antony Deane, after the Restoration, was the first to provide English frigates with stowage for six months' victuals in the *Rupert*, built in 1666, and the *Resolution* in 1677. 'This,' says Derrick, 'was another great step of improvement to our navy, put in practice by Sir Antony Deane' (*Memoirs of the Royal Navy*, p. 84).

³ The *St. Andrew* (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635–6, p. 370).

⁴ They were put ashore without money, or the means of obtaining it. In January 1636 Sir William Monson presented to the King certain 'Propositions' for improvements in the navy. One of these was a suggestion that an under-treasurer should go in every

To the ninth he saith that he can speak no further of his own knowledge than that divers of his men have complained to him that those who were discharged could not get their pay for want of tickets from the ships from whence they were turned over.

To the tenth he saith that both in this voyage and former voyages he hath been told by the pursers that such men as were discharged could not be paid except they appeared in person.

To the eleventh, he refers it to the consideration of those to whom it appertaineth.

To the twelfth he saith that he hath heard that divers great sums are owing by divers persons trusted with the money of the Chest,¹ to the great prejudice of the poor mariners who pay it for the relief of themselves and others, the particulars whereof he refers to the overseers.

To the thirteenth he saith that of his own knowledge 2s. in the pound is abated to alehouse-keepers where the mariners run on the score, and to such as furnish clothes and he hath heard that 2s. in the pound is abated to such as lay out money for the mariners.

Taken the 19th of November, 1636

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvi. 14.]

The Attestation of Robert Fox, Lieutenant to Sir John Penington, concerning the Articles presented to his Majesty by the Earl of Northumberland touching the defects and abuses of the Navy

To the seventh article he saith that the butter and cheese in the St. Andrew was not good, and that the beef in divers fleet, 'with money to give content to men upon their landing sick or hurt' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 158). The matter was considered by the Lords of the Admiralty in March, and it was eventually left to Sir William Russell, the treasurer, to decide how much money should be sent with the fleet for the pay of sick and disabled men, and who should administer it (*ibid.* p. 346). Monson's suggestion, he himself tells us, had been already made to Queen Elizabeth, and adopted by her 'in the last voyage she lived and wherein I went admiral,' but 'her present death following caused it to be neglected' (Churchill, *Voyages*, iii. 373).

¹ On the history of the Chatham Chest under Charles I. see *E. H. R.* viii. 494.

hogsheads wanted twenty pounds in the hundredweight, and in some more.

To the ninth article he saith that some of the men now in the *St. Andrew*, who were turned over out of other ships, have made suit unto him to solicit Sir John Penington to get them tickets from the other ships, alleging that heretofore for want of such tickets they have lost their pay.

To the thirteenth article he saith that this last spring, when the men of the *Vanguard*¹ were paid aboard the ship, there was 2s. in the pound abated by the paymaster's clerk of such moneys as were owing for apparel, or for drink, or otherwise.

Taken the 19th of November, 1636

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvi. 15.]

The Attestation of William Cooke, one of the four Masters, concerning the Articles presented to his Majesty by his command by the Earl of Northumberland touching the defects and abuses of the Navy

To the first article he saith that divers of his Majesty's ships are so old and decayed, and have been so often repaired, as he verily believeth it will be charge cast away to repair them again, but that if they were broken up many of the materials would be very useful both for building of new ships and otherwise, whereof the worst as he conceiveth are the *Assurance*, the *Adventure*, and the *Black George*.

To the second he saith that the girdling of many of his Majesty's ships would be very necessary, both for the enabling them better to bear their ordnance and sail, and strengthening of them, whereof he conceiveth the fittest to be the *Charles*, the *Triumph*, the *Victory*, and the *Garland*, and the *Merhonour*;² and he holds it fit to take away so much of their galleries as hinders their ordnance.

To the third he saith that the *Assurance* and the *Mary Rose* were very leaky at their going out, and so were divers others, but the reason he knoweth not.

¹ 750 tons, 40 guns (*E. H. R.*). Penington had been in command of her in the early part of the year.

² Built 1589; rebuilt 1613 (*ibid.*).

To the fourth he saith that there is in the King's navy very much ill cordage, and that he hath been heretofore employed in survey thereof, and he did then find fault with much of the cordage of Russia, but that it was answered that there was then a necessity for the King to have it ; and he saith that much of the cordage now in the ships is of the same sort.

To the fifth he saith that he findeth a great part of the men brought in by the prestmasters by experience to be very insufficient, and the refuse of the whole kingdom, but by whose default it is he knoweth not.

To the sixth he saith that divers of the King's ships will not take in full six months' victuals, and those that do take it in are for the present deep-buried in the water, and not so fit for service, especially those that carry their ordnance low ; and that it would be a great preservation of the health of the mariners if they might sometimes be supplied with fresh victuals.

To the seventh he saith that the victual for the most part in this voyage was reasonable good, but that in the Triumph¹ some part of the butter and cheese and part of the beer was naught.

[To] the eighth he saith it would be very necessary to have a treasurer always in the fleet, for the relief of men discharged and poor sick men.

To the ninth he saith he can say nothing.

To the tenth he saith that he knoweth that the paymaster doth refuse to pay the tickets except the parties be present.

To the eleventh he saith that he conceiveth a benefit may be made in such case, but he knoweth no particulars.

To the twelfth he saith that there is owing to the Chest of the poor of Chatham about 3,000*l.* by Sir Sackville Crowe, and by Sir William Russell² about 500*l.*, as he conceiveth there are likewise other debts owing, which he cannot now set down in particular, by means whereof poor maimed men cannot be relieved. And this he knoweth, being one of the governors of the said Chest.

¹ The admiral's flagship, in which the attestant was master (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 254).

² Russell and Crowe were both treasurers of the navy.

To the thirteenth he saith that for all moneys lent and for moneys paid to alehouse-keepers and those that furnish apparel there is a deduction made by the paymaster or his clerks, but what it is he cannot say in particular at the present.

Taken the 19th of November, 1636

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvi. 21.]

The Attestation of Captain Jeremy Brett, Captain of the Assurance, concerning the Articles presented to his Majesty by the Earl of Northumberland by his Majesty's command touching the defects and abuses of the Navy

To the first article this deponent saith that the Assurance, whereof he was captain, is so old and decayed and ill-conditioned as he doth hold it not worth the repairing.

To the third he saith that the Assurance and the Mary Rose, in both which ships he commanded, were both leaky while they were in the river.

To the fourth article he saith that the cordage of the Assurance was very bad, and far short of such as he hath known in the King's ships in other voyages.

To the fifth he saith that he had many unserviceable men sent him, whereof seven or eight had never been at sea.

To the sixth he saith that the Assurance will not stow above four months' victuals of all sorts.

To the seventh he saith that there was only a small proportion of fish and of butter bad in his ship.

To the eighth he holds it very necessary, both for relief of men discharged, and other occasions, that there should be a treasurer in the fleet with money.

To the ninth he can only say that some men in his ship turned over to Sir John Penington complained unto him that in former voyages they had not lost their pay for want of tickets, being turned over in like manner.

To the eleventh he verily believeth the article to be true.

To the thirteenth he saith that he hath heard of divers complaints in that kind, and namely by an officer of his ship that upon occasion he had lent 40*l.* among the ship's

company, and was forced to pay 2s. in the pound for his own money and for clothes and other necessities ; the like abatement is made by the paymaster and his clerks, and all the commodities so ill as the poor mariners suffer extremely by it, he that furnisheth the said clothes being allowed by the officers of the navy.

JER. BRETT

Taken the 20th November, 1636, per me, Will. Becher¹

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvi. 74.]

The Attestation of Captain John Burley, Captain of the Fifth Whelp, to the Articles presented by the Earl of Northumberland by his Majesty's command touching the defects and abuses of the Navy

To the first,

To the second,

To the third he saith that the Fifth Whelp wherein he served, though she came newly from under the carpenter's hands, yet at the beginning of the voyage proved so leaky that she was forced to go into Plymouth, where, upon search, it was found that the seams were so open that a man might thrust his hand all along them. and besides the beam whereon the mizenmast stood was much defective.

To the fourth, .

To the fifth he saith that in his ship much of the butter and cheese were naught, and some of the fish thrown overboard, and the beef short in proportion in some hogsheads twelve or fourteen pieces, as may appear by the certificates of the ship's officers.

To the eighth he saith that a treasurer is very necessary for divers causes.

To the ninth,

To the tenth he saith that he can prove that the paymaster refused to pay those that came not themselves to receive their pay, although they were mustered by the muster-master and entered in the purser's book, and that he himself was fain to give a gratification to have his servants' pay, they being not present.

¹ Sir William Becher, clerk to the Council.

To the eleventh, that he is of the same opinion.

To the twelfth,

To the thirteenth he saith that he is able to justify the same in some particulars.

JO. BURLEY

Per me, Will. Becher, ultimo Novembris 1636

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvi. 75.]

The Attestation of Captain Lewis Kirke, Captain of the Repulse, to the Articles presented by the Earl of Northumberland by his Majesty's command touching the defects and abuses of the Navy

To the first,

To the second,

To the third he saith that the Repulse wherein he served proved so leaky, and having spent her mainyard, being so rotten, he was partly for that cause sent in before the end of the voyage.

To the fourth,

To the fifth he saith that at his first coming on board he found his ship very ill-manned, and inquiring of the men where they had served, they answered that they were pressed upon spite and had never been at sea before, so that he was fain to discharge many of them, being not serviceable.

To the sixth he saith that he is of that opinion, provided they be not forced to stay for the taking in of the victuals, as they have done formerly.

To the seventh he saith that the most part of the fish was so bad that it was thrown overboard, and the beef and pork short in the weight at least thirty or forty pound in most of the hogsheads.

To the eighth he saith that a treasurer is very necessary.

To the ninth,

To the tenth,

To the eleventh,

To the twelfth,

To the thirteenth he saith that Mr. Robert Halsted who provides the seamen's clothes told him, when he ques-

B B

tioned him about the rating of the seamen's clothes so high,¹ the reason was because he paid 2s. in the pound to the steward of the ship for entering them into the book.

L. KIRKE

[S P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvi. 76.]

Endorsed:—Captain Carteret

To the first article this attestant saith that divers of his Majesty's ships are so old and decayed that he doth not hold them fit to be repaired, of which he conceiveth the Assurance, Adventure, and Black George to be the worst among them.

To the second he saith that the Charles and Garland in which he hath served have need to be girdled, and some others which he hath observed to be tender-sided ; and it will also be very useful to retrench their galleries.

To the third he saith that the Assurance, Mary Rose, the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Whelps were very leaky at the beginning of the voyage, and some of them so continued to the end.

To the fourth he saith that he had aboard his ship some new cables by which, after his ship had ridden four or five days, they grew less between two or three inches and did wear very ill, and that a top rope in hoisting the top-mast did break and the mast did break through the two decks before the ship came over the chain.

To the fifth he saith that near a third part of his men had never been at sea in a ship, and of 150 men he could not find twelve (besides officers) able to take their turn at the helm, which he can impute to nothing but the default of the prestmasters.

To the sixth he saith that his ship and divers other of his Majesty's ships are not able to store six months' victuals of all proportions, and those that are able to take them in are buried deep in the water that they can neither steer nor sail as they ought ; and the often taking

¹ On the arrangements made at different times to fix the price of seamen's clothes, see Mr. Oppenheim's articles (*E. H. R.* ix. 479 ; xi. 45).

in of ballast doth much harm to the victuals, and it would be a very great preservation of the poor mariners if they might have sometimes fresh victuals instead thereof.

To the seventh he saith that in his ship the victual was very good, but that in most of the hogsheads of beef there wanted about five or six pieces.

To the eighth he saith that in most part of the former voyages, when there was no treasurer, many poor men who were discharged perished for want of means.

To the ninth that one Bennet, a master's mate in his ship,¹ having served part of the voyage in the St. Andrew, was at the general pay refused to be paid for want of a ticket for the time he served in the St. Andrew, notwithstanding he was entered aboard the said ship at his first coming, and that the time of his service doth appear by the muster-book.

To the tenth he saith that he hath seen the paymaster refuse some tickets because the parties were not present, and he hath known him pay some others in the same case, but why he did refuse the one and pay the other he knoweth not.

To the eleventh he leaveth it to be considered where it is most proper.

To the twelfth he saith that he hath heard a general report that Sir Sackville Crowe doth owe three thousand pounds to the Chest, and Sir William Russell six or seven hundred.

To the thirteenth he saith that he hath heard a constant report that the paymaster hath 2s. in the pound for all apparel which is furnished to the mariner, and the purser who delivers it out hath 1s. in the pound, and that the house-keepers who trust the mariners when they get to land and tipple are paid by the paymaster, abating 4s. in the pound; and likewise the ships' officers do complain that when their prentices run in debt to such kind of people, the paymaster pays their scores against their master's wills, taking for the same 2s. in the pound; and particularly the gunner of the Reformation told this attestant that he hath been told by Mr. White,² one of

¹ Captain George Carteret's ship was the Happy Entrance, 582 tons and 32 guns (*E. H. R.*).

² See note on p. 52, *supra*.

the four masters, that the colliers who have their servants and apprentices in his Majesty's service do much complain in the same kind, and chiefly because this disorder doth occasion their servants running away and serving foreign States.

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvi. 77.]

Endorsed:—Extract of Sir Henry Mervin's relation concerning prestmasters. December 1636

To the fifth he saith, that there are many unsufferable abuses in the manning of the King's ships with insufficient men, committed either through the folly, or dishonesty, or both, of mean, uncertain fellows employed abroad as prestmasters. The James,¹ having 260 men in pay, coming from Portsmouth this summer into the Downs, had not ten (besides officers) able to take a turn at the helm. Coming to anchor this summer in Portland Road with your lordship, I had occasion of conference with the Mayor of Weymouth, who reported to me and others that the prestmasters sending him a warrant the Friday about 12 at night to assemble into the Town Hall all the able seamen belonging to that town against 8 the next morning, he accordingly did provide a number of proper and sufficient seamen, kept them there till 8 the same night, and in that time hearing nothing of the prestmasters dismissed them. The next night (as I remember) about midnight the prestmasters came to town, sent presently to the Mayor and constables, who rising out of bed came to them, whom they found so drunk that the one rising fell into the chimney, the other over his stool, and so far misbehaved themselves that the Mayor had scarcely the patience not to commit them. The next day by their command such seamen as could be gotten (the chiefest by this occasion dispersing themselves in the country) were assembled into the hall, where the prestmasters, reviling the magistrates, rejected the men, ran forth, took out of the houses, shops, and in the streets, tradesmen, apprentices, or whoever they met, gave them prest money, and committed them to the charge of officers, &c.

¹ A new 48-gun ship of 875 tons, built in 1633 (*E. H. R.*).

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvii. 1.]

Right Honourable,—This is to certify your lordship my opinion and knowledge of the Articles propounded.

1. That divers of his Majesty's ships (Repulse, Assurance, Adventure, Black George, and divers others that I have been informed of) are so old and decayed is certain, and the continual charge they are I do verily believe in seven years would build a new ship, which with ordinary charge would last twenty year ; besides the timber they put in hold takes up so much room that they are not able to stow six months' victuals if they should be employed to the southward, and besides able to do but little service.

2. The girdling some of his Majesty's ships (Triumph, St. Andrew, Charles, Victory, St. George,¹ Swiftsure²) and taking away the galleries will add much to their force, and the girdling will make them carry a stout sail, and in my opinion make them last seven year the longer. There are more that have need of this, but I know them not by name ; and for the galleries I do believe none that have seen a sea fight but will acknowledge they being taken away, and ordnance placed in their rooms, will be a great force added either for defence or offence, besides they hold a great windtite³ either under sail or at an anchor, and besides rot that part of the ship.⁴

¹ 895 tons, 42 guns ; built in 1622 (*E. H. R.*). To be distinguished from the Black George, which was apparently smaller. She had already been reported in April 1635 as much decayed in the planks and wales under the sheathing (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 15), and in November as much worm-eaten in keel, rudder, and bows (*ibid.* p. 499).

² 887 tons and 42 guns. Built in 1621 (*E. H. R.*).

³ An intensive, as in 'ton-tight,' meaning 'full weight.' 'A great windtite' therefore means 'a very great deal of wind.'

⁴ Rainborow had already urged upon the authorities the desirability of removing these galleries, and the officers of the navy had reported upon his 'propositions.' They were prepared to reduce their size so as to lessen the danger of fire, the 'main objection' against them, 'but for the absolute taking away the galleries, unless in the smallest vessels,' they were of opinion that it would 'much diminish the beauty of his Majesty's ships' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 162. [Jan. 15.]).

3. I heard the Mary Rose, the Adventure, to be leaky, and the James complained [of], and the Assurance, and all the Whelps : the Triumph her boltsprit is very bad, and we spent our foretopsail yard.¹ The Defiance and Swallow² each of them a topmast. I conceive this comes by long standing in the ships, being often tarred, and so look sound without yet rotten within.

4. All the cordage that I did see in any of the ships that I have observed, their cables and standing ropes are very good, and all their running ropes as bad as ever I saw used in ships.

5. I have heard of many that have taken money to discharge good men that they have pressed, and taken bad in their rooms, and I myself, being once prestmaster for Dorsetshire, had six pieces put into my hand by a man to clear him, yet I made him serve, and I was extraordinary railed at because I would not clear men for money. Now to prevent it I do verily believe that if a commission were given to the vice-admiral of the several shires, and to the justices adjacent, and to the mayors and officers of towns to press and send up so many able men, it might verily be done, and if any of the men by them pressed do not appear, that then certificates of their names be returned down, and so that punishment be inflicted accordingly, which hath not yet been done.

6. I suppose that laying of six months' victuals for a Narrow Sea service is very incommodious, yet if they were to go to the southward most of them will stow it.

7. For the victuals in general in the Triumph was good, only the butter very bad, for which we bought more in the place ; and much beer bad, especially the last month's beer from London. The bread this last voyage I did not hear complained of, but the year before it was very bad that it did fetch the skin off men's mouths.

8. The want of a treasurer is very inconvenient, men being sick and if there be no money to imprest them people will not receive them into their houses, and by that means many perish, and others that have recovered or

¹ Rainborow was captain of the Triumph, the admiral's own ship.

² 478 tons, and 34 guns ; built in 1634 (*E. H. R.*).

gotten hurt and are to be discharged cannot travel to London without money ; whereas if there be a treasurer he is paid what is due to him, and his Majesty saves conduct money from the place the ship is in to London, and for paying for ballast, and many other petty charges, which when there wants money is a great discommodity.

9, 10, 11. And for the ninth, tenth, and eleventh I have only heard so, and it is very probable.

12. Twelfthly, for my own part I have no hand in the Chest business, but I have been credibly informed that Sir Sackville Crowe doth owe to the Chest 3,100*l.* and Sir William Russell 700*l.* or thereabouts ; for others I know not. And I have heard that money hath been bestowed upon men that never were at sea, which is unreasonable. I have heard it credibly reported both from the seller of clothes and by the others, but have had no experience myself.

Your lordship's humble servant,

WM. RAINBOROW

Southwold, this 1st of December, 1636

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvii. 15.]

Endorsed:—Sir Henry Mervin concerning clothes for the mariners, &c.

Addressed :—To the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners for the Admiralty, *these*

May it please your lordships,

The miserable condition of our poor mariners, who in the extremity of this cold and tempestuous weather for want of clothing fall down daily into desperate sicknesses, insomuch that I am forced to discharge more men by reason of their weakness than we can again supply ourselves withal from ships passing by, make me presume in their behalfs to be an humble suitor to your lordships that you will be pleased to order 400*l.* or 500*l.* to be sent down for their relief, for on my credit the most part of them are barefooted, without stockings, and scarcely rags to hide their skin. If your lordships please to have compassion on them this way, I will, if your lordships please, be an accountant for the disbursement thereof, and order the bestowing of it for the good of the service and content

of the company, for I would appoint some principal officers of each ship and some foremast-men chosen by the company to see the buying of all particulars so as they shall be assured to pay nothing more than the price things cost at the making up. Some clothes are here of one Halsted's, but so unserviceable and deceitful, and the prices so unconscionable by reason of fees paid to clerks, pursers, and others who send them and stop the moneys at the pay-days due for them little less than four shillings in the pound, which so raises the price of the clothes that the poor men had rather starve than buy them.

I hope charity will move your lordships to pity these poor men, as it hath made me their advocate, who humbly rest your lordships' most obedient servant,

H. MERVIN

Downs, December 6, 1636

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxviii. 39.]

Extract of the several particulars attested by Captains and others under their hands, upon their examinations taken on the thirteen Articles presented by the Earl of Northumberland to his Majesty sitting in Council touching the defects and abuses of the Navy.

First Article.—Divers of your Majesty's ships are so old and decayed that the repair of them is a great and continual charge, and the ships are able to do little service.

Particular Instances.—The Repulse and Defiance are old and decayed, and not able in any weather to bear out their lower tier of ordnance.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

The Assurance is old and decayed, carries her ordnance low, and is very leeward.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

The Adventure both in her hull and force altogether unserviceable and fit to be cast.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

Mary Rose her hull is serviceable, but she is of small force in regard of her lower tier.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

Black George and Tenth Whelp decayed in their hulls, and not worth the charge of shipkeepers.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

St. Denis¹ and Dreadnought,² as well as the ships before-named, are not worth the charge bestowed on their reparation.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.

That the ships aforementioned are decayed as aforesaid; besides they are so clogged with timbers as they cannot carry six months' victuals.

Captain RAINBOROW.

That the Assurance, Adventure, and Black George are the worst of the decayed ships.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.

Captain CARTERET.

WM. COOKE, Master Attendant.

Second Article.—The girdling of some of your Majesty's ships and taking away their galleries will add much to their force.

Particular Instances.—The Triumph and Garland wants girdling, and if their galleries were taken away and built as the galleries of the St. George and St. Andrew, they would be the stronger and more commodious.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

St. Andrew is tender-sided and leeward, wants girdling and a false keel.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

The Charles wants girdling, and that ship's and the Reformation's and Entrance's³ lower tier be useless, but might be easily amended.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

¹ 528 tons and 38 guns; a prize in 1625 (*E. H. R.*).

² Rebuilt in 1613 (*ibid.*).

of the company, for I would appoint some principal officers of each ship and some foremast-men chosen by the company to see the buying of all particulars so as they shall be assured to pay nothing more than the price things cost at the making up. Some clothes are here of one Halsted's, but so unserviceable and deceitful, and the prices so unconscionable by reason of fees paid to clerks, pursers, and others who send them and stop the moneys at the pay-days due for them little less than four shillings in the pound, which so raises the price of the clothes that the poor men had rather starve than buy them.

I hope charity will move your lordships to pity these poor men, as it hath made me their advocate, who humbly rest your lordships' most obedient servant,

H. MERVIN

Downs, December 6, 1636

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxviii. 39.]

Extract of the several particulars attested by Captains and others under their hands, upon their examinations taken on the thirteen Articles presented by the Earl of Northumberland to his Majesty sitting in Council touching the defects and abuses of the Navy.

First Article.—Divers of your Majesty's ships are so old and decayed that the repair of them is a great and continual charge, and the ships are able to do little service.

Particular Instances.—The Repulse and Defiance are old and decayed, and not able in any weather to bear out their lower tier of ordnance.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

The Assurance is old and decayed, carries her ordnance low, and is very leeward.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

The Adventure both in her hull and force altogether unserviceable and fit to be cast.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

Mary Rose her hull is serviceable, but she is of small force in regard of her lower tier.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

Black George and Tenth Whelp decayed in their hulls, and not worth the charge of shipkeepers.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

St. Denis¹ and Dreadnought,² as well as the ships before-named, are not worth the charge bestowed on their reparation.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.

That the ships aforenamed are decayed as aforesaid ; besides they are so clogged with timbers as they cannot carry six months' victuals.

Captain RAINBOROW.

That the Assurance, Adventure, and Black George are the worst of the decayed ships.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.

Captain CARTERET.

WM. COOKE, Master Attendant.

Second Article.—The girdling of some of your Majesty's ships and taking away their galleries will add much to their force.

Particular Instances.—The Triumph and Garland wants girdling, and if their galleries were taken away and built as the galleries of the St. George and St. Andrew, they would be the stronger and more commodious.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

St. Andrew is tender-sided and leeward, wants girdling and a false keel.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

The Charles wants girdling, and that ship's and the Reformation's and Entrance's³ lower tier be useless, but might be easily amended.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

¹ 528 tons and 38 guns ; a prize in 1625 (*E. H. R.*).

² Rebuilt in 1613 (*ibid.*).

³ The Happy Entrance and Constant Reformation were both built at Deptford in 1619, and were so named by James I. to commemorate Buckingham's entrance on his post of lord high admiral, and the results to be expected from it (*ibid.* vii. 489). The former was a 32-gun ship of 582 tons, and the latter a 42-gun ship of 752 tons.

Very ill cordage in the Bonadventure,¹ insomuch as in towing the long-boat astern both the guest rope² and boat rope snapped asunder, the boat rope being a new cablet³ of seven inches, and by that means the long-boat of that ship was lost.⁴

Captain STRADLING.

There were aboard the Entrance some new cables which grew less between two or three inches after the ship had ridden by them four or five days. That a top rope in that ship brake in hoisting the topmast, that the mast did break through two decks before the ship came over the chain.

Captain CARTERET.

There is in the navy very much ill cordage. That when the Russia cordage was surveyed, some of the surveyors of it found fault with much of it, and it was answered that there was then a necessity for the King to have it; and much of the cordage which was in the King's ships this summer was of the same sort.

WM. COOKE, Master Attendant.

Fifth Article.—The making mean men prestmasters doth occasion abuses.

Particular Instances.—That the James having 260 men in pay, had not this summer when she came into the Downs twenty men besides officers able to take a turn at navy lists and the State Papers as the 'Convertive,' 500 tons and 30 guns. In 1648 she sailed to Holland with the rest of the ships that revolted against the Parliament (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1648-9, p. 124). In the Commonwealth lists, however, there appears a 40-gun ship of 500 net and 666 gross tonnage named the Convertine, a prize of 1651 (*E. H. R.* xi. 46), probably the same ship retaken, but there is no doubt that the two names were used indifferently long before Commonwealth times. 'Convertine' is written in a State Paper as early as 1629 (*S. P. Dom.* vol. cxxxv. No. 32).

¹ 675 tons and 34 guns; built in 1621 (*E. H. R.*).

² A rope carried to a distant object for warping or towing.

³ A small cable, or cable-laid rope, of less than 10 inches in circumference.

⁴ A certificate of Captain Henry Stradling to the same effect is among the State Papers (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, p. 277).

the helm. Notable abuses committed by the prestmasters sent last summer to Weymouth. Insufficient men pressed into the King's ships are a great charge to his Majesty, and a great disservice and abuse to him and the country.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

In the Unicorn,¹ when she came from Chatham to the Hope, scarce a seafaring man besides the officers, men of poor and wretched persons, without clothes or ability of body, tradesmen that never saw the seas,—a glover, a thatcher, &c.,—and yet as it was said there were able seamen whence these were pressed.

Sir HENRY MAINWARING.

A general complaint of ill and unable men pressed into the King's ships.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.

Captain KIRKE.

WM. COOKE, Master Attendant.

Ill men pressed into the Repulse, Assurance, Adventure, whereof some were never before at sea.

Captain KIRKE.

Captain BRETT.

That near a third part of the men in the Entrance had never been at sea in a ship, and that of 150 men there were not twelve besides officers able to take their turn at the helm.

Captain CARTERET.

That the officers of the navy give protection to men belonging to merchants' ships.

Captain MENNES.

That it hath been said that the prestmasters took money to discharge able men that are pressed. It is propounded, to prevent the prestmasters' abuses, that a commission should be given to the vice-admirals of every shire and to the justices of peace adjacent, and the mayors and officers of towns, to press and send up so many able men, which might easily be done, and if any of the men by them pressed and returned do not appear, then certificate of

¹ 823 tons, 46 guns ; built in 1633 (*E. H. R.*).

their names to be returned to the vice-admiral or other officer that pressed them, whereby punishment might be inflicted upon them.

Captain RAINBOROW.

Sixth Article.—Laying in six months' victual is very incommodious.

Instances.—Ships employed on the coast victualled for six months are subject to divers discommodities: heavy ships deep laden are not so serviceable; the victuals become ill-conditioned and unwholesome; long use of salt meats breeds fevers, fluxes, and scurvy, and many other diseases; sick men have no relief, nor the whole means to preserve their health.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

Few of the King's ships are able to take in six months' victuals of all proportions, and such as are able will be so deep in the sea as renders them unfit for present service, which is to be hourly expected in the Narrow Seas.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.
WM. COOKE.

It makes the ships that they can neither steer nor sail well, and the often taking in of ballast doth much harm to the victuals.

Captain CARTERET.

That four months' victual for the Narrow Seas is enough to be put aboard at first, whereof at most but one month dry salted, the rest in repacked pickle, and the other two months' new killed and packed would be very wholesome.

Sir HENRY MAINWARING.

Incommodious to lay aboard six months' victuals for service in the Narrow Seas, but to the southwards most ships would stow it.

Captain RAINBOROW.

Seventh Article.—Much of the victuals naught and short in the proportions.

Particular Instances.—In the James much of the butter was Irish, very unwholesome and unserviceable. About 300 lings were so corrupt as they tainted the hold, and there-

fore were thrown overboard. About three or four hundred of cheese was putrified and rotten. At the last supply from London delivered to the James, there were some pieces of beef that weighed 45 pounds short in the hundred. The cans, which should contain a gallon, being measured did not contain above six wine pints, which is quarter less than ought to be. That the purser (who provides the cans) in justification of himself saith that the victualler, who should allow the tun of beer after the rate of beer measure, serves wine measure, so that if the purser shall give to the company each his wine gallon a day (as the King allows), the beer by reason of leakage and waste will not only fall short, but the company must drink the dregs and grounds of the vessels. That which supports this abuse is that the victualler gets by the difference of the wine and beer measures about 4 tuns in 20, which is the cause that the men lose one quarter of their due allowance.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

In the St. Andrew the butter was very bad, the cheese was good, and much of the beef and pork wanted 20 pounds in the hundredweight, and in some, more, beyond the ordinary allowance.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.
Lieutenant FOX.

In the Unicorn much bad victuals, as appears by certificate of the officers of that ship, who are to give account of the victuals on behalf of the company, who testify ¹ that of the first six months' victuals all the dry salted beef proved very bad, which was for four months, and that it was without reason so to victual, for it was white and blue mouldy, not fitting to be spent but on necessity. The pickled beef was very faulty, because it was not repickled from the bloody pickle, except 10 hogsheads, which being repickled proved well. Two or three hogsheads of pease were faulty. One hogshead of pork stank. Both the ling and haberdine was very bad, so as there was little or none

¹ A certificate 'of Robert Bennett, master, and six others of the crew of the Unicorn, touching the bad condition of the beef, fish, and other victuals supplied to that ship,' is among the State Papers (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1636-7, p. 277).

of it dressed all the voyage, except the two first months, for when it was boiled the men would not eat it, but threw it overboard. The bread was some of it old, some new, mingled together. The second victualling for one month which was taken in at the Downs proved well.

Sir HENRY MAINWARING,
and the certificate of the officers of that ship.

The surgeon of the Unicorn certifieth that the musty and floury bread sent aboard that ship for her victualling from London caused a soreness of the mouths and throats of divers of the company, so as there have been sixteen or seventeen of them all at once affected with that grief.¹

The victuals in the Triumph in general were good, only the butter very bad, and much beer bad, especially the last month's beer from London.

Captain RAINBOROW.
WM. COOKE, Master.

In the Entrance the victuals were very good, but in most of the hogsheads of beef there wanted five or six pieces.

Captain CARTERET.

There was much rotten fish thrown overboard out of the Convertine.

Captain MENNES.

In the Repulse the most part of the fish was so bad that it was thrown overboard, and the beef and pork short in weight at least 30 or 40 pounds in most hogsheads.

Captain KIRKE.

In the Assurance only a small proportion of fish and of butter bad.

Captain BRETT.

In the Fifth Whelp much of the butter and cheese was naught, and some of the fish thrown overboard. The beef was short in some hogsheads 12 or 14 pieces.

Captain BURLEY.

¹ The certificate of William Thorp, the surgeon, to this effect is among the State Papers (*Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1636-7, p. 277).

Eighth Article.—The want of a treasurer very inconvenient to all the fleet.

Particular Instances.—That the advancement of money to pay as well insufficient as sick men fit to be discharged, is not only an advantage to the service but a profit to the King.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.
 Sir JOHN PENINGTON.
 Captain KIRKE.
 Captain BRETT.
 Captain BURLEY.
 WM. COOKE, Master Attendant.

That it is necessary to have one or more treasurers in a fleet to issue money to the sick, who for want of money must either be kept aboard, or turned ashore in danger of starving, or not to be received into any house, so as some have been seen to die upon the strand for lack of relief. Also that men who have served long, and their clothes worn out, may have some part of their money to furnish them, for want whereof this last voyage some of the best men daily fell sick, or are not able to stand to their labour upon the decks, or to keep their watches in the winter. That by paying discharged men the King saves conduct money. And it is requisite to have money to pay for ballast and other petty charges, the want whereof is a great discommodity.

Sir HENRY MAINWARING.
 Captain CARTERET.
 Captain RAINBOROW.

Ninth Article.—The paymaster refuseth to pay men turned over from other ships, if they bring not tickets from the ships where they have first served.

Particular Instances.—That in former employments there were no complaints of this kind, but it is now grown a grievance amongst the common men.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.
 Captain RAINBOROW.

Divers of the men serving lately in the St. Andrew complained that those that were discharged could not get

C C

their pay, for want of tickets from the ships from whence they were turned over.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.
Lieutenant FOX.
Captain BRETT.

That one Bennet, a master's mate in the Entrance, having served part of the voyage in the St. Andrew, was at the general pay refused to be paid for want of a ticket for the time he served in the St. Andrew, notwithstanding he was entered aboard the said ship at his first coming, and the time of his service doth appear by the muster-book.

Captain CARTERET.

Tenth Article.—The paymaster will pay no tickets but to the parties themselves unto whom the money is due.

Particular Instances.—In former employments there have not been complaints of that kind, but is now a great grievance among the common men.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

In the last and former voyages the pursers said that such men as were discharged could not be paid except they appeared in person.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.

The paymaster denied the captain of the Convertine upon a pay-day to pay men's tickets that appeared not, albeit he had Mr. Edisbury's hand to the tickets.

Captain MENNES.

The paymaster hath been seen to refuse some tickets because the parties were not present, and hath been known to pay others in the same case.

Captain CARTERET.

It is known that the paymaster refuses to pay tickets except the party be present.

WM. COOKE, Master.

That the paymaster refused to pay those that came not themselves to receive their pay, although they were mustered by the muster-master, and entered in the purser's book. And that the captain of the Fifth Whelp was fain

to give a gratification to have his servants' pay, they being not present.

Captain BURLEY.

Eleventh Article.—If the paymaster have it in his power to refuse whom he will, he may draw men to what composition he pleaseth.

Particular Instances.—It is conceived a benefit may be made in such case, but it is left to the consideration of those to whom it is proper.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.
Captain CARTERET.
Captain RAINBOROW.
WM. COOKE.

Twelfth Article.—Great sums are owing to the Chest.

Particular Instances.—It is reported that great sums are in arrear in the Chest, not only for the former, but present service, and it is advised that the moneys due to the Chest should henceforth be satisfied at the pay-days as well as other debts stopped upon the mariners' wages.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.
Sir JOHN PENINGTON.

That it is reported that Sir Sackville Crowe doth owe to the Chest at Chatham 3,000*l.* and Sir William Russell 600*l.* or 700*l.* or thereabouts, and that the Chest money hath been bestowed on men that were never at sea.

Captain RAINBOROW.
Captain CARTERET.

Wm. Cooke saith that he is one of the governors of the Chest, and knoweth that there is owing to the Chest at Chatham about 3,000*l.* by Sir Sackville Crowe, and about 500*l.* by Sir Wm. Russell, and that there are other debts owing which he cannot particularise, by means whereof poor maimed men cannot be relieved.

WM. COOKE.

Thirteenth Article.—That 2*s.* in the pound is usually abated upon all such moneys as are lent to supply the poor men's wants upon any occasion.

Particular Instances.—That Mr. Halsted, who vends clothes to the mariners, hath by his own report paid to Mr. Hollond 200*l.* for stopping of money due unto him from the common men for clothes sold to them in the time of the last employment, but he knows not whether it be allowed at the rate of 2*s.* in the pound more or less. That every man lending moneys to any in the service to relieve him as sick or supply him as a wanting man, if it be charged upon wages due at the pay day, gives to Mr. Hollond for stopping the same 2*s.* in the pound rateably. And that the same sum hath also been given for receiving of wages due.

Sir HENRY MERVIN.

That 2*s.* in the pound is abated to alehouse-keepers where the mariners run on the score, and to such as furnish clothes, and that it is reported that 2*s.* in the pound is abated to such as lay out money for the mariners.

Sir JOHN PENINGTON.
WM. COOKE, Master.

When the Vanguard's men were paid the last spring, there was 2*s.* in the pound abated by the paymaster's clerk of such moneys as were owing for apparel, for drink, or otherwise.

Lieutenant FOX.

The last year when that Captain Stradling of the Swallow was paid off, he gave order to his purser to receive from the paymaster 5*l.* which he had lent to the captain of that ship, but the paymaster did not, nor would pay without stopping 10*s.*

Captain STRADLING.

That Robert Halsted, who provides the seamen's clothes, told Captain Lewis Kirke, when he questioned him about rating the seamen's clothes so high, that the reason was because he paid 2*s.* in the pound to the steward of the ship for entering them into the book.

Captain KIRKE.

That an officer in the Assurance upon occasion lending 40*l.* among the ship's company, was forced to pay 2*s.* in the pound for his own moneys. And for clothes and other

necessaries the like abatement is made by the paymaster and his clerks ; and all commodities are so ill, as the poor mariners suffer extremely by it, he that furnisheth the said clothes being allowed by the officers of the navy.

Captain BRETT.

That it is a constant report that the paymaster hath 2s. in the pound for apparel furnished to the mariner, and that the purser who delivers it out hath 1s. in the pound, and that the alehouse-keepers who trust the mariners when they get to land and tipple are paid by the paymaster, abating 2s. in the pound. That the ship's officers complain that when their apprentices run in debt to such kind of people, the paymaster payeth their scores against their masters' wills, taking for the same 2s. in the pound. That particularly the gunner of the Reformation told Captain Carteret that he hath been told by Peter White, one of the four masters attendants, that the colliers who have their servants and apprentices in his Majesty's service do complain much in the same kind, and chiefly because this disorder doth occasion their servants running away and serving foreign states.

Captain CARTERET.

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvii. 53 I.]

The humble Answer of Sir William Russell, Knight and Baronet, Treasurer of his Majesty's Navy, to so much of the Articles lately exhibited to his Royal Majesty touching defects in the government of naval affairs as may seem to reflect on him, the said Treasurer

First.—Whereas the want of a treasurer is insisted upon as a great inconvenience to all the fleet, he humbly answers that according to custom on like occasions there was a sub-treasurer appointed to attend the fleet with such a sum of money as by the rest of the officers of the navy was held competent ; which, being issued according to order, it pleased the right honourable the lord admiral to think fit to have him return with letters to London for a further supply of money, where by reason of the contagion finding Sir William Russell retired into Cambridgeshire, there was so much time elapsed in the sub-treasurer's sending of

answers from thence, and the necessary attendance upon the advancement of the said supply, that before he could return to Dover with bills of exchange and other orders for money, his lordship and the fleet were departed to the northward, where, having attended his lordship's return for a competent time, and receiving no new commands from sea, he addressed letters to the officers of the navy for order how further to govern himself therein, from whom he received commands for his return to London ; and whatsoever inconvenience thereby accrued to his Majesty's service he humbly conceiveth may for the future be prevented by the advance of a greater sum in imprest unto him upon the first going forth of the fleet, if there shall be cause.

And secondly.—Whereas overture is made of great sums owing to the Chest, it is confessed that 500*l.* thereof (and no more) was in the hands of the said Sir William Russell at the time of the complaint, but that it neither was in his intention nor power thereby either to do any disservice to the state or damage to the Chest he humbly hopes will manifestly appear by this plain relation of the truth of the case. It stood with the conveniency of the governors of the Chest (by reason of the distant places and times of payment, which they could not without great charges¹ attend) to make use of Mr. Edisbury, then paymaster under Sir William Russell, for the staying of 6*d.* per mensem out of the mariners' wages to the use of the Chest, which the said Mr. Edisbury undertaking for their accommodation (but without the privity of Sir William Russell) there was by virtue of those defalcations a sum of 2,370*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.* so stayed for Chest money in anno 1626, at which time [there being a great want of money for the defraying of the mariners' wages],² the said paymaster, for the avoiding of the then present clamour and tumult, thought fit to make use of the said 2,370*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.* Chest money for payment of mariners' wages ; whereof the said Sir William Russell not receiving notice from Mr. Edisbury till the close of the year's account, but finding then so much allowed unto him upon his account in the nature of

¹ Another copy [No. 54] reads 'without charge.'

² No. 54 omits the words in brackets.

an addition to his surplusage, he was called upon by the governors of the Chest for present payment thereof, which he refusing to do because he had as then no assignments from the lord treasurer for the same, nor for 13,446*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.* further in surplusage upon his said account, the governors thereupon commenced a suit against him for the same, and upon their eager prosecution thereof he was forced to become an earnest suitor to his lordship for assignments both for that Chest money and the rest of his surplusage; which he no sooner obtained (being in time not till anno 1629, and those not receivable till the last of December 1631), at which time his Majesty had enjoyed the benefit of the said 2,370*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.* by the space of five years without paying any use for the same, as by the certificate of the auditors may appear, but presently he gave security by special obligation to the said governors for the payment of the said 2,370*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.* Chest money, according to such times and by such proportions as were by them accepted of, being at three several days of payment equivalent to the said last of December 1631, and did actually pay in 1,000*l.* thereof before any part of the same could by him be received by his said assignments, and did clear with them all but one 500*l.* thereof according as the occasions of the Chest required; but for the last 500*l.* he humbly confesseth that he has been the less punctual in paying of it in, because he conceived it was to lie dead in the Chest, and his obligation (so long as he remained solvent) would ever be sufficient to secure the Chest from damage, and himself by having forborne far greater sums by reason of his assignments not being paid near their days, as by the auditors' said certificate may also appear, might stand (as he conceived) capable of such an undamageable courtesy from the Chest. But if the benefit he is supposed to have enjoyed thereby (which he humbly conceiveth upon discussion of the account will be very little) shall in his Majesty's princely wisdom be held any disadvantage to the Chest, or the act itself (wherein he is but accidentally and involuntarily involved) any disservice to his Majesty, he doth for the one (besides the payment of the said 500*l.* which is already by him done) humbly offer to advance as great a sum for as long a time to any occasion that the Chest can have, or to pay them use for the same so long as

he hath had the use thereof, to which, he conceives, the governors could not but know that he stood liable in any Court of Equity by his specialty, and for the other in all humility lays himself at his Majesty's most gracious feet.

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxlix. 98.]

The Answer of Sir William Russell, Knight and Baronet, Treasurer of his Majesty's Navy, to sundry Articles objected against him and John Holland his paymaster in manner following, viz :

Article First.—The paymaster refuseth to pay men turned over from other ships if they bring not tickets from the ships where they first served.

Answer.—I am limited by my patent to the voucher of the principal officers for all payments I shall make, by myself or my deputy, and thereupon demand a ticket from all men turned over from one ship to another, when neither the officers nor their clerks are present to attest my payments ; but where they are present and refuse not to allow me such moneys as I shall pay unto the parties turned over, I do always pay them without tickets, although I am of opinion that it is more safe for his Majesty's service, and me his treasurer, and less trouble and loss to the seamen, to have their tickets made by the pursers when they are turned over, than to be turned over without tickets, as by the reasons ensuing more fully will appear.

First, because sometimes the ships from whence the men are turned over continue longer at sea than the ship into which they are turned, and in this case, if the party turned over hath not a ticket, my paymaster cannot pay him because he hath no book to maintain his time, nor allowance of his wages upon account, the ship being yet at sea and unpaid ; and upon this ground have the complaints grown to captains and others maintaining this article, and one Bennet, master's mate in the *St. Andrew*, was forced to send from London into the Downs and back again for a ticket for his service in the *St. Andrew*, being turned out of that ship into the Entrance without a ticket, and the Entrance paid before the *St. Andrew* being yet at

Secondly, if men have their tickets when they are turned over from one ship to another, they may be paid by their tickets the moneys due to them, not only at the pay without further trouble, but before the ship (into which they are turned) be commanded into harbour, and having that money may therewith furnish themselves with clothes and other necessaries for their present relief, for want whereof they are oftentimes either ready to perish or at best forced to take them up at excessive rates.

Thirdly, when men have no tickets (when they are turned over) the purser may afterwards make out tickets to wrong parties, and those men may receive the money, and deceive thereby the parties to whom it is due; as this last year it happened in the *Mary Rose* (the ship upon which this article was grounded), one Robert Richardson and Thomas Barker being turned out of the *Mary Rose* into the *Bonadventure* without tickets, some other men in their names came to the purser and procured tickets, and afterwards came to my office, and were paid their wages due upon those tickets, which was again demanded by the said Richardson and Barker at the pay of the *Bonadventure*, but could not be paid them (being formerly paid by tickets signed both by the captain and purser, ready upon all commands to be presented to your lordships' view), to the great loss of the poor men, and clamour on his Majesty's service, all for want of tickets when they were at first turned over.

Article Second.—He will pay no tickets but to the parties themselves to whom the money is due.

Answer.—If I be warranted from his Majesty to pay his treasure to men to whom it is not due, I shall willingly pay all men that shall demand any money for other men's uses without further query, although my so doing will be much dishonour to his Majesty and loss to the subject. And I do many times pay men's wages to wrong parties lawfully authorised to receive the same, but confess that where no authority is brought, or such as my paymaster conceives (as it often happens) to be counterfeited, he in his discretion, or by my order, refuseth their payment, either till I see the party, or till the principal officers have determined by special warrant whether I shall pay the

party without sight or not, the inconvenience whereof will yet further appear by the reasons ensuing :

First, I or my paymaster may be forced to repay the money to the party or his executors twenty years after its payment, as about four years since Mr. Wells, paymaster under Sir Robert Mansell, was by an order from the Council table commanded to do for the wages of one Captain Franks, paid for his use to Sir Richard Bingley, notwithstanding he produced the party's hand to whom he paid it, acknowledging receipt.

Secondly, his Majesty of necessity must suffer much thereby, there being nothing more frequent than for pursers to make, and some captains to sign passes for men that never served in the ship, or at least not half or all the time maintained by those tickets, which, if they be paid, the King not only loseth the wages, but the victuals of the party, and by non-payment saves both.

Thirdly, if his Majesty's treasure be permitted to be paid to all men demanding the same upon letters of attorney, not only counterfeit letters of attorney and tickets will be (as they are now) daily presented, and the money paid, but true tickets will be bought and sold either to captains, lieutenants, or pursers to grant or procure their discharge from his Majesty's service ; and thereby his Majesty's subjects shall be (as they are often) oppressed by pressing of new men to supply the others' rooms, his service dishonoured by the report of those that sold their tickets to purchase their discharges, others discouraged by seeing able men discharged and they forced to serve, his Majesty's prest, conduct, and presteing charges lost, and liberty will be given to all captains and pursers (upon combination) to advance men's money into their own or other men's hands for their uses without all possibilities of prevention of abuses by muster-books or otherwise.

Article Third.—That two shillings in the pound is usually abated upon all such moneys as are lent to supply the poor men's wants upon any occasion.

Answer.—This poundage hath been given to the ministers of my predecessors for collecting debts for clothes trusted in the service by the space of thirty years past without complaint ; yet if your lordships shall think fit to forbid all

stops or fees for stoppage in the future, both I and my paymaster are willing to observe your lordships' commands therein, and in the interim I have ordered my paymaster not to make any stay or take any reward whatsoever for staying of any man's wages till your lordships' pleasure be herein declared.

Article Fourth.—If he have it in his power to pay or refuse whom he will, he may draw men to what compositions he pleaseth.

Answer.—I have not such power to pay or refuse to pay whom I will, but if the party comes to my office with a sufficient warrant for his wages, I, or my paymaster for my use, both must and do pay him freely and fully.

Article Fifth.—Great sums are owing to the Chest.

*Answer.*¹—It is confessed that 500*l.* thereof (and no more) was in my hands at the time of the complaint, which I presently paid, but that it neither was in my intention or power thereby to do any disservice to the state or damage to the Chest I humbly hope will manifestly appear by this plain relation of the truth of the case. It stood with the conveniency of the governors of the Chest by reason of the distant places and times of payments which they could not without great charges attend, to make use of Mr. Edisbury, then paymaster under me, for the staying of the 6*d.* per mensem out of the mariners' wages to the use of the Chest, which the said Mr. Edisbury undertaking for their accommodation (but without my privity) there was (by virtue of those defalcations) a sum of 2,370*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.* so stayed for Chest money in anno 1626, at which time there being a great want of money for the defraying of mariners' wages, the said paymaster, for the avoiding of the then present clamour and tumult, thought fit to make use of the said 2,370*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.*, being Chest money, for payment of mariners' wages; whereof I not knowing until the close of the year's account, which was two years after, and then finding so much allowed unto me upon my account in the nature of an addition to my surplusage, I was called upon by the governors of the Chest for present payment thereof, which I refusing

¹ See p. 390, *supra*.

to do because I had as then no assignment from the lord treasurer for the same, nor for 13,446*l.* 12*s.* & further in surplusage upon my said account, the governors thereupon commenced a suit against me for the same, and upon their eager prosecution thereof I was forced to become an earnest suitor to his lordship for assignments both for the Chest money, and the rest of my surplusage; which I no sooner obtained (being at that time not till anno 1629, and not receivable till the last of December 1631), at which time his Majesty had enjoyed the benefit of the said 2,370*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.* by the space of five years without paying any use for the same as by the certificate of the auditors may appear, but presently I gave security by special obligation to the said governors for the payment of the said 2,370*l.* 12*s.* & Chest money, according to such times and by such proportions as were by them accepted of (being at three several days of payment, equivalent to the said last of December 1631), and did actually pay in one thousand pounds of the same above a year before any part thereof could by me be received by my said assignments, and did clear with them all but one 500*l.* thereof according as the occasions of the Chest required. But for the last 500*l.* I confess that I have been the less punctual in paying of it in, because I conceived it was to lie dead in the Chest, and my obligation (so long as I remain solvent) would ever be sufficient to secure them from damage, and myself by having forborne far greater sums by reason of my assignments not being paid near their days (as by the auditors' said certificate may appear) might stand (as I conceived) capable of such an undamageable courtesy from the Chest; and further Nathan Terne, then clerk of the Chest, ever told me, so that they might have it as they had occasion to use it for the payment of their pensioners, it was well enough, having no power to put it into the Chest till a public meeting. And as he called for the same he had it. All which I submit to your lordships' wisdom, &c.

WILLIAM RUSSELL

Articles objected against John Hollond, Paymaster of the Navy, and their Answers as followeth, viz :

First Article.—The paymaster refuseth to pay men turned over from other ships if they bring not tickets from the ships where they have first served.

The treasurer of the navy is limited by his patent to have two or more principal officers' hands to all payments he shall make by himself or his deputy for marine causes, and upon that ground I demand a ticket from all men turned over from one ship to another when neither the officers nor their clerks are present to attest my payments ; but where they are present (and refuse not to allow me such moneys as I shall pay to the parties turned over) I do always pay them without tickets. Which yet in divers cases I need not do, by reason that the pursers, sometimes through ignorance and sometimes through carelessness, do not enter the men turned over upon their sea-books as men turned over into other ships, but make them fully discharged the service, which implies that they either have or ought to have their tickets before they be paid, as by the Mary Rose's sea-book, upon which this complaint was grounded, appeareth.

Second Article.—The paymaster will pay no tickets but to the parties themselves unto whom the money is due.

If the treasurer be warranted from his Majesty to pay money to wrong parties I shall willingly pay all men that shall demand any money for themselves or others without further query, although my so doing will be much dishonour to his Majesty and loss to the subject, as by divers reasons ready to be tendered in writing to this board will appear. And I do many times pay men's wages to wrong parties lawfully authorised to receive the same, but confess that where no authority is brought, or else such as I conceive may be counterfeited (as it often happens), I refuse their payment either till I see the party, or till the principal officers have determined by special warrant whether I shall pay the party without sight or not.

Third Article.—That 2s. in the pound is usually abated upon all such sums of money as are lent to supply the poor men's wants upon any occasion.

If it be meant for moneys imprested or lent by the

treasurer or his ministers I absolutely deny it, but if it be meant for clothes trusted by merchants that adventure the same in each ship I freely confess it, and am ready to justify my so doing, it being freely given almost thirty years past to my predecessors without complaint,¹ and am willing to forgo the profit so that I may be eased of the trouble and hazard attending my payments by performing the labour.

Fourth Article.—If it be in his power to pay or refuse whom he will, he may draw men to what composition he pleaseth.

I have no such power to pay or refuse to pay whom I will, but if the party come to the office with a sufficient warrant for his wages I both must and do pay him freely and fully.

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxxxvi. 88.]

Inconveniencies attending payments to wrong parties, though their tickets be firmed² by the captain and purser to warrant their time and by an officer to warrant their payment, viz :

1. The treasurer or his paymaster may be made to repay the money to the party or his executors twenty years after, as about four years since Mr. Wells was by an order from the Council table commanded to do for the wages of Captain Frank, paid to his use to Sir Richard Bingley in the time of Sir Robert Mansell's being treasurer.

2. His Majesty must of necessity suffer much thereby, there being nothing more frequent than for pursers to make and some captains to sign passes for men that never served in the ship, or at least not half or all the time maintained by those tickets, which if they be paid, the King not only loseth the wages but the victuals of the party, and by not payment saves both.

3. The subject must needs suffer, for if a ticket be lost the party finding it may easily obtain the money upon a counterfeit letter of attorney, and it is an ordinary thing with the common seamen not only to steal true tickets out

¹ This was Sir H. Palmer's excuse for selling Government cordage, and pocketing the proceeds (*E. H. R.* ix. 475).

² To 'firm,' is to confirm or make valid by a signature.

of their fellows' pockets when they are drunk, and make false letters of attorney, but also to counterfeit tickets, both with the captain's and purser's hands for the time and with an officer's hand for their payment.

4. If payments to wrong parties be allowed, no man will come to the office for his money, but rather choose to sell his ticket to the purser or some other for the one half, and thereby his Majesty's honour shall much suffer in these men's mouths, who will and do slanderously report that they were short paid, &c., whereas (unless it be in case of sickness or death) if they come personally they can have no just cause of complaint, being fully paid according to the time of their ticket.

5. In case his Majesty should want money to pay his ships and that liberty be given to the parties to make over their tickets, it would then happen as it was in the late time of Sir Sackville Crowe, when counterfeit tickets and letters of attorney for men's service and wages were such good merchandise that an unhappy wag wanting money made a ticket for the service of a great dog, called Ball, in one of his Majesty's ships for the space of five or six months, and went and sold it with its letter of attorney to a poor man that lodged seamen discharged from his Majesty's ships.

JOHN HOLLOND

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., cccxlix. 99.]

Article First.—That divers of his Majesty's ships are so old and decayed that the continual repair of them is a continual charge, and the ships able to do little service.

To the first article we answer that for the state of his Majesty's ships we have with our best care and intelligence endeavoured as we conceive it especially our duties to understand it, as far as our own judgments could lead us, and by advising with men of the best ability and experience in that science, both of his Majesty's servants and others, and have, as far as we presumed we might, intimated unto your lordships our opinion of their present condition a year ago.

That ships will grow old, and become subject by the injury of time to decay, is beyond man's prevention, yet

we hold them not a subject fit to be brought under the disadvantage of every man's censure, lest the force of his Majesty's navy may thereby receive disparagement ; neither indeed are the worst of them such as that article averreth which may appear unto your lordships by a late survey taken at Chatham by some of the ablest of the Trinity House and his Majesty's master shipwrights,¹ wherein they enable them to be made serviceable for certain years, except the Black George, not held worth the repairing, and the Prince,² Red Lion,³ and Repulse, whereof till they see them opened they forbear to give positively their opinions.

If the captains or masters upon serious observation will give us notice of anything in his Majesty's ships which either in point of sailing or force may be bettered, we shall do our uttermost to rectify those errors, which we are persuaded may many times be helped by a diligent care to seek out their ships, trim, and by often rummaging⁴ to keep them so, which is of great consequence in a ship's sailing and too much neglected.

Article Second.—That many of his Majesty's ships want girdling, and that taking away their galleries would be necessary.

For the girdling of his Majesty's ships which in the trial prove tender-sided, we are so far from dissenting therein as upon notice given that they might thereby be bettered it is already performed on divers of them.

¹ A survey of the ships 'not lately fitted for sea service' by 'the Officers, with the chief masters of the Trinity House and prime shipwrights of the Thames, and his Majesty's own shipwrights,' was ordered by the Lords of the Admiralty on July 23, 1635 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635, p. 290). The survey of the hulls of the Prince Royal, Dreadnought, St. Denis, Defiance, Nonsuch, and the Second and Fourth Whelps, is dated August 27 (*ibid.* p. 356).

² 1,200 tons and 55 guns; built in 1610 (*E. H. R.*).

³ The Lion was built at Deptford in 1609, and repaired in 1622. In May 1636 she was reported to have many of her timbers 'defective and rotten,' but might possibly be made serviceable for a summer's voyage at a cost of 800*l.* (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1635-6, p. 410).

⁴ To 'rummage' is to clear out a ship's hold, either to examine or rearrange its contents.

For the galleries taking away we have a good while since had a conference with the Trinity House men and returned to your lordships both our own opinions and theirs, how far we thought it necessary to reduce them to a convenient proportion, and were all of opinion that it was not expedient to take them away, which would blemish the grace and beauty of his Majesty's ships,¹ to which proposition we have conformed ourselves, and rectified that exorbitance excepted against in this article.

Article Third.—The leakiness of many of his Majesty's ships and illness of their masts must proceed from some negligence.

The cause hereof is presupposed to be in the negligence of the caulkers, which we have made strict inquiry into, and for aught we can be informed, either by the masters of attendance or master shipwrights who have the oversight of those works, most or all of those leaks grew from such defects in the ship as the narrowest observation could not prevent ; as in the *Mary Rose*, though upon complaint twice caulked, yet till she came into the dock the leak could not possibly be found, and then by the issuing of the water it was discerned by her keel just under the well, and the hole not big enough to put a man's little finger into, which till so discovered the wit of man could not foresee or prevent ; but yet it hath occasioned a stricter oversight of the caulkers and carpenters.

For the masts, there are none taken into his Majesty's stores but we have them diligently surveyed, and all such refused we can discern the least imperfection in. If inwardly they have any unsoundness our care cannot prevent it, but experience sheweth nothing more ordinary at sea than the failing of masts either by extremity of foul weather or over-pressing them with sails. One informeth the spending a foretopsail-yard, which whether it be to be accounted a wonder we leave to experienced seamen, who would think it a strange security to meet with no greater hazards, though set out with never so much care by their owners.

¹ See note on p. 373, *supra*.

Article Fourth.—All his Majesty's ships are furnished with ill cordage.

We do earnestly desire that those officers mentioned to except against the goodness of the cordage in the last fleet may be called to justify the ground of their complaint, being yet most confident that in no place of the world there is better made than by his Majesty's own servants; and for the great quantity affirmed to be taken in, to the value of twenty thousand pounds' worth damned and disallowed by those appointed to survey it, we desire that it may be particularised by whom it was contracted for, into what storehouse brought, and who were those surveyors.

Article Fifth.—That the making mean men prestmasters doth occasion abuses.

There is no one thing wherein we have more often and more seriously advised together of the best way for prevention of abuse than in the matter of pressing able and fit mariners for his Majesty's service, wherein if those who make complaint can give us better advice we shall willingly hearken unto it: for the persons employed, they are either boatswains or men of such experience in the knowledge and choice of seamen as we know not within the compass of the government where to appoint officers more fit for that employment, and such as have to our knowledge misbehaved themselves we have severely punished and sequestered from that service.

Concerning the certificate of the Mayor of Weymouth against John Phillips and Thomas Nash, we have commanded them to make to all the particular complaints their answers, which we have annexed thereunto.

Article Sixth.—That laying in six months' victuals is very incommodious.

We are of opinion, as we have delivered to your lordships, that the storing of six months' victuals, but upon necessity of the service so requiring it, is not commodious in many respects, many of which are specified in this article; only when your lordships gave order unto us that we should make inquiry which were able to take so much

in, we gave warrant to the masters attendants and master shipwrights to certify such as could stow that proportion which certificate we returned to your lordships and by warrant proceeded therein.

Eighth Article.—That a treasurer is very needful in the fleet.

The reasons for this alleged in this article we cannot with reason dissent from, but hold the employing one of very necessary use, and that the want thereof will breed unavoidable inconveniences.

H. PALMER, KEN. EDISBURY, DEN. FLEMING

[S. P. Dom., Charles I., col. 7.]

At St. James', the 16th of March, 1636-7

Present :

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| The King's Most Excellent Majesty | |
| Lord Treasurer | Lord Cottington |
| Earl Lindsey | Mr. Comptroller |
| Earl Dorset | Mr. Secretary Coke |
| Mr. Secretary Windebank | |

This day his Majesty sitting in Council with the said Lords Commissioners for the Admiralty, and with the Earl of Northumberland, Custos Maris and Admiral of his Majesty's fleet (now preparing to be set forth for defence of the kingdom): The complaints of several abuses in the fleet employed the last summer, and in the navy in general, and the answers, as well of the treasurer and paymaster of the navy, as of the officers of the navy in general, and of the victualler, for so much as concerned their several charge and offices respectively, were fully heard ; and thereupon his Majesty and their lordships did order as followeth :

First, concerning the paymaster's refusing to pay men turned over from other ships unless they bring tickets from the ships wherein they first served

It was ordered that where the books of both ships are delivered in, certified according to the course of the navy,

the paymaster shall not henceforth refuse to pay any man turned over from one ship to another for want of a ticket. But when the ship from whence the party is turned over is at sea, it is held requisite he should produce a ticket testifying the time he served in the former ship. And the purser of every ship is to be required in his book to note every man that is turned over out of his ship into another, with a distinct mark declaring the time when he was turned over.

Touching the paymaster's refusing to pay some tickets unless it be to the parties themselves to whom the money is due, and yet paying others in the same case, whereby he takes upon him a power to pay or refuse whom he will

It was ordered that henceforth there be no such latitude of power left to the paymaster, but that he pay such tickets as (being approved of and signed by the officers of the navy) shall be brought to him, though not by the parties themselves ; and that the said paymaster shall not henceforth take upon him to pay or refuse what tickets he pleaseth of parties that are absent, but that he therein govern himself wholly by such orders as he shall receive from the officers of the navy.

Concerning 2s. a pound taken by the paymaster, it is ordered that the paymaster shall not presume any more to abate, or take to himself two shillings of the pound, or any other sum, of any seaman's or mariner's wages for collecting any money for their creditors, or upon any pretence whatsoever.

Concerning the arrears of the Chest money, his Majesty doth expressly command that the sixpence due out of every man's monthly pay be collected after the usual manner and presently paid to the governor of the Chest, and not detained at all either by the treasurer or paymaster of the navy upon pretence of his Majesty's service, or upon any other colour or cause whatsoever.

As concerning the complaints charged upon the officers of the navy in general his Majesty was pleased to order as followeth : And first touching the old ships

It now appeared that by his Majesty's command the Black George is cast and discharged out of the list of

the King's navy.¹ The rest of the old ships are by the care of the lords commissioners for the admiralty ordered to be thoroughly searched and surveyed. And divers of his Majesty's ships which wanted gi[rdling]² or which had exorbitant galleries, are girdled and have their galleries retrenched; and the rest as soon as they come from sea are ordered to be likewise amended in those particulars.

As concerning the leakiness of his Majesty's ships and badness of their masts

The negligence of the officers of the navy therein was conceived to be very great, however they excuse themselves upon the caulkers for the one, and on the shipwrights and master attendants whom they employed to survey and search the masts, for the other.

Touching the ill cordage wherewith his Majesty's ships were furnished last year

It is answered by the officers of the navy that the principal ground tackle of his Majesty's ships is (for the most part) of home-made cordage, than which there is no better in the world. But there was some foreign cordage bought about seven years since, when there was a want in the navy, and when no better could be had, which is not so good as home-made, but they say there is of it but a small quantity remaining in his Majesty's stores. Whereupon his Majesty commanded that the officers of the navy shall forthwith survey and certify to the lords of the admiralty, what quantity of old foreign cordage there is left remaining in his Majesty's stores, that such order may thereupon be taken with the same as shall be fit.³

¹ See note 1 on p. 361, *supra*.

² MS. torn.

³ On April 29, 1637, the Officers of the Navy certified to the Lords of the Admiralty that there was only 22 tons 5 cwt. of Russia cordage remaining in Deptford storehouse, 'whereof there are 4 cables of 11 inches, and the rest is in halsers and small cordage' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1637, p. 35).

As for the employment of mean men to be prestmasters which is complained to be an abuse

The officers of the navy answered that they would gladly hearken to any course that might prevent the abuses of prestmasters and furnish the King's ships with able mariners. And hereupon it was ordered that henceforth warrants shall be sent to the mayors, vice-admirals, and justices of peace to press seamen and mariners upon the place where they dwell, and that the officers of the navy shall only send to them so much prest and conduct money as shall be fit for that purpose. And to prevent the running away of seamen after they are pressed, his Majesty commands that the Lord Keeper, Sir Henry Martin, and Mr. Attorney General shall consider of a course for trial of such pressed men as run away from the King's service.

Concerning the laying of six months' victuals into his Majesty's ships, which hath been conceived to be very incommodious

His Majesty and their lordships were not well satisfied that there ought to be any alteration in that particular.

It was confessed by the officers of the navy that [it] is very necessary that a treasurer should be sent in the fleet.

And his Majesty and their lordships did order that such an officer shall be continually sent with every fleet, as the last year, but order is to be taken by the treasurer of the navy that he be henceforth supplied with a competent sum of money to defray such necessary disbursements as the service shall require.

INDEX

- ABUSES**, caused by ignorance and by-ends, 55 ; general summary of, 261-2
Accounts should be exactly audited, 340
Admiral, the Lord, supreme governor of the navy, 10, 89 ; orders the supply of victuals, 66 ; his power blasted by the Parliament, 281 ; did not impose orders on the commissioners of the navy, 292, 299 ; determined the pay of generals, 294 ; claimed the cast ships, 333 ; commissioned to inquire into disorders, 336
Admirals, charges against, 131-3
Alderne, Captain Thomas, afterwards Major, chief of the victualling, 124-5 ; victualling contractor, 158, 297 ; large sums imprested to, 349 ; dead, and no account rendered, *ib.*
Alexander, Sir William, 357
Allcock, Stephen, the victualler, 315
Anchor-forges in the State's yards, 244 ; reasons for, *ib.* ; disadvantageous to the service, 245 ; abuses not foreseen, 251
Anchors, method of buying, 252 ; price of, 252-6
Anchors, Spanish, left in 1639, claimed by the Earl of Northumberland, 289, and sold, 290
Andrewes, Nathaniel, victualling contractor, 158, 297
Andrews, Giles, purveyor of timber, 223
Andrews, Thomas, member of the committee of merchants, 122
Apsley, Sir Allen, surveyor of victuals, 171
Arundel, Earl of, 361
Auditor of the stores unnecessary, 100
Avidous = greedy, 192

BADILEY, Richard, general in the Mediterranean, lviii
Ball, a dog called, ticket to, 399
Ball, William, mariner, 357
Balmerino, Lord, lxxiv
Barham, Francis, purveyor of timber, 223
Barker, Thomas, a seaman, 393
Bartholomew babies, 149
Batten, Captain William, surveyor of the navy, revolts from the Parliament, xix ; commissioner at Portsmouth, 121
Beale, William, victualling contractor, 158, 297
Becher, Sir William, clerk to the Council, 368
Beef, Irish is inferior, 177 ; leg bones and offal put among, 178
Beer, scarce 'water frightened,' 181
Bence, Alexander, member of the committee of the navy, lxii, lxiii, lxiv
Bence, Squire, a member of the committee of the navy, lxii, lxiv
Bennet, a master's mate, 371, 386, 392
Bennett, Robert, a master, 383
Berkeley, Lord, 344
Bethell, Slingsby, lxxi
Beverage, 167

- Bingley, Sir Richard, surveyor, 118, 394, 398
- Blackden, Richard, a messenger, xix
- Blake, Robert, general at sea, xx ; member of the admiralty committee, 115, 133 ; mentioned, 169-171, 273, 339
- Boate, Augustine, keeper of the out-stores at Chatham, xii, xiii, 55
- Boatswain, his pay is insufficient, 101
- Bond, Denis, a member of the committee of the admiralty, xx
- Bourne, Nehemiah, a commissioner of the navy, xxi, xxii-xxviii, 124
- Brett, Jeremy, captain of the Assurance, 367-8, 379, 381, 384-6, 388-9
- Broad Arrow, the, order for goods to be marked with, 238
- Brooke, John, clerk of the check, x ; his quarrel with Hollond, xi ; dismissed from his post and imprisoned, *ib.*
- Brooke, Matthew, clerk of the check at Portsmouth, ix
- Brouncker, Lord, 338
- Brown, Thomas, a timber-merchant, xvii
- Buck, Sir Peter, of doubtful honesty, xxxvii ; clerk of the acts, 118
- Buck, Thomas, his complaint, xliii
- Buckingham, Duke of, lord high admiral, 114, 330 ; said to have imposed orders on the commissioners, 293 ; mentioned, 333-4, 377
- Burley, John, Captain of the Fifth Whelp, 368-9, 379, 384-5, 387
- Burrell, Andrewes, a shipwright, lxi-lxiv
- Burrell, William, master shipwright, lxi, 119 ; on the Grand Commission, 118 ; assistant commissioner, 329 ; husband for the navy, 334
- By, upon the, 116
- CABLES of private make are bad, 196 ; are loaded with tar or sand, 197
- Candle, sales by the, 284 ; may be quite fair, 285 ; abuses of, 285-8
- Captains, charges against, 131-3 ; their duty to protect the seamen, 132 ; in league with the contractors, 172
- Carriage by water, rateable by discretion, 63 ; abuses in, 64 ; unnecessary, enhances the price of stores, 72
- Carteret, Captain, afterwards Sir George, xxviii, lxxii, lxxiii, lxxix, 343, 370, 377, 380-2, 384-7, 389
- Certificates, the grand cheat of the navy, 271 ; various kinds of, *ib.* ; colour fraudulent contracts, 272 ; miracles wrought by, 274 ; measures to prevent false, 276
- Changings, the manifold confusion arising from, 10, 11
- Chaplains' groats, 348
- Charges, presting, great abuses in, 49
- Charges, travelling, 46 ; often excessive, *ib.* ; doubled or trebled, 48 ; unauthorised, 49
- Cherry, Sir F., King's merchant, 59
- Chest at Chatham, the, 6*d.* per mensem from each man to, 348, not been accounted for, *ib.*
- Child, Josiah, 128
- Clerk of the acts, same as clerk of the records, his functions, 100 ; called also clerk of the accounts, 327
- Clerk of the records, the, one of the four principal officers, 10, 82
- Clerk of the survey is an assistant surveyor, 92, 101 ; appointed to each yard, 340
- Clerks fittest to govern the navy, 89-93
- Clerks of the check, their neglect, 30, 151 ; dishonesty, 38, 101 ; dead pays to, 54 ; keep a prick-book, 127 ; not to be paid seamen's wages, 130, 164 ; give vouchers for petty warrants, 162 ; without any effective check, *ib.* ; have great opportunities for fraud, 339
- Coke, Sir John, x, 118, 303, 333, 403

Colpott, Thomas, a boatswain, 123

Commerce, expansion of, 5

Commissary general for victuals, 171; his instructions, *ib.*; his warrant from the general, *ib.*

Commission, the Grand, its design, 118, 336

Commissioners, assistant, necessary at the ports, 83-5; were formerly allowed, 85; their salary, 86; fit men must be chosen, 87; their necessary qualifications, 88; clerks are most fit, 89-90; benefits that will arise from, 95, 98, 101

Commissioners of the admiralty are in the room of a lord admiral, 292; have the same power, *ib.*; their relation to the commissioners of the navy, 293-5; undertake too much, 303

Commissioners of the navy refuse to sign tickets, 128; ought to attend payment of wages, 133; are blamed for other men's faults, 147; their complaints ill received, 159; wink at abuses, 198; turn timber-merchants, 211; overpowered by the committee of the navy, 266; hire their ships to the navy by false representations, 267-9; use certificates to cover fraudulent payments, 272; ill consequences of their ignorance or neglect, 275-6; buy and sell stores, 280; their advertisements for tenders a specious pretence, 281-2; give contracts by favour, 283; are partners in frauds, 288; subordinate to the admiralty, 292; resent the interference of the admiralty, 293; obey positive orders from the admiralty, 301, great sums have been paid in this way, 302; their pay, 306; should not be private traders, 309-311; merchants ought not to be employed as, 312-15; two additional, appointed, 329, *passim*

Commissions of inquiry are often matters of private revenge, 117

Complaints not attended to, 159

Comptroller, the, one of the four principal officers, 10, 82; pay of, 306

Contract, work by, 29; not the best way of doing work, 35; not the cheapest, 36; often impossible, *ib.*; work cannot be exactly appraised, *ib.*; does not lessen the number of officers in the yards, *ib.*; opens the door to many abuses, 37; may be made to include private jobs, *ib.*; if made with the King's officers, an abuse, 38-41, instances of this, *ib.*; excessive charge for overworks, 43; which cannot be valued, *ib.*; rope made by, is bad, 75; victualling by, hazardous, 155, costly, 156, breeds discontent, *ib.*; victualling by, 160; arguments in favour of, *ib.*; disadvantageous, 161, 167; arguments in favour of making cordage by, 199, the pleader for, should be sent to heaven in a string, *ib.*; a, ordered by the admiralty committee to be signed, 295-9, was refused by Hollond, 296; ought not to be made with a commissioner, 316

Contractors for timber offer impossibilities, 218-19, and pass inferior timber, 219-20

Contractors for victualling supply bad victuals, 160; have had too much influence, 166; complaints against, not redressed, *ib.*; excuses made for, 168; favour shown to, *ib.*; can bring pressure on the generals, 172; force pursers to sign false receipts, *ib.*; are allowed for loss, 173, on insufficient voucher, *ib.*; force the pursers to deal with their own agents, 174; put up offal for victuals, 178, causing the men to desert, 179; ought to deliver petty warrant victuals, 182; get paid twice over, 185

Cooke, Mr., 55

Cooke, William, one of the four masters, 365, 377-82, 384-8

Cooper, George, purveyor of timber, 223
 Cordage, abuses in respect to, xlix ; Russia, is very bad, 193, is the worst, 194 ; fraudulent surveys of, *ib.* ; should be made in the State's yards, 195 ; of private make is bad, *ib.* ; wanting in strength, *ib.* ; of inferior hemp, *ib.* ; bought from the rope-merchant is not to be trusted, 199 ; may have been ten or twelve years in store, 201 ; may be fake-rotten, *ib.* ; complaints of, in 1656, 202 ; the merchants who supplied it, made inquisitors, 203
 Cottington, Lord, 403
 Coventry, Sir W., lxx
 Coytmor, Robert, clerk to the admiralty committee, xix
 Crandley, Captain Benjamin, lxx
 Crandley, Richard, a commissioner of the navy, xviii, lxii, lxiii, lxx
 Crane, John, victualler, 315
 Cranfield, Sir Lionel, on the Grand Commission, 118
 Credit causes increased prices, 71
 Creditors ought not to be paid the seamen's wages, 130
 Crew, Randolph, King's merchant, 59
 Crowe, Sir Sackville, 366, 371, 375, 387, 399
 Customer, a, forbidden to be a merchant, 311, or to have any interest in ships or cargoes, 311-12
 Customs, act for regulation of, 117, 120 ; commission of, 125

DARTMOUTH, Lord, 175
 Dead pays, 25 ; abuse of, 25-6, 140-1 ; as rewards, 53 ; recognised, 140
 Dean, forest of, iron-works in, suppressed, 229
 Deane, Richard, general at sea, xx, 133, 170, 180, 339
 Deane, Sir Anthony, 225, 363
 Denbigh, Earl of, 303

Dermott, Richard, muster-master, 339
 Desertion caused by bad victuals, 179
 Digby, Sir Kenelm, 329-30, 336, 356-7
 Doors, back, 'thieves in the King's service,' 97
 Dorset, Earl of, 403
 Downing, Captain Joshua, assistant commissioner at Chatham, ix, x, 99
 Downing, Mr., master smith, 239

EARNING, Anthony, 186
 Eastwick, Stephen, commissioner of customs, 124
 Eastwood, Thomas, purveyor of timber, 223
 Edisbury, John, clerk of the check at Portsmouth, xi
 Edisbury, Kenrick, paymaster, afterwards surveyor of the navy, x, xi, 56, 361, 386, 390, 395, 403
 Eglinton, Earl of, lxxiv
 Eye, the master's, fattens the horse, 99, 145

FENN, Nicholas, commissioner of victualling, 155
 Fleming, Denis, clerk of the acts, xii, 361, 403
 Fletcher, Richard, purveyor of timber, 223
 Foley, Mr., 231
 Fortescue, Nicholas, on the Grand Commission, 118
 Fox, Robert, lieutenant of the St. Andrew, 364, 383, 386, 388
 Foxcroft, George, commissioner of customs, 125
 Franks, Captain, 394, 398
 Freeman, Alderman, 334, 335
 Freight, the hire of a ship into the State's service, 264 ; sometimes for the hull only, *ib.* ; most commonly the merchant pays all, *ib.* ; great sums of money paid upon this head, 265 ; of merchants' goods taken by captains of

- State's ships, 353 ; an abuse most fit to be regulated, *ib.*
 French, the vaunting of, 7
- GAUDEN, Sir Denis, contractor for victualling, 155, 158, 171, 297
 Geere, Sir Michael, 357
 Generals at sea, charges against, 131-3 ; in league with contractors, 166, 172 ; supply ships under their command with victuals, 169
 Gofton, Francis, on the Grand Commission, 118
 Goring, Lord, lxxviii
 Grant, Charles, 55
 Great, by the, 41
 Greenwell, William, merchant of London, 75
 Grene, Giles, a member of Parliament, lxvi, 139
 Greville, Sir Fulke, afterwards Lord Brooke, treasurer of the navy, 329, 333
 Groats. *See* Chaplains'
- HADDOCK, Sir R., commissioner for victualling, 155
 Halsted, Robert, contractor for clothes, xv, 388
 Hamilton, Captain John, his report on pressed men, 51
 Harbie, Job, a merchant, 193
 Harvey, Colonel Edmund, commissioner of customs, 124 ; committed to the Tower, 125
 Hawkyms, Sir John, charges against, xxxiv
 Hayward, Mr., clerk of the survey at Portsmouth, xi
 Hemp, various kinds of, 188 ; mixed, is best, 189 ; of different goodness and price, *ib.* ; musty, will not endure the twist, *ib.* ; if bad, endangers the lives of the men and the safety of the ships, *ib.* ; false packing of, 190 ; should be bought by pre-contract, *ib.* ; buying in open market is uncertain, *ib.* ; price of, 197
- Henry VIII., his establishment of the navy, 327 ; bounty paid by, to shipbuilders, 355
 Heydon, Sir John, lieutenant of the ordnance, 100
 Hildesley, Mark, commissioner of customs, 124
 Holborn, Richard, 97
 Hollond, John, entered the service of the navy, ix, 1 ; clerk to Capt. Downing, ix ; paymaster of the navy, x ; has a grudge against Brooke, xii ; is accused by the Earl of Northumberland, xiv, xv ; is engaged in the timber trade, xvii, xviii, 209-10, 217-18 ; surveyor of the navy, xix, 121 ; a commissioner of the navy, xx ; his feeling for the seamen, xxi, xxii, 107, 110 ; hostile to the Petts, xxiii-xxiv ; resigns, xxvi, 295-6 ; secretary to the treasurer, xxix ; his Second Discourse, xxix, 105, its date, xxix, xxx, omissions in, xxx ; difference between his First and Second Discourses, xxxi-xxxiii ; not the first to denounce abuses in the navy, xxxiii ; his First Discourse, xxxv, 11, 103 ; his charges against officials, xxxviii ; his exposure of abuses, xliii, xliv ; his character, lvi, lxiii, lxiv, lxvi, lxvii ; MSS. of the First Discourse, lxviii ; MSS. of the Second Discourse, lxix ; a member of the committee of merchants, 122, 139 ; his animus against executive officers, 166 ; is threatened with ruin, 241-2, 262 ; bought the Spanish anchors, 290 ; maintains the independence of the commissioners of the navy, 295-6 ; is worried out of the navy, 296 ; the 'hand of God,' 297 ; his integrity as a commissioner, 312 ; his reply to the accusations against him, 392, 397, and *passim*
 Holt, William, 273
 Hopkins, Edward, xxvi
 Horsman, Edward, commissioner of customs, 125

Hosier, Francis, muster-master at Gravesend, 231

Houses in the yards, 97 ; made fitter for knights, *ib.* ; the exorbitant expense of, in the State's yards, 148-50 ; are built of chips, 151

IRON, forest or English, 229 ; old, is embezzled, 257, men in each yard appointed to collect, *ib.*, they do not deliver it, 258, sell it to the smiths, *ib.*, are in league with the smiths, *ib.*

Ironworks, petty, various sorts of, 231 ; give a great latitude of deceit, *ib.* ; a mystery in the rating of, 232, peculiar to the State's service, *ib.*, usage of private builders as to, 233 ; careless weighing and examination of, *ib.* ; medium rate of pay for, suggested, 234 ; should not be forged in or near the State's yards, 236, 251, which gives opportunity to steal, 237-41, by which smiths have made great estates, 240

JAMAICA fleet, undue cost of the, 148

James I., exceeding corruption during the reign of, liii, lxviii

Joiners' Hall, proposal for estimates from, 35

Jones, Colonel, member of admiralty committee, xix

KEYS to the great gate, &c., 97

King's merchant, the. *See* Merchant.

King's tradesmen, the, warrants or commissions to, 281 ; were put an end to by the Parliament, *ib.*

Kirke, Lewis, captain of the *Repulse*, 369-70, 379, 381, 384-5, 388

Kirke, Sir David, 357

Knacks = tricks, 157

LABOURERS, a needless number of, 16

Langham, Captain, 125

Leveson, Sir Richard, 329

Limbery, Captain John, victualling contractor, xxv, 158, 186, 297

Limbery, William, 186

Lindsey, Earl, 403

'Louse in the pot,' 134

MAINWARING, Sir Henry, 378, 381-2, 384-5

Mandeville, Lord, treasurer, 119

Mansell, Sir Robert, treasurer of the navy, li, 47, 329, 334, 398

Maplesden, George, purveyor of timber, 223

Martin, Sir Henry, 406

Masham, Sir William, a member of the committee of the navy, xx

Mason, Captain, his travelling expenses, 47

Master attendants, the, their pay, 19 ; their deputies, *ib.* ; loss by their non-attendance, 20 ; duties of, 20 ; payment of their deputies, 48 ; abuse of, *ib.* ; the four, 89

Master shipwrights, the, pay their own servants at high rates, 28 ; press men unnecessarily, *ib.* ; absent from the yard, *ib.* ; ought to be mustered, 31 ; their absence leads to neglect and confusion, *ib.* ; working by a deputy, 31 ; lavish expenditure demanded by, 34 ; apt to be dishonest in rating of contracts, 38 ; prefer working by contract, 42, the reason, *ib.*, a gross abuse, 44 ; sell timber to the King, 79 ; the three, 89 ; have too much power in the rating of wages, 133 ; show undue partiality in rating, 134 ; fraudulent sales by, 209 ; turn timber-merchants, 211, and obtain excessive rates, *ib.* ; give false certificates, 219-20 ; are partners with the contractors, 220 ; ought not to carry on private trade, 317-18

- Men, borne in the king's ships, employed privately, 16, 17 ; appear but at pay day, 17 ; paid, in different capacities, three or four times over, 142, 172 ; poisoned by stench of putrid victuals, 157 ; forced to eat bad victuals, 166, 273 ; disgusted by the badness of the victuals, 179 ; can get no redress, 179 ; are wronged in the matter of their victuals, 180
- Mennes, Sir John, lxxv, lxxviii, lxxix, 379, 381, 384, 386
- Merchant, the King's, a most unnecessary and chargeable minister, 58 ; excessive payments to, 60 ; fraudulent practices of, 69 ; appointment of unfit persons as, 70 ; exaggerated charges of, *ib.*, examples, 71, 280
- Merchants, committee of, dispute with Hollond, xix ; appointment of, 120 ; regulated in the sole interest of the customs, 121 ; remove all the old officers of the customs, 122, 123 ; partiality of, 123 ; appointed for the government of the navy, 334
- Mervin, Sir Henry, xiii, lxxii, 372, 375-9, 381-3, 385-8
- Ministers, subordinate, their pay is insufficient, 100 ; must live knaves or die beggars, 101
- Monck, George (afterwards Duke of Albemarle), a member of the admiralty commission, 115, 133
- Monson, Sir William, his Naval Tracts, xxxv, xlvii, and *freg.*
- Morris, John, a commissioner of the navy, xviii, lxii, lxiii
- Mountagu, Edward, general at sea, 171
- Mountagu, James, rear-admiral under the Earl of Warwick, 357
- Musters, false, xl-xlii ; necessity of exact, 142 ; unexpected, by persons not foreknown render corruption almost impossible, 339 ; of the yards to be taken by clerks of the principal officers, 345 ; the same clerk not to be employed twice together, *ib.*
- Myddelton, Thomas, surveyor, 50, 176
- Mystery is generally attended with knavery, 256
- NAILERS should not be permitted to live in or near the State's yards, 237, evils arising from their doing so, 237-44
- Nails have a limited weight to each thousand, 230, abuses in this, *ib.* ; should be both weighed and counted, 259-61
- Nash, Thomas, 402
- Navy, the, under the Parliament, xvii ; its national importance, 5, 113 ; under Elizabeth, 5 ; under James I., *ib.* ; under Charles I., *ib.* ; its weight with foreign powers, 6 ; a wheel that sets all Christendom to work, *ib.* ; its government, 8 ; its state, 9 ; is become not unlike a great wood, 11, 116 ; needs to be governed by deserving, knowing, and honest men, 55 ; want of money in, 71 ; is governed by the four principal officers, 81-2 ; government of, corrupted by the increase of shipping, 82 ; cannot now be regulated as formerly, *ib.* ; a clerk the proper person to govern, 89-93 ; prevented foreign invasion during the Civil War, 113, and during the first Dutch war, *ib.* ; little success in the regulation of, 115 ; its business referred to men who had no knowledge of it, *ib.*, and were guided by private interest, *ib.* ; Act for regulation of the officers of, 117 ; Act for regulating, 120, 122 ; regulated by tradition, 252 ; committee of, made contracts without consulting the commissioners, 266 ; the service of, to be brought to a stand for want of money, 301 ; taken to farm by the merchants, 335 ; commands in, given to masters of merchants' ships, 335
- Navy Office, the, books of, very

- superficially kept, 337 ; number of clerks in, insufficient, 337
- Norris, Captain Thomas, surveyor of the navy, 99 ; on the Grand Commission, 118
- Northumberland, Earl of, lord admiral's substitute, commands the fleet, xiii ; reports abuses, xiii, xxv, lxxiii, App. *passim* ; is dissatisfied with the result, xvi ; his letter to Strafford, xvi ; mentioned, lxxii, 114, 289, 337
- Nose of wax, 319
- Nottingham, Earl of, lord admiral, 330, 333
- OATHS, value of, 277 ; not administered to commissioners, *ib.*, except the treasurer, *ib.* ; administered to pursers, 278, not to victuallers, *ib.*
- Officers, evils arising from their absence, 18 ; seamen, unfit to govern the navy, 90-1 ; none should deal for any provision, 212
- Officers, the four principal, their authority, 10 ; are all immediate ministers for the King, 11 ; ignorant expenditure of, 35 ; wink at abuses, 37 ; employ an overseer, who ought to be a man of discretion and experience, 45 ; must keep the stores well furnished, 60 ; cannot act in London and at the out-ports at the same time, 83 ; pay of, 306, 327 ; a council to the lord high admiral, 328 ; suspended, 334 ; cannot perform their duties without sufficient clerical assistance, 341 ; to have separate rooms for their clerks, 344 ; to appoint their clerks to muster the yards, 345
- Officers of ships, their pay is insufficient, 102 ; it is recognised that they must steal to live, *ib.*
- Order, want of, the stroy-good of the navy, 81-2
- Ordnance of the navy, mastership of, and of the land service united, 331 ; proposal to separate the two again, *ib.* ; the union has caused much inconvenience, 382
- Ornament. *See* Ships
- Osborne, John, on the Grand Commission, 118
- Overly = careless, 277
- PAINTERS' HALL, proposal for estimate from, 35
- Palmer, Sir Henry, comptroller of the navy, xi, xii, xlv, 361, 363, 398, 403
- Parks, Edward, commissioner of customs, 125
- Parsons, John, commissioner for victualling, 155
- Pay, harbour, 13, 126 ; sea, 13, 20, 126 ; abuses, 21 ; of officers insufficient, 102, and leads to embezzlement, *ib.* ; arrears of, a great cause of confusion, 345 ; of seamen, 351
- Payler, George, xxviii
- Payments should be distinctly set out in all books, 152
- Penington, Sir John, vice-admiral of the fleet, xiii, lxxiii-lxxv, lxxvii, 163, 289, 361, 364-5, 367-9, 381-3, 385-8
- Penn, Sir W., 133, 148, 180, 338, 342, 344
- Pett, Christopher, xxiii, xxiv
- Pett, Peter, master shipwright, xxiii, xxiv, 119
- Pett, Peter, navy commissioner, xx, xxii, xxiii, 123, 164, 309-10, 343
- Pett, Phineas, xii, xxxix, 329, 336
- Pett, Phineas, 225
- Petts, the, family of, xi, xxiii ; influence of, xxiv, 239 ; double dealing of, 310
- Phillips, John, 402
- Pilotage, 12 ; rewards for, 51 ; paid without just cause, 52 ; should not be paid to officers of the ship, 52-3
- Pine, Stephen, an ex-purser, 175
- Pitt, William, on the Grand Commission, 118
- Popham, Edward, general at sea,

- 133, 169, 170 ; shipwrecked, 41 ; threatened to hang the victualling contractor, 273
- Popham, Sir Home, false charges against, lviii
- Pork, offal put among, 178
- Preice, Richard, victualling contractor, 158, 297
- Press of unfit men, xxxvii, xxxviii, 50 ; of men from merchants' ships, 21 ; abuse of, *ib.* ; grievances of, 22-3 ; not needed, 352
- Prestmasters, undeserving and unable, 51
- Prest-money, 21
- Preston, Robert, a clerk, 239
- Pride, Colonel Thomas, victualling contractor, 124, 158, 297
- Prusen, Hildebrand, the King's merchant, 59
- Purefoy, Colonel, member of admiralty committee, xix
- Purlainings, 101
- Pursers generally poor, 163 ; live well, *ib.* ; their tricks, *ib.* ; Pepys on, *ib.* ; pay of, *ib.* ; seamen's wages should not be paid to, 130, 164 ; in subjection to contractors, 174-5 ; are damnified thereby, 175 ; share with the victualler, 180 ; their dispute with contractors, 181-4
- Purveyance calls for experience, care, and circumspection, 56
- Purveyors, duties and qualifications of, 56 ; commissioners are guided by, 57 ; have opportunities for embezzlement, 61 ; cannot act in different places, 62 ; should be seasonably called to account, *ib.* ; in league with hoymen, 65 ; pass worthless stores, 68 ; difficulty of checking, 77 ; ought not to carry on private trade, 317
- Purveyors of timber, great trust reposed in, 206 ; their pay is continuous, 210 ; great loss caused by their ignorance or worse, 222 ; their accounts should be examined, 224 ; the provision by, should be inspected, *ib.*
- RADCLYFFE, Sir Edward, lxxx
- Rainborow, William, xiii, 373-5, 377-9, 382, 384-5, 387
- Raleigh, Sir Walter, 116
- Regulators, committee of, 122-3. *See also* Merchants, committee of
- Religion a cloak for fraud, 227 ; a vizard to abuse the State, 297
- Repairs, done on float very costly and allow many abuses, 145 ; should be done in dock whenever possible, *ib.* ; should be done betimes, 146
- Retinue, abuse of, 26
- Rewards, 12 ; for a service done, 53 ; as increase of salary, *ib.*, examples, 53-4 ; unjust apportionment of, 55
- Rhynband, a kind of hemp, 74
- Richardson, Robert, 393
- Rope, bought ready made, one of the greatest thefts in the navy, 75-6
- Round robins, 156, 159
- Russband, a kind of hemp, 74
- Russell, Sir William, treasurer of the navy, x, xi, xii, xvi, xvii, xviii, 118, 329, 334, 361, 364, 366, 371, 375, 387, 389-90, 392, 396
- Ryder, Skinner, purveyor of timber, 223
- SALESBURY, Hugh, 273
- Salesbury, Mrs., used to cash tickets, 129
- Saltoun, Lord Alexander, his complaint, 198
- Sandwich, Earl of, 330. *See also* Mountagu, Edward
- Seamen, pay of, 351
- Seek, I am to, = at a loss, 161
- Servants, King's, to have a preference, 24 ; are seamen bred by the service, 24 ; employment of, in merchants' ships, *ib.*
- Servants, multiplicity of, an abuse, 15 ; their insufficiency, 16
- Shafto, captain of a hired merchant-ship, lxii, lxiii
- Sharkings, 27, 54
- Shaw, Sir John, 191

Sheldon, Mr., 55

Ships, costly ornament of, 33-4 ; a vain expense, *ib.* ; kept in sea pay for want of money, 138 ; many months in harbour, 147 ; improper entries in books of, 152 ; hazarded for private profit, 201 ; merchant, hired for the service of the State, 264 ; 'old toads and leeward jades,' 267 ; fraud in the sale of, 319-20 ; cast, the due of the lord admiral, 333 ; merchant, were formerly of strength equal to the King's, 354 ; building of, discouraged, 355

Ships :

Adam and Eve, 320
Adventure, 362, 365, 370, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 381
Andrew, 273 ; St. Andrew, 362, 364, 365, 371, 373, 377, 378, 383, 385, 386, 392
Angel, lxii, lxiv, lxv
Anne Percy, lxii, lxiii
Anne Royal, her loss, 52
Assurance, xx, 362, 365, 367, 370, 373-4, 376-8, 381, 384, 388
Black George, 365, 370, 373, 377, 400, 403
Blessing, lxii, lxiii, lxiv
Bonadventure, 380, 393
Charles, 29, 362, 365, 370, 373, 377-8
Constant Reformation, 28, 377, 389
Convertive, lxxiii, 379-80, 384, 386
Crescent, lxvii
Defiance, 374, 376, 378, 400
Destiny, 379
Dragon, lxii
Dreadnought, 362, 377, 400
Expedition, lxxiii
Garland, xxii, lxxiv, lxxv, 362, 365, 370, 377-8
Gillyflower, 320
Grantham, 131
Happy Entrance, lxxii, lxxiv, lxxv, 371, 377, 380-1, 384, 386, 392
Hector, 320, 357
Henrietta Maria, 29

Ships (*cont.*) :

Honour, lxiii
Hope, 320
James, xlviii, 372, 374, 378, 380, 382-3
Leopard, 29
Lion, 400
Little Neptune, 357
Little President, 320
Loyalty, 186
Lucie, lxvii
Mary, 320
Mary Rose, 362, 365, 370, 374, 376, 378, 393, 397, 401
Mayflower, lxii-lxiv
Merhonour, 365, 378
Messenger, lxv
Nicodemus, 320
Nonsuch, 400
Paragon, 273
Phoenix, 273
Plover, 320
Primrose, 320
Prince, 33, 400
Prince Consort, 51
Prince Royal, 400
Providence, lxii, lxiii, lxxiii
Rainbow, 273
Red Lion, 400
Reformation, 185, 186
Repulse, 362, 369, 373, 376, 378, 381, 384, 400
Resolution, 273
Roebuck, lxxii
Royal Defence, lxxiii
Rupert, 363
St. Denis, 377, 400
St. George, 373, 377, 378
Samuel, lxiv
Satisfaction, 273
Seven Brothers, 157
Sovereign, 33
Sovereign of the Seas, 253, 355
Swallow, 29, 374, 378, 388
Swiftsure, lxxiii
Tiger, xxii
Triumph, 362, 365, 373, 374, 377, 378, 384
Truelove, lxv
Tulip, 320
Unicorn, xii, 179, 381, 383, 384
Vanguard, xliii, 365, 388

Ships (cont.):

- Victory, 119, 362, 365, 373, 378
 Westergate, 320
 Whelps, the, 41, 362, 374, 378
 First Whelp, lxxiii
 Second Whelp, 362, 370, 378, 400
 Third Whelp, lxxii, lxxiii
 Fourth Whelp, 370, 400
 Fifth Whelp, 362, 368, 370, 378, 384, 386
 Eighth Whelp, lxxii
 Tenth Whelp, lxxii, 362, 377-8
 Wildman, 320
 Wren, 320
 Shipkeeper, the, generally the cabin-breaker, 19
 Shipwrights' Hall, proposal for estimates from, 35
 Short, clerk of the check at Chatham, xi
 Sickness caused by bad victualling, 160
 Slingsby. *See also* Slyngesbie and Slyngisbie
 Slingsby, Henry, lxxi
 Slingsby, Mary, lxxxi
 Slingsby, Sir Francis, lxxi
 Slop-seller, a, should not be allowed to advance clothes to a seaman without authority from the captain, 131
 Slyngesbie, Lady, lxxx
 Slyngesbie, Sir Robert, his Discourse of the Navy, lxviii, lxix, lxxxi, 327; comptroller of the navy, lxx, lxxi, lxxix; commands the Third Whelp, lxxii; commands the Expedition, lxxiii; commands the Happy Entrance, lxxiv; commands the Garland, *ib.*; thrown into prison, lxxvii; joins the King at Oxford, *ib.*; sent on a secret mission, lxxviii; at the siege of Bristol, lxxviii; spent 5,800*l.* in the royal service, lxxix; his estimate of, lxxxi; MSS. of his Discourse of the Navy, lxxxii
 Slyngesbie, Col. Walter, brother of Sir Robert, lxxviii
 Slyngisbie, Sir Gylford, lxxi, 118
 Smith, John, a contractor, 236

- Smith, Thomas, a navy commissioner, xx, lxv, lxvii
 Smiths' forges, abuses connected with, 247-9
 Smiths ought not to have free access to the yards, 245, which renders the watchmen useless, 246
 Smyth, Sir Thomas, on the Grand Commission, 118
 Sogging = soaking, 63
 Sousa, Antonio de, Portuguese resident in London, lxxiv
 Sovereignty of our kings in the Narrow Seas, 327
 Spragge, Sir Edward, 171
 Stewart, Sir Francis, vice-admiral under the Earl of Warwick, 357
 Still, Thomas, merchant of London, 75
 Stores, definition of, 13; should be of the best, 66-7; not in excessive quantity, 67, 70; depletion of, to be avoided, 73; the State's should not lie in any private man's keeping, 259; unserviceable, the perquisite of subordinate officers, 333
 Stradling, Captain, 380, 388
 Strafford, Earl of, letter to, from Earl of Northumberland, xvi, lxxv, 116
 Sturt, Anth[ony], commissioner for victualling, 155
 Surgeons, 2*d.* per mensem from each man to the, 348
 Surveyor the, one of the four principal officers, 10, 82, 327
 Sutton, Richard, on the Grand Commission, 118
 Sweetenings, 315
 Symons, Thomas, house carpenter at Chatham, 239

 TAR, price of, 197
 Taylor, Captain John, master shipwright at Chatham, 157
 Taylor, Daniel, commissioner of customs, 124
 Terne, Nathan, clerk of the chest 396

1871